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The papers collected here were presented at the second conference of the Hungarian Society for the Study of English held at "József Attila" University of Szeged on January 26-28, 1995. For the Department of English and American Studies it was an honour to host the HUSSE/2 Conference in Szeged and to welcome the nearly three hundred participants from all over Hungary and from abroad. It was an honour and pleasure to welcome so many old friends and to meet so many young scholars, to provide the opportunity for the professional exchange of ideas promoting the scholarly study and teaching of the English language and the English-speaking cultures. Similarly, it is an honour to publish now a selection of the papers presented at the Conference in Volume VI. of *Papers in English and American Studies*. (Ninety-eight presentations were read at the Conference; more than half of them were submitted for publication. Practical considerations have compelled the editor to select the thirty-five printed in the present volume.)

I wish to thank all the participants who spoke at the conference. I owe thanks to all those in the Department of English and American Studies of "József Attila" University who helped make the event possible, in particular to Zoltán Vajda, the treasurer of HUSSE and György Novák, the editor of this volume, whose fund-raising efforts and editorial work, respectively, have been invaluable in the production of this volume.

Sarolta Marinovich-Resch
Chair
Department of English and American Studies

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KEY-NOTE LECTURE

Zoltán Abádi-Nagy

Disciplinary Self-Evaluation and the English Profession

Developments during the past 4-5 years in Hungary have shown that some traditional reflexes *regarding quality* in higher education need to be reprogrammed. The days of ministerially-controlled academic curricula (the story of the not so recent past) are gone; the 19th century view of professional standards which maintained that all you need in a university environment is to have first-rate professors in place and that this is what makes quality self-evident, has become — although with the good professor still a basic requirement — pathetically obsolete in a new age of much greater social accountability (higher education institutions use *public* funds after all) and in times when a higher education institution has to show flexible responsiveness to rapidly changing needs in society. As for traditional practices of private or collective, recorded or unrecorded, formal or informal evaluations, those are still necessary, but *institutional coordination* must be introduced.

Wherever one turns — Great Britain, the United States, France, Denmark, The Netherlands, Finland, to mention only a few examples — an important part of a modern higher educational institution today is systematic quality assurance and quality control. Colleges and universities must institute quality assurance, and must improve their activities and organization in order to improve quality. In order to be officially recognized, i.e. to be accredited or licensed as a college or university, a higher education institution must be able to *demonstrate* that it has mechanisms and procedures to ensure the maintenance and enhancement of quality and standards. Quality assurance, critical institutional self-evaluation, must be a *continuing* institutional policy and program. What develops as a result of evaluation conducted by the institution itself is the self-evaluating institution. But in order to be accredited, to be furnished with the proper credentials from society and state, from time to time a higher education institution must also subject itself to external inspection. Part and parcel of all this — institutional self-evaluation and external assessment (alias accreditation) — is what should be the most immediate quality concern of every HUSSE member (individual or institution) and is also what my paper aims at: the question of disciplinary evaluation and self-evaluation, i.e. we urgently need a continuing program of quality review and quality improvement in the English profession in Hungary.

Why do we need to develop disciplinary quality assurance? Why is it so urgent? What is the connection with institutional self-evaluation? What has it got to do with HUSSE? What should be done?

Why Do We Need to Develop Disciplinary Quality Assurance?

In Great Britain, external evaluation is of three kinds, conducted by two different councils. One is called a "quality audit," and is conducted by the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) Division of Quality Audit, which is responsible for quality *control* in universities, i.e. it reviews each university institution to assess the quality of its mechanisms for monitoring and promoting standards of service. The other is called

"quality assessment," and is done by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE); these inspections are concerned with assessing the quality of teaching provision in each subject in every university institution, and involve rating such provision as "Excellent," "Satisfactory" or "Unsatisfactory." The assessment outcomes do not merely provide accessible public information on the quality of *education* in a given institution but they most directly inform funding too. And, thirdly, the *Research* Assessment Exercise is conducted every four or five years also by HEFCE, and it determines the funding for staff research in universities.

As things are, in Hungary all these three external evaluation responsibilities *are* within The National Accreditation Committee's remit. The Hungarian Rectors' Conference (MRK) and the National Accreditation Committee (OAB) decided — and consequently there is a provision for it in the Law on Higher Education — that institutional accreditation is necessary in this country. In other words, OAB has to undertake the task of licensing or not licensing, i.e. accrediting or not accrediting, Hungarian higher education institutions. Therefore OAB had to add institutional accreditation to its tasks besides so-called "professional accreditation" (accreditation of Ph.D. programs), and the first round has to be accomplished by 1998 (unless Parliament postpones that date to the year 2000). OAB has thus been assigned the task of a kind of national quality assessment where "assessment" is not used in the specific British sense; rather, it means that OAB has to consider a college as if it were a college and a university faculty as if it were a university faculty (the job of quality control like that of the British HEQC) and to assess teaching/-learning (i.e. education) as well as research (the jobs of quality assessment and research assessment like those of the British HEFCE). What is more, OAB inspection also involves university management (administrative management).

The whole Hungarian institutional accreditation enterprise is not without contradictions: e.g. if you take it that the total HEFCE assessment process for each institution extends for a period of over eight months, and they do a third or a quarter of the OAB assessment load in each case, the deadlines that Hungarian institutions and OAB committees have to work with — and in a totally unprepared and inexperienced environment at that — are *absurd*; OAB moves in as *external* auditor into colleges and universities to do a quality-audit-like job, among other tasks, when *internal* quality assurance procedures and mechanisms have not yet been developed in Hungarian higher education institutions (true, it could easily be objected, that one has to start somewhere: institutional accreditation can be a powerful incentive for us to start developing internal quality assurance policies fast).

One thing is certain however: OAB institutional accreditation will be conducted with a focus on the degree the college or university faculty under inspection issues. If it is going to be done along professional lines, English degrees awarded by various Hungarian institutions will also be treated (i.e. their worth assessed, judged and, if need be, reported on) independently from degrees other than English. And this is the disciplinary assessment aspect of institutional accreditation. We must develop disciplinary quality review and assurance mechanisms for the English profession not simply because we form an organic part of our college or university faculty, the college or faculty that comes up for institutional accreditation, but because the degrees *we* too award will decide that accreditation. Accreditation will be done with an eye to the quality of work that goes into a degree, and to the national and international standing of that English degree.

My suggestion is that we should prepare for all this and start surveying our individual (institutional) situations as well as the national scene. We must develop procedures and mechanisms of quality assurance, make these a continuing program, and do our own professional (disciplinary) self-evaluations so that external (national or international) auditors or inspectors should find us in better shape.

Why Is It So Urgent?

The deadline that the Law on Higher Education sets for OAB is 1998 (or 2000 if changed by Parliament). In fact, for those of us whose institution is undertaking so-called pilot-accreditation (our host institution included) it may be too late. But the point is that it is not, because what I am talking about is the future. We must create a continuing program of review and improvement irrespective of how many site visits there are, or where, by what assessors and when.

Institutional Evaluation and Disciplinary Assessment

The external assessment visit or audit visit is always preceded by material provided for OAB's "visiting committee" by the institution. It is provided in the form of what is called the "Self-Assessment Dossier" that contains lots and lots of statistical indicators about the staff profile, student profile, infrastructural profile, resources, management, institutional aims, curricula, teaching and research — perhaps too many statistical indicators at this early stage of pilot accreditation to facilitate real, qualitative institutional self-assessment as opposed to mere quantitative provision of material to brief the audit team.

One quality assessment point for the English profession, as well as for other degree-awarding disciplines of any institution, is precisely this, the material the Self-Assessment Dossier requires: namely staff numbers, student numbers, student/staff ratios, staff qualifications, curriculum, lecture and seminar syllabi, theses for degrees, student staff evaluations and so on.

However, from the point of view of how the English profession should proceed in this country in the future, I think we should use the self-evaluation stage of the OAB accreditation procedure as a springboard and envisage the self-evaluating institution of the *future* in which quality assurance is a deliberate, public, continuing program. The OAB-accreditation self-assessment stage contains some good indicators (some, not all) for a continuing professional self-evaluation program (inside the framework of the self-evaluating institution).

This is one connection between institutional self-evaluation and disciplinary self-assessment, quality assurance and control. The other aspect is something that does not follow from the actual OAB-accreditation procedure (in fact it follows from something the OAB does *not* do at all). It is that the OAB assessment of the English profession is always that of the English degree-awarding activities and standards of a particular Hungarian higher education institution. The OAB at present does not do what HEFCE in fact does: quality assessments do not systematically aim at inspecting the state of the art at the different institutions according to *subjects*, e.g. Assessment of physics, chemistry, English etc. in various institutions in Hungary. Quality information regarding *disciplines* remains *inside* the complex institutional overview and is not going to be channelled into something at the national professional (subject-) level so that it could be nationally comparable to the benefit of the profession. This is a job *we* must undertake ourselves, in our case for the English profession. And this is why HUSSE should be involved.

Why HUSSE?

HUSSE is the only national forum suitable for a project like this. HAAS is for American studies only. (HAAS should be concerned, in a similar fashion, with American Studies degrees where these exist at all. But at the moment English and American Studies, language and literature all contribute to the same college or university English degree.) The English and American Studies Department of the Modern Philological Society (MFT) is not a proper section either, for many obvious reasons. HUSSE is the national forum of those English institutes and departments and of those individuals who are responsible for English degrees in Hungary, whose primary concern, at a national

level, should be to maintain and enhance the quality and standards of the profession in this country.

What Is To Be Done?

I. What is to be done globally?

It is good to know that the university sector and the college sector — the Hungarian Rectors' Conference and the Conference of College Principals (FFK) — jointly set up a Committee for Self-Evaluation some time in late 1993. Just this month this committee advised MRK and FFK to warn all university rectors and college principals that it is time to create the necessary internal environment and internal mechanisms for institutional self-evaluation, both disciplinary and managerial. As regards the former, Hungarian higher education leadership should also call on the individual disciplines to alert their national societies and associations to brace the profession for the new situation by launching a program of discipline-oriented self-assessment at a national level; or to form national societies and associations where certain disciplines do not have one yet.

As for the English profession, we are in a relatively good position. Although there are disciplines whose national scientific associations can take pride in a venerable history longer by far than ours (the physicists founded theirs in 1894!), we *do have* HUSSE at least — at last. And let me seize the opportunity of the present conference to alert HUSSE, to alert *ourselves* to the new situation. The rest, I presume, is a matter of decisions to be taken by the Board here and now, or soon after this conference.

II. What Is To Be Done in Concrete Terms?

II.1. First and foremost HUSSE, as our national forum, should make the decision to meet the pressing challenge and give close and systematic attention to quality assurance, maintenance, review and improvement in the degree-awarding programs of the English profession.

II.2. HUSSE should set up a task force or a committee for the purpose of coordinating and controlling the structural prerequisites and quality requirements of training that goes into English degrees in Hungarian colleges and universities.

II.3. Careful thought should be given to what "quality" means in an assessment of our academic programs, once we start doing these assessments. The honest truth is that the concept of "quality" is largely undefined because it has so many aspects and dimensions. Whose idea of quality? The government's, society's, the academic's, the student's? Quality of input, output (the graduate student as a "product") or quality of process? What performance indicators? According to whose interpretation? Judged by whose criteria, norms and standards? Objectively *quantified* quality and/or subjective peer reviews? Whereas the concept of "quality" lacks clarification internationally, the definition of "fitness for purpose" is generally applied. As it is applied by OAB: institutional accreditation as external quality assessment will mainly focus on mission statements and degrees after all, and on how the latter correspond to the former. The problem with formulating all-inclusive quality criteria for higher education is that those criteria may be discipline-specific. This also means, however, that it may be somewhat easier to define a set of criteria *inside* one single discipline, in this case: a set of criteria for quality in English academic programs.

II.4. Besides assessment of research — doctoral and postdoctoral degrees, publications, conference lectures, organizing conferences (as in most other contexts: national and international), memberships of scholarly societies as well as of scientific bodies and committees, editorships, research conducted abroad, participation in Ph.D. programs, citation index etc. — often-neglected *teaching and educational quality* must be

seriously considered in disciplinary assessment. The connecting links between teaching and research are numerous and obvious but we should utilize the Dutch experience and organize separate systems for assessing teaching and research.

II.5. Appropriateness of infrastructure and program management should also be taken into account.

II.6. Assessments should be internal (self-evaluation) — and HUSSE leadership should encourage the development of professional habits and quality assurance mechanisms that would facilitate a move in Hungary in this direction — and assessment visits (i.e., external quality assessment — external from the point of view of a given institution but organized by HUSSE, i.e. organized internally, by the profession) should also take place. This would combine the systems of self-assessment and peer review.

II.7. Outcomes of assessments (self- or external) should be recommendations that are constructive and aid quality improvement. No ranking of any kind should taint these processes.

II.8. Disciplinary self-evaluation and external evaluation of English programs should become a regular routine coordinated by HUSSE.

II.9. HUSSE's Board and/or soon-to-be-created Committee for Disciplinary Self-Evaluation should gather experience nationally (the developing self-evaluating system of our own higher education institutions, MRK, FFT, OAB, national societies and associations of other disciplines, MTA's Committee for Research Evaluation, MTA's Committee for Modern Philology).

OAB's "Self-Assessment Dossier" is full of good hints as to what we could all start considering immediately in our various institutions. What is our standing in the light of our institution's mission statement and strategic plans? How does our English major program relate to what the discipline, the state of the art, expects from us today? Can the staff of a given English Department execute the curriculum at the proper level? Are there adequately functioning systems of internal cooperation, proper institutional policy and decision mechanisms and external relations? Do we obtain regular student evaluation of our work?

Can the experience accumulated by senior national associations of other disciplines be helpful? To see the value of this it is enough to have a look at some of the proceedings material of the Eötvös Loránd Physics Society (Eötvös Loránd Fizikai Társulat), and especially to consult the national survey reports they prepared about the state of physics in higher education in Hungary. This study covers the field from motivating and demotivating factors when students consider whether to become or not to become a physics major, through national staff/student ratios and other inter-university comparative data, matters of budgeting, sponsorship and resource generation, to a follow-up survey of what happens to physicists after graduation as well as conclusions and recommendations. It is highly relevant in the present context that a project of theirs in progress is the creation of a national Higher Education Forum for Physics as a standing committee inside the Eötvös Loránd Physics Society.

HUSSE should also be aware that MTA's Committee for Modern Philology surveys the scene in the different modern languages from time to time. We have heard reports on Scandinavian, German, French, Italian, Spanish and Russian Studies. And there *was* one prepared on English and American Studies by Aladár Sarbu about one and a half years ago.

II.10. HUSSE's leadership and/or that task force or Committee should also acquire experience internationally. I recommend especially the UK and France where, besides whole-institution quality audits, disciplinary-level quality assessment also exists, and The Netherlands, where, at present, assessment is only disciplinary and institution-wide

management audits may or may not be introduced in the future. We could in fact occasionally invite in – individually, as English Departments or through HUSSE – some assessment assistance, i.e. peers from abroad (professors of English, educationalists, higher education management experts) to assist us in assessing the state of the art in English programs in Hungary.

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The summons that I have used the opportunity of this plenary lecture to announce may strike some HUSSE members as strange. The idea of disciplinary self-assessment may be something that some of you need time to familiarize yourselves with. ("Self-assessment," "self-evaluation" are in this case conceived to include both the institutional disciplinary self-assessment phase *and* HUSSE-based "external" assessment, i.e. everything that takes place *inside* the profession, before assessors who are really external, like e.g. OAB visiting committees, move in to assess from *outside*.) The summons may be unexpected, strange and even dreadful. But it is emphatic and urgent. And the only thing we cannot afford the luxury of doing is to ignore it.

HISTORY

Dickson D. Bruce

The Significance of African American History for American Studies

As the title suggests, this paper focuses on the ways in which the strivings of African Americans, and the history they created, has been a component of more general trends in American life, and in American social and cultural development. But the main theme will not be so much the contributions African Americans have made to the history of the United States, though they have been enormous, as the challenges their very efforts have posed for white attempts to create a national identity in which color, as such, was a major feature, attempts traced by historians to the earliest days of the American republic.

Although the origins of a color-conscious American nationalism are obscure, the forms that it has taken, and its cultural force, are fairly clear, recently summarized, for instance, by what Nobel Prize author Toni Morrison has called an "Africanist presence" in American life and thought. It is a presence that, as she shows, has pervaded the "canonical" literature, as major white authors have intruded black characters into their works, using the most demeaning stereotypes gratuitously to assert, as Morrison argues, an African inferiority. This presence, she has said, has done much to create what she has called "the quintessential American identity," with color as its defining attribute, providing a yardstick for the measurement of proper American—and by definition "white"—ideals. What Morrison has shown for literature, others have seen in such popular forms as minstrelsy, whose reliance on black stereotypes enabled audiences, especially immigrant working-class audiences, to assert a common "American" identity based on a common whiteness.[1]

More recent scholarship has, however, complicated this picture. Eric Lott, in his 1993 *Love and Theft*, and Howard and Judith Rose Sacks, in *Way Up North in Dixie* (1993), have explored the minstrel tradition in ways that show it to have involved more than white fantasies of people of African descent. Rather, it sought to incorporate and, as Lott emphasizes, control an authentic black voice, elaborating on, even as it caricatured materials drawn from actual African American sources.[2]

This effort to seize and control, as well as to caricature an African presence has been documented in other areas, as well. Eric Sundquist, in *To Wake the Nations* (1993), has shown this effort in such significant white-authored, black-voiced texts as Thomas

1. Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1992), 44-45; for a recent discussion of the debate on color, see Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race*, vol. I: *Racial Oppression and Social Control* (London: Verso, 1994), 2-21; see, on minstrelsy, David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*. London: Verso, 1991.
2. Eric Lott, *Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), esp. 116-19; Howard L. and Judith Rose Sacks, *Way Up North in Dixie: A Black Family's Claim to the Confederate Anthem*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993.

Gray's 1831 rendering of the "confession" of captured slave rebel Nat Turner. With somewhat different emphases, Shelly Fisher Fishkin has argued for the influence of a voice rooted in African American traditions on the works of Mark Twain, especially *Huckleberry Finn*.[3]

Such work at least suggests that the roots of the "Africanist presence" were complex. And, indeed, if one looks back to the early national period of American history, there is some evidence for a time when that "presence," while no less strong than it would later be, was far less clearly defined. Sundquist's work is especially important in this regard, because, as he shows Gray struggling to render Turner's confession for a white audience, he also shows Gray struggling with issues of credibility and authority, with the implications raised by giving Turner a voice at all.

Following Sundquist's lead, this paper will also look at the early national period, because the problems he shows for Gray were common at the time. As Sundquist's work suggests, one of the key areas in which this influence appeared was that of voice, an area that, in more general terms, was the subject of controversy in early national America. This, in itself, had much to do with the kinds of challenges African Americans posed to a "white" American nation.

Prior to independence, the issue of voice was closely tied to status in America, as colonial elites assumed a natural connection involving social position, eloquence, and a public voice, tying authority and credibility to narrowly-conceived standards of rhetorical competence. After the American Revolution, this assumption was increasingly challenged by those who, inspired by egalitarian rhetoric, saw political virtue in a "democratic idiom," involving considerably broadened standards of competence and credibility.[4]

Complicating the issue were trends in American religion, notably the democratic tendencies of an emerging American evangelicalism. Stressing a spiritual egalitarianism, evangelicals deliberately overturned hierarchy in religious affairs, celebrating the heart-felt, simple eloquence of the convert over the refined speech of the theologian, developing a "democratic idiom" of their own.[5]

It was in terms of these trends that the African American efforts had their greatest impact. Even at this early date, increasing numbers of black people, slave and free, had begun to assert their right to participate in political and religious affairs. The emergence of this group posed a difficult challenge to whites. As John Saillant has recently shown, many, including Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, understood that to listen to the black voice was to include the black speaker in the larger American community. Already committed to a white America, they responded by asserting ideas of African inferiority, denying even the possibility of competence and credibility to people of African descent. Jefferson's famous dismissal of Phillis Wheatley's poetry as "below the dignity of criticism" was a case in point, but many took a similar view.[6]

Others, however, did not find such a dismissal so easy, and they provide good evidence that, where a black voice was concerned, matters were somewhat less certain than a Jefferson or a Madison might wish. Wheatley's celebration by at least a few opponents of slavery, for instance, was a measure of the extent to which at that date

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3. Eric J. Sundquist, *To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. 38-39; Shelly Fisher Fishkin, *Was Huck Black? Mark Twain and African-American Voices*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
4. Kenneth Cmiel, *Democratic Eloquence: The Fight Over Popular Speech in Nineteenth-Century America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 53-57.
5. Nathan Hatch, *The Democratization of American Christianity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 17-27.
6. John Saillant, "Lemuel Haynes's Black Republicanism and the American Republican Tradition, 1775-1820," *Journal of the Early Republic* 14 (1994), 320-24; for a summary of the debate over Wheatley's poetry, see *The Poems of Phillis Wheatley*, ed. Julian D. Mason, Jr. (Revised and Enlarged ed., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 29-31.

matters were not entirely settled. Among white evangelicals, the situation was especially complex. While most tended to view their religious community as a white community, their spiritual egalitarianism made them, unlike Jefferson, far from quick to reject black testimony altogether. Many even celebrated the value of "African" testimony for Christians of all colors.[7]

The uncertainty this evidence reveals lies at the heart of the issues with which this paper is concerned, because it has much to do with the kind of "Africanist presence" which Morrison and others have discussed, the kind of Africanist presence on which a white American identity came to be based.

To see why this is so, it is useful to examine a series of documents in which the uncertainties of the era had special force. These were documents in which, for various reasons, white authors took the black voice seriously, even as they asserted the validity of a color-based view of American society. By trying to bring the two aims together, they revealed the deeper conflicts that an African American voice created in white American thought, the conflicts that resulted from the challenges it posed.

Among the first of these documents was *Sambo & Toney: A Dialogue in Three Parts*, written in 1808 by Edmund Botsford, a South Carolina Baptist, slaveholder, and missionary to the slaves. It was a fictional dialogue between two "South Carolina Africans," as he called them, "Sambo," a slave convert, and "Toney," whose conversion, as a result of Sambo's labor, the dialogue described. There can be little doubt about Botsford's desire to represent a genuine black voice in the dialogue. He had long believed that slave converts could play an important role in spreading Christianity on the plantations; Sambo, an eloquent and devout Christian, dramatized that idea.[8]

But *Sambo & Toney* also says much about the problems a black voice posed for whites in early national America. Writing in a weird version of black dialect, Botsford left no doubt about his conviction of the inferiority of black people, of their suitability for slave status. He used his dialogue, in part, to try to justify the compatibility of Christianity with slavery, chiefly by portraying Christian slaves expressing contentment with their status. At the same time, as he incorporated the black voice into his dialogue, perhaps influenced by evangelical traditions, he had to give it great power. Most obviously, when he had Sambo, rather than a white minister (like himself) act as the chief agent for Toney's conversion he showed the possibility of a religious eloquence unconstrained by color. Providing further testimony, Botsford even had Sambo suggest that the agent for opening his owner's heart to allow religion on the plantation was not a white minister, but was, instead, another slave, the devout "Uncle Davy."[9]

That the two representations were not entirely compatible should have been clear. Botsford may have hoped to use his dialogue to justify black subordination, but when he presented a black, evangelical voice with significant power, he conceded a credibility and authority to that voice which his dialogue's overt message sought to deny. Indeed, as he relied on an "African" voice to defend slavery, he even raised the possibility that slaves possessed the most relevant voice on the issue. It was an enfranchisement that, however disingenuous, ultimately subverted any effort to define the early American religious or political communities as, somehow, exclusively white.

Botsford himself seems to have been subtly aware of the problem. When recounting Toney's transformation, he had Sambo say, "The word of the Lord speak to every body alike, white people, black people, rich man, poor man, old man and young

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7. See Albert J. Raboteau, *Slave Religion: "The Invisible Institution" in the Antebellum South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 181-82; James D. Essig, *The Bonds of Wickedness: American Evangelicals Against Slavery, 1770-1808* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), 33-34.

8. On Botsford, see Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 135.

9. [Edmund Botsford], *Sambo & Toney: A Dialogue in Three Parts* (Georgetown: Francis M. Baxter, 1808), 43.

man." Using a black voice, as he wished to, could not be separated from acknowledging a common humanity transcending color and condition; the implication of granting a black voice was, thus, made particularly troublesome for a man in Botsford's position.[10]

The same may be said in regard to another document, from about a decade later, Robert Finley's 1818 "Dialogues on the African Colony." Finley was a Presbyterian minister and, in 1816, one of the founders of a group known as the American Colonization Society, a white organization whose chief goal was the removal of free people of color to the west coast of Africa. Although some African Americans had shown interest in black-led colonization projects since Revolutionary times, the Society's purposes led to strong black opposition, the Society being viewed as a movement intended, as one group said, to "exile us from the land of our nativity."[11]

Finley was aware of this African American opposition, and his dialogues were an effort to respond to it. Set in heaven, they envisioned a conversation involving William Penn, Quaker founder of Pennsylvania; Paul Cuffe, a wealthy African American shipowner who had attempted to create a trade-oriented African colony of his own; and Absalom Jones, a noted black minister. Cuffe represented a proponent of colonization; Penn, a neutral observer; and Jones, the opposition. By the end, both Penn and Jones had come to acknowledge the wisdom of Finley's plan.

The "Dialogues on the African Colony" showed the same kinds of conflicts that characterized Botsford's work. Finley's defense of colonization was made on the basis of a radical incompatibility of black and white peoples, leading Penn, for example, to conclude that nothing could "prevent the wall of partition between them and the whites from remaining impassable." But it was Finley's Cuffe, participating in a conversation across the color line, who convinced Penn of such views, denoting the authority Finley felt a black voice could have. That he chose to respond to black opposition at all was, a measure of that voice's authority for him, as well.[12]

The result was that although Finley tried to create a black voice that gave assent to its own exclusion, he, nonetheless, could not avoid the dilemmas that such an assent created for his case. As he dramatized the conversation among Cuffe, Jones, and Penn, tacitly putting all on the same intellectual and moral level, he did more to emphasize similarities among them rather than the endemic differences on which his program was supposed to rest. As he sought to justify exclusion, he did so in a way that at least implicitly undermined that justification itself.

The dilemma one sees in Botsford and Finley took no less striking form a few years later, in another document associated with the Colonization Society. At the end of 1826, the Society's magazine, *The African Repository*, published a memorial signed by a group of free people of color in Baltimore, encouraging whites to contribute to the Society, expressing their own desire to go to Africa—a move several actually did undertake—and, again, responding to black opposition to the Society's work. The circumstances surrounding the memorial remain obscure. The best evidence indicates that Charles Harper and John Latrobe, the Society's two white Baltimore agents, actually wrote the document, although such black signatories as William Cornish and George McGill helped influence its final content. Nevertheless, when published, it was presented without qualification as speaking in a black, procolonization voice, its authenticity vouched for by Harper and Latrobe.[13]

Like the two earlier documents, the 1826 memorial both maintained and subverted the significance of color. At one level, the memorial acknowledged that significance, as white Americans had come to define it by accepting the unlikelihood that black

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10. Botsford, *Sambo*, 9.
11. *Poulson's American Daily Advertiser* (Philadelphia), August 12, 1817.
12. Robert Finley, "Dialogues on the African Colony," in *Memoirs of the Rev. Robert Finley*, ed. Isaac V. Brown (New Brunswick: Terhune & Letson, 1819), 336.
13. "Memorial of the Free People of Colour," *African Repository* 2 (1826).

Americans would ever fully fit into American society: Noting, "we reside among you, and yet are strangers," the memorial acknowledged, for its white readers, that its signatories were "an extraneous mass of men."[14]

At the same time, the memorial, like Finley's dialogue, was still a concession to the necessity for black participation in the colonization debate, one that dramatized the importance of black consent to colonization schemes by representing African Americans speaking for themselves on the Society's behalf. But, unlike either Finley's or Botsford's dialogues, there was a specific denial of fantasy in the memorial's presentation. Here, black Americans—opponents and proponents of colonization alike—were actually incorporated into the deliberative community, a logical conclusion to the taking of a black voice seriously.

This inclusion of the black voice was reinforced, substantively, by the content of the memorial itself. Its signatories described great hopes for the colonizationist venture, hopes not unprecedented in the American experience. Colonization was presented as a chance to build a nation, of which the colonists would themselves be "the fathers." White readers were informed that "an empire may be the result of our emigration," as it had been of their readers' ancestors, invoking a tie between black memorialists and white readers based on the possibility of a common historical experience.[15]

Such connections were directly related to the issue of voice, as it had come to be defined. In conceding the ability of African Americans to create a nation of their own, and one replicating the historical experience upon which America itself was said to be based, they had conceded the very competence which every form of discrimination and exclusion sought to deny. Once they had done this, they had, even more than Finley or Botsford, undermined the foundations of that "partition" of difference upon which their organization's entire program was based.

These early American documents illuminate much that came later in American culture and American letters, because they illustrate how difficult a black voice could be for whites to control, when they felt compelled to take it seriously. In each case, contradictions arose, undermining the case for separation and subordination, based on color, undermining the presentation of an American identity whose "whiteness" was ensured by a sufficiently distinctive imagery of people of African descent.

Thus, it is not surprising that one should find the kinds of processes of seizure and control that students of such forms as the minstrel show, or literary sterotyping, have revealed, because these were processes that responded to an insistent black voice with an effort to deny such a voice could have any credibility at all.

Such processes began even as Finley, Harper, and Latrobe were confronting thorny issues of dialogue and assent. Among the earliest black caricatures were those aimed at undermining the credibility of the most threatening black voice, that which turned American political and evangelical ideals toward the cause of "African" emancipation. As historian Shane White has shown, such caricatures began to appear in the late 1810s, in the so-called "Bobalition" broadsides, parodying, in ridiculous dialect, the growing number of actual African American speeches and pamphlets on behalf of freedom and equality. Caricaturing black speakers, the authors of these broadsides avoided the problem of credibility and inclusion that plagued even Botsford, as he sought to reconcile slavery with his evangelical beliefs.[16]

This effort itself casts some light on that white American obsession Morrison has called the "Africanist presence." If it be the case that white Americans' identity has included, as a strong component, color as such, then it is not difficult to see why the caricature of non-whites Morrison has described should be an important part of

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14. "Memorial," 296.

15. "Memorial," 297-98.

16. Shane White, "'It Was a Proud Day': African Americans, Festivals, and Parades in the North, 1741-1834," *Journal of American History* 81 (1994), 35.

maintaining that identity. However, the early American documents, which actually look in alternative directions, also show why caricature is not simply important, but essential, and why it must be asserted over and over again, as Morrison herself has said.

The problem for white Americans has never been simply a black presence, but, more, a black assertiveness, and a need to maintain whiteness against every proof blacks have provided that the whiteness white Americans have sought to maintain has no real meaning, no real basis in either nature or fact. Only by reducing the African to a "presence" could that voice be handled, and this, too, had to be done constantly to keep it in line. Understanding the power of the voice that presence has had to mask is an important part of understanding what an American identity has, historically, entailed.

Maurna Crozier

Integrated Irish Studies in Northern Ireland: Academic and Practical Approaches

Introduction

I wanted to make this paper as practically useful to those of you who either are — or maybe thinking of — introducing Irish Studies into your University programmes as I could. For this reason I have focussed on what I perceive might be your particular interests, and on the models available from the contemporary scene in Irish Studies, with examples drawn principally from Northern Ireland, where the first Institute of Irish Studies was founded in 1965, at Queen's University, Belfast. In an endeavour to cover the ground adequately in the limited time available, I have had to concentrate less on the intellectual-underpinning amd more on the facts about the programmes which I mention, but I hope that there may be time, either at the end of this session, or at any other informal time during the Conference, to discuss those issues which are of particular interest, and which I may have had to cover too quickly.

This paper, therefore, is concerned with:

(1) presenting the rationale which gives a place to Irish Studies under the rubrick of 'New Perspectives in English and American Studies';
(2) outlining the origin of 'Irish Studies' as an accredited subject for academic study;
(3) discussing the place of Irish Studies, in schools and universities;
(4) outlining a practical application of Irish studies — known as the Cultural Traditions Programme — which is attempting to the diverse political and religious affiliations which have led to the murderous conflict in Northern Ireland.

Ireland no longer has a monopoly on violence, so I hope, bearing in mind your wide knowledge of other divided communities in Europe, that this may be of interest to you.

I. Irish Studies — the Rationale

There seem to me to be three main reasons which validate the place of Irish studies on university curricula: firstly, there is the international status of Irish writers, and their position among those writing in the English language; secondly, there is the rise in the study of contemporary, or contemporaneous, literature; thirdly, there is the increased interest in what I will call, with no sense of disparagement, 'regional' writers.

For the most part Irish Studies have slithered on to university courses through the door of English literature. Yeats, Synge, O'Casey, Joyce, and now, Heaney, Muldoon, Durcan, Montague have all featured in the 20th century English litery canon. The earlier writers, although always seen by Irish scholars as Irish writers, were, and are, so central to English studies, literary criticism, and universal acclaim that Ireland has traditionally been seen, from an Oxfordian perspective, as the place on which their genius cavorted,

rather than the soil from which it sprung. Their place in the English literature was confirmed because they wrote in that language, and because they were acclaimed worldwide. However, they are Irish writers, and emanate from Irish cultural roots.

Secondly, I would suggest that Irish studies have been validated as a result of a change in the focus of literary studies. Twenty or thirty years ago it was a relative rarity to study contemporary literature: now it is a commonplace of courses both in Europe and in America. While it may have been considered unnecessary to question the prevalence of consumption when grieving ones way through Keat's letters and poetry, or the agrarian system while wallowing in Wordsworth, it is natural to query the position of black women after reading Maya Angelou, or the relevance of emigration in contemporary Ireland when studying Friel's 'Philadelphia, here I come'. Perhaps it was Seamus Heaney's direct and internationally accessible early poetry, which forced the reader to connect him with place, in a less romanticised way than had been the case with, say, Yeats. More significant, perhaps, was the intellectual struggle voiced in his volume 'Station Island' — where he questions a poet's responsibility to his country as it is gripped by violence — which tipped the critical balance, and forced the literary critics to relate such writers as much to their place of origins as to their formative peers. For many of the major writers in the English language in this century, that place has been Ireland.

My third point is related to this last: while 'regionalism' has always been rather despised by metropolitan cultures which have assumed that the central concerns were the significant concerns, two European movements in the last ten years or so have raised the profile of the regional. The first is the European Community within which regions have been targetted for special attention for development projects and economic assistance. Most relevantly, in this case, has been the recognition given to minority languages, many of which have survived in areas which have been classified by the larger national boundaries as 'regions'. The second movement which has raised the profile of regions, and regionalism, has, of course, been the fragmentation of 'countries', determined as a result of the major wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, which have disintegrated in the last ten years. Thus, the voices of areas previously defined as regions, are now being recognised as of importance to the centre.

While it has always been possible to dismiss indifferent writers as 'regional', it is not a tenable position when those who exult in their region also excel at their art. They bring the periphery to the centre. However, even regional issues may be the stuff of poetry, as Patrick Kavanagh wrote so memorably in his poem 'Epic' (1934):

> I have lived in important places, times
> When great events were decided, who owned
> that half rood of rock, a no-man's land
> Surrounded by our pitch-fork claims.
> I heard the Duffys shouting 'Damn your soul'
> And old McCabe stripped to the waist, seen
> Step the plot defying blue cast-steel —
> 'Here is the march along these iron stones.'
> That was the year of the Munich bother. Which
> Was the more important? I inclined
> To lose my faith in Ballyrush and Gortin
> Till Homer's ghost came whispering to my mind.
> He said: I made the Iliad from such
> A local row. Gods make their own importance.

In these ways — among others — the Irishness of major writers has been acknowledged, and their origins and the context of their writing is seen relevant to an understanding and appreciation of their work.

This, I believe, gives one possible, and international, founding rationale for an integrated approach to Irish studies.

II. Irish Studies — Origins

The origin of Irish Studies as a concept and as an integrated multi-disciplinary programme can be attributed to three main influences: Irish academic scholarship; American interests and the Northern Irish conflict. Each of these have resulted in particular outcomes - which will be the focus of the second half of this paper.

1. Academic scholarship

Estyn Evans, a Welsh ethnographer, archaeologist and geographer, was a Professor of Geography at Queen's University, who had a profound influence on several generations of academics in many disciplines in Ireland, and beyond. In a new preface to his seminal book 'Personality of Ireland' which I recommend most strongly to you, the poet Paul Durcan has written:

> Reading it I knew I was reading one of the most important books of my life.... He was an environmentalist who believed with all his heart and his conscience that a landscape and a people cannot be understood except in relation to each other.... It enabled me to jettison much of my own cant and prejudice and to articulate suspicions I had been having for many years about the murderous mythologies of an Irish racial purity.

Evans was giving academic credibility to the common perception that there was a unity to an island people — but he was not basing it on selective nationalisms, but on shared habitat, heritage and history.

Evans was, of course, a scholar of the school of Braudel and Bloch, and those European historians and geographers who had stretched their disciplines to encompass social and economic studies. Their perceptions had made bridges between philosophy, historiography and material culture, and in this they had given status to people's history - now the fashionable, (and accessible) end of a hitherto restricted academic preserve. During the 1960s these academic ripples were translated into the inter-disciplinary studies in universities in the United Kingdom, which, seeking a coherence, resolved into courses on European studies, Women's studies, Peace studies, Russian studies and Irish studies, and much else.

A further significant indigenous origin is hinted at in Durcan's introduction: Irish academics felt the need, from the 1950s on, to counteract the cultural nationalism of the Republic of Ireland (independent since 1922) and the conflicting nationalisms in Northern Ireland.

This feeling, added to the movement for inter-disciplinary studies, led to the establishment of all-Ireland professional associations and, most importantly, the Institute of Irish Studies and the Ulster Folk Museum in Belfast.

2. American interest

From the 1960s on there was also 'a remarkable quickening of interest in Irish studies' (Bartlett 1988:1) in America. This emanated from the ethnic identity search of third and fourth generation Americans, searching for origins, principally African and Irish — given the mass migration from Ireland during the 18th and 19th centuries. While the popular movement was largely a genealogical 'roots' search, many American academics were drawn to study what they saw as a post-colonial society — which had the virtue of being English-speaking. This made it equally accessible to sociologists, and particularly anthropologists, who flocked to the west of Ireland, drawn by the unique blend of the archaic and the modern. Those whose interests are linguistic continue to find Ireland particularly fruitful, with its ancient vernacular rich in early texts, and the complexity of incoming languages and dialects, giving rise to the literature — with its potential for literary theory and criticism — already discussed.

3. Northern Irish conflict

Perhaps the most specific factor which has led to the international interest in the Irish experience has been the conflict in Northern Ireland. For the last 25 years television has transmitted the agony into homes throughout the world, and has raised humanitarian concerns, as well as concerns relating to terrorism, political options, religious identity and many others issues shared with communities in other places. These external interests have also shaped an holistic approach to Irish studies.

There has also been an internal political imperative. By 1987 the Government was searching for ways of addressing the complex historical processes which had shaped, and continued to drive the communities of Northern Ireland to express cultural diversity through violence. Civil servants sought the views of academics — since more had by this time been written about Northern Ireland than almost anywhere else on earth (taking into account not just books, but academic and journalistic articles and documentary films), — to inform their policies, and, as a result of their consultations, instigated programmes which, it was hoped, might be more long-lasting and effective than those which simply involved dealing with the imperatives of terrorism. By the 1980s, the students and disciples of Estyn Evans headed up many of the major educational and cultural institutions.

As a result of their recommendations the Cultural Traditions programme was instigated. This has considerably widened the market for, (and has redefined) Irish studies, which now exist, in a variety of forms, throughout the schools in Northern Ireland, as well as in museums, colleges, universities and community groups. It is to these programmes that I now turn.

III. Irish Studies in Schools and Universities

The education systems in Ireland are, for the most part, segregated by religion. In the Republic of Ireland the dominant ethos of the state schools is Roman Catholic, and most Protestant children attend non-state schools. In Northern Ireland nearly all Protestant children attend state schools, and Catholic children go to schools run by the Roman Catholic church. A small number of Catholic pupils attend state schools with a high academic reputation in their final two years of schooling, before going on to university. As a result of a parents' initiative, there are 15 integrated primary and 6 secondary schools, with 6 more starting this academic year. 3% of school-age children attend these schools, which, like all the others in Northern Ireland, are financially supported by the government.

The integrated school movement started about 15 years ago in response to a system which had not only segregated children from the age of five, but had left the choice of topics — most crucially in history — to the schools, and the provision of texts to outside agencies, which, with a few notable exceptions, were often partisan. Until the late 1960s the teaching of history, in particular, tended to reinforce widely different views, the state schools using British textbooks, and teaching from that perspective, and the Catholic schools using Irish-focussed books, which cast Britain in a very different role. The opportunity to introduce and encourage an interest, pride and, above all, confidence in Irish culture in state schools in Northern Ireland was largely lost. A similar blind spot in Roman Catholic education was the failure to encourage an identification with the historical and material culture of the Anglo and Protestant Irish, so that notions of 'our' culture and 'their' culture, the alternating possessing and dispossessed were perpetuated in both communities, and the institutional separation of the two streams of education was accentuated by curriculum variation.

Although most teachers had also been separated by religion during their training, many teachers were, of course, also sensitive to the divisive effect of such education, and in the mid-1980s groups of Protestant and Catholic teachers joined together to work out a joint curriculum for pupils at primary and secondary levels. This was at first a voluntary movement, but in 1989 the Department of Education introduced the study of Cultural Heritage in all schools as a compulsory cross-curricular theme. The aim was to enable

pupils to learn and understand:

(1) the common experiences of their cultural heritage;
(2) the diverse and distinct aspects of their culture and
(3) the interdependence of cultures.

The identification of the divisive educational system as a contributing factor to violence in Ireland is not new, and attempts to address it can be found throughout the 19th and 20th century.

Although this curricular initiative, contributing overall to education for mutual understanding, is largely accepted in schools, an integrated system is still rigourously opposed, particularly by the Catholic church. Ironically, although the Protestant churches do not oppose the growth of integration, Protestant parents are slower to enter their children for such schools.

The cultural heritage strand in schools is yet another process which is contributing to the general advance and spread of 'Irish studies'. You can imagine that the new courses need text books and learning packs, and the teachers need resources to support the challenging work which they are undertaking. The Cultural Traditions Group, for which I work, has been instrumental in initiating courses of Irish studies for teachers, encompassing history, geography, language and literature, and also providing experience in learning to use primary local sources. This includes not just documentary evidence, but also the use of historic monuments — the prolific archaeological sites which abound in Ireland; the castles and ancient houses, and the 18th and 19th century industrial sites — many of them relating to the traditional linen industry, which had engaged both the agricultural and urban economy until the 1940s. Support for this growth of interest has also been offered by the local and national museums, which have played a crucial part in arousing interest in local culture through the exhibition of material artifacts. Central to all this work has been the introduction of a general audience, through exhibitions and publications to sound academic research.

IV. Irish Studies in the University

As a result of the various processes outlined briefly at the beginning of this paper, the Institute of Irish Studies was established at Queen's University in Belfast 'to promote and co-ordinate research in those fields of study which have particular Irish interest.' The Institute was initially, and remains principally, a Research foundation, its Fellows ranging through the disciplines of archaeology, history, language and literature, art and anthropology — among others. Research Fellowships are held for one year by senior academics from all over the world. Junior Fellows are usually post-doctoral scholars preparing their work for publication.

Since 1987 the Institute has offered first degree courses, (BAs), and post-graduate degrees (MAs) and Diplomas. The courses are inter-disciplinary, and include methodological approaches, introducing students to environmental, economic, social and modern history; archaeology and geography; literature in Irish and English; politics and social anthropology. Each of these course elements is taught by lecturers from the relevant department — not by generalists — and this, I think, contributes to ensuring that the standards relating to each discipline are maintained.

I have brought copies of the course topics, since I imagined that some of you might like more detail than I would have time to give during the course of this paper.

While cross-disciplinary studies may have been challenged by those who believe that breadth is no substitute for depth, and may have seemed radical to some academics in the 1960s, the natural logic to which I referred at the beginning of this paper seems to characterise the approach of the students. A case might also be made against inter-disciplinary studies in general, (not just Irish studies), on the grounds that they may foster cultural myopia. Although there are always overseas students at the Institute, who make valuable contributions, the majority of students are Irish, and inevitably bring their own prior range of interests, to which their acquired knowledge is, hopefully, an objective addition, so their studies lead to what might be described as a 'world view' of Ireland.

The significant underlying difference between single-subject and inter-disciplinary courses, is that the traditional approach is essentially comparative, and the latter cumulative. I would suggest that those who plan to be career academics should have first degrees which are subject specific, but that 'studies' courses offer

(1) an invaluable introduction to the rigours of different disciplines, which should be applicable to whatever students chose to do subsequently, and

(2) a range of knowledge which can be hugely life-enhancing to people during the rest of their lives.

In conclusion, I want to tell you briefly how the insights of scholars in the various disciplines which constitute 'Irish studies' have instigated a new initiative in an attempt to address the violence which has been the result of religious and politically differing ideologies.

V. Irish Studies — A Practical Application

The general features of the conflict in Northern Ireland will be familiar to you through the medium of television This paper has indicated how the education systems in Ireland have offered opportunities to those who achieve third-level education, but, which serve to further divide the majority of the community.This educational division is exacerbated in several areas by residential separation, so that many individuals have no personal contact with people of another faith.

The problem faced by the Cultural Traditions programme was to consider how the perceptions of those who were familiar with the field of Irish studies could usefully address the problem of fear and prejudice associated with the diverse traditions of the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. In Ireland we have what has been described as the 'double-minority' situation. Catholics are in the minority in Northern Ireland, where the population is roughly 60% Protestant, 40% Catholic, but Protestants are overwhelmingly the minority in Ireland as a whole, and represent only 4% of the population in the Republic of Ireland. Thus, as one observer has commented 'both groups exhibit the worst features of both modes — the insecurity of a minority and the arrogance and insensitivity of a majority' (M. Hayes, *Whither Cultural Diversity?* [Belfast: Community Relation Council, 1990], p. 12.).

The model (copies of which have been distributed) offers the analytical basis for an educational approach which is being tried in the interests of encouraging a more positive attitude to the cultural diversity which characterises the Catholic and Protestant communities of Ireland. Both groups feel fear and alienation. Fear makes people emphasis their power — in institutions and organizations: alienation makes them emphasise their difference from the power group. These notions of power and difference feed their ideas about identity and are expressed in language, literature, interpretations of history, music, sport and much else, so that eventually these elements of life — these cultural traditions — become themselves symbolic of identity.

The simple aim of the cultural traditions programme is an increased knowledge of 'own' and 'other' culture for both Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland.

The hope is that such knowledge may help to de-fuse the partisan interpretations of the past which so often pass for history in Ireland, and serve to de-code the contemporary threatening and triumphalist community symbols. The long-term hope is that cultural traditions programmes may eventually help to engender a confidence in both shared and diverse culture, which will provide a base for reducing fear and aggression.

The scheme offers financial support to broadcasters and publishers for the provision of film, archival and published resources which contribute to an understanding of cultural diversity. It also funds community projects. The aim is to help people to build on their own enthusiasms whether these are in music, drama, local history or whatever, by linking them to professionals in these fields, who may help them contextualise and be objective about their traditional customs and attitudes. There is a huge enthusiasm at local level for crossing boundaries, welcoming 'others' and building bridges. The people

of Northern Ireland know in their bones what every academic discipline has illustrated: that the peoples of Ireland have less which separates them than they have in common. It is crucial, however, to work within the stereotypes in order to work through them. What the programme has managed to do, I think, is raise the debate about diversity and pluralism in a multitude of different spheres, so that Northern Ireland has been described recently as 'a community in dialogue with itself'.

This process is surely be crucial to all societies which must encompass difference, whether it be ethnic, religious or political. For 20 years or so, Northern Ireland has been regarded as the anachronism of Europe - a country still fighting the civil wars which had typified the nineteenth century, but been submerged by centralist ideologies in the twentieth.

It is now tragically evident that much of Europe has had conflict bubbling below the surface, and 'the mosaic' not 'the melting pot' is the reality.

No one believes that communities learn from history, but individual behaviour is changed and modified by the opportunities which are offered by the society in which they live, principally the economic and educational opportunities, which allow the individual the possibility of choice. Economic prosperity can help people to realise their ambition, but it is only education which trains people to conceive different options, both for themselves, and for the society in which they live.

It is in this way, I suggest, that Irish Studies are so crucial to those of us who live in Ireland, and the inter-disciplinary programmes which are being organised, both within and outside the universities, may provide a model for other countries which are also facing the threats and possibilities inherent in pluralist societies.

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John Braidwood

The British Government and the Present Face of the Troubles in Northern Ireland

The overwhelming political event of the last year or so in the UK is without doubt the ceasefire in Northern Ireland. Some commentators would argue that the never-ending Eurodebate has been dominating British politics recently. I would argue that the peace process in Northern Ireland is itself part and parcel of the ongoing Eurodebate. Now that we have a ceasefire in place the debate on Northern Ireland has shifted to speculation on the possible shape of the political settlement there and this necessarily deals with the issue of borders and sovereignty. At the heart of the Northern Irish question lies the thorny problem of sovereignty. Similarly, the concept of sovereignty also lies at the heart of the Eurodebate as the very nature of the European Union itself transcends the fundamental concept of internal borders. If Brussels is to be our master — and there has already been a large amount of derogation of sovereignty to Brussels — then the question of British or Irish sovereignty over Northern Ireland, Ulster, the 6 counties, the province, the North ... call it what you will, then the problem of borders will have been transcended and it will no longer be an issue, except perhaps in people's sectarian memories.

In order to begin to make sense of what is going on in Northern Ireland today we have to first look at the major political developments of the preceding decade. An understanding of that will allow us to attempt to wrestle with the present political situation. We have two policy documents on which to work — the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and the 1993 Joint Declaration also between the British and Irish governments. And not a lot else. When dealing with political science we are of course free to speculate but we must limit ourselves to the realm of concrete facts and avoid being drawn into an ill-informed guessing game of what ifs and maybes.

The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was an example of good domestic policy for both the British and Irish governments, an exercise in highly skilled statecraft which raised the debate on the future of Northern Ireland to a new level, hauling it out of the quagmire of the province's interminable internal politics and pushing it into the international arena. It has been argued that the Anglo-Irish Agreement served only the presentational advantage of the two signatories, but it did in fact set in motion a bold and controversial train of events known as the Intergovernmental Conference, itself a development from Garret FitzGerald's New Ireland Forum. Now, for the first time, the Dublin government did have a say, however small, in the affairs of the British province of Northern Ireland. This represented a solid affirmation of the long-debated "Irish Dimension" now enshrined in an international treaty between Britain and Ireland. The clear intention was to achieve some form of recognition for the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, something which the unionist ascendancy had completely failed to recognise since the partition of Ireland in 1926. Naturally the unionists reacted furiously to what they saw as the British government forcing them down the road towards Dublin — something abhorrent to unionists.

In attempting to make an assessment of current British government policy towards the province of Northern Ireland we have only one still valid policy document on which

to work. This is the pivotal, though much maligned, Joint Declaration[1] of 15 December 1993, and more commonly referred to as the Downing Street Declaration[2]. It was reached by the British Prime Minister John Major and the then Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and all analysts of the Northern Ireland situation agree that the Declaration has to be used as the point of reference for all subsequent political developments there. There simply is no other concrete government policy document to which we can refer.

Paragraph 1 states that *"the most urgent and important issue facing the people of Ireland, North and South, and the British and Irish governments together, is to remove the causes of conflict, to overcome the legacy of history and to heal the divisions which have resulted, recognising that the absence of a lasting and satisfactory settlement of relationships between the peoples of both islands has contributed to continuing tragedy and suffering."* As a statement of intent this is excellent, as a statement of policy it would seem to be somewhat insufficient. Unfortunately even this was more than we should rightly have expected bearing in mind the failures of previous governments to achieve anything. What we can tentatively add to the debate about the Downing Street Declaration is that we in fact know very little about what it actually *means*. The Forum for Peace and Reconciliation is up and running, creating an arena for debate rather than killing. The only stumbling block to that at the moment is the continued reluctance of the unionist parties to officially join, although there have been informal contacts between them. Clearly we are now witnessing the direct consequences of that Declaration by virtue of the fact that for almost 5 months the unilateral IRA ceasefire announced on 31 August 1993 and since of course joined by the loyalist ceasefire has held, though it hasn't been without its difficulties. The shooting of postal worker Frank Kerr by an IRA gang in the course of a bungled robbery was the work of a renegade unit reluctant to give up the good life provided by the organised crime activities of the IRA. The stoic refusal of the IRA to be drawn into retaliatory action following the bombing of the Sinn Féin advice centre by Loyalists can only be praised. Never have we known such a benign IRA. What could be behind their new face?

So we see that since 1985 the British and Irish governments have been actively discussing the situation in Northern Ireland at the highest of levels. Who are the key actors in what has become known as the peace process?

For the British government there is the Prime Minister **John Major**, a man who is in the difficult position of purporting to be a unionist while being prepared to sacrifice British sovereignty for the sake of peace in Northern Ireland. More on his current political dilemma later.

For the Irish government there is Labour Party leader and coalition government foreign minister **Dick Spring**. Mr Spring has been a much more important player than his media conscious prime ministers Garret FitzGerald and Albert Reynolds.

The tireless mediator in the whole affair has always been **John Hume** MP leader of the Northern Irish SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party), a pacifist nationalist party close to the small cross-community Alliance Party. He has liased with both the British and Irish governments and he is credited with being the first politician to bite the bullet, embrace Sinn Féin and to get the political ball rolling.

There is **Sinn Féin** itself, the small but vocal nationalist or republican party with their highly talented media players Martin McGuiness and, more prominently, Gerry Adams. The party is the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (the IRA) the well-

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1. Command Paper 2442, London: HMSO, January 1994.
2. It acquired this name due to the fact that negotiations took place in Downing Street from where the two premiers made their joint announcement. For posterity it perhaps gives too much credit to the British when it is the Irish who are making most of the running with their offer to consider constitutional change in order to bring about a political solution to The Troubles.

known and highly efficient terrorist organisation.

The **United States** has, perhaps surprisingly, been very much involved in the peace process. There is a powerful Irish American lobby in the US congress, some 40 million Americans claim Irish ancestrage (which is quite impressive when you consider that the total population of Ireland is a mere 5 million). The Americans went out of their way to bypass the Special Relationship with Britain (a relationship which largely exists only in the minds of the British Conservative Party) in order to grant visas to a number of prominent nationalists and unionists. America provided a forum for these people when they had been denied one by the British government. Until the end of last year members of what the British government termed terror organisations or their spokespersons were denied access to the media. This had also been the case in the Republic of Ireland.

And there is **Gusty Spence**. He is a convicted loyalist terrorist turned peacemaker who has been called the godfather of the loyalists. It was Gusty Spence who appeared at the press conference to announce in the name of the Combined Loyalist Military Command the ceasefire of the loyalist terror organisations in October 1994. Yet again this was a reaction to an IRA move. It has been argued by some political commentators that loyalist violence has largely been reactive to IRA violence.

You may have noticed that the more mainstream unionist politicians are missing from this list of key actors in the peace process. Since 1985 they have been largely bypassed as a result of their famous intransigence and refusal to discuss the future of Northern Ireland with Sinn Féin. Therefore I do not discuss at this point the more prominent unionist politicians of the old school: Ian Paisley, James Molyneux, Peter Robinson. These are politicians who are actually on the margins of the peace process, not because they oppose peace but because of their stubborn commitment to the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland — a commitment which is far from reciprocated by the British. To the activists of the loyalist movement these are politicians who are seen as representatives of the "soft middle classes" and no longer earning the unconditional support of the working classes who make up the bulk of the unionist movement.

The present situation in Northern Ireland is not all it seems to be. There is definitely a reassessment of priorities and a jockeying for position going on which is directly connected to power politics within Northern Ireland and at Westminster. I won't be discussing here the possible future shapes that Northern Ireland could take. At this moment the door is open to a solution of the ancient troubles of Ireland. The Downing Street Declaration in effect states the obvious, but states it once and for all. This is zero option time for the terrorists in Northern Ireland. If there is a majority decision in Northern Ireland for a united Ireland, then so be it. If there is a majority decision that Northern Ireland remains within the UK, then so be it. The British government is not washing its hands of Northern Ireland, although it gladly would if it could, it is simply stating the bald facts: they don't mind how it is done but a peaceful settlement *will* be reached. Guarantees are provided to both communities — the nationalists and the unionists — that their traditions will be honoured. In effect this is a negative guarantee as it precludes any progress for either community towards their stated aspirations: for the nationalists a united Ireland, for the unionists a renewed sense of union with Britain.

So what made the IRA declare a total cessation of violence? At this point it is incredibly difficult to specify exact reasons. There seems to have been a fundamental shift in IRA/Sinn Féin thinking. Gerry Adams himself says this started at around the time of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. We are seeing a slow acknowledgement by the IRA that the goalposts have moved and that the rules of the game are now different. The spectre of British imperialism no longer haunts Ireland and the activities of the IRA were actually making the situation worse for the nationalist community in Northern Ireland by causing the British army to intensify its patrols and searches. (Less than two weeks ago the army ended all daylight patrols in Northern Ireland, they have already switched from steel helmets to berets, the RUC has abandoned flak jackets and officers now only carry side arms during the day. These are massive confidence building gestures

to the people of Northern Ireland that a sea change has taken place within Northern Ireland). The IRA ceasefire was very difficult for a lot of people to swallow. Some nationalists were outraged, many unionists deeply suspicious. Why now? The IRA had clearly not been defeated by the British.

It was the acknowledgement of the actual parameters of the situation in Northern Ireland by the IRA that persuaded them that the armed struggle was now over, exactly as the British government had claimed they had said in a secret exchange of messages. At present we have no clear confirmation of this, only that the two sides disagree on what may or may not have been said. It had finally dawned on the IRA and Sinn Fein that the British and their army had absolutely no desire to be in Northern Ireland and that their own campaign of terror was in fact making the British military role more permanent. The building last year of new watchtowers and fortifications by the British army in the "bandit country" of southern Ulster around Crossmaglen can now be seen as a tactical move to show the terrorists that the army was going nowhere until major concessions had been given by the terrorists. At the time this construction work was considered insensitive and counter productive.

Inherent in this change in the thinking of the IRA is the acknowledgement that it is not altogether clear that the majority of Catholics in the North really want unity with the South. The South has meanwhile indicated that it would be happy to have a referendum on the issue in the South. According to Irish political analysts the response would be a resounding "NO THANKS!" from the people of the South if asked if they want union with the North. The IRA and Sinn Fein are now coming to terms with the concept of "consent to change" as being the way forward in Northern Ireland. The two proposed referenda (one in the South and one in the North) are seen as crucial to the whole process of self determination for the people of Ireland. Not that these referenda would actually achieve any new political settlement — but they may provide the stability required to allow Northern Ireland to progress not as a part of a united Ireland, not as a part of the United Kingdom, but as part of a united Europe. They would also serve to turn the ceasefire into peace.

While it might seem to your average British news watcher that the key to the peace process is Sinn Féin this is now only partly true. It is true to say that Sinn Féin and IRA do hold a wild card that they can play or threaten to play at whatever time they deem fit: they can stop, slow down or derail the peace process by reactivating the campaign of violence, terror and intimidation. The IRA is, after all, still armed to the teeth. Let's just believe that they really have abandoned the armalite for the ballot box, but let's not forget either that — without their weapons — they represent a minority in Northern Ireland politics and a very tiny minority in the politics of the whole island of Ireland. Oddly the key actors in the future of Northern Ireland have become the very people largely left out of the negotiations: the unionist politicians. Of course they are crucial to any future referendum (the outcome of which is hardly in doubt anyway) but they have recently become crucial to the survival of the Conservative government in Westminster. Last week there was a vote on European Union fishing policy in the House of Commons which would have seen the government defeated had it not been for the support of, strangely, the Ulster Unionist Party. This parliamentary grouping of only 9 MPs holds the trump card in any Commons votes now. So who should keep whom sweetest? The UUP could actually bring down the government, but if it did so it could well allow the Labour Party to come to power — ands the Labour Party has a very much greener agenda than the Conservatives. The end result may be that the long-awaited framework document — much feared by the Ulster unionists — may be somewhat longer coming than originally thought.

Éva Péteri

Questions of Religion in Victorian England — D. G. Rossetti.

It was in 1849 that Rossetti's first completed oil painting, "The Girlhood of Mary Virgin" was exhibited at the Free Exhibition in London. The picture was applauded by experts and the Victorian public alike. Although some of the critics accused Rossetti's work of Mariolatry, the painting was singled out as the best of the exhibition. It was praised for displaying "grace and beauty" (*The Builder*), "sincerity and earnestness" (*The Athenaeum*), and "a high tone of mind" (*The Builder*); for the "ineffable sweetness" of the Virgin and her mother (*The Observer*); for its "extraordinary minuteness" (*The Builder*), and "its pure imitation of early Florentine art" (*Art Journal*).[1]

Rossetti at that time planned to paint a series of pictures on the theme of the Virgin Mary's life. He intended to set up a diptych with an Annunciation scene in the left hand panel, and a pendant on the right showing Mary's death, which, in the end, was never undertaken. He also thought of making triptyches with the different combinations of themes depicting the Virgin planting a lily and a rose, the Holy Family sitting at Passover, Mary in the house of St. John after the Crucifixion, the Annunciation, and the Virgin's childhood. (Finally none of the planned variations were realised, though within the following ten years Rossetti executed pictures on almost all these themes.[2] His only triptyches are the two versions of "The Seed of David"[3] commissioned by John P. Seddon for Llandaff Cathedral.)

So, after the first success of his painting in 1849, Rossetti's enthusiasm was enormous. He started working on his "Ecce Ancilla Domini" with great zeal, and the picture was completed as planned by the 1850 exhibition. This work was conceived in the same spirit, and executed apparently on the same artistic principles as "The Girlhood of Mary", so Rossetti expected similar praise and success. In a letter to his aunt Lydia Polidori he speaks about "establishing ... some degree of reputation" with this painting.[4] Yet "The Annunciation"[5] received a ferocious storm of hostile criticism which led Rossetti to swear never to exhibit in public again, and to abandon his original plan of a diptych. Critics attacked Rossetti's technical disabilities, they pointed out the weak perspective of the painting, and claimed that Rossetti lacked the skill of exact drawing and proper painting. The way the picture imitated the so-called 'primitive' painters could not win the spectators' favour; they regarded it as retrograde and as a return to 'uncultivated infancy.'

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1. See G. H. Fleming, *Rossetti and the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood* (Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd., 1967), 103-104.
2. "The Girlhood of Mary"—1849; "Ecce Ancilla Domini"—1850; "Mary Nazarene"—1857; "The Passover of the Holy Family"—1856 (unfinished); "Mary in the House of St. John"—1858.
3. Water-colour: 1856, oil: 1858-64.
4. May 1849. Letters, vol. 1. p. 52.
5. Rossetti renamed "Ecce Ancilla Domini" as "The Annunciation" in 1853 to avoid suspicion of popery.

Reviewers were also outraged by the revelation of the 'conspiracy' behind the scene; the existence and anti-Academic intentions of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood were leaked out just before the opening of the exhibition. Finally, Rossetti's work was seen as 'sadly Romish', as the latest alarming manifestation of the spreading influence of Roman Catholicism.

This kind of abrupt change in the opinion of the Victorian public is very peculiar, but there are several factors contributing to its formation. The quick transition in the public attitude towards the young Pre-Raphaelites just before the exhibition as well as the latent but important differences between "The Girlhood of Mary Virgin" and "The Annunciation" resulted in the devastating attack on the latter painting in 1850.

On the face of it Rossetti's first two paintings are, indeed, very similar. Each of them depicts a scene from the Virgin Mary's life, presenting therefore a kind of sequence, two episodes of the same theme. The same brown-haired girl can be seen as Mary in both pictures, painted after Rossetti's sister, Christina. The thematic continuity, the serial character is indicated by the same long red cloth embroidered with a white lily; in "The Girlhood" it is just being worked on, while by the time of the Annunciation it has already been accomplished.

In both paintings (to a significant extent in "The Girlhood") Rossetti used conventional Christian symbols adopting, in this sense, the traditions of religious painting. In "The Girlhood" some of the symbols refer to the Virgin's excellence, such as the books bearing the titles of cardinal and theological virtues bound in the colours traditionally associated with them. (Green stands, for example, for hope, gold for charity, and blue for faith.) The lamp is an emblem of piety, the lily is that of purity, and the dove refers to the presence of the Holy Ghost. Other symbols are used to foreshadow certain biblical events. These are the red cloth beneath the cruciform trellis embroidered with the Tri-point referring to the Holy Trinity and Christ's robe at the Passion, and the seven-leaven palm and the seven-thorned briar lying on the ground representing Mary's seven joys and seven sorrows. The grapevine in the background and on the trellis suggest Christ's sacrifice as indicated by the wine of the Eucharist.
The abundant use of this kind of symbolism might have been responsible for the accusation of Mariolatry in 1849.

In "The Annunciation" the lily, the dove, and the lamp reappear, and besides the basic colour, white, the colour of purity, Rossetti uses the traditional colours associated with Mary: blue, red, and gold. The date of March written in the bottom left corner of the painting is also symbolical, since it is the time of the Immaculate Conception. (The painting was actually completed in April.)

Besides the thematic and symbolic connections, the two pictures are also closely related to each other by the unconventional or, at least according to Victorian standards, strange approach with which Rossetti treated his subjects. At that time, he was still under the strong influence of the artistic principles of William Holman Hunt, who advocated complete adherence either to the religious script or to actual reality, and the avoidance of idealisation as the requirements for establishing a new style of religious painting. In accordance with these ideas, Rossetti tried to show these instances of Mary's life as they actually might have happened.

As there is no reference in the Bible to the childhood of Mary, Rossetti tried to be adequate in a historical sense. He regarded the traditional way of representing Mary's education showing her reading a sacred book as "very inadequate", and "obviously incompatible with those times",[6] and he also thought of it as a commonplace solution. Instead, he presented the young Mary being occupied with needlework, embroidering a lily.

Rossetti's approach and intentions were the same when painting "The Annunciation". He abandoned all the accessories of the well-established representations of the scene, the use of which, he felt, were not justified by the text of the Bible.

The conventional image of the Annunciation shows Mary as a moved and happy

6. Letter to Charles Lyell, November 14, 1848. *Letters*, vol. 1. pp. 47-48.

Madonna, smiling and overwhelmed with delight hearing the messenger's news. She is presented as being occupied with reading some sort of religious book in the hall of a beautiful palace or church with delicately carved columns and arches, which provide a magnificent view upon an exquisite landscape. This kind of splendid environment and abundance of material wealth is not based on the biblical description, but stems rather from the conception of Mary as 'Queen of Heaven'.[7]

As a contrast, Rossetti's Mary is a simple young girl, who is sitting in her bed just having been awakened by the messenger of God. Her bed and her room are very simple and almost completely white. She is frightened, her shrinking posture and worried eyes reflect fear and despair. With this conception Rossetti created a unique and, in several respects, very modern image. He tried to be 'realistic' even when painting the angel, as far as it is possible at all to paint a heavenly messenger in this way. So his Gabriel is also quite unconventional: he has no wings, and he is very earthly, in fact, very masculine. The only indications of his heavenly origin are the flames around his feet and the golden halo round his head. (Were it not for the golden haloes, the flames around Gabriel's feet, and the wings of the little angel in "The Girlhood", the two pictures might pass for representations of secular scenes. In this respect it is interesting to note that Rossetti found it the most difficult to paint the angels, and that the halo of Gabriel in "The Annunciation" is a later [1853] alteration.)

The basic difference between the two pictures lies in the dissimilar character of the scenes.

"The Girlhood" was painted at a time when Rossetti had little other experience of the world than his family home. The picture can be seen as the reflection of the Rossettis' family parlour with its serene but creative atmosphere, and with the dominant role and 'grave sweetness' of the mother.

In several ways the Rossetti family did not fit in with the average English pattern of the age, as the father had an eccentric, and in temperament very Italian personality, and as the parents both encouraged the artistic endeavours of their children. But, as in most Victorian families, the education of the children was left to the mother, and it was also her duty to ensure a harmonious, peaceful, and respectable home for all the members of the family.

The underlying feature of Rossetti's first painting is exactly this kind of Victorian family atmosphere. It reflects harmony, safety, earnestness and assiduity, all that were regarded as supreme values of Victorian life. No wonder, therefore, that the contemporary audience liked this image, and could pass over its Catholic inspired symbolism.

"The Annunciation", on the other hand, was very different indeed. Instead of harmony and peace it reflected embarrassment, doubt and fear; instead of family unity and respectability it showed a solitary young girl being approached by a suspiciously masculine, wingless angel; and instead of productive labour it pictured perplexed helplessness.

However, the painting is as reflective of the Victorian age as its predecessor. But the contemporary audience could not possibly accept it, since it revealed the unpleasant, the consciously concealed concerns of society. And in 1850, when the painting was exhibited, the Victorian public was not yet prepared to cope with such a disturbing image revealing their hidden problems.

The overwhelming optimism of the Victorians was, for the most part, no more than appearance. The nineteenth century scientific revolution, the rapid and enormous increase in knowledge meant that the traditional firm belief in the truth of every single word of the Bible and its divine origin was no more unquestionable. In fact, it was becoming impossible to hold the old credo. The Bible, the base of the Protestant religion was rapidly losing its sacred authority, which, of course, caused grave anxiety for both

7. See, e.g. *The Annunciations* of Fra Angelico, Filippo Lippi, Botticelli, Crivelli, Jan van Eyck, and Leonardo da Vinci.

Nonconformists and Anglicans. In this kind of uncertainty, the immediate and instinctive reaction of most people was to stick firmly to all the conventional formalities and customs of their religion, obtaining in this way a firm ground to rely on. Everyone longed for a strong authority, and the religious leaders, who sensed the danger of the situation, like Samuel Wilberforce or Thomas Arnold, provided the Victorians with the authoritative and dogmatic confirmation and guidance they so badly needed.

Besides the dangers of serious doubt and uncertainty, which could actually lead to agnosticism or even to atheism, Protestants also had to fear the spreading influence of Roman Catholicism. The firm moral principles and strong authoritative character of the Roman Catholic Church made it popular among those in a state of doubt. The interest in medievalism was also growing, and its art as well as its spirit were revalued. In the confused and precarious life of the nineteenth century medieval past was increasingly seen as a simpler, more generous, more beautiful and pious era.

Parallel to this, from the 1830s, more and more people sympathised with the Oxford or Tractarian Movement, which was formed in order to reform the Church of England by reviving some of the rituals and traditions of the early Church, and consequently reducing the gap between the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church. After 1841, the publication of John Newman's "Tract 90", in which he argued that the 39 Articles did not necessarily contradict the doctrines of the Church of Rome, the charges of Romanism against the movement speedily escalated. The anti-Catholic opposition was even more inflamed when in 1850 Pope Pius IX issued a Papal bull in which he announced the establishment of the archbishopric of Westminster and the division of England into twelve Roman Catholic dioceses. Lord John Russell, the current Prime Minister, immediately applied both to the state and to the Church of England to stop the 'aggression' of Rome, and in a letter to the Bishop of Durham he confirmed his worries not only about Papal expansion but also about the growing uncertainty and nonconformism among the clergy of the Church of England.

A fierce battle was fought against the Dissenters, who had to face serious reprisals for their disobedience. Several advocates of the Tractarian ideas suffered such retribution. In 1844 the degree of the Tractarian W.G. Ward was taken away as the result of the publication of his "The Ideal of a Christian Church", in which the Church of England appeared to be compared unfavourably with the Church of Rome. Another prominent figure of the Oxford Movement, J.A. Froude, was forced to withdraw from his post as schoolmaster five years later. And John Henry Newman, a leader of the movement, also had to resign his position in Oxford being withdrawn from public life by his bishop. (Nevertheless, he continued propagating his ideas, and, embittered by the attitude of his church, converted to Catholicism in 1850, later becoming a Catholic priest and Cardinal.) In this hostile anti-Catholic atmosphere Rossetti's "Ecce Ancilla Domini" had little chance of getting a favourable reception. While the inscription PRB passed unnoticed in 1849, by the 1850 exhibitions the secret Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood was revealed to the press by the sculptor A. Munro, who had his information most probably from Rossetti himself. The name itself had an unfortunate Catholic connotation, and suspicion was intensified by its close resemblance with the name of a group of German painters, the Nazarenes. This group of German artists was also known as the Brotherhood of St. Luke named after the pátron saint of painting, and as Pre-Raphaelites. They (among them Peter von Cornelius and Johann Friedrich Overbeck) lived and worked in Rome in a semi-monastic community from 1810, and advocated both in their art and in their life-style the superiority of pre-Reformation Christianity to the nineteenth century religion distorted and enfeebled by theological controversies. As the result of his sincere and overwhelming admiration for early religious painting, Overbeck even converted to Catholicism, the prime inspiration behind the adored works. By the middle of the century, the art of the Nazarenes as well as their religious and artistic motivations were well known in England. They had a strong influence on the art of William Dyce and Ford Madox Brown, both of whom actually met Overbeck (Dyce in 1827 and Brown in 1846). As Madox Brown was the first tutor of Rossetti, and the two later became good friends, Rossetti most probably had an exact, first hand knowledge of the German painters.

The Nazarenes were also known because of their rebellion against the strict academic curriculum of the Academy in Vienna, where they had all studied. Similarly, the English Pre-Raphaelites intended to 'take the Royal Academy by storm'. And when the existence and revolutionary intentions of these young men came to light, the public obviously turned against them. A secret organisation of discontented young men had to be subdued, especially at a time when the fear of a possible revolution was much in the air; when the memory of the 1848 revolutions on the Continent and the riots in London was still very fresh.

Had the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and their artistic aims not been kept secret, the fear it caused and the hostile rejection it incurred would most probably have not been so devastating. In retrospect it seems that at the time the Royal Academy was surprisingly tolerant, and, in most cases, tried to support talented young artists. For example, not only were the picture of the novice Pre-Raphaelite painters accepted at the 1849 and 1850 Royal Academy Exhibitions, but they were also very favourably displayed. But, by the opening of the 1850 Exhibition, the public and the critics had become alarmed by the Pre-Raphaelites' revolutionary attitude and the strong impression of Catholicism in their works.

For the first cause Rossetti was probably responsible by insisting on forming a secret society as well as by revealing it to Alexander Munro. He was obviously fascinated by belonging to a secret, rebellious organisation, since his father had been very much involved in such things in Italy, and enthusiastic discussions about it were held daily in their home; but he did not really care about delicate religious distinctions. Although he was infatuated by the magnificent and spectacular formalities and accessories of Catholic ceremonies, and deeply impressed by the profound spirituality of the early Christian paintings, his approach was basically not religious, but artistic and emotional. He most probably did not even realise how significant the difference was between "The Girlhood" and "The Annunciation". Besides the basic difference that "The Girlhood" reflected Victorian harmony, and "The Annunciation" Victorian doubts and fears, they displayed another significant distinctive quality.

Irrespective of the Romish ecclesiastical symbolism of the paintings, the first work was basically a Church of England picture, while the second rather a Catholic one. In "The Girlhood" the depicted scene was that of education, where things were to be examined and understood. "The Annunciation", on the other hand, suggested that teaching and learning have already passed by, and yet no certitude has been achieved. In this scene the tentative advance of Gabriel, and the perplexed withdrawal of Mary point to the fact that the things happening here cannot be learned or understood, they simply had to be believed. Rossetti captured the precious moment of encountering something beyond human comprehension, and he pictured perplexed humility and awe as called forth by unexpected divine revelation. These emotions, of course, have a lot to do with the traditional emotions attached to Christian mystery, but in Rossetti's case the emphasis was almost entirely on the aspect of mystery, and he had little concern for theological connotations.

In Rossetti's short story, "Hand and Soul", written at the time when he worked on "The Annunciation", we can find the theoretical formulation of his ideas. In Rossetti's conception God is wise and yielding, who accepts as faith everything that comes from the heart, regardless of whether it is designed to serve Him or not. This God does not demand learned and dutiful religiosity but fidelity to one's own inner experience. By creating such a personal concept of God, Rossetti could reconcile his respect for and awe of divine mystery with his strong inner strive and passionate admiration for all forms of beauty. And as Catholic art has an inclination towards a profoundly pious and mysterious character, and also towards exuberant visual beauty, Catholicism, and especially Catholic art, was not at all alien to Rossetti. Nevertheless, he never joined any kind of religious movement, and showed no interest in religious controversies.

It seems that the beginning of the 1860s was the turning point beyond which more and more people could speak out about their real feelings, their doubts and worries without punitive consequences. Darwin's *The Origin of Species* was published in 1859; the

controversial *Essays and Reviews*, a collection of essays on "the proper mode of interpreting and studying the Bible, and on the relative value of the internal and external evidences of religion"[8] followed in 1860. Two years later the Philosophical Club was founded, which aimed at protesting against evasion, and searching for and advocating always and nothing but the truth. Also in 1862, the book of Bishop John William Colenso, *The Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua Critically Examined* was published, in which Colenso claimed that the Bible contradicts the results of scientific investigations. The book unleashed a stormy debate, but Colenso's confession, by revealing that they were not alone with their problems, gave strength to several other people to come forward with their opinions. (It was a great help to John Ruskin as well, who, probably encouraged by the book, also revealed his agnostic views later in 1862.[9]) Nevertheless, a long controversy followed, and also attempts to excommunicate the Bishop, but his opponents could not succeed. And in 1870 the once so powerful Evangelicals, as Matthew Arnold pointed out, could no more control the situation: "The Evangelical clergy no longer recruits itself with success, no longer lays hold on such promising subjects as formerly. It is losing future and feels that it is losing it. The best of their own younger generation, the soldiers of their own training are slipping away from them."[10]

Parallel to this shift in public attitude, the judgement on Rossetti's "Ecce Ancilla Domini" also changed. After the exhibition in 1850 Rossetti could not sell his painting. The first purchaser, Francis MacCracken of Belfast bought it (advised to do so by Ruskin) three years later for £50. In 1878 he got almost eight times as much for it from a second buyer, who finally sold the painting to the Tate Gallery in 1886 for £800. Ruskin was, of course, among the first advocates of "The Annunciation". In the third volume of *Modern Painters* (1856) he claims that in painting the Blessed Virgin should be represented as "a simple Jewish girl, bearing the calamities of poverty and the dishonours of inferior station", and not as "a graceful princess, crowned with gems, and surrounded by obsequious ministry of kings and saints".[11] Although he dos not mention Rossetti's "Ecce Ancilla Domini" here, he gives a sort of theoretical justification to it. Later, in 1878, in "The Three Colours of Pre-Raphaelitism" he praises the unique conception of the scene and the basic sincerity of this particular painting.

F. G. Stephens shared Ruskin's view, praising Rossetti's work also for its unique approach and simplicity.[12] In 1933, David Larg already speaks about a 'modern treatment of religious theme'[13] in connection with the painting, and he also appreciates the way it arrests the moment of revelation, the moment of mystery. In the second half of the twentieth century the painting is still seen as a revolutionary achievement and a surprisingly modern work. G.H. Fleming describes it in 1967 as "a revolution in the way of simplicity, humility, and up to a certain point, realism in religious painting";[14] and in 1982, Quentin Bell says that "'Ecce Ancilla Domini' is essentially a very modern picture..., an essay in 'probable' religious art".[15]

8. Arthur Stanley, from a response to *Essays and Reviews*, April, 1861. Republished in: *Culture and Society in Britain 1850-1890* (Oxford University Press, 1986).
9. See John Ruskin's letter to Sir John Naesmyth, quoted in: George P. Landow, *The Aesthetic and Critical Theories of John Ruskin* (Princeton University Press, 1971), 266-267.
10. Quoted in: George P. Landow, *Op. cit.*, 268.
11. Quoted in: *The Pre-Raphaelites* (Tate Gallery), 276.
12. See G. H. Fleming, *Op. cit.*, 116-117.
13. See David Larg, *Trial by Virgins* (London: Peter Davis, 1933), 115-117.
14. G. H. Fleming, *Op. cit.*, 132.
15. Quentin Bell, *A New and Noble School — The Pre-Raphaelites* (London: Macdonald, 1982), 106-107.

Gabriella Varró

Two Popular Incarnations of the "Comic Black" Stereotype in Early 19th-Century Minstrel Songs

As my title indicates I am going to examine two popular versions of the "Comic Black" stereotype which of all the white-created racial cliches has been the most firmly embedded popular formula in the American mind. The "Comic Negro," (and I will apply the term "Negro" here when referring to the popular usage of the word in the period I am examining) a generic term, holds together a long range of subtypes, all of which gained "artistic" expression first through 19th-century minstrel stages, and have developed over the years into powerful cultural icons in American culture.

Blackface minstrelsy (the art of blacking the face conjoined with Negro representation), which functioned as the cradle of the Comic Negro stereotype, was an entirely new form of popular theater at the beginning of the 19th century. Minstrelsy was a creation of Northern whites, and the minstrel materials reflected a unique cultural mix, as a result of the varied sources and influences clashing in the North. As early as the 18th century there had already been examples of individual blackface performances between the acts of plays in established theaters, and the first original blackface performance where "the blackface performer was not only the main actor, but the entire act" (Wittke 20), came with Thomas Dartmouth Rice's "Jim Crow" act in 1829. Rice's "Jim Crow" impersonation became an immediate hit, and his simple song and dance act had been expanded by the 1840s into the standardized popular stage format of the so-called minstrel show.

The greatest appeal of the minstrel show was due to the Negro, who loomed large among the figures of the minstrel stage. The Comic Stage Negro soon became an obsession with the theater-going public. What, one might ask, gave rise to this popular formula? How can one explain the birth of this stereotype, the "Comic Black," which had such a wide public appeal?

Stereotyping practices generally occur in culture-contact situations (Abrahams 11), when the need to define or to confront "otherness" is expressed. The evolution of stereotyped images of Blacks, therefore, should primarily be seen as emerging from the need to interpret and also incorporate the Black into the processes of cultural communication.

The acknowledgement of Black culture, however, from the very beginning involved the recognition of and confrontation with the "otherness" of Blacks. Thus, it was not surprising that when stereotypical images of the Blacks sprang up in America, they chiefly emphasized this distinctness of the Negro from the mainstream of American culture.

The minstrel stage translated the mental pictures of the Blacks into perceptible "artistic" images. It was the first institutionalized form of popular theater, where the distinctness and disjunction of Black culture was openly acknowledged for the first time, although through the art forms of white culture.

Among all the white-created Negro stereotypes, the "Comic Black" had the

greatest public appeal.[1] Rice's Jim Crow impersonation hit upon an extremely successful formula, which became the foundation of an enduring stereotype. The attractions of the new image were manifold. The new stereotype was based on "basic, axiomatic, taken-for granted stock of ideas" that matched white expectations concerning the Negro (Dormon 119). But the figure contained more than just an easily adaptable formula, it was also a nonthreatening, comforting image of a "happy, guileless, funny creature" (Dormon 120). This image communicated two main things to white audiences. One, that there was nothing to fear in the darky and, second, that whites were free from responsibility for the conditions of the slaves (after all it was an altogether ideal circumstance for these naive creatures). The Comic Darky delivered to white audiences exactly what they needed, a rationale to preserve the subordinate status of the slaves. The argument supplied sufficient ammunition for those supporting the notion and institution of slavery.

Whether these psychological processes actually existed would be hard to state in retrospect. One thing, however, is certain, that the minstrel stage brought the Negro to the foreground of national interest, and probably for the first time in history an outcast came to occupy the national stage. The minstrel stage was in many ways a safe vehicle to confront "questions about the nature and proper place of black people in America" (Toll 57). Thus the minstrel stage by taking up, popularizing and reinforcing the stereotypes of Blacks in popular consciousness, institutionalized the image of the Comic Negro.

Since the racial context of the minstrel performance was chiefly delivered through the lyrics of the minstrel song, and because the documents and collections I researched concentrated essentially on minstrel songs (and not the stump speeches, sermons, or minstrel dialogues) of the 1830s and 40s, the prime illustrative documentation will be brought from the minstrel songs and the pictorial images of the sheet music covers of this period.

The Plantation Darky

The first Comic Negro type to enter the minstrel stage was the figure of the Happy Plantation Darky. The character incorporated two considerably different types, one being the contented, loyal servant, forever seeking to please his master, and that of the carefree, happy-go-lucky, irresponsible entertainer of white folks. The two images, though developed together on the minstrel stage, had different life-spans, the former wearing off relatively early, while the image of "Sambo," the darky as entertainer not only took hold in the public fancy, but was passed on from one generation to the other to recur subsequently in radio shows, films and in dozens of 20th-century novels, from Harlem Renaissance authors to Faulkner or Ellison.

The myth that generated and buttressed both character-types was the Cavalier myth that set out to prove the plantation not only a safe but also desirable place for Negroes, and the Happy Darky, in both of his incarnations supported this argument. Of these two modes, the sentimental and the comic, which were present in the minstrel tradition, I will be concerned with the latter.

Boskin draws the comic version of this type-figure and its future incarnations under a more general term, "Sambo," which is the sum of all the images and concepts that the white man associated with the Black slave as the initiator and the butt of jokes. Sambo was a worker as well as an entertainer from the outset, forming an integral part of the plantation family. The comic traits of Sambo probably go back to the court fools of medieval Europe. As opposed to these comic court jesters, however, Sambo did not

1. The term "Comic Negro" originates from Sterling A. Brown's typological system of white-created Negro stereotypes in fiction, first outlined in Brown's "Negro Characters as Seen by White Authors"; the two stereotypes I am introducing in this paper can be conveniently interpreted as subtypes to Brown's "Comic Negro".

become an outcast; on the contrary, unlike his real-life counterpart (the black slave), the image of Sambo was embraced and cherished by masses of American audiences, so that he soon "became a figure unrivaled in the culture for producing and accepting laughter" (Boskin 10).

The minstrel show incarnation of Sambo, the Comic Plantation Darky, was a direct descendant of the popular Sambo image. The comic traits of this figure were conveyed to blackface audiences in the most explicit form through the dress. Early sheet music covers of the 1830s and 40s of famous minstrel songs can give the readers an idea of the external appearance of this type-figure. Whether considering the sheet music cover of the already mentioned "Jim Crow" or any of his later alter-egos, the surface attributes designed for the Plantation Darky become perfectly obvious (Figure 1). The ill-fitting, worn and torn clothes, the bare, endlessly dancing feet, and the naive grin on the face seem to have become recurrent features of the plantation hand. Once these surface standards were established, the pattern came to be imitated widely by hundreds and thousands of blackface delineators.

The explicitly drawn physical caricature (itself a culturally established icon) was gradually and very cautiously transferred to infer *inner* attributes of the Negro. Justification of racial caste and supporting arguments about the superiority of the white race over Blacks were very subtly incorporated in surface stereotypes or hidden carefully in the texture of the lyrics. So carefully in fact that racial meanings were almost never detected by early blackface audiences, since the blackface minstrel did not want to expose himself in political controversies by openly taking sides.

One of the oldest songs to represent the figure of the Happy Plantation Darky clearly as a comic type-figure, is the "Bonja Song"[2] from around 1820. The song is the first concrete example of the carefree, light-hearted, music-loving darky type in minstrel songsters. The Negro boy is pictured here as a total opposite of the great, proud, smart but joyless and always worrisome master. The opposition is also marked by the "me versus him" duality in the song.

Dennison interprets the lyrics as establishing the superiority of the white man over the darky "by picturing the white as proudly suffering the world's blows while the carefree slave bask[s] under his protective wing" (Dennison 33). I find Dennison's reading somewhat strained. Although it is possible that white superiority is indirectly hinted at, the song emphasizes the persona of the darky and his approach or view of the world, which is expressed best through the refrain:

Me sing all day
Me sleep all night
Me hab no care my heart is light
Me tink not what tomorrow bring
Me happy so me sing.

The protagonist of the "Bonja Song" became the first example to represent the most important inner and outer attributes of a new type, the Comic Plantation Darky in minstrel song. The image of the happy darky, with the banjo (or fiddle) in his hands and an ever-present smile on the face, was to establish a long tradition.

Light-heartedness and irresponsibility as dominant character traits of the Comic Plantation Negro, were often paired with childish naivete. Blackface minstrels liked to portray blacks as infantile, not only because audiences could get a good laugh at the expense of the naive character, but also because they themselves were allowed to indulge

2. "Bonja Song" Brown University, Harris Collection, No.9. In Starr Sheet Music Collection, Lilly Library, Bloomington, Indiana, M1.S8, Afro-Americans before 1863. Dennison mentions 1815 or 1816 as possible dates for the publication of the song (see Dennison 33); The words of the song (according to the listing of the Brown University, Harris Collection) come from an R. C. Dallas, its composer is unknown.

in these childish games for the period of the performance.

"A child in intellect," and a "child in faith" (Lott 143), the Comic Plantation Negro came to be portrayed on the minstrel stage as a perfectly infantile "element" of the community, whose oversized clothes and shoes, grammatical lapses or lexical "mistakes" in the minstrel puns (see Lott 142-43), as well as his strange "habits" (like thievery) could all conveniently be blamed on his fundamentally childish character and restricted intellect. In "Genny Git Your Hoe Cake Done,"[3] for example, the darky's indulgence in singing instead of going to work, was interpreted as resulting from his in-born irresponsibility, and carefree conduct. In another popular song, "Old Dan Tucker"[4] possibly by Emmett (1846), the protagonist in one version was pictured as a careless fieldhand, and made funny through his apparent laziness:

> *Tucker is a nice old man,*
> *He used to ride our darby ram,*
> *He sent him whizzin down de hill,*
> *If he hadn't got up, he'd laid dar still.*
> (quoted in Lott 144)

Laziness, just like irresponsibility, was seen as the lack of sufficient maturity and civilization in the Black man. The lazy plantation darky, soon incorporated into the standard images of the Happy Darky, further enhanced the beneficent effect of slavery on the Negroes (Dennison 35). "Do I Do I Don't Do Nothing,"[5] from 1825, was in fact one of the first songs on this theme. The laziness and good-for-nothingness of the Negro, this apparent myth, made the darky not only laughable to minstrel audiences, but also exposed (although not openly) the slaves as scapegoats to be blamed for economic problems.

The darky was not only pictured as carelessly negligent, but also as ultimately breaking white rules and codes in his ignorance. The ill-doings of the slaves, however, appeared more funny than to be a cause for outrage to white audiences, since whatever the darky did could be blamed on his stupidity, rather than on his wickedness. The Plantation Darky pictured as a natural thief appeared as a favorite topic in a number of minstrel songs. In "De Long Island Nigger," a Christy Melody quoted in Toll, the darky publicly boasted of his newest acquisition, his master's coat: "Massa bought a bran new coat and hung it on de wall. Dis nigga's gwine to take dat coat, and wear it to de ball" (Toll 74).

The comic appeal of the Plantation Darky was guaranteed also by the numerous symbolic objects songwriters attached to him over the years. It was a popular device with songsmiths to picture the Darky with his favorite instruments (fiddle, banjo, tambourine, etc.) or to represent him in song in the company of certain animals. In a number of songs following the publication of "Jim Crow" blacks were oftentimes referred to as crows, the basis of analogy (blackness, attributed dumbness, associations with danger and fear, etc.) being quite apparent. On one sheet music cover the analogy between man and animal is even carried over onto the blackface performer, a quite exceptional example given the connotation of the animal symbolism in blackface songs (see Figure 2).

Crows, opossums, racoons, alligators, frogs and chickens (to mention just a few) tend to accompany the slave on most of his ventures. While a considerable amount of the animal symbolism in early minstrel songs came from Black lore ("Clar De Kitchen," "Possum Up A Gumtree"), many parallels between blacks and animals were invented by

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3. For text see Dennison 97.
4. "Old Dan Tucker," published in Damon, Foster S. *Series of Old American Songs*, no.37, quoted in full in Lott 143-44.
5. Arranged by "An Amateur" and published and sold by G. Willig (according to a copy of the song in the Starr Sheet Music Collection).

white performers to degrade the Negro to the level of animals. In one such song, entitled "Old King Crow"[6] of 1843, the composer alludes to the common element of thievery between blacks and crows.

Now gemmen hear what I'se gwoin to say,
It am a fac dat you know,
It come for to pass on a werry fine day,
An its all about an Ole King Crow
He's de blackest tief I know,
He nebber says nuffin But Caw! Caw! Caw!

Minstrel blacks of the antebellum years (just like many of their real-life counterparts), however, did not stand open ridicule and humiliation without "fighting back" as best they could. Tricking the master by trapping him in his own argument had long been a favorite "game" among Negroes to get back at their oppressors. For instance in the story of a minstrel slave named John, who playing on his master's assumption of his stupidity "subverted the plantation by feeding green tobacco to sheep, eating oats meant for the horses, making his master's tea out of bitter leaves, and even beating the master's coat while he still had it on" (Toll 75). This kind of open mocking of the master was of course unthinkable on the minstrel stages after the slavery controversy had come to the foreground of national dispute.

The Northern Darky

The Northern version of the Comic Darky followed its Southern counterpart fairly close in time on the minstrel stages. The character of the Northern Dandy Darky, though comprised of a different set of physical and inner attributes from that of the Happy Plantation Hand, was invented basically to justify the same pro-slavery arguments. Urban, free blacks, needless to say, were much more of a threat to white society than Southern slaves were, therefore the ridicule targeted at Northern Negroes in the shows was harsher and more explicit than in the case of the Happy Plantation Darky.

Probably the very first appearance of the Negro Dandy in the minstrel repertoire came with George Washington Dixon's "My Long-Tail Blue"[7] as early as 1827. The ridicule of the dandy was often targeted at his clothing; this was the most explicit vehicle for Northern whites to express that they didn't desire blacks amongst the white aristocrats, and they were also quite firm in their belief that blacks had no business in the North either. "[L]ong-tailed coat with padded shoulders, a high ruffled collar, white gloves" (Toll 68), came to be recognized as standard attributes of the Citified Darky, who was seen by white audiences as a ridiculous but also threatening presence in the North (Figure 3). The Black Dandy posed a threat to white audiences not only because he tried to imitate the ways of white aristocracy through his flashy outfit, and artificial mannerism, but also because he was seen as a source of danger for the white female. The third stanza of "My Long Tail Blue" phrases this threat quite explicitly:

Jim Crow is courting a white gall,
And yaller folks call her Sue;
I guess she back'd a nigger out,
And swung my long tail blue.

The alleged aspirations of the Black Dandy to behave, dress and live like white

6. "Old King Crow," Brown University, Harris Collection, no. 39. In Starr Sheet Music Collection, Lilly Library, Bloomington, Indiana, M1.S8, Afro-Americans before 1863.
7. "My Long-Tail Blue," Brown University, Harris Collection, no. 14. In Starr Sheet Music Collection, Lilly Library, Bloomington, Indiana, M1.S8, Afro-Americans before 1863.

aristocrats were occasionally exaggerated to the extent that the black dandy ultimately expressed the wish to become white. In the last stanzas of "A Nigger's Reason,"[8] this particular desire is reinforced as the highest ideal of all blacks:

He'd like to be a gentleman,
If he could live unhired.
Nigger man no like to work,
'Cause it make him tired.

Him tink it bore him debts to pay,
Though folks may say is not right,
'Cause for three months in de bench,
Black man come out all wash white!
(quoted in Dennison 148-9)

White songwriters did their best to make the black man completely impossible as a rival to white males physically and mentally alike. Physical parody of the Dandy Darky was expressed to various degrees in minstrel songs, from the more modest caricatures of black pretentiousness and self-indulgence, to the most vicious cases of physical ridicule. A highly popular minstrel air of the Dandy Darky, "Dandy Jim of Caroline,"[9] detailed the egocentrism and vanity of the Black Dandy, but without going into direct physical depreciation.[10]

Dandy Jim started bragging about his irresistible personal charms and his conquests of many a female heart in this fashion:

I've often heard it said of late,
Dat souf Carolina was de state,
Whar a handsome nigga's bound to shine,
Like Dandy Jim of Caroline.

For my ole massa tole me so,
I was de best looking nigga in de country,
O, I look in de glass an found 'twas so,
Just what massa tole me, O.
(quoted in Dennison 138)

Sometimes the Dandy Darky character got so carried away by his own egocentric boasting that, forgetting about his female partners (for whom the act was originally devised), he went into open confession of the fact that above all he was in love with himself, like in this stanza of "A Little More Cider":

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8. "A Nigger's Reason" quoted in full in Dennison 147-9.
9. "Dandy Jim From Caroline," Brown University, Harris Collection, no. 34. In Starr Sheet Music Collection, Lilly Library, Bloomington, Indiana, M1.S8, Afro-Americans before 1863.
10. According to the Brown University notes for this song, the composer of the song was Dan Myers, the violinist of the Virginia Serenaders, and the author was S.S. Steele. Odell's *Annals* supplies the name of the first performer of the song, an A.F. Winnemore, who in all likelihood was "the original Dandy Jim of Carolina" (Odell, V, 138). The sheet music cover of the song of 1843, however, represents Barney Williams in the role, who later became one of the most excellent delineators of Irish characters on America's stages (Brown University notes).

I love de white gal and de black,
And I love all de rest;
I love de gal for loving me,
But I love myself de best.
(Dennison 149)

The physical ridicule of the Dandy Darky, however, often reached more serious, even violent expressions in minstrel songs. Depiction of self-love, vanity and the ridiculous imitation of white aristocrats through flamboyant, overadorned outfits were soon turned into open attacks against alleged or real physical attributes of the black male. Henry H. Paul's "Sam Of Tennessee," an apparent parody on "Dandy Jim of Caroline," Rice's "New Oh! Hush!," "Do Come Along Ole Sandy, Boy"[11] and many more of the kind launched attacks on a variety of black bodily characteristics (like big feet, body odor, etc.).

To demean the darky intellectually besides making him a target of physical ridicule came to be essential for songsmiths if they wanted to prove the black male absolutely unfit to Northern white circles. Whereas the "Happy Plantation Darky" appealed to white audiences as attractively funny in his ignorant misdeeds and naive trouble-making, the Black Dandy was pictured as a ridiculous but less attractive character through his pretensions at intellectual superiority. "Going Ober de Mountain," "Walk In The Parlor," and Rice's "Pompey Smash,"[12] can all be quoted as brilliant examples for the intellectual putting down of the Black Dandy.

The song, however, which stated this intellectual attack against the citified dandy best as well as summarized the most important attributes of this minstrel figure was "Zip Coon"[13] (see Figure 4). The sheet music cover of the song is especially important as illustration for the obvious physical ridicule that blackface performers invented primarily to diminish the physical appeal of the black dandy, and to make him impossible as their rivals.

The text of the song caricatured the darky's diminished intellectual abilities as well as his clumsy notions of politics in addition to the physical ridicule. Zip Coon's boasts of his intellectual abilities, that he was a "very larned scholar," were ridiculed through the fact that he could perform "Cooney in de hollar" cited as proof for his mental talents (Dennison 59). His maleness was made fun of through his mad, old lover, Old Suke Blueskin, while his political ideas were pictured as perfectly twisted and idiotic. Zip Coon's grotesque portrait was topped by his secret hopes to become the president of the United States.

If I was de President of dese United States,
I's suck lasses candy and swing upon de gates,
An dose I didn't like I'd block em off de dockett,
An de way I'd block em off would be a sin to Crocket.
(Dennison 61)

Zip Coon, Dandy Jim, and other embodiments of the Dandy Darky circulated widely on the minstrel stages, and they came to establish the tradition of the Black Dandy for several decades to come. The darky, the songs suggested, did not belong in the North; his freedom if he had it was used for the wrong purposes (imitation of white aristocrats, courting white women, ridiculous pretensions at education). The comicality of the character was summarized best by Dennison. "Laughter provoked by the caricature of his physical appearance, his love-making abilities, his outlook on life, in short, his entire

11. All quoted in part in Dennison 152.
12. All quoted in part in Dennison 140-3.
13. Bob Farrell claimed, and is usually credited with, the authorship of this song, although George Washington Dixon, who also featured it, insisted it was his (Dennison 58-9). The cover of the sheet music represents Dixon, and is dated 1834.

character, was effective in stripping him of his dignity" (Dennison 147).

Minstrels, however, did a little more than merely satirize the figure of the Dandy Darky. They also tried to show the black as malfunctioning in the North. Minstrel routines pictured blacks in comedy-like situations "up in the city" as they "got tricked out of their money by con-men, run down by trolleys, shocked by electric batteries, and jailed for violating laws which they did not understand" (Toll 69). The Black on the whole was unfit for life in the city. While making the Blacks absolute outcasts in the city, they also served as models "of how not to do things." Thus, beyond providing comic relief at the expense of the Negroes, minstrel stages also educated their audiences, like Barnum's Museum did, "but they did it with laughter, not with exhibits" (Toll 70).

Figure 1



Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

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Tibor Glant

The Image of Hungary in the American Press during the First World War[1]

Studies of French and British public opinion suggest that the positive, Kossuth-type romanticized concept of Hungary was gradually replaced in those two countries between the turn of the century and the outbreak of the First World War by a more realistic and, from a Hungarian point of view, rather unfavourable image.[2] A similar change of opinion regarding Hungary also took place in the United States but only during the World War. This was to some extent due to the staying power of the Kossuth myth in America as well as the logical result of America's traditional lack of interest in European, and especially East Central European affairs. However, the growing American involvement in the war together with wartime propaganda and the press not only reflected but also helped to bring about this revision of opinion. Not surprisingly, wartime American foreign policy and peace preparations were carried on without paying attention to Hungarian interests; and war propaganda in the New World, especially after the American declaration of war on Austria-Hungary in December 1917, also did more to damage than to improve Hungary's image.[3] In contrast, in the press self-appointed representatives of Hungary were given a say even during the final months of the war—a fact that makes the study of the wartime American press not only interesting but also necessary.

This, however, is easier said than done in the absence of overall studies of either the American press or Hungarian-related American public opinion during that battered second decade of our century. Here, an introduction to the prewar images of Hungary, the Hungarians and the Hungarian-Americans in America is followed by a sometimes topical at other times chronological survey of the press and, by way of conclusion, a few general comments are also offered.

For centuries, the 'nobles' (members of the gentry and the aristocracy) had viewed themselves as the 'Hungarian Nation' and projected this image towards the world outside the Kingdom of Hungary. This image of the nobleman: educated, chivalrous and proud while fond of wine, woman, and song was transferred to America from Europe. Hungary's heroic stand in 1848-49 boosted this image in the eyes of most Americans; and even a brief diplomatic interlude took place between Kossuth and the American government.[4] Kossuth's eight-month American visit in 1851-52 turned interest into 'love affair.' The

1. The following essay is based upon the relevant sections of my unpublished Ph.D. dissertation and some further research.
2. See for example Géza Jeszenszky, *Az elveszett presztízs* (Budapest, 1986) and Mária Ormos, *Pádovától Trianonig, 1918-1920* (Budapest, 1983).
3. On this issue see Tibor Glant, "The War for Wilson's Ear: Austria-Hungary in Wartime American Propaganda," in: *Hungarian Studies Review*, 20/1-2 (Spring-Fall 1993), 25-51.
4. Eugene Pivány, *Hungarian-American Historical Connections from the Pre-Columbian Times to the End of the Civil War* (Budapest, 1927), 34-35. Note that Pivány also published the relevant documents in *Századok* in 1910.

Hungarian politician well understood that mid-nineteenth century America was driven by WASP values and promoted the image of a republican-Protestant Hungary in the USA.[5] Needless to say, Hungary was neither republican nor predominantly Protestant at that time; but this mattered little then. This positive attitude towards Hungary and the Hungarians was further strengthened by the Hungarian-American contribution to the cause of the union in the Civil War.

Thus, it was not until New Immigration started and people from Hungary migrated to the US in large numbers that alternative images began to emerge. Immigrants in the New World have always occupied the lowest position on the American social scale; and immigrants from Hungary were no exception. However, the image of the 'hunky,' that of the cheap and expendable physical labourer,[6] did not mix with the general, romanticized image of Hungary. Nor did the conduct of the Hungarian government influence American attitudes, not even the arrest of an American government agent in Budapest[7] or open anti-assimilation policies in the US; which was a clear indication of continued lack of interest on the part of Americans.

Subsequently, the image of the 'hunky' and the various manifestations of the by no means democratic inclinations of the Hungarian government only coloured the Kossuth-type image of the land of the Magyars in America. So did personal connections, especially the rapidly unfolding friendship between Ct. Albert Apponyi and Theodore Roosevelt. They first met during Apponyi's visit to the conference of the Interparliamentary Union, held in St. Louis, Missouri in 1904. Theodore Roosevelt, then President of the US, invited the Hungarian aristocrat for a private dinner and they stayed in touch afterwards. During his 1910 tour of Europe Theodore Roosevelt came to Hungary and paid a short visit to the Apponyis. In 1911 Apponyi was again invited to America and it was on this occasion that the two met for the last time. Enraged by the German sinking of the *Lusitania* Theodore Roosevelt ended their correspondence in July 1915[8] and then he died in January 1919. Apponyi went on to play an important part in the Austro-Hungarian war effort and represented Hungary at the Peace Conference in early 1920.

Following Theodore Roosevelt's lead, prominent Americans, if interested at all, came to view the Catholic aristocrat Apponyi as the heir apparent to Kossuth. Meanwhile, the Hungarian-Americans chose the more radical, and actually Protestant, Count Michael Károlyi for the same position. The Hungarian-American banker Alexander Konta testified to this by writing a special article for the magazine section of the *New York Times* during Károlyi's second visit to America in the summer of 1914, with the title reading: "To Seek American Sympathy for Hungarian Liberty" and the subheading: "Remembering Kossuth's United States Visit, Members of the Independent Party Are

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5. P. C. Headley, *The Life of Louis Kossuth, Governor of Hungary, Including Notices of the Men and Scenes of the Hungarian Revolution* (Auburn and Buffalo, 1854), esp. 251 and 254.
6. On the 'hunkies' see the relevant passages in Edward A. Ross, *The Old World in the New. The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American People* (London, 1914) and Julianna Puskás, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Allamokban, 1880-1940* (Budapest, 1982).
7. The person in question was Marcus Braun, an acquaintance of Theodore Roosevelt. Braun, serving as Immigration Inspector, accused the Hungarian Premier Count Istvan Tisza of misconduct claiming that he forced non-Magyar emigration and cashed in on a deal with the Cunard Line. During Braun's next visit to Hungary he was arrested by the police for supposedly insulting a detective and was released only after the Roosevelt Administration had intervened on his behalf. See: Marcus Braun, *Immigration Abuses* (New York, 1906).
8. The Roosevelt-Apponyi friendship has been reconstructed from the Theodore Roosevelt Papers in the Manuscript Division in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. An interesting second-hand account is József Kerekesházy, *Apponyi* (Budapest, 1943).

Coming to Ask Our Aid for Democracy."[9] It is hardly surprising that this contrast remained unnoticed by the general public in the US. It took nothing less than a World War to make Americans come to terms with reality: the romanticizing attitude towards Hungary and the Hungarians was abandoned in favour of a rather condemnatory one by the end of the war. With some simplification one may say that by late 1918 Masaryk had replaced Kossuth as the hero of East Central Europe in the eyes of the Americans. But what role did the American press play in this process?

The period of American neutrality actually saw no major changes in news reporting regarding Hungary and the Hungarians; attitudes shifted but little. Hungary was still viewed as an exotic country and actual facts were treated rather light-heartedly: Apponyi featured in the *New York Times* as former Hungarian Premier and Tisza was 'promoted' by the same paper to the illustrious post of 'Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister.'[10] Besides Tisza and Apponyi, two other key Hungarian politicians were also regularly mentioned in the American press: Károlyi, who had the best press of all, and Count Julius Andrássy, son of the man who had created the German-Habsburg alliance and who as the last Foreign Minister of the Monarchy undid it in October 1918. Tisza was presented as the instigator of the war and the behind-the-scenes operator at the Ballhausplatz, Apponyi as the 'friend of America,' Andrássy as a leading opposition politician and Károlyi as the possible bringer of a 'New Hungary on American Plan.'[11]

The only Hungarian politician to make an attempt to influence American public opinion directly was Apponyi. During 1915 the *New York Times* printed several feature articles by him, usually in the Sunday magazine section.[12] In his writings for the American press and public, Apponyi repeatedly described the war as a Russian plot to destroy the Habsburg Monarchy. He also warned the Americans that their position was neutral only in name since they provided the Allies with contraband while the Central Powers could find no access to it. Thus, he considered submarine warfare an acceptable means of keeping the Allies at bay but touched upon the wrong nerve in America with the following comment regarding the sinking of the *Lusitania*:

> What are the few hundred who went down with the Lusitania, deeply though we mourn their lot, in comparison to the hundreds of thousands who are killed by American bullets fired by Russians from American guns, by American explosives, a token of sympathy offered by a peace-loving democracy to the representative of darkest tyranny and wanton aggression?[13]

This was not something the American public was ready to hear at that time and Apponyi was accused of echoing German views. The rather unfavourable reception of this article and his earlier break with Theodore Roosevelt marked the end of Apponyi's one-man campaign in the American press at the end of 1915.

Contraband, however, remained a very hot issue. In the absence of a satisfactory official solution the Ambassadors of Germany (Count Johann von Bernstorff) and Austria-Hungary (Constantin Theodore Dumba) called for strikes in American munition factories and issued warnings that such work may result in capital punishment once the

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9. See the 5 July, 1914 issue of the *New York Times*.
10. From the front page of the 24 December, 1915 issue: "Advices from Budapest dated Dec. 15 convey the impression that the Austro-Hungarian prime Minister, Count Tisza is—or was—likely to overrule Baron Burian, the Foreign Minister, in case the latter should be desirous of meeting the American demands..." No quotation can be more telling than this one.
11. All these are from the *New York Times* and *The Nation*, which was the leading political weekly at the time.
12. 17 January, 28 March, and 12 October, 1915.
13. From the 12 October, 1915 piece, which was printed on p. 10.

offender returned home after the war. With most East-Central European immigrants intending to do so, this was a serious threat. Sabotage, however, proved to be fatal for Dumba: he was caught in the act and was declared *persona non grata* in late 1915.[14] This triggered off a wholesale spy and saboteur catching campaign in the press. Ironically, it was the *New York World*, which had been founded by the Hungarian immigrant Joseph Pulitzer, that played the leading role in this campaign. Being associated with saboteurs and spies made life for many Hungarian-Americans almost unbearable and loyalty demonstrations, all well received by the White House, soon began.[15]

Furthermore, on two occasions American journalists actually visited Hungary and, as if to save much of the work of later historians, they echoed the earlier outlined stereotypes instead of making a genuine attempt to understand what was going on in Budapest. Their strikingly similar accounts, widely read as the only first hand information available, guided Henry Bayard Swope of the *New York World* and William Christian Bullitt of the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, to entirely different fates.

Swope, whose single report, the thirteenth in a series about belligerent Europe, was printed in the 16 November 1916 issue of the prestigious metropolitan paper, later simply disappeared from the political scene. The ruthless press war between the *World* and *The Fatherland*, the leading German-American weekly, soaked up most of his energy and, on top of that, he was roasted in the Hungarian-American press for what was considered a gross misrepresentation of facts.[16]

Bullitt, on the other hand, although writing only for a regional paper, quickly rose to prominence, which makes this early chapter of his long (and rather hectic) political career even more interesting. Newly-weds in 1916, the Bullitts decided to spend their honeymoon travelling, of all places, in the Central Powers interviewing key politicians to boost William's career as a journalist. He had all the makings of a talented journalist: good insight, an enjoyable style, the ability to ask the right question and to interpret the answers 'correctly' even when he received none. Typical of his luck, they were in Budapest when Rumania declared war on the Monarchy and he interviewed Tisza, Apponyi and Andrássy. He submitted a copy of the Tisza interview to the State Department after the Hungarian Premier had asked him not to publish it. He cleverly skinned the same cat twice by publishing the rest of his interviews in the *Public Ledger*, which secured the attention of the highest circles for him. Colonel House, Wilson's chief advisor, had him appointed to the State Department and later he was added to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.[17]

During the period of American belligerency the earlier pro-Hungarian statements were gradually replaced with anti-Hungarian ones—the final disintegration of the positive and idealized prewar image of Hungary was one of the most distinctive developments of the period. Another, equally significant, change was the 'discovery' of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in Russia, which secured the interest and sympathy of the American public for

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14. This is the so-called "Dumba affair", which is a standard feature in books on wartime America. The Ambassador's own account may also be consulted in English: Constantin Theodore Dumba, *Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London, 1933).
15. Julianna Puskás, *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Allamokban, 1880-1940* (Budapest, 1982) 303-315.
16. An undated cutting from a November 1916 issue of *Szabadság*, the Cleveland Hungarian-American daily, which was located among the Géza Kende Papers in the Bethlen Home, Ligonier, Pennsylvania.
17. The Bullitt story was reconstructed from his articles for the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, from the diary of his wife: Ernesta Drinker Bullitt, *An Uncensored Diary from the Central Empires* (London, 1918), and from his official biography: Will Brownell and Richard N. Billings, *So Close to Greatness. A Biography of William C. Bullitt* (New York and London, 1987). Bullitt's report to the State Department was located among the Frank Lyon Polk Papers in the Sterling Memorial Library, at Yale University, New Haven, Connceticut.

the Czech cause exactly when Masaryk arrived in Washington.[18]

Interestingly enough, it was neither the American declaration of war on Germany nor the subsequent US-Habsburg diplomatic break that brought about the first major change in the image of Hungary in the American press but the events between May and August 1917: Tisza's resignation over the issue of universal suffrage pushed Hungary into the focus of attention for the first time during the war. When Tisza reportedly commented on the subsequent changes that they were nothing short of a revolution, optimism began to rise in America. Special articles were printed in the *New York Times* and in Walter Lippmann's *New Republic* discussing the Hungarian situation. Since Americans tended to view the exit of the Habsburg Monarchy from the war as the key to the defeat of Germany, high hopes, in fact too high hopes, were attached to the coming 'revolution' in Hungary.[19] When it did not come, frustration was riding very high in the New World; during the early months of 1918 the first attacks on Hungary appeared in the American press.

One such example is the contribution of the Rumanian-American K. Bercovici, "Hungarian Lust for World Power," in which he claimed that:

> The cruelty and intolerance of the Magyars is as proverbial in the Balkans as is their arrogance and stupidity. Long of arms, bowlegged, with fierce mouth and deep-seated, small eyes, the Magyar is the typical savage of history. Like his brother, the Teuton, he is an abject slave and a horrible master... [After the war, the] mad passions, the blood lust so long repressed of all those thinly veneered barbarians, will be given free play.[20]

Wilson's switch from the program of federalizing the Monarchy to its dismemberment, together with the public campaign in support of the Czecho-Slovak legion in Russia, opened the floodgates for dismemberment propaganda in the American press during July-August 1918. Yet, even under such circumstances Hungarian voices were also heard. The radical Hungarian-American journalist Eugene Bagger-Szekeres had a long piece published in the 20 July 1918 issue of the *New Republic* under the title "Because I Am a Magyar." He suggested dismemberment and the establishment of separate Austrian, Czecho-Slovak, Hungarian and Jugoslav states in the Danubian Basin. The Allies, he continued, should also bring about regional integration in East-Central Europe and guarantee

> the independence and rights of the Magyar people proper, and define the boundaries within which the right of the Magyars to live their own national life and to cultivate their independent statehood is unassailable. To omit this would be a grave strategic error as well as an infringement upon justice...

Given that, Bagger-Szekeres continued:

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18. The standard work on the Czechs, which is somewhat biased, is Betty Miller Unterberger, *The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina and London, 1989).
19. See p. 169 of the 16 June, 1917 issue of the *New Republic*. The *New Republic* was started in 1914 by the young journalist Walter Lippmann, then a radical, and soon emerged as a major political weekly of opinion. Interestingly, the *Outlook*, which was earlier edited by Theodore Roosevelt and for which George F. Kennan of all people reported on the two Russian revolutions of 1917, did not discuss Hungary or the Habsburg Monarchy during the war. Meanwhile, the *New York Times* covered the story with headlines like "Hungary May Cause Rift in Teuton Ring" (16 September, 1917, Section 7, p. 6).
20. See the 17 March, 1918 issue of the *New York Times*.

> the breaking up of the territorial unity of Hungary, involving as it does exploding the cherished fiction of historic rights, will in the end benefit the Magyars themselves no less than their Slav neighbors.... There can be no happy and secure Hungary in the midst of an unhappy and insecure Europe, and Europe will continue to be unhappy and insecure as long as the menace of Slav irredentism darkens its south-eastern horizon.

The conclusion is emotional and explicit:

> I believe in the full victory of the Allies and Czecho-Slovak and Jugoslav independence, not in spite of being a Magyar, but because I am a Magyar. And I believe... that the time will come when all my countrymen will think as I do.[21]

The release of such an article at that time was a clear indication of the fact that Hungary's loss of prestige in America could possibly have been countered by, for example, a well-orchestrated Hungarian-American press campaign; at least certain channels remained open despite the state of belligerency.

The analysis of the failure of the Hungarian-Americans and the Hungarian government to stand up for the future of Hungary in America would extend far beyond the scope of this conference lecture. Nevertheless, a few general remarks, by way of conclusion, seem necessary to place the above cited facts into a broader context.

Hungary's dramatic loss of prestige in America during World War One should be seen in the context of the American war effort and of American attitudes towards the Habsburg Monarchy. Austria-Hungary was viewed in the New World, and not without justification, as a Catholic, backward and decadent European power while much was expected of the Hungarians whose democratic inclinations the Americans clearly overestimated. After the release of Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* thesis in 1915 the Americans came to consider the exit of the Monarchy from the war to be the key to victory. According to Wilson, this was to be achieved through a separate peace and not through revolution (notice the difference between the opinions of the press and the White House on the issue) or dismemberment. Thus, American entrance into the war cut the White House and the public off from information from the Danubian Basin at exactly the same time when the region came to the focus of attention. Information in the press was gradually replaced by wide scale speculation and dismemberment propaganda, which focused primarily on Hungary.

Meanwhile, due to Dumba's rather unfortunate actions, Hungarian-Americans had to swim with the tide and come to terms with that cruelest reality of all: their new homeland was at war with the mother country. This 'crisis of loyalty' and the various attempts to solve it,[22] together with other, mostly religious conflicts, simply ruled out a unified stand in favour of Hungary. At the same time, the leading Hungarian politicians,

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21. The quotes are from pp. 340-41.

22. Discussing the Dumba affair, the aforementioned Géza Kende wrote in the 19 September, 1915 issue of the *New York Times*: "Did the American press and the American people stop to think only a minute what it means for Hungarians in America to manufacture munitions which are intended to kill their own brethren and destroy the houses in which they were born? Don't you see the dark, tragic side of the situation? Is it not a crime against the mother country to help willingly and knowingly the enemies who want to destroy it? Is it not the duty of the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary, even of every good American citizen, to help these poor Hungarians in their desperate situation, and show them a way to get some other peaceful occupation which is not in contrast with their feelings and sentiments?" This is a clear indication what was meant by the crisis of loyalty. The situation deteriorated further after December 1917, when the United States declared war on Austria-Hungary.

with the exception of Apponyi, did not consider campaigning in America necessary; they intended to sort out the future of Hungary back in Budapest.

Despite the establishment of the Committee on Public Information, the first ever American propaganda ministry, which heavily censored the press,[23] the example of Bagger-Szekeres suggests that a campaign for Hungary, most surprisingly, was and would have been possible even during the dying days of the war. Since it did not come, and with Wilson's change of policy clearing the way, dismemberment propagandists, with Masaryk at the helm, took centre stage and reversed the positive prewar image of Hungary within a matter of months. Their motivation was simple: they wanted territories from Hungary and American support for their often conflicting claims at the impending peace conference.

Further study of the American press will reveal whether this negative image prevailed in the New World or whether lack of interest, which returned as early as mid-1919, brought back the earlier stereotypes.

23. On the CPI see: Stephen L. Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines. Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1980).

Anthony Johnson

Inigo Jones, Annotation and Literary Collaboration: An Overview.

In *Ben Jonson: Poetry and Architecture* (Oxford, 1994), I examined — among other things — the artistic collaboration of playwright and architect, Ben Jonson and Inigo Jones, on the court masques of the Jacobean and Caroline periods. Taking my cue largely from the point of view of the playwright, I investigated his interest in architecture; his annotations to architectural works (including the *De architectura libri decem* of the Roman architect, Vitruvius), and his construction of masquing texts — early in the liaison with Jones — which appeared to have been arranged largely in conformity with the precepts of Vitruvian aesthetics. Such an approach to the playwright's theories and practices would clearly be complemented by a fuller view of the intellectual development of the architect; yet any attempt to correlate the interplay of ideas between these two men over time is hampered, from the outset, by an imbalance. In the case of Jonson we have access, on the one hand, to a great deal of information, for his medium was language and he was vociferous in the expression of his own opinions. Yet on the other hand, his early critical gleanings were swept away in a fire which destroyed his library in 1623. Paradoxically enough, then, very little external evidence of his early thoughts on literary construction, let alone Vitruvianism, survives; while his later comments on the subject are tainted by a growing hostility to Jones (who, by the 1630s, had developed his own form of Vitruvianism from a lifetime's immersion in the tradition, and evolved a philosophy to back it up). And in the case of Jones, we are confronted by an artist whose medium of expression is primarily visual rather than verbal so that the eloquence of his response to Jonson's attack on his Vitruvianism, embedded silently in the iconography of his later masques, has waited until the present century to find an interpreter.[1]

Buried in the margins of the extant books from Jones's library, however, is a substantial body of writing, of which very little — partly because of problems in legibility and idiosyncrasies in spelling — has ever been published. (That such factors should not be confused with an incoherence of thought is, however, demonstrated amply enough by B. Allsopp's transcription of Jones's meticulous marginal notes to Palladio.)[2] In contrast with Jonson — who was not in the habit of dating his annotations and whose handwriting does not seem to have significantly changed over the course of his career — Jones occasionally assigned places and dates to his marginal comments and consciously italicised

1. See Gordon, D. J. (6 February, 1975), *The Renaissance Imagination*, ed. S. Orgel (Berkeley, Calif.): 86—96. Earlier versions of the present paper appeared in Johnson, A. W. (1987), '*"Angles, Squares*, or *Roundes*": Studies in Jonson's Vitruvianism', doctoral dissertation, 2 vols (Oxford); and Johnson, A. W. (1990), 'Inigo Jones and Ben Jonson', unpub. paper delivered at the Symposium, 'Inigo Jones: Renaissance Man', University of Oxford.
2. Jones, Inigo (1970 edn = *Quattro libri*), *Inigo Jones on Palladio: Being the Notes by Inigo Jones in the Copy of 'I Quattro libri dell Architettura di Andrea Palladio 1601' in the Library of Worcester College, Oxford*, ed. B. Allsopp, 2 vols (Newcastle).

his earlier secretary hand as he grew older. John Newman — matching the handwriting against the dated annotations — has, in consequence, been able to identify four main phases in the architect's style and has thereby provided the palaeographic tools by which we may begin to analyse and date the stages of Jones's intellectual development.[3]

In this paper I would like to outline some aspects of Jones's imaginative preoccupations by considering his annotations, placing them (with the aid of Newman's findings) in their position within the chronology of Jones's life, and using them as a yardstick against which the movement and counter-thrust of Jonson's thought may be measured. Accordingly, I will explore the marginalia in a number of the books from Jones's library, paying particular attention to four texts (all of them in Italian) - his Barbaro Vitruvius of 1567, his 1568 edition of Vasari's *Lives*, his 1614 copy of Plutarch's *Moralia*, and his 1554 version of Plato's *Republic* - choosing these because they seem to reveal most clearly the directions in which Jones's thought progressed.[4] Such a survey will enable me to sketch (in outline at least), aspects of the changing orientations which the architect was to bring to bear in his collaboration with Ben Jonson: orientations which may help to elucidate the reasons for the early success of the partnership as well as the tensions which led to its ultimate, rancorous, dissolution in the 1630s.

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The majority of Jones's extant books may be found in the libraries of Chatsworth House, Derbyshire; Worcester College, Oxford, and Queen's College, Oxford.[5] Of these works, which fall into three main categories, the body of volumes on art and architecture has attracted the most attention; and indeed, including in its number the treatises by Alberti (1565), Barbaro (1567), Busca (1619), Cartari (1592), Cataneo (1567), Lomazzo (1584), Lorini (1609), de l'Orme (1567), Palladio (1601), Rusconi (1590), Scamozzi (1615), Serlio

3. Newman, John (1980), 'The Dating of Inigo Jones's Handwriting', typescript from 'Essays Presented to Professor Peter Murray'. (Copy now lodged in Senate House Library, University of London.) I am very grateful to Mr Newman for sharing his knowledge with me. Over recent years, the implications of Newman's work have been developed by a number of scholars, most notably in Higgott, G. (1983), 'Inigo Jones in Provence', *Architectural History*, 26: 24—34; Harris J., and Higgott, G. (eds) (1989), *Inigo Jones: Complete Architectural Drawings*; Peacock, J. (1990), 'Inigo Jones as a Figurative Artist', in: *Renaissance Bodies: The Human Figure in English Culture c. 1540—1660*, ed. L. Gent and N. Llewellyn (London).

4. A complete transcript of the annotations to Vasari, G. (1568 = *Lives*), *Delle vita de' piu eccellenti pittori scultori et architettori*, vol. I of the third part (Florence); Plutarch (1614 = Moralia), *Opuscoli morali, di Plutarcho Cheronese*, tr. M. A. Gandino (Venice); and Plato (1554 = *Republic*), *La Republica di Platone*, tr. P. Fiorimbene (Venice), appeared in Johnson (1987), vol. II: 332-95; and will reappear in Johnson, A. W. (ed.) (forthcoming, 1996), *Inigo Jones, the Non-Architectural Annotations: Plato to Xenophon* (Åbo). A transcript of Jones's annotations to Vitruvius (1567 = *Dieci libri*), *I dieci libri dell'architettura*, tr. D. Barbaro (Venice), appeared in Toplis, G. (1967), 'Neo-platonic Aspects of the Thought and Work of Inigo Jones', unpub. M.A. thesis, 2 vols (Liverpool), vol. II. I wish to thank the Librarian and staff at Chatsworth House for allowing me to consult Jones's copy of the Barbaro original.

5. I have been able to consult all the works cited below — with the exception of Jones's Lomazzo (which is privately owned) and his 1619 edition of Serlio (in the Library of the Royal Institute of British Architects) — and am particularly grateful to Lesley Le Claire, formerly Chief Librarian at Worcester College, for her support over the period in which these studies were made.

(1560-1562), Vasari (1568), Vignola (1607) and Viola (1629) — and supported by the writings of Euclid (1575), Scala (1603) and Ubaldo (1581) on mathematics and mechanics — this must have constituted one of the most formidable English collections of Italian art-books in the period. Yet we should not forget that Jones's shelves also housed the works of antiquaries, historians and geographers — such as Leandro Alberti (1588), Appian (1551), Bordinus (1588), Caesar (1598), Curtius (1559), Dictys (1570), Dio (1548), Florus (1546), Fulvio (1543), Gamucci (1569), Guicciardini (1580), Herodotus (1539), Palladio (1588), Patricius (1583), Plutarch (1607), Polybius (1558), Ptolemy (1561), Sarayna (1540), Strabo (1562 and 1565), Summonte (1601-1602), Vasari (1588), Vegetius (1551) and Xenophon (1521 and 1547) — or that the architect possessed a small but select collection of philosophical works, represented by Aristotle (1551), Piccolomini (1575), Plato (1554) and Plutarch (1567 and 1614).[6]

With the exception of four volumes, all of these works were either written in Italian or appear in Italian translation; and it is notable that, of the exceptions, the Latin books by Bordinus and Sarayna (which Jones, on account of his inadequacies in that tongue, may have been unable to read) are unmarked; and the third, a French edition of Polybius, is annotated in a hand that is not Jones's; while the fourth, Philibert de l'Orme's *Le premier tome de l'architecture*, contains only one light underscoring and no notes.[7] Of the Italian texts a large number are heavily annotated, yet, of the architectural treatises studied by Jones (excepting the Palladio), only the Alberti, the Barbaro and the Serlio appear to have been transcribed in their entirety by subsequent critics (and none in a published form); while, from the non- architectural works, scarcely a handful of annotations have appeared in print.[8] This neglect, no doubt, is in part a result of the fact that the importance of such marginalia was eclipsed by enormous significance that Jones's reading of Palladio has had on the history of English architecture since Leoni first published a partial transcript of the notes in 1742. But in the long term such a concentration on the annotations to one volume has had an unfortunate effect: perpetuating that monocular view of a Palladianised Jones which was created to a great extent by the eighteenth century and which has only been recently modified by the work of Sumner Smith, Orgel, Strong, Peacock, Orrell, Higgott, Chaney, and Newman himself.[9]

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6. For Jones's books, see Wilkinson, C. H. (1926), 'Worcester College Library', *Transactions of the Oxford Bibliographical Society*, vol. I. part iv: 261—320; Harris, J., Orgel, S., and Strong R. (1973), *The King's Arcadia: Inigo Jones and the Stuart Court* (London and Bradford): 63—7, 217—18. Harris (1973: 64), mentions that Jones also owned a copy of Arthur Hopton's *Topographical Glasse* (1611), although he does not state its whereabouts.
7. The marking in Philibert de l'Orme (1567), *Le premier tome del'architecture* (Paris), Book V, Chapter vi: 136^{v} — has the appearance of an accidental slip of the hand. Nevertheless it is of interest, because it occurs in the passage where de l'Orme discusses the difficulties of talking about architecture in a language which lacks an adequate terminology for the concept; and this problem, as we know from Jonson's jibes at Jones's vocabulary, was confronted by Jones in his dealings with the English language.
8. Renditions of the Alberti and the Palladio appear in Toplis (1967); while the annotated Serlio (c.1560-1562), was transcribed by Dr George Clarke and donated to Worcester College Library (along with his entire collection of Jones's books) in 1736. Other significant quotations from Jones's notes have been made in Gotch, J. A. ([1928] 1968), *Inigo Jones* (New York): 72-82; Summerson, J. N. ([1966] 1983), *Inigo Jones* (Harmondsworth): 43, 71; Summerson ([1953] 1977), *Architecture in Britain* (Harmondsworth): 118; Pevsner, N. ([1943] 1983), *An Outline of European Architecture* (Harmondsworth): 309-10; and by Toplis in his contribution to Harris, Orgel, and Strong (1973): 61-3.
9. Leoni, G. (1742), *The Architecture of A. Palladio in Four Books* ... (London), is passingly discussed in Wittkower, R. ([1974] 1983), *Palladio and English Palladianism* (London):

In fact, taken together, the marginalia in Jones's books seem to offer evidence that he used the medium of Italian as a means of embarking on a thorough and systematic programme of self- education which extended far beyond his architectural interests and grounded him in the work of classical authors who were, at that time, either unavailable or largely inaccessible in English versions.[10] Let us turn, then, to chart this development.

The earliest stage in Jones's handwriting identified by Newman occurs in the first decade of the seventeenth century: a period in which Jones's *ductus* is characterised by a preponderance of upcurving 's's and secretary 'r's, 'p's, and 'h's which are increasingly replaced by italic forms after 1610. If we analyse the three categories of Jones's books from this angle it becomes immediately apparent that his notes in the historical, geographical, antiquarian and philosophical volumes are almost all of later origin, whilst only a small number of the works on art and architecture seem to have been marked in the earlier period.[11] However, as Newman and Higgott have shown, this was a significant minority, and it included the Serlio, the Palladio and the Barbaro Vitruvius.[12] That Jones should have been reading Serlio at the beginning of the century is not surprising, for both

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79-85; and Jones's relation to Palladianism is treated in, among others, A. Tait (1970), 'Inigo Jones — Architectural Historian', *The Burlington Magazine*, 112: 235; and Tafuri, M. (1970), 'La fortuna del Palladio alla fine del cinquecento e l'architettura di Inigo Jones', *Bollettino del C.I.S.A.*: 47-62. Significant studies which examine the wider spectrum of Jones's sources and influences include Sumner Smith, J. (1952), 'The Italian Sources for Inigo Jones's Style', *Burlington Magazine*, 94: 200-207; Orgel, S., and Strong, R. (1973 = O&S), *Inigo Jones: The Theatre of the Stuart Court*, 2 vols. (London, Berkeley, Calif., and Los Angeles): vol. I, 29-48; Peacock, J. (1978) 'New Sources for the Masque Designs of Inigo Jones', *Apollo*, 107: 98-110; Peacock (1982), 'Inigo Jones's Stage Architecture and Its Sources', *The Art Bulletin*, 64: 195-216; Peacock (1984), 'The French Element in Inigo Jones's Masque Designs', in: *The Court Masque*, ed. D. Lindley (Manchester): 149-68; Orrell, J. (1985) *The Theatres of Inigo Jones and John Webb* (Cambridge); and Chaney, E. (1993), 'Inigo Jones in Naples', in *English Architecture Public and Private: Essays for Kerry Downes*, ed. J. Bold and E. Chaney (London and Rio Grande), pp. 31-53.

10. In the cases of Vitruvius and Plato's *Republic*, for example, no edition appeared in English during Jones's lifetime. And, with respect to Plutarch's *Moralia*, Jones would have had to have waited until he was thirty for Philemon Holland's translation to appear: although by *Epicoene* (1609) its popularity was such that Jonson could make comic capital by mocking it — see Jonson, B. (1925-52 edn = H&S), *Ben Jonson*, ed. Herford, C. H., Simpson, P., and Simpson, E. (Oxford), vol. V: I. i. 62-6. With respect to contemporary Italian writings the problem of inaccessibility, or the availability of texts in piecemeal or unreliable translations, was even greater. Vasari's *Lives*, for instance, was partially translated into English by William Aglionby in 1685, some thirty-three years after Jones's death, and the Italian version, as Howarth notes, was 'apparently a difficult book to find in Jacobean London' so that Peacham, one of the earliest English commentators on the Lives, found it necessary to borrow Jones's copy of the work — see Howarth, D. (1985), *Lord Arundel and His Circle* (New Haven, Conn., and London): 118.
11. A notable exception is *I commentari di C. Giulio Cesare, con le figure in rame ... Fatte da Andrea Palladio* (1598), which contains notes in Jones's secretary hand (e.g. the 'k' in 'a brige with basketes of stones', on page 390). Considering the date of publication it would seem reasonable to assume that Jones purchased this volume on his first Italian visit.
12. The Serlio has long been recognised as an influence on early Jones, but for palaeographic evidence confirming Jones's early ownership of Barbaro, see Higgott (1983): 26; and for Palladio, see Newman (1980), fols 7-11.

Jones and Simon Basil seem to have made use of this source in their entertainments for the King in the hall at Christ Church College, Oxford, in 1605.[13] (The Palladio, too, contains a few notes from Jones's earlier period so that the inscription on the flyleaf of the volume, 'Vennis 1601', may well represent its date and place of acquisition as well as publication.)[14] But most striking from the point of view of handwriting is the Barbaro Vitruvius, as this contains a variety of early markings that may be used to map out Jones's early concerns.[15]

The annotations in Jones's 1567 Italian version of this work date from several periods of his life and provide evidence that, as in the Palladio, the architect returned again and again to the text, modifying and adding to his earlier notes. However, there are two substantial passages that Jones seems to have studied in their entirety in the period before 1610, when his collaboration with Jonson was in its early stages, and they throw some light on his preoccupations at that time. The first set of notes, written in a small, neat, secretary hand in the margins of Book II, Chapter viii, are suggestive in that their subject is a pragmatic one: the kinds of walling, the materials that should be selected for different tasks, the ways in which they should be treated, and the uses to which they should be put (*Dieci libri*, 83-6). Although, then, there is no evidence that Jones actually built anything until he became Surveyor to Prince Henry, it is clear that he had an early interest in the practicalities of architectural construction.[16]

The other passage in the Barbaro Vitruvius that is marked throughout in one early ink — displaying a hand that is rich in secretary 'r's, 'p's and 'h's — is found in Vitruvius' chapter on the parts of architecture (Book I, Chapter ii). Here it is plain that Jones's primary interest is to hammer out the basic terminology of architecture and 'To vnderstand ye 6 thinges ' that make up 'all Comparasons and Relations' (*Dieci libri*, 27). Consequently, he glosses 'order', noting what it is in 'yts generall nature', how 'architectes order' differs, how order implies a hierarchy of 'Respecte' in which 'Som thinges go before[,] others follow', and how it consists in 'ye Dispencing of thinges equall and unequale' (*Dieci libri*, 28). He also observes that as order entails 'disposinge of mesures to the Simitri', so 'disposition is ordering ye partes to ye Place' (*Dieci libri*, 29); that 'bel Numero' — which he calls 'Eurithmia' (*Dieci libri*, 26) or 'fayr number' — may be defined as 'grat[i]ous aspecte in composition of ye members' (*Dieci libri*, 33); and that 'Simitri' is 'the B[e]auty of order as Eurithmia ye B[e]auty of Disposition' (*Dieci libri*, 34). Likewise, he renders 'compartment or simitrye' as the 'correspondence of ye parts with ye holle', 'Decorum' as 'Thinges doon with autoriti', and 'Distribution' as 'Things accomodated to

13. See Orrell (1985): 24-38.
14. Newman's findings revise Harris's ascription of Jones's acquisition of the volume to the second Italian visit — see Harris, Orgel, and Strong (1973): 64-5; and we could add that all other dates in the flyleaves of Jones's books seem to register his ownership rather than publication data. However, it is also possible that Jones was able to purchase some of his Italian books while he was in England, from booksellers such as Robert Martin whose shop, 'the Venice in the Old Bayly', was thriving in the reign of Charles I — see J. L. Lievsay (1970), *The Englishman's Italian Books 1550-1700* (Philadelphia): 75. Equally, it is not implausible that like his rival, De Servi (who 'had Italian source material sent to him through the city merchants, concealed in bales of cloth' — see Orrell (1985): 193, n. 59), Jones may have had access to other channels of supply.
15. A summary of Newman's findings and the rationale for the dating of the annotations discussed below are presented in Johnson (1987) vol. II: 328-31.
16. See Summerson ([1966] 1983): 31-4; and Strong, R. (1986), *Henry, Prince of Wales and England's Lost Renaissance* (London), for a discussion of Jones's duties as Surveyor to Prince Henry.

youse' (*Dieci libri*, 27).[17] In these annotations we can watch Jones learning the language and concepts of Vitruvian organisation. But further, it is clear that at this period Jones is already responsive to Barbaro's vision of Vitruvianism as an aesthetic unifying the arts. For example, Jones's comment that 'order disposition &c. are generall and commune termes and therefore have thear diffinitiones in the common & generall siense caled Metaphysik' (*Dieci libri*, 27) probably belongs to the period around 1610; as does one of the few early notes made in the Vitruvian discussion on proportion, where Jones writes that 'the boddi of man well proporsioned is the Patern for proportion in buildings' (*Dieci libri*, 109). We also find, in Vitruvius' chapter on the parts of architecture, Jones, in secretary hand, transcribing the Roman architect's claim that it is the 'modulo' that 'rules all ye workes greatnesses' (*Dieci libri*, 28), while some pages previously, in another cluster of early notes, he enunciates the metonymic principles which underlie Barbaro's aesthetic and 'seerue to many artes' (*Dieci libri*, 23):

> 'in musicke the[rc] must be a proporsionatt distance between the low and heayght /...the same simpathy is in the stares / ... [and] the ruels of arethmeticke that unites musicke with astrologiy' (*Dieci libri*, 24).

At this stage in his career, Jones does not seem to have perceived of any special antagonism between architecture and language, and he notes Barbaro's 'comparrason betwene the orrator & the Architect' (*Dieci libri*, 36) with interest; citing with evident approval - in what seems to be an even earlier annotation - 'An exelent comparason of Barbaro betwene the Orrator and the architect' (*Dieci libri*, 115).[18] Finally, there is a small class of early markings in the Barbaro Vitruvius reflecting the interest in design which may have been Jones's major concern in the first decade of the seventeenth century. Indeed, the earliest allusion we have to Jones's profession, dated 1603, refers to him as a 'picture-maker', and it is bolstered by Jones's own claim, in the opening of *Stonehenge Restor'd*, that 'Being naturally inclined in my younger years to study the Arts of Design I passed into foreign parts to converse with the great masters in Italy'.[19] When Jones appeared in the Jacobean Court it was, as Parry has pointed out, his facility with the pen — his ability to get his ideas down on paper — that made him stand out amongst his contemporaries, and we may guess that, likewise, it may have been the promise of his early architectural drawings and masque designs that earned him an eventual place in the King's Works.[20] For these reasons alone we may not find it remarkable that Jones notes 'what ground plot is'; 'what upprit is', or 'what profile is'; registers 'The great Benifite of makyng ye Purfile'; or observes that Barbaro is 'in doubte whether scenografia bee Purfille or prospective of ye face and side / yt is not ye modell as som have thought' (*Dieci libri*, 30). Nor should we be surprised at the insistence with which Jones later returned to the passage, clarifying, in three separate amendments, the Vitruvian terminology with which Barbaro is struggling.[21]

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17. Similarly Newman (1980): fol. 6, identifies the earliest annotations in the Palladio as those which reveal Jones acquiring a basic knowledge of the Doric order (*Quattro libri*, I: 22).
18. For a fuller citation of the context of this passage, see Johnson (1994): 52. Climactically, Barbaro argues that the conditions of one form may be mixed with those of another, as is evidenced by the true 'Architects of oration' ('Architetti dell'oratione').
19. Summerson ([1966] 1983): 16, points out that the passage imitates the opening to the *Quattro libri*.
20. See Parry, G. (1981), *The Golden Age Restor'd* (Manchester): 151; and Summerson (1977): 112.
21. In one addition to the lower margin of page 29, Jones points out that 'in this word of the purfile Barbaro is deceaued for Vitruvious plainly cales it sccenografia which is the front and side of a building drawne in prospective. & ye purfile is nothing but the uprights of

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Like the Palladio, the Serlio, or the Barbaro, Jones's 1568 Vasari may well have been acquired during the course of the architect's first Italian visit. For the most part the annotations in this volume are of a later date and it is plain — as Jones reveals in the chapter on Frà Giocondo when he observes that 'now at my being at vennis 1614 the Brent[a] is all opened' (*Lives*, 247) — that Jones took this volume with him, along with the Palladio, when he returned to Italy for his second visit.[22] Yet there are earlier notes, made in a secretary hand in the margins to the life of Antonio da Sangallo, and it is these that I would like to consider here.

Antonio da Sangallo himself is, of course, not without interest as a pioneer in the application of Vitruvian principles to built architecture as well as the initiator of an ambitious project to produce an Italian translation of the *De architectura* with a commentary; and it seems significant that, as in the Barbaro Vitruvius, a number of these early notes demonstrate a concern for design. In England during the period, the idea of what was termed the 'model' (or 'design') of a building was certainly current — although, as Pevsner implies, it was the idea of 'a building as a whole, organized throughout — in plan and elevation — according to rational rules' which was to be Jones's particular contribution to English architecture.[23] Hence, we may suspect that behind the three occasions in the chapter where Jones draws attention to Vasari's comments on 'models' lies an appreciation — or perhaps even a realisation — of their potential for his own work. On page 320, for instance, he ponders the 'wonderfull Model maad for St Peters by ye Order of Sangallo and doon by Antonio Abacco' - an allusion to what, in this case, seems to have been a real three-dimensional representation of Sangallo's design - while on the next page, in a slightly later hand, he registers the (adverse) 'Opinion of Mi Angell and many other workmen on ye modell of San Gallo'. But Jones himself seems to have shared Vasari's positive opinion of the work and evidently wished to put his enthusiasm to practical use. For as Summerson reveals, the spire and pinnacles in one of Jones's earliest surviving drawings — the design for the central tower for St. Paul's Cathedral (c.1608) — are 'collected from Labacco's illustration of San Gallo's design for St. Peter's'.[24] Elsewhere in the chapter Jones, writing in a hand with secretary 'r's, records Vasari's comment on the 'rare modell' that Antonio made for the church on the Strada Giulia, in Florence, jotting down the conspicuous cost of 'twelfe thousand Crounes spent in ye foundation in watter of ye florrentines Church/' that Vasari deplores as a needless expense sanctioned by an unthinking Pope (*Lives*, 315). And in summation of this line of thought, Jones opines in a slightly later ink at the top of the next page that 'an Architecte shuld thinke well before he begine ye worke'. Finally, the chapter contains another early annotation which is congruent with the practical interest in building and architecture that we have seen in the Barbaro; and that is where Jones remarks, in Vasari's discussion of the temples Sangallo built on the island of Viscentina, on how 't[w]o tempels on[e] eyght square without and Round within[,] ye other square withoutt & ottangle within sheawde how he could vari ye termes of Architetur' (*Lives*, 316).[25]

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the inner partes of a building not drawne in to prospective'. On the following page Jones again draws attention to Barbaro's 'errour', concluding in a pencil note that 'barbaro knew not that purfill is upprite of the inner partes of a building' (*Dieci libri*, 32). Jones's use of the terms 'model', and 'platform' or 'plan', are desynonymised (for another context), in Gotch ([1928] 1968): 94.

22. Jones's comment was first noticed by Gotch ([1928] 1968): 250, Item 17.
23. Pevsner (1983): 308.
24. Summerson ([1966] 1983): 28.
25. As Newman reveals (1980): fol. 7, some of Jones's earlier annotations in the Palladio occur on the plates in Book II illustrating the villas, so that in the case of that work, too, there

From this brief consideration of Jones's early annotations three points emerge. Firstly, it is evident that the development of his Vitruvianism and Palladianism do not follow a simple linear, or logical direction: Jones owned a Palladio at the same time as a Serlio, a Barbaro and a Vasari — and was able to draw ideas from them throughout the period — while other authors, such as Alberti, whom he might have been expected to have read early in his career, were not - in all probability - assimilated until after his second Italian Journey.[26] Secondly, Jones was immersing himself - at a textual level - in the practicalities of architectural construction and design from the first decade of the seventeenth century. And thirdly, the period seems to have been one in which (with the help of Barbaro) Jones was engaged in mastering the basic terms and concepts on which Vitruvian discourse depended.

The knowledge that Jones was already reading and annotating his Vasari and Barbaro before the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century also casts at least a little light on the preoccupations of Jones at the beginning of his career as a scenographer. John Orrell's suggestion that Jones may have used *periaktoi* — inspired by his reading of the Barbaro Vitruvius — for the King's Oxford entertainment in August 1605 seems wholly tenable in this context (although Jones's notes beside the relevant passage appear to be too late in style to have been written at the time of that performance); and Orrell's contention is supported by Jones's use of the same device in *Tethys' Festival* as well as his adaptation of a similar principle for the movement of the House of Fame in *The Masque of Queens*.[27] Behind the scenic descriptions and extant drawings of the period, too, we may glimpse a serious endeavour to realise on paper the 'scenografia' and 'purfiles' of his early reading: the classical triumphal arches lurking behind the House of Fame in *The Masque of Queens* or St. George's Portico in *Prince Henry's Barriers*; the palace in *Oberon*, with its Serlian windows, Bramantesque dome and Palladian balustrade; or the architecture praised by Campion in *The Lords' Masque*, with its upper 'bastard order with Cartouses reversed, comming from the Capitels of every Pillaster'.[28]

Such festive structures encourage a certain amount of elaboration — and even redundancy — since they do not have to conform to the structural constraints of the architecture of stone. Yet nevertheless, it is not quite fair of Summerson to dismiss these masque designs as 'nonsense-architecture .... in the proper dominion of nonsense', since the political occasions behind the masques are, for the most part, not insignificant, and — as the annotations themselves suggest — Jones's curious mixing of Vitruvian classicism with the native Gothic elements does not necessarily imply naiveté.[29] Rather, it may connote an attempted fusion of the expected iconography of the Jacobean Court and the harmonic principles of classical design within the accepted decorum of temporary architecture in a manner which violates neither tradition but which — on account of the subsequent and, in many ways, surprising development of a purer form of Palladianism in English architecture — seems only retrospectively to lack integration and finesse.[30] With

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is evidence of an early practical bias in his interest.

26. Although there are many interesting annotations in this volume, I do not find any in a secretary hand.
27. See Orrell (1988): 32-5; and O&S I: 5-7; II: 823; Johnson (1994): 183-7.
28. See Campion, T. ([1909] 1966), *Campion's Works*, ed. P. Vivian (Oxford): 94, ll. 40-41; and Summerson ([1966] 1983): 34.
29. Summerson ([1966] 1983): 31-2. The comment is also challenged in Peacock (1982): 195-7.
30. Indeed, he commented in his Scamozzi on the 'Diference of buildings according to ye Cont[r]y' — see Scamozzi, Vincenzo (1615 = *Idea*), *L'idea della architettura universale*, 2 vols (Venice), vol. I: 223; and his early designs for the masque scenes seem a good deal less redundant than the lavish ornamentation of so many of Harrison's Arches of Triumph — see Parry (1981): 1-39.

this in mind, it is worth recalling that Jonson, reconstituting the form of the masque through a re-mix of native and non-native elements, is trying the same thing. And when we realize that as well as his enthusiastic descriptions of the Vitruvian stage machinery in *The Masque of Blackness*, or the decorously superimposed Corinthian and Ionic pilasters in *The Masque of Beauty*, Jonson is using in both masques an echo tradition which Loewenstein has traced back specifically to Vitruvius; then it begins to become apparent that the poet and his collaborator were attempting, in the early masques, to integrate Vitruvian thought at a variety of levels.[31]

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The period from 1610 until his second Italian Journey was one in which Jones built on his earlier preoccupations. It was a time when he was rapidly consolidating his drawing skills, and the marginal comments in his Vasari reflect the growth of his interest in the theory, history, and techniques associated with the subject.[32] In the preface to the volume, writing in an italic hand which summarizes the concerns of the earlier secretary notes that follow, Jones jots down the five 'aggunctes' — 'Rulle ... order ... measur ... desine ... and manner' — that Vasari considers have brought the arts of architecture, painting and sculpture to their perfection, and he underlines their definitions with care, paying particular attention, perhaps, to Vasari's plea for generic purity in the use of orders (*Lives,* [*****2^{v}]).

Here, however, it is painting which absorbs most of his interest. In a secretary hand (probably dating from around 1610) he follows Vasari's comments on the 'Ancient modernes' who were too laboured in their work: lacking 'Libirtie in ther Rulle', 'tendernes of flesh and muskles' in their design, 'slendernes and gratiousnes'; displaying an insufficient diversity in their drapery, conceits ('Bizar['r']ia'), 'B[e]auti of collors ... vniversaliti of Buldings and ye far of[f] and varried Landscipe'; and failing to bring their representations of feet, hands, hair and beards, to the 'extreme perfection' of the finest art (*Lives,* [*****3]). Yet, at the same time, the notes are by no means all negative, for Jones also takes Vasari's point that 'desine is To Imitate ye best of nature' and that 'godd manner Coms by Copiinge ye fayrest things' (*Lives,* [*****2^{v}]).

In a series of additions, dating, perhaps, from 1613-1614 onwards, Jones changes tack, underlining those painters commended by Vasari — 'Leonardo Da Vinci', 'Rafell Vrbine', 'Andrea del S[ar]to', 'Antonio Da Corregio', 'Parmegiano' (Parmigianino), 'Pollidor And maturino', 'Rosso. fra: Sebastiano. Giulio Romana. Pierino del Vaga', 'Mihill Angell' — many of whom he was to copy in his 'Roman Sketchbook' — taking his inspiration not only on location in Italy but also from the large number of prints that he brought with him back to England in 1614.[33] Prints take on a considerable significance for Jones in these middle and later annotations. In Vasari's life of Marcantonio Bolognese, for instance, Jones takes notice of a reference to the engravings that Caraglio had made for Rossi when the latter was at Rome; glosses the name of Giovanni Battista of Mantua; registers an allusion to Vignola's 'booke in print of Architettur[e]' (which he himself was shortly to buy); attends to the discussion of Marcolini's wood prints of the *Giardino de' pensieri,* which is so commended by Vasari; and considers the Flemish work of Calcar, and Martin Hemskerk — whose composition of thirty-two scenes from the story of Cupid and Psyche is mentioned by Vasari and marked in the text by a hand (*Lives,* 305-9).

In fact, the subject of Cupid and Psyche seems to have exercised a special interest

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31. See Loewenstein, J. (1984), *Responsive Readings: Versions of Echo in Pastoral, Epic, and the Jonsonian Masque* (New Haven and London): 61. Jonson's numerical conceit behind these masques is discussed in Johnson (1994): 115-39.
32. See O&S I: 34-5.
33. Jones's 'Roman Sketchbook' is now at Chatsworth, and its sources are discussed by Sumner Smith (1952): 200-207.

for Jones, as he demonstrates much later in the volume in his detailed notes to the life of Giulio Romano, where Vasari discusses the frescoes on the same theme in the Palazzo del Tè. Here, rather than merely transcribing Vasari's comments, Jones adds his own. This is probably because 'this History', as he himself points out, was 'draune and Painted by B. franco: the[n] with Prints I have' (*Lives,* 331); and he is consequently able to compare his prints with Vasari, noting beside the description of Psyche taking her bath, 'an error in Bati: franco to make mars in the Bath for thear is an armour and a helmet hanging [.] this commes for waant of history'.[34] The personal note re-emerges too, after the description of the Palazzo del Tè when — beside Vasari's comment that Giulio's design of the Nativity of St John the Baptist had been engraved by Sebastiano da Reggio — he announces with evident pride: 'Sebastia di Regio Cutt ye natiuiti of St Jo: babi that I haue/' (*Lives,* 336). And again, we may sense the collusive enthusiasm of the private collector behind his last note in the volume: 'Julio sheawith to giorio Vasari all the Pianti of ye anticke buildings of Rome Naples and Poziolo and Campania' (*Lives,* 337).[35]

In addition to the increasing importance of drawings and prints as source-materials for Jones's masque designs, their inspiration to his own technique, and his private passion for collecting, there may be a more detached professional interest behind at least some of the annotations. It is well known that Jones had travelled to Italy in 1613-14 as an adviser, companion, and interpreter for the Earl of Arundel to whom, as Dudley Carleton had noted, he could be of great use 'by reason of his language and experience in these parts'.[36] The works that Jones carried back with him to Italy were therefore invaluable, both as aesthetic guide-books to lead his patron (who was not yet adept at Italian) to the best places, and as a signpost pointing Jones (as they, no doubt, pointed Arundel's agents, Coke and Petty) in the direction of the art works that Arundel wished to purchase for his

34. Vasari (*Lives*, 331). This comment is revealing, not only because it emphasises Jones's concern for iconographic accuracy, but also because the Queen's House at Greenwich did eventually contain a painting (on the ceiling of the Queen's Room) of the story of Cupid and Psyche, as John Webb testified in a note, dating from 1639, which may be found in the terminal flyleaf of his 1601 edition of Palladio (also in Worcester College Library): 'All the peeces of paynting are to be made of the story of Cupid & Psyche, the neerest figures of such bignesse as the distance requires for ye seeling is but 19: fo: high; The greatest peece in the middle of the ceeling to bee of Cupid and Psyche in Heaven .... The peeces on ye sydes about ye roome must bee all of the same story of Cupid & Psyche & ye bignesse of ye neerest figures answerable to those in ye seeling .... ' As Webb points out, 'Sr Balthasar Gerbier doe bespeake these peeces &c as for himselfe & make the bargayne of the prise & tyme they are to bee finished wch is desired to bee as soon as may bee', so that it is evident that, by 1639, the scheme was in the hands of Gerbier, who was Jones's rival at Court. But we may wonder whether, in a similar manner to Rubens' ceiling for the Whitehall Banqueting House - which, as Strong has argued, may have been designed according to Jones's conception (see Strong, R. (1980), Britannia Triumphans: Inigo Jones, Rubens and Whitehall Palace (London): 14 ff.) — so, too, Jones (thinking of the Palazzo del Tè) may have been responsible for the interior, as well as exterior, fore-conceit of the room. For the Cupid and Psyche myth in Charles's Court, see Parry (1981): 141-2 and 196-7.

35. For Jones's enthusiasm in this field, see W. G. Keith (December,1925-6), 'Inigo Jones as a Collector', *RIBA Journal,* 33: 95-108.

36. Cit. Gotch ([1928] 1968): 71. This account of the expedition is supplemented in Gotch (1938), 'Inigo Jones's Principal Visit to Italy in 1614: The Itinerary of his Journeys', *RIBA Journal,* 46: 85-6; and has since been reappraised by Parry (1981): 110-14; as well as Howarth (1985): 35-52.

own collection.[37] In this context it is certainly significant that — of the artists listed in the preface to Jones's Vasari — Arundel eventually acquired a large number of drawings by Leonardo, Raphael, and Michelangelo (housing them in a room which may well have been designed by Jones); as well as about 250 of Pollidoro's works, a mass of drawings by Parmigianino (acquired, apparently, at the instigation of Jones, who admired his work greatly), and a series of Giulio Romano's preparatory sketches for the Palazzo del Tè.[38]

In these notes, then, we can watch Jones becoming an expert and learning how to advise his patrons. Yet there may have been times — as we may suspect from a very late annotation in the life of Leonardo — when Jones exceeded his authority. The note — 'la Geneura di Amerigo Benci' — which is signalled by a marginal hand (*Lives,* 8), refers to the portrait of Benci's wife that Leonardo drew in Milan; and it may well have triggered Jones's imagination, as the Papal Representative, Panzini, revealed in a letter of 1636 recounting the arrival of a Leonardo in England:

> The King's architect Jones believes that the picture by Leonardo is the portrait of a certain Venetian, Ginevra Benci and concludes it from the G. and B. inscribed on her breast. As he is very conceited and boastful he often repeats this idea of his to demonstrate his great knowledge of painting ....[39]

Here, perhaps, is a verdict on the self-confident Jones of later years with which Jonson would have agreed wholeheartedly.

The architectural notes in the Vasari for the period from 1610 to 1614 show a similar consolidation and development of Jones's earlier studies. Even at this stage, he pays particular attention to the staunchest Vitruvians of the architectural community — Frà Giocondo, Baccio d'Agnolo, Giuliano and Antonio Sangallo (uncles to Antonio the younger) — although he is also excited by the manneristic innovations of Giulio Romano. Among the passages glossed in these chapters we find theoretical pronouncements which reflect the growing confidence which appears in Jones's drawings from 1610 onwards. 'Architecture', he notes - famously - in the chapter on Baccio d'Agnolo (in a hand which probably dates from the beginning of the period), 'Must be Masculine fear*m*e ['Sollid'] Simpell. And Inriched with ye grace of desine and of a varried subiecte in the Compossition that with nether too littell nor to[o] much alterithe ye Order of architecture nor ye sight of ye Iuditious' (*Lives,* 282). Elsewhere in the chapter, as if to counterbalance Vasari's earlier praise of gaining 'godd manner' merely by 'Copiinge', he translates the author's observation that 'he who hath not desine and Inuention of himsealfe shal euer be Poore of graace perfection and Judgment In great Compositions of architetture' (*Lives,* 283).[40]

After 1610, when Jones was appointed Surveyor to Prince Henry, it must have become increasingly necessary to master the practicalities of architectural construction and, understandably, his comments in the Vasari reflect his development in this direction.[41] 'In a Roome out of square', he notes in the chapter on the Sangallo brothers,

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37. For Coke and Petty, see Howarth (1985): 35-52, 127-48.
38. Details of Arundel's acquisition of these works are given in Howarth (1985): 2, 36-7, 40, 46, 67-8, 110, 116, 134, 162, 181, 214, 217.
39. See Howarth (1985): 114, n. 32; and Wittkower ([1974] 1983): 68. We may add that the 'e's in Jones's note are formed in two-strokes and the style of the whole hand has the printed, crabbed appearance that Newman has identified with Jones's late writing, so that we may suspect that the note could have been made around 1636.
40. In fact, as Pevsner (1983): 308, has noted — and the work of Peacock has demonstrated — 'we find nowhere in Jones's work mere imitation'.
41. For a detailed account of Jones's surveyorships, see Summerson's (1975) contribution to *The History of the King's Works: Volume III 1485-1660* (part I), ed. H.M. Colvin (London),

'you Cutt off[f] ye Roote of the Imperfection by making ye waall Thikker' (*Lives,* 100). When, likewise, he works through the chapter on Frà Giocondo, Jones absorbs himself in the details of the friar's collaboration with Raphael and Giuliano Sangallo in a scheme aimed at strengthening the foundation of St Peter's (*Lives,* 246). While he is in Venice, he investigates the engineering feat whereby Frà Giocondo had prevented the lagoons from silting up, as well as studying the latter's bridge architecture, and the remarkable – if unconsummated – scheme for urban redesign that the friar had wished to impose on the city (*Lives,* 245-8). Comparably, following Vasari's account of the Palazzo del Tè, he considers the layout of the whole building, its evolution from humble origins; Giulio Romano's pragmatic use of brick rather than stone for the 'Bazi and collons Baces and Capitels'; and a number of other practical details which may have found direct applications in his own work (*Lives,* 327, 332-3).

These concerns, of course, harmonise with what was Jones's major achievement of these years: his measuring and comparison of the buildings of Rome, Vicenza and Venice with the plans in Palladio's *Quattro libri*; his meeting and discussion with Scamozzi; and his acquisition of Scamozzi's (as well as Palladio's) drawings.[42] When Jones returned to take up the post of King's Surveyor in 1615, he came equipped with a practical grounding in architecture, a vision of the potentialities of his medium, and a sharpened technique. We may well suspect that, faced with the grandeur of the real, Jones's scenographic interests were falling a little into abeyance.

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It is, perhaps, slightly surprising that the mathematical basis of architecture does not seem to have been one of Jones's earlier preoccupations. In what may be a revealing underlining in his 1614 edition of Plutarch's *Moralia* - or, as it is termed in Gandino's translation, the *Opuscoli morali* - the architect draws attention to the author's comment that mathematics is upsetting to young men at the beginning of their studies but loses its smart in later life, and we may wonder if Jones is thinking of his own case.[43] Certainly, his early architectural exercises are mainly geometrical and it is not until some time after 1614, when he brings a copy of Alberti back with him to England, that we are able to watch him coming to terms with numbers. He is systematic. In Book VIII, Chapter v, for example, we find him translating the details of Alberti's measurements and proportions for towers, while in Chapter vi of the following book we are able to follow his painstaking progress through the proportions of numbers in the measuring of areas; his glossing the musical terminology of the proportions; his noting of 'how on[e] shuld youse these numbers in the heyghte of roomes'; and, in a note dated '16 febu. 1615', his working through his squares and square roots in order to understand Pythagoras' theorem (*Architettura*, [260-3]).[44] It may well have been around this period, too, that he annotated relevant comparable passages in his Barbaro Vitruvius: the discussion of ten as a perfect number; the three sorts of numbers; special considerations of eight, twelve, six and

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Chapters vi-vii, pp. 121-60.

42. See Howarth (1985), pp. 43-4, 50-1 and 185; and Gotch ([1928] 1968), 74-6.

43. See the entry under 'Plutarch, Moralia, p. 520,' in Johnson (forthcoming, 1996).

44. Jones's date does not specify the day on which his note was made so that we cannot ascertain whether it was written in Italy, where Jones adopted the New Style, or England, where he reverted to the the Old (see Gotch ([1928] 1968), pp. 72-73). If the note had been made in England in 1615 (i.e. on 6 February, 1616, New Style), it would reveal that Jones's mind was thinking along similar lines to Jonson's in the period when *The Golden Age Restor'd* was staged. For the structure of this masque, see Johnson (1987), vol I: pp. 299-303; and for the date of its first performance, see Orrell, J., 'The London Court Stage in the Savoy Correspondence, 1613-1675', *Theatre Research International*, 4 (1979), 83-84.

twenty-eight; or the Aristotelian definition of wholeness and the perception of eurhythmy as 'the temperinge of the proportion applied to ye matter, as Equaliti is to Justice' (*Dieci libri*, 112-13, 162).

Yet it does not seem that Jones was entirely satisfied with the pragmatically orientated mathematics of Alberti and Barbaro (despite their exhibition of considerable erudition in neo- Platonic number theory), for he sought more direct access to their own sources. Much of the thought of both architectural theorists derives — both directly and indirectly — from Plato's *Timaeus* and although there is no evidence that Jones ever owned or read *that* work, we may witness, in the annotations to his 1614 Plutarch, the architect's struggle to push his knowledge of number theory back as far as possible towards its Platonic (and Pythagorean) origins.[45] Plutarch's essay, 'Della creatione dell'anima descritta nel Timeo di Platone', offers a summary and reinterpretation of *Timaeus* 35 A1 — 36 B5, emphasising the presence of an active agent in the creation of the soul in a manner which Jones may have found compatible with his Christianity.[46] Jones's compliance with the Plutarchan viewpoint is, perhaps, encouraged by Gandino's translation of the passage where Plutarch cites Plato's contention that 'the soul, being senior to the body, initiates all change and motion installed in her position of chief and, as he has said himself, of primary agent' (*Plutarch's Moralia*, XIII, part 1, 174) for he renders 'primary agent' — πρωτουγον in the original (*ibid.*, 178) - as 'architetto principale': a phrase that Jones underlines and highlights with a marginal hand. Nor need we doubt the enthusiasm behind such markings (which are probably from the late 1620s and early 1630s), for the apparent Platonic image of the soul as the principle architect of the body — sanctioned by the authority of Plutarch — would have seemed to be a powerful weapon to use in Jones's dispute with Jonson about the precedence of architecture or literature in the 'body' and 'soul' of masque.[47]

Whether or not this was at the back of his mind when he made the annotation, it seems clear that Jones is following the author's argument sympathetically. He notes Plutarch's rejection of Heraclitus, and his vision of a primal 'Cayos ... voyd of reson', in which there existed a disorderly and malevolent motive principle (or soul) which partook of intelligence, reason and wondrous harmony ('harmonia marauigliosa') in order to become the soul of the universe (*Moralia,* 317-18): creating a set of distinctions which Jones eventually glosses as 'T[w]o Soules the on[e] not created of good [i.e. god] not soule of ye world but a virtu in the Immaginati and thought mouing confusedly/ the other Soule created by god in number and proportion' (*Moralia,* 320). Plutarch's interpretation of Plato on these ideas, as Cherniss argues, is highly idiosyncratic, and goes even further by rejecting Plato's specific concern with ratios rather than any particular integers 'not only because it makes the matter harder to understand but also because it would prevent him from indulging himself in the arithmological speculations about the "remarkable numbers" to which he devotes several chapters' (*Plutarch's Moralia,* XIII, part 1, 135-7). The point is important because if Jones does follow Plutarch's authority (as I suspect he does in his later work) numbers take on a symbolic rather than metonymic significance: appealing for what would have been perceived as their 'essential' values rather than the

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45. The *Timaeus*, interestingly enough, has a direct link with the Palladian tradition, since its *editio princeps* (Venice, 1513), was produced by Aldus Manutius, Trissino's associate (see Cosenza, M. E. (1921-1922), *A Biographical and Bibliographical Dictionary of the Italian Humanists, s.v.* 'Aldus' and 'Trissino'; and, for the Plato, Sandys, J. E., (1958), *A History of Classical Scholarship* (New York), vol. II, p. [104]).

46. Plutarch's argument — favouring, in an almost Christian manner, the idea of a benevolent creation out of chaos — is explained with precision by D. A. Russell (1972), in *Plutarch* (London), p. 66. Modern English quotations incorporated in the text are from H. Cherniss' translation (1976), of vol. XIII of the Moralia (= *Plutarch's Moralia*) for the Loeb series, ed. F. C. Babbitt *et al.* (Cambridge, Mass. and London).

47. See Gordon (1975), pp. 79-83, 95-6.

relative values that they generate by proportional arrangement.[48] Within the context of the second half of the same essay we can see that Jones attends carefully to the numerological theorising, passing in silence over the preliminary explanation of the Platonic lambda (from which the numbers of the universe are generated), and only intruding when Plutarch discusses a more advanced point: the remarkable numbers that appear when one adds the parallel terms of the two number lines emanating from one -

1
2 (+) 3
4 (+) 9
8 (+) 27

Here Jones notes '5' (the product of the first addition which, as Plutarch tells us, was called 'tremor' ('baila', *Moralia,* 321) possibly because the fifth is the first harmonic of the scale.[49] And avoiding the second addition (which is miscalculated in Gandino's edition), he moves straight to thirty-five (the product of eight and twenty-seven) known as 'concord'. Plutarch demonstrates its nature by forming a parallelogram of thirty-five squares falling into harmonic proportions of 6 : 8; 6 : 9; 6 : 12 and 9 : 8; which Jones, alongside Gandino's elegant diagram, renders as 'sesquialtera', 'sesquitersia' (an accidental inversion of the two terms), 'dupla' and 'sesquioctauo' — identifying them correctly as 'diatessaron', diapente', 'diapason' and 'tono': 'in all 35 caled harmoni' (*Moralia,* 321). Yet even while he is absorbed in the abstractions of Pythagorean number theory, his thoughts are not far from their architectural application. For when the author continues by explaining that thirty-five times six produces 210, 'the number of days in which it is said seven months' babies are born fully formed' (*Plutarch's Moralia,* XIII, part 1, 279), Jones cannot resist observing that 'leon Battista' Alberti borrows from the passage (*Moralia,* 322).[50]

It is probably on account of an already existent knowledge of arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic 'means' — culled from Alberti or Barbaro — that Jones appears to pay little attention to the subsequent section in the chapter where Plutarch reverts to this topic.[51] His next intrusion is an underlining clarifying the point that Plato had no desire to claim that the soul was made up of number but, rather, wished to show that it was ordered by number, and the last notes in the chapter concern themselves with Plutarch's discussion of sirens (*Moralia,* 327, 333-4).

In the section at the end of *The Republic* dramatised by what Jones, in his copy, called 'Ero Armeno his fabulus story of hell &[c]', Plato describes his vision of the universal order with eight sirens standing on the rims of the whorl of the 'spindle of Necessity', each on a different rim and singing a different note of constant pitch so that,

48. Indeed, Cherniss argues (*Plutarch's Moralia*, p. 135) that Plutarch is interpreting Plato's numbers with a 'misplaced literalness'. Thus Jones, following Plutarch's stress on absolute numerical values rather than ratios, may be adopting an idiosyncratic view of the *Timaeus*.

49. This is Cherniss' suggestion, pp. 272-3, note b.

50. See Alberti, Book IX, Chapter v, p. 258; a passage that Jones brackets in the margin, noting (in an earlier hand): 'god delites in ye number 7 and why'.

51. Jones carefully studied Book IX, Chapter vi, in his Alberti (pp. 260-4) in the period around 1615, paying attention to the musical terminology — including the 'mediocrita Musicalle' — and emphasising the use that 'Architectes haue maad of ye Mediocrities both for ye hool building and ye members thear of' (p. 264). Barbaro's more complex discussion of the different types of proportion and their addition and subtraction is also noted in an italic hand that seems to belong to the same period (Barbaro, pp. 98-103). Even later than these annotations are Jones's markings in Plutarch's chapter 'Della Musica' (p. 228, l. 31), which will be discussed below.

together, they sound the eight notes of a musical scale.[52] It is this that Plutarch alludes to when — in a paragraph marked by Jones — he relates the courses of the planets to the five tetrachords of music before proceeding — in another passage that is underlined and glossed — to tacitly identify the sirens with the nine muses. Thereafter the muses, like the sirens, are integrated into Plutarch's argument as evidence of the consonant motions of the rational soul so that harmony, proportion and virtue are related — as is symbolised, Jones notes, by the fact that 'ye ancientes put musicall instrumentes in ye hands of ye stattues of ye godes' — while, conversely, 'discord and disproportion' are 'all on[e]' (*Moralia,* 333-4). The significance of the sirens and the problem of their relation with the muses was evidently a matter of great interest to Jones, because Plutarch's chapter devoted to unusual observations on the number of the muses in Book IX of the *Questioni conuiuiali* (section 14) is heavily marked throughout in a hand dating from the later 1620s (*Moralia,* 491-4), and we may, at least, pause to consider the motives for his concern. In part, no doubt, he may have been attracted by the case as an illustration of the universal consonance which lay behind his own building practice, while, in part, explanatory details, such as the reason why statues of the gods hold musical instruments, may have had a practical use — either for his understanding of the iconography of the statues that were being amassed at Arundel House (and on which he was being consulted), or for his own masque designs.[53]

But when we consider these annotations in the light of *The Masque of Beauty,* they seem to take on a special relevance. For if Jones did participate in that entertainment he would probably have been concerned with the design — or painting — of those pilasters which held up the eight Elements of Beauty, surmounted by Harmonia herself with a lyra in her hand.[54] This image appears to have been conceived by Jonson, who refers us back to Macrobius' *Somnium Scipionis,* Book II: a passage that not only explains why there are seven jewels in Harmonia's crown (representing the seven planets and their spheres); but which also resolves the problem of reconciling the muses and sirens by making the ninth muse the concord produced by the other eight (II. iii. [1-2]).[55] (This solution is also relevant to Jonson's entertainment, for harmony, the masque proposes, is 'the *worlds Soule*' (H&S VII, 193, l. 374). We may wonder, then, whether Jones, at a later date, is reappraising the iconographic significance of an earlier collaboration in which Jonson was clearly the controlling partner.)

Behind the idea of universal harmony as it is discussed in Plutarch's chapter on the generation of the soul lies a solid practical, historical, and mathematical knowledge of Greek music, a subject which it would have been important for Renaissance architects to master if, as Wittkower contended, they did sometimes build according to harmonic principles.[56] In the case of Palladio we have little evidence about his grounding in the subject although it seems probable that much of his knowledge may have come through Leonicenus' translation of Ptolemy's *Harmonics* which Trissino presented to the Pope,

52. For Jones's comment, see Johnson (forthcoming, 1996), *s.v.* 'Plato, p. 439, l. 27'.
53. For Jones's activities at Arundel House, see Howarth (1985), pp. 104-18.
54. H&S VII, pp. 186-9.
55. *Macrobius: Commentary on the Dream of Scipio* (1952 edn), tr. W. H. Stahl (New York).
56. The premises of Wittkower ([1949] 1973), in *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism* (London), have been subjected to minute scrutiny by D. Howard and M. Longair (1982), in 'Harmonic Proportion and Palladio's *Quattro Libri*', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians,* XLI/2, 116-43. This study tentatively reveals that in many of Palladio's own constructions harmonic proportions were not necessarily employed, although in other cases (where the inhabitants may have been expected to understand harmonic form) Palladio's buildings are more harmonious than even Wittkower had suggested.

Paul III, in 1541.[57] But in the case of Jones we are more fortunate because, in the putative author's heavily marked essay 'Della musica' we may watch the architect coming to terms — again in the late 1620s and early 1630s — with those complexities of the subject which have a bearing on his subject. Here, Jones avoids the initial discussion by Lysias - 'a practiced musition' - concerning the practicalities of performance and the histories of auloi, cithera players and modes; rather, he concentrates on the comments of Soterichus, whom he construes as 'a theorisian and marster indeed' (*Moralia,* 237). But even in this section Jones passes over Soterichus' preliminary technicalities on the construction and use of modes, beginning to pay close attention only when his author discusses Plato's knowledge of harmonics and the application of harmonic principles in his description of 'ye creation of the soule' in the 'Timeo' (*Moralia,* 228). In particular, Jones glosses Plato's differentiation of the arithmetic, harmonic and geometric means and his conception of the soul as a harmonious arrangement of the four elements, underscoring an approving authorial comment about Plato's mastery of mathematics. And similarly, he marks 'Arristotells dimonstraation of harmony' as a 'heauenly thinge' (*Moralia,* 228-9) beside the Plutarchan contention that:

> Harmony is celestial, since its nature is divine, noble, and wonderfully wrought. Being in its operation naturally quadripartite, it has two means, arithmetic and harmonic, and its parts and magnitudes and excesses are manifested in conformity with number and equality of measure; for melodies are given their form in the range of two tetrachords. (*Plutarch's Moralia,* XIV, 405)

Apart from manifesting an interest in this view of the musical construction of the world soul, Jones also follows the later discussion of the way in which music affects a sympathetic and harmonic response in our bodies. In this context he takes down Soterichus' point (echoing Plato's argument for the rejection of effeminate modes) about the ancient, and praiseworthy, uses of music 'in honor of ye gods and for education of youth' which degenerated in Plutarch's time to a situation where only the 'musike of theaters' remained in fashion, while, through an oversophistication in the use of the modes, 'the antient maner of musicke' was 'spoyled' (*Moralia,* 230-1). Here we may suspect that Jones's sympathies are aligned with ancient simplicity rather than modern complexity; and we may feel it almost as a reflection on Jones's own architectural preferences when he registers Soterichus' assertion - in the same passage - that the ancients, like the moderns, did make new inventions and introduce innovations, but that

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57. Trissino's letter reveals that he had employed his friend as a teacher in philosophy, and that Leonicenus' translation was expected to make new subtleties of the diatonic genre as well as the harmonic and chromatic genera accessible to Latin scholars. Leonicenus died in 1524 (before Trissino met Palladio), but Trissino's letter was written in August, 1541, when he was in Rome, with Palladio, measuring the ruins, and we may suspect that he discussed Leonicenus' manuscript with the architect. The letter is quoted by Cattin, G. (1979), on pp. 160-1 of 'La musica nella vita e nelle opere di Giangiorgio Trissino', in the *Convegno di studi su Giangiorgio Trissino*, ed. Pozzi, (Vicenza) pp. 153-74. Jones possessed Leonicenus' translation of Dio Cassius and lightly marked it in a late hand: attending to the descriptions of buildings (p. 361^{v}; p. 440); noting the 'Tirania et Ingratitudine di Tiberio ad vn Architetore' beside Dio's description of how the Emperor, jealous of the achievements of one of his architects, would not allow his name to be entered on the records (p. 438); and quoting Maecenas' application of a harmonic metaphor from building to society in his oration on monarchy — 'inequalita dissolue le fabriche' (p. 344^{v}).

they achieved their aims within the bounds of 'magesti and decorum' (l. 7).[58] Similarly, Soterichus' advice that one should cultivate the ancient music and 'adorne' one's knowledge of music with 'other sienses & filosofie espetaly' is duly noted (*Moralia*, 232): possibly because it complements the syncretistic impulse which, as I have observed elsewhere, Jones seemed so to admire in the architect Pythius.[59]

In an analysis of the political context in which Barbaro's commentary on Vitruvius was composed, Manfredo Tafuri argued that Barbaro (who was to become Patriarch of Aquileia) understandably represented an autocratic and authoritarian viewpoint, and that this was reflected in his writing.[60] Reading Jones's annotations one may suspect the development of a similar value-system, for his notes veer increasingly towards an explicit endorsement of the traditional hierarchy. This we may see clearly enough in the marginalia cited above or in the comment jotted in his Scamozzi that 'an Architect shuold chose good and obedient workmenn' (*Idea*, part 2, 15). But the point is made even more markedly in Jones's gloss on an apophthegm in his 1567 edition of the *Moralia* that: 'The most Glorious end of seruing of Princes is to help and Addorne our Contry', as this is a statement which radically alters the emphasis of Plutarch's text, shifting it from the interrogative to the declarative.[61] We may, indeed, wonder whether Jones's philosophy, in his forties and fifties, was beginning to harden into that protective orthodoxy which Tafuri — discussing Vignola, Herrera and Scamozzi — has identified with 'a movement towards a *timeless art*, abstract in the fullest sense of the term .... an art that does not want to create new meanings, or probe its own interior with merciless self-criticism, but prefers to exalt, beautify and rhetorically enlarge an accepted *truth* without discussion'.[62]

In the light of this comment it certainly would not seem insignificant that Jones should write, in the margin of his Scamozzi, 'All that we haue in building of good and faier is by tradition from the Ancientes', or that he should emphasise adornment (marked by his double underlining of 'ornarne' in the 1567 Plutarch and supported by his single underlining of 'adornala con altre scienze' in the 1614 text of the essay on music (p. 232, l. 30)).[63] All this is not to say, however, that the function of adornment is necessarily

58. As we have seen from his Vasari, Jones was actively studying decorum in building types from before his second Italian journey; in his Scamozzi he observed, 'e[a]ssy and Simpell Inuentions beast' (I, p. 46, l. 8); and as his surviving buildings suggest, he did in practice, observe a high degree of idiomatic purity (see Summerson ([1966] 1983), p. 159).

59. See Johnson, A. W. (1986), 'Ben Jonson: An Ungathered Allusion', *Notes and Queries*, n.s. 33 no. 3, pp. 384-5. Pythius really seems to have had a special significance for Jones, who alludes to him several other times in his Scamozzi (I, p. 27), his Barbaro (p. 22), his Strabo (where he notes 'pitias his opinion good but not aproued by Strabo' (p. 29v)), and Book III of his Herodotus (where he marks 'ye Sonne of phileo' (p. 99 [sig. mii])).

60. Tafuri, M. (16 December, 1986), 'Il *Vitruvio* di Daniele Barbaro', paper delivered at the colloquium, 'Vitruvius and His Influence', at the Warburg Institute (University of London).

61. 'E quel detto di Euripide si dee a questo altro uerso dire; che se si *dee molto a cosa del mondo attendere* se si debbono *le cose altrui frequentare, e corteggiare; se si uuole alcuno a la seruitù di un Principe sottopore, non puo per altra cosa piu gloriosamente farlo, che per giouarne, & ornarne la patria sua*, ne le altre cose poi non è ma le cercare le amicitie giuste, e sante', Plutarch (part II), p. 24v (814E).

62. Tafuri, M. (1968), *Theories and History of Architecture*; English Version (1980 [from 4th Italian edn, 1976]), ed. D. Sharp and tr. G. Verrechia, (London), p. 18.

63. Scamozzi, I, p. 226. The topic of adornment is also taken up in Scamozzi's explanation of why there are only five Orders (II, Book IV, Chapter v): a passage that Jones marks throughout in a hand which — lacking the secretary 's' of his early and middle writings but containing secretary 'e's which demarcate it from his final style — may be dated to

trivial. If there is an accepted correspondence between hierarchies — the stars, music, mathematics, virtue and justice; and if the metonymic relation binding the forms of art to those of life is felt to be real; then adornment — as the appropriate dressing and mirroring of what *is* — may seem to be the only correct function of the artist. And indeed it appears to me that it is this search for correctness which is embodied in many of Jones's notes of the 1620s and 1630s — not only in the second half of the chapter on music but also in that Platonic source which lurks behind so much of Plutarch's moral philosophy: the *Republic*.[64]

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The odd note scattered through the text of Fiorimbene's translation of this work suggests that Jones had read it in its entirety, but his marginalia focus on two main areas: the discussion of the first stage of education in Books II and III (which Jones takes up from [376c]), and the theory of art propounded in Book X (which he follows carefully from [601a]). These passages, which are largely concerned with the nature and function of poetry in society, are of considerable interest for the glimpse they offer of Jones's later view of Jonson's art; but they also have a bearing on the relationship between music and morality, and it is this that I should like to consider first.

In Fiorimbene's preface to the *Republic*, Book III, which is heavily underlined by Jones, the translator reiterates Plato's distinction between those laudable consonances representing the constant habit of the mind ('il constante habito della mente', *Republic*, 93) and those which reveal pride, indescribable rage, effeminate pleasures, the overwhelming sadness of the soul, and other similar vices. He emphasises, too, the power that harmony exerts on the soul because of the likeness between the harmonic construction of the second Platonic soul ('l'anima secondo Platone') and that of the heavens, the body and the spirit; concluding that the soul of the listener, like that of the singer, is affected by music.[65] This, of course, opens a practical corollary to the speculations on the nature of the world soul which Jones had paraphrased in Plutarch's essay on the *Timaeus*: namely that the right sort of music is appropriate to the first stage of education; and it is hardly surprising to find on the following page that, as in Plutarch's essay, Jones should underline the prescription that it is 'la semplice musica' (marked by a hand) which should be used to enhance the soul. Likewise, later in Plato's text, Jones attends to Socrates' rejection — with the help of 'Glaucone the musico' — of all modes except the Dorian and the Phrygian (*Republic*, 116). These are scales which Jones specifically emphasises in the section of the 'Della Musica' where Soterichus points out that one should not study the science of harmonics in isolation since 'no sort of harmony hath in hit any absolute proprietye'. Rather, continues the latter, it is plain from the example of an enharmonic genre such as the Phrygian that the moral character of music may vary within a mode; and citing the additional example of the Dorian, Soterichus argues that one should learn to judge both the propriety of modal usage and its effect on

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the late 1620s and early 1630s. In this chapter he notes how 'god ... adorned ye world' (p. 15, l. 21); how the same example is found in Nature, with 'creatures les or mor Adorned' (l. 28); and how, like Nature — which is constant in 'creation and propagation' (l. 50) — there should be a constant number of Orders which should not be 'altered but bettered' (p. 16, l. 8). This, surely, offers a clear indication of the reactionary direction in which Jones's later thought was progressing.

64. Quotations from this work cited in the text are from the transcription in Johnson (forthcoming, 1996). Modern English translations (= *Plato's Republic*), refer to the Loeb edition, tr. P. Shorey ([1930] 1963), 2 vols, vol. I (London).

65. The importance of this preface has also been noticed — although in a slightly different context — by Gordon (1975), p. 100.

the perceiver if one wishes to become a musical expert (*Moralia,* 233).

Between the two philosophical texts that we have been considering, then, it appears that Jones's annotations are mutually supportive, reflecting a movement of thought in a particular direction. And that direction — putting aside those subjective personal factors which may have guided him — is towards a deeper understanding of the abstract principles which underlie his architectural practice. Architecture, in fact, is not far from Plato's mind in Book III of the *Republic*. Having decided on the correct modes to use; that, like music, 'maner of speech foluith the Habit and affectes of the mind' - and that in both good literature and good music, beauty of form and good rhythm are dependent upon a 'habite of good and honest custombes in the mind' - Socrates and Glaucon extend their discussion to 'Painting & tapestry varriety & Architectur', which are 'full' of the same qualities and share the same propensity for goodness or ugliness (*Republic*, 120). The Socratic argument is that, like poets (who should either portray good character in their poems or not write at all), artists and craftsmen should not display 'ill customs' in their work and should avoid the representation of anything that is 'laciuious', 'nigardly', or 'inconuenient' (in the sense of 'unsuitable' or 'ugly'), either in 'figures' or in 'Edifices'. And it is a prescription which Jones transcribes, noting, too, the 'hurt that it brings' if the philosopher's words are ignored (*Republic*, 121).

More importantly, however, Jones follows Socrates' subsequent recommendation concerning the 'kynd of Artiffi[c]ers' required in his state: men capable of perceiving the real nature of what is beautiful and producing 'Honest worke' to affect the 'sight and hering of young men'. This advice defines the role of the architect within society, giving adornment a moral basis and an educative function. When Socrates continues by summing up the reasons 'why young men shuld learne musicke' — in a paragraph that Jones heavily underlines (*loc. cit.*) — he therefore articulates an affective theory of the nature of harmony that is (and would have been felt by Jones to be) as applicable to architectural practice as it is to music:

> 'And is it not for this reason, Glaucon,' said I, 'that education in music is most sovereign, because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary?' (*Plato's Republic,* vol. 1, 257-9)

But in the terms of the *Republic* as Jones read it, synonymity with musical form connoted synonymity with poetic form since, as Fiorimbene suggests in the opening of his preface - underlined by Jones and marked with a marginal hand - poetry is 'the first music' ('la prima musica', *Republic*, 93). Plato, in his treatment of the arts is thus a leveller; and we may feel that — both in his classification of architecture with the 'other crafts' of embroidery and furniture-making (*Republic*, 120), and his assault on poetry in Book X — he is diminishing the grandiose claims of architect and poet, in their famous argument over who should 'inuent' the 'soul' of a masque, to a humble equality.

As a supplement to Gordon's excellent account of Jones's dispute with Jonson on this issue we could add that Jones's comments in the Plato reveal not only an interest in those arguments which he could use against Jonson but also an understanding of the equivalence of his collaborator's claim.[66] So he notes in Book III 'what poesi is Imitation' and in Book X that 'Painting is Imitation' (*Republic*, 108, 421). Likewise, he underscores those passages (marking them with a hand) where Socrates describes how the poet uses words and phrases as a medium to paint verbal portraits and where, in the same Book, he transfers his criticism of the deceptiveness of visual representation to the arts which appeal to the ear, and which we call poetry (*Republic*, 418, 422). Jones's subsequent comment on the same page — 'what poetes Imitate' — besides Socrates' continuation,

66. Gordon (1975), pp. 76ü101.

also connotes an awareness that spatial appearance is to visual art as action is to poetry, and may therefore remind us of Jonson's simile between action and space in his *Discoveries*.[67]

Although Jones predictably pays heed to Plato's rejection of all poetry from his state except for 'Poesi in Himes' (*Republic*, 426), it is clear that he does not entirely agree with the philosopher's censure of literature. For beside the paragraph where Socrates denigrates Homer by asking what poets have done to affect the real world of military strategy, political adminstration, human education or human conduct, Jones replies with an affirmative: 'I think yt homer taught lawgiuers' (*Republic*, 416). This is, indeed, a pertinent point, for if poetry does have such an effect in the real world it must clearly weaken Socrates' case — either forcing him to accommodate more in the allowable poetry of the state, than 'Himes' and paeans in praise of good men or, more radically, implying that not all poetry belongs in the mimetic category which is assigned to the third remove from truth. The possibility that this sort of reasoning is at the back of Jones's mind is strengthened by the fact that in Book III he marks Socrates' distinctions between Homer speaking as himself or adopting the persona of Chryses, registering 'what poesie is *not* [my emphasis] Imitation' for the case of the author speaking in his own voice, and noting that Socrates' prose narration, which recreates the hypothetical case of Homer telling the story of Chryses in his own voice, is 'no immitation' (*Republic*, 107-8).

Jones appears to be thinking along similar lines in the 1614 Plutarch when he underscores the phrases in the 'Della musica' linking poetry and music; or in the 'Ragionamenti d'amore' were he jots down Plutarch's statement that the 'Poetes' and 'lawgiuers', as well as the 'filosophers', teach us about the gods, and that although there are differences between these parties in their interpretation of the number, rank, nature and function of the deities — with 'Poetes and lawgiuers against filosifers' — the 'godhead of loufe [love]' is 'agreed vpon by all 3 sortes' (*Moralia*, 512-13). It would seem, then, that Jones concedes more to the poet than Plato does, although we may suspect from his agreement with the Platonic line in Book III of his Piccolomini — 'Adulteries & Traison in Poetes fables not fitt to tell children' (*Institution morale*, 95) — that his concept of the poet, like that of the architect, is restrictive: residing for the most part within the gamut of encomium and adornment ('Poesi in Himes').

Jones's view of literature, reflected in these annotations, does not seem inconsistent with his comments on the subject expressed elsewhere. In an early note to the Barbaro, as we have seen, Jones appeared to approve the correspondence between the lapidary and verbal arts. In Vasari's life of Frà Giocondo it may be significant that he marks out one of Jonson's masters, 'Julio Cesar Scaliger' as one of the 'allies' of the architect: perhaps sensing a parallel between his own relation as the British Vitruvius collaborating with a man whom, even in a late and bitter epigram, he could address as 'ye beste of Poets', and that of the first editor of Vitruvius associating with the man whom Vasari describes as 'huomo litteratissimo de' tempi nostri' (*Lives*, 249).

At this point, however, we may wonder whether our reading of the marginalia on poetry is too Jonsonian. Jones was clearly hammering out a coherent philosophy of the arts for himself and it may seem excessive to imagine that Jonson was in his mind when he annotated works on art or moral philosophy. Yet, in one instance at least, we can be sure that this *was* how Jones thought. In the essay 'Della tranquillita, e securità dell' animo' in Jones's 1567 Plutarch, the author praises his friend Paccius because, although he has commanders as friends and is himself a noted rhetorician, he cannot be accused, like Merops in the tragedy, of letting the applause of the mob inflate and stupefy him, raising him to the heavens and making him supremely happy:

> ... come quel Merope Tragico, ti gonfi, e pazzamente stupisci al plauso della

67. See H&S VIII, p. 645, ll. 2688-95.

moltitudine, che te inalza al cielo, e ti fa beato. (*Alcuni opuscoli*, 2^{r-v})[68]

Jones underlines 'Merope' in the text, glossing it with one word: 'Jonson'. And beside the verso continuation he writes 'dogson still'. The annotations are in Jones's later hand and date, I suspect, from that period in the early 1630s when the animosity between architect and poet was at its height. If this is the case, the comments furnish evidence of that acerbic wit which may have goaded the latter into his bitterest poetic responses. 'Merops' would have been a painfully apt appellation for Jonson at a time when his relationship with his theatre audience was at its lowest ebb, drawing out of him the odes to himself; and the contemptuous familiarity of 'dogson' should remind us that behind the intellectual sparring of the collaborators lay a clash of similarly-charged personalities: the arrogance of a Pythius and the ego of a Merops.[69]

* * *

I have concentrated on the details of Jones's marginalia, attempting to place them as accurately as possible within a chronological framework because of the pattern that emerges when we contrast the development of Jones's and Jonson's Vitruvianism. Both Jonson and Jones were probably reading Vitruvius (in Barbaro's Latin and Italian editions) from the time of their first collaboration in the middle years of the first decade of the seventeenth century. But where Jones's early interest was largely practical — concentrating on plan and elevation — and only blossomed into a wider investigation of the principles behind his practice at a later date when he had access to Italian translations of theoretical materials; Jonson had mastered the number theories early, assimilating them in the precocious stride of his classical reading. In fact, Jonson's vaunted classicism was, in many ways, a key to his position as Court poet and masque-maker, conferring on him an authority which few poets could challenge. The presentation texts of his early masques, laden with scholia for the edification of the Queen and Prince Henry, proclaimed their 'solid learnings' by quoting from the very tradition that we have been examining in this paper: *The Masque of Beauty* with its explicit Platonic and Macrobian references; or *Hymenaei*, with its allusion — from the *Moralia* [876E-877C] — to the Soule as 'meere *Number*' (H&S, VII, p. 214), its discourse on the number five — from the *Moralia* [264 A-B] — and its borrowing from the work of other number theorists, including Martianus Capella.[70]

Jones's initial asset in the Jacobean Court, by contrast, was not solidity so much as flexibility; not knowledge of the past so much as knowledge of the present. When he sailed out of Venice for the first time (probably in 1601) Palladio's façade for S. Giorgio Maggiore was under construction. The Venice that Jones left behind would have confronted him daily with the harmonically proportioned and integrated forms of Palladio's churches: the Redentore (which had been completed some five years before his arrival), the Zitelle; the façade for S. Francesco della Vigna; and the convent of the Carità (which Jones would have been able to see across the water but which he probably did not visit until later).[71] Outside the realms of ecclesiastical architecture he may — like Coryate later in the decade — have visited Palladio's Venetian playhouse; and he could hardly have missed the palaces of the older generations of Venetians such as Sansovino

68. This passage is discussed in a slightly different form in Johnson (1986).

69. Another hint of Jones's Pythian attitude is revealed in his Scamozzi when he notes 'What ye Controler is to the Architect', underlining Aristotle's prescription that the foreman should build what the architect wants, acting solely as the executor of his wish and nothing else (I, p. 29).

70. Jonson's number theory and its implications for the structure of the masques is discussed in detail in Johnson (1994).

71. For these developments in Venetian building see Wittkower ([1974] 1983), pp. 11-24.

and Sanmicheli; as well as the continuation of the canal project initiated by Frà Giocondo.

Yet this may not have been the most provocative images that he carried with him. In Jones the late paintings of Tintoretto, the more recent, and daring, illusionistic feats of Veronese, or the work of Palma the younger would have found a sympathetic audience. In Jones the work of the new generation of post- Palladian architects would have found a shrewd and suggestible analyst: buildings such as Scamozzi's Procuratie Nuove, which had been in construction since 1584 (although it is doubtful that the architect himself was there at the time of Jones's first visit); or models on public display, such as Antonio Contino's Bridge of Sighs, which was designed while Jones was in Venice. In short, the city offered Jones a wide range of visual experience which was beyond even that offered by Palladio, let alone Serlio, Shute, Lomazzo, or any pattern-book accessible in England during the period.[72] Rudolph Wittkower has written that 'if there is any law in cultural evolution it is this: that naiveté cannot be recaptured once it has been lost',[73] and the point is precisely applicable to Inigo Jones. For when he returned to England in 1604 he came armed not only with the new books that were to initiate his long trek backwards into neo-Platonic number theory, but also with new aesthetic values and a visual imagination which was radically different from that of most of his English contemporaries. So the dynamic of Jonson's early collaboration with Jones could, in part, be explained by the fact that both poet and architect were leaning towards a common end from different extremes: Jonson progressing from classicism towards the discovery of a new type of planning in English literature, Jones progressing from a new conception of design in English architecture towards its classical origins. We could accordingly suspect that the earliest stages of their collaboration — which were certainly among the most successful in terms of their reception at Court — are also marked by an attempt to synchronise their line- numbers and scenic-proportions, subsuming both beneath a unified 'invention'. And we could, similarly, envisage the possibility of a Vitruvian 'moment' in their collaboration — possibly around 1615 — when Jonson was just completing that manifesto of classicism, his Folio *Workes*, and Jones had newly returned from measuring the antiquities of Italy with his head full of Palladio.

But history is seldom simple. The mature Jones noted in his Barbaro Vitruvius that 'Time ruines all thinges' (*Dieci libri*, 128), and it seems that while each partner grew in knowledge of the other's subject he changed the ground of his own. Jones's interests, as the later annotations indicate, seem to have moved beyond Palladio into a more Scamozzian position in which absolute numbers became increasingly important, while Jonson's enthusiasm about the symbolism of absolute numbers seems to have waned after the early masques (although he retained an interest in proportion and harmony).

On a more personal level, it is clear that simultaneous with their increasing hostility (and a deterioration of health that was common to both) the fortunes of the collaborators developed in opposite directions: Jonson's career fell into decline while Jones, under regular employment and receiving the additional benefits of Court patronage, was still in the ascendant in the 1630s.[74] From Jones's point of view it seems understandable that, in his late fifties, he should have desired equal status with his collaborator as an inventor. Yet conversely, it is equally comprehensible that Jonson should have resented what would have seemed like a threat to his authority. In the later

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72. For material in this paragraph I am indebted to O. Logan's chapter (1972), on the visual arts in *Culture and Society in Venice 1470—1790* (London), pp. 220-255; Murray, P. and L. (1963), *The Art of the Renaissance* (London); and Murray, L. (1967), *The Late Renaissance and Mannerism* (London); 'The Printed Plans and Panoramic Views of Venice', ed. J. Schulz (1970), in: *Saggi e memorie di storia dell'arte* (Venice); and Jane Martineau and Charles Hope, eds (1983), *The Genius of Venice 1500-1600* (London).

73. Wittkower ([1974] 1983), p. 74.

74. See Gotch ([1928] 1968), pp. 177-91; and Harris, Orgel and Strong (1973), pp. 165-84.

masques it seems, then, that although Jones's stage architecture began to reflect his own 'Palladian' buildings; although Jonson's scripts — in line, no doubt, with the vogue of Charles's Court — pandered to neo-Platonism; and although, in the emblemism of *Chloridia*, Jonson conceded to Architecture and Sculpture an equality with Poesy and History as well as Jones's accession to the shared title of 'Inventor'; Jonson could not be expected to sanction his own defeat by the structural embodiment of his partner's principles.[75] In fact, after his explicit rejection of Vitruvian embodiment in *The Magnetic Lady* (1632) it is clear that any idea of a co- operative unity based on the complementary harmony of poetic structure and visual image was unrealisable.[76]

What, then, was Jones's influence on the 'invention' of the late Jonsonian masques? The surviving evidence from Jones gives us little more than a hint, but it does not seem coincidental that there is a correspondence between the Jones who has emerged out of our analysis of the later annotations and the Jones whom Jonson satirizes in *Love's Welcome at Bolsover* as Coronell Iniquo Vitruvius: the Surveyor who oversees the burlesque dance of mechanics (H&S VII, p. 810, ll. 67-70). And it is as though Jonson were replying (with some irony) to Jones's observations from Plato on the role of poetry when Philalethes cuts short the elegant dialogue of Eros and Anteros with the words:

> No more of your poetric (pretty *Cupids*) lest presuming on your little wits, you prophane the intention of your service .... Leave it, prettie *Cupids,* leave it. Rime will undoe you, and hinder your growth, and reputation in Court, more than anything beside you have either mention'd or fear'd. If you dable in Poetric once, it is done of your being believ'd, or understood here. (H&S VII, 812-13, ll. 140-2, 152-6)

Notably, too, as if in response to Book III of the *Republic*, Philalethes speaks prose in his own person to a real King and Queen, addressing the subject of their real marriage as an emblem of harmony and turning the Court into 'An Academie ... where all the true lessons of Love are throughly read, and taught; the Reasons, the Proportions, and Harmonie, drawne forth in analytick Tables, and made demonstrable to the *Senses*' (H&S VII, 813, ll. 144-7).[77]

Jonson, then, appears to feel that the act of writing poetry in the masque itself is threatened, and we may wonder whether this is due to Jones's pressure on him to fulfill his obligation to the state by presenting it with 'Poesi in Himes'. I do not wish to overstress this, but it certainly seems remarkable that of the two Jonsonian masques which share the credit for their invention with Jones — *Love's Triumph Through Callipolis* and *Chloridia* — the main body of the masque proper in the latter is an antiphonal structure which is sung throughout, while in the former the entire masque is sung (the antimasque being wordless), resolving — via Euclia's 'Hymn' (over a scene with muses

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75. For the vogue of neo-Platonism in Charles's Court, see Parry (1981), pp. 184-97.

76. Even before the severance of their collaboration, Jonson's compliance with Jones was probably too perfunctory to allow the elaborate correspondence of text and visual image that we will observe in the early masques. That the genre was particularly dependent on an integrated liaison between partners is amply testified by Orrell (1985), p. 193, n. 59, who recounts Campion's description of how the designer for *The Somerset Masque*, De Servi, 'being too much of him selfe, and in no way to impart his intentions', forced the 'invention' of the masque 'into a farre narrower compasse then was from the beginning intended'.

77. The irony — implied by Gordon (1975), p. 96 — that this speech levels Jonson's and Jones's claim by diminishing both, is heightened by the fact that we can see from Jones's note in Plutarch (*Moralia*, 512, l. 17), that the architect would have been in agreement with the status accorded to Love in *Love's Welcome at Bolsover.*

on the rocks), a quartet by Jupiter, Juno, Genius and Hymen; and Venus' song — into a climactic paean dedicated to 'CHARLES with his MARY' (H&S VII, 742, l. 220).

After Jonson's death, as Orgel and Strong have so convincingly shown, Jones's Scamozzian brand of neo-Platonism mirrored the Court in its progressive isolation from the political imperatives of the day, rhetorically adorning the 'accepted' truths of Kingship which were to be so rudely shattered by the Civil War.[78] Jones, since 1631, had been the chief inventor of these masques, and the last of them, *Salmacida Spolia* , fittingly emblemises the continuance of his concerns. Its plot is based on a story from Vitruvius (which we can find glossed and marked by Jones's later hand in his Barbaro),[79] the text is sung and the whole is accompanied (with the aid of some of Jones's most sophisticated Vitruvian stage machinery, and scenic designs taken from Perugi) by architectural features based on Serlio and Palladio: forming a complex image of Concord.[80] To the end of his career as a masque designer, the Vitruvian aesthetic which had been active in Jones's imagination from the beginning of the first decade of the seventeenth century acted as an inspiration to him. The annotations to the Vasari, the Plutarch, and the Plato bear witness to a widening and deepening of his theoretical knowledge; and the acquisition of

78. O&S I, pp. 49-75; and Orgel, S. (1975), *The Illusion of Power* (Berkeley), pp. 77-89.

79. In his Barbaro, p. 87, Jones marks Vitruvius' 'discription of ye pallas of Mausolus and his tombe', adding (in a different ink): 'History of ye fountain of Salmasis', from which he was to derive the motto for Salmacida Spoila ('Salmacida spoila sine sanguine sine sudore', O&S II, p. 730, ll. 71-2). And beside the continuation of the passage (p. 88), he notices the 'History how the rodianes attemted Heliarnassus & defeated by Artemissia', which is recalled at the opening of the masque (ll. 77-92). Other passages in Jones's books may also have influenced his descriptive notes. The *locus amoenus* that Jones renders with a surprising eloquence (ll. 156 ff.) may, perhaps, owe a little to Scamozzi's passage on the 'deliciosissimo, e fruittifero Monte Pausilippo' and its environs (I, p. 117): an area that Jones explicitly mentions later in the masque (ll. 292—300), and which we know he had visited from a note in his Barbaro on 'this potsolano which ... I brought from Pottsiolo 1614' (p. 268), while passages in his Summonte (I, pp. 104 and 260) may also have refreshed his memory. Jones, moreover, may have had special reasons for including this locale in his masque, since Arundel, at about the same time, had reconstructed the grounds of his Surrey villa in imitation of Pausilipo, presumably with some recourse to Jones's own knowledge of the area (see Howarth (1985), p. 125).

80. The sequence of the masque from chaos to concord, and its fore—conceit based on the myth of the water of Salmacis, bear some suggestive similarities to the literary endeavours of other committeed Vitruvians such as Trissino, whose *Italia liberata* (Rome, 1547) moves from the tempestuous destruction of Gnatia and the liberation of the Trojan captors from the clutches of the snake-like Acratia (Book V, p. 169, ll. [373] ff; cf. Jones's 'Fury', O&S II, p. 731, ll. 118—121), with the help of the regenerative water of Sanajo (which is explicitly contrasted against the enervating 'Salmacia linfa' of the non-Vitruvian tradition (p. 160 [l. 146]); over a difficult Alpine Pass, leaving Sudor behind (p. 183, [ll. 763-5]); before arriving on the 'soave piano / Pien d'ogni frutto, che e salubre al Mondo' ([ll. 770-1]), where Areta's Vitruvian palace is situated. And in the light of these resemblances (which are probably generic rather than allusive), it is worth remembering that Trissino was a particular favourite of the Medici, inspiring the literary endeavours of Lorenzino as well as Saint-Gelais' French adaptation of his play as *La Sofonisba* for performance at Blois before Catherine de' Medici in 1559 or 1560 (see Cosenza (1921-1922), *s.v.* 'Trissino', p. 3473). *Salmacida Spoila*, then, presented England's Medici Queen, Henrietta Maria, with an iconography which was entirely fitting to her 'Tuscan wisdom' (O&S II, p. 733, l. 323).

a new level of specialization which was attained without sight of the underlying principles of Vitruvianism. But it was a widening and deepening which isolated him increasingly from his most successful collaborator; and a specialization which gestured, beyond language itself, towards the Platonic silence of forms.

LITERATURE

Attila Kiss

Who Reads? Towards a Semiotics of the Reading Subject

0.o. The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate how much depends in poststructuralist theory upon the critical, deconstructive reading and answering of the question included in the title. The question is not introduced here as a random choice but as a case in the sociology of literature, since it was one of the three titles of a conference organized by the Czóbel Minka Society in Szeged in 1994.

0.i. Who reads? I maintain that this very question, which appears to be so common, neutral and automatic at first sight, contains traps which the critical reader has to avoid by problematizing the semiotic logic of the sentence. This question offers ideologically determined sites of meaning-production for the subject where the possible answers are always already pre-coded by the power-technologies of modern culture. I propose to come up with an answer by investigating the problem through a deconstruction of the subject-positions offered by the question. I will rely on the critical apparatus of the semiotics of the subject.[1]

The Subject

0.ii. It is one of the central positions of poststructuralist critical thinking that a theory of the reading subject must be based on an understanding of the constitution of the speaking subject.[2]

The constitution of the speaking subject is determined by historically specific technologies of power that establish institutionalized sites of discourse where the circulation of possible meanings in society is governed. The discursive practices create ideologically situated positions which the subject must enter in order to have access to (a version of) the Real and in order to be able to predicate an identity and a context for that identity. Thus, subjectivity is a function and a product of discourse: the subject predicates his/her identity in a signifying practice but always already within the range of rules distributed by ideological regimes of truth. The subject is a property of language.

This thesis implies that the status of the subject in theory is first of all a question of the *hierarchy between signification and the speaking subject*. Recent developments in critical theory share the common goal of theorizing the Subject, that is, establishing a complex account for the material *and* psychological constitution of the human speaking subject as positioned in a socio-historical context. Although they employ various strategies (semiotic, psychological, political, moral aspects, etc.), they all strive to *decenter* the concept of the unified, self-sufficient subject of liberal humanism, the Cartesian ego of Western metaphysics.

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1. For advanced introductions to recent developments in the theory of the speaking subject, see Coward & Ellis 1977, Kristeva 1984, Silverman 1983.
2. Cf. Kristeva, "The system and the speaking subject." In: Toril Moi (ed.), *The Kristeva Reader.* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 24-31.

The Cartesian idea of the self-identical, transhistorically human subject is replaced by the subject as a function of discursive practices. This project calls not only for a complex account of the socio-historical macrodynamics, but also for the psychoanalytically informed microdynamics of the subject, which traces the history of the emergence of subjectivity in the human animal through the appearance and the agency of the symbol in consciousness. Since the symbol always belongs to a historically specific Symbolic Order (society as a semiotic mechanism), the historical problematization of the *macrodynamics* and the psychoanalytical account of the *microdynamics* of the subject cannot be separated and are always two sides of the same coin: the identity of the subject coined by the Symbolic.

0.iii. The relation of the subject to society and ideology is at the center of socio-historical theories of the subject. Technologies of power in society work to subject individuals to a system of exclusion, determining the way certain parts of reality are structured and signified as culture.[3] They position the subject within specific sites of meaning-production: power and knowledge become inseparable; the way information is circulated becomes constitutive of one's personality.

The historicization of the constitution of the subject throws light on the logic of discursive practices that structure a system of subject positions and the formation of social identities in these positions. However, this approach does not penetrate the structure of the subject itself, the mechanism which uses language to predicate identity in ideologically determined ways. We also have to account for how the subject becomes able to use language, and how the intervention of the symbolic system into the psychosomatic structure of the subject produces specific subjectivities.

0.iv. According to Julia Kristeva, theories of the speaking subject can be categorized either as theories of the enunciated or theories of the enunciation.[4] The former orientation studies mechanical relationships between the signifier and the signified and considers the subject as a controller of the production of meaning. The subject is a possessor of linguistic rules, a closed unit who always stands hierarchically above the elements of meaning-production (signifier, signified, grammatical rules, etc.): s/he is the guarantee, the *origo* of meaning and identity.

Theories of the enunciation are interested in the *production* of the above elements of semiosis that are no longer understood as monads, or units, but rather as unstable productions in a heterogeneous signifying *process*. The Freudian revolution introduced a decisive inversion in the hierarchy of the signifier and the subject. It became clear that the human subject is not a homogeneous unit but a system in which different modalities are always simultaneously at work. The subject as a heterogeneous system can no longer be the controller and sole possessor of meaning and identity.

The Question

1.o. I would now like to interpret the question Who reads? in the light of the theory of the subject delineated above.

1.i. If we concentrate on the question itself, instead of the automatic answering mechanisms triggered by the question, the first problem of course arises because of the polysemy of the sentence. How many ways are there to read this question? Which version shall we prefer? The polysemy and the compulsion to choose among alternatives point out two special attributes of the question's textuality: it addresses us and calls for interpretation in the first place rather than an answer.

In order to clarify the dilemma, let us put it this way: in what situations can this question become meaningful? For whom can it be meaningful, that is: who is the potential reader of this question? What are the reader- or subject-positions invited,

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3. For the genealogy of the modern subject and the logic of subjection, see Foucault, "Afterword. The Subject and Power." In: Dreyfus & Rabinow (eds.) 1984.

4. "The Speaking Subject," 10-11. In: Blonsky (ed.) 1985, 210-220.

preferred, presupposed by this question? In order to relate to these uncertainties, we have to approach the act of reading as a **process**.[5]

Let us have a closer look at the structure and the semantics of the sentence. What is **not** being asked here? It is not a WHAT that reads, but a human agent; we are not asked to define a group (Who are those who read?), but a general agent without reduction; it is not asked what is being read, the question is interested only in the person who performs the activity. That is, in the sentence we have an agent who performs an activity, and in fact s/he is defined through this activity. It follows that the task imposed on us by the question is to define the category of the **reader**. The conclusion is that the question which addresses us places the emphasis on the **action**, the nature of the activity, and not on the quality of the agent. But, at the same time, it is also implied and posited that this activity is performed, executed, that is, **possessed and controlled** by a person: the activity originates in the person instead of him or her suffering the effect of the action.

1.ii. This is when we first have to pause to rethink more critically our approach, since we have already been entrapped, sucked into a preferred, pre-fabricated reader-position by the question. In this position we automatically read the question within the horizon or with the expectation that the act of reading is performed, controlled by the reading individual, and all we need is a description of the **process of reading** in order to answer the question by defining the reading agent by that action. The question WHO READS? prefers, invites a certain reader-position in which this WHO appears as a transparent, homogeneous and unquestionable entity or unity. This implies that, on the one hand, there is the agent, and, on the other hand, there is the action "supervised" by the reading subject. But the interrelationship between the two components of the question may not be that obvious or that one-sided. Let us pose some more questions in order to conceive this more explicitly.

2.i. Who does not read? Who asks "Who reads?" Who is being read?

2.ii. Among these variants the most interesting to us is the question "Who does not read?" I believe it can be stated without elaborate semiotic reasoning that reading as an act and the WHO as an agent are not separable, alternative concepts. The WHO, that is the subject, is always already a reader since the condition of subjectivity is that the subject using language identifies with the category of the I available in the linguistic utterances and predications, separates him/herself from the categories of the NON-I available in the discourses, and all this is done with regard to the meanings accessible in the community of speakers. In fact, with this we have only stated that the WHO, the subject is always a speaking subject using language. But what is the case with reading, or can we state that it is even more so with reading? By now it should be apparent that the interrelationship between WHO and READS is already more complicated than it was at first glance since, here, it appears redundant: the answer is that everybody, every WHO, every subject reads.

3.i. There are two points now that have to be elaborated: the difference or non-difference between speaking and reading, and the possibility of approaching the question "Who reads?" focusing not on the action but on the agent, or rather on the relation of the agent to the action, on the hierarchy of this relationship. Does the reading WHO preside over the act of reading?

3.ii. Psychoanalytic criticism argues that the logic of the Signifier is independent of the intentional activity of the speaking subject. Consequently the speaking subject is always a subject being spoken, a subject in the process of being narrated. In the signifying process, the subject is not a possessor or master of language, but rather a function of pre-given possible meanings. In the speaking subject there is always more than one modality of signification at work: conscious and unconscious processes inform semiosis

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5. Since, in the semiotics of the subject, any signifying practice is interpreted as a heterogeneous process in which the subject's identity is being constituted and questioned simultaneously, the act of reading should also be problematized as a process in which the subject is involved as a heterogeneous system.

simultaneously, and the subject as a heterogeneous structure speaks and is always spoken at the same time, since speaking makes him/her part of processes and positions beyond his/her control. Speaking is happening to the subject just as it is performed by him/her. So we may rephrase the question: it is not WHO SPEAKS but WHO IS BEING SPOKEN?

3.iii. But our original question was WHO READS? How about the reading subject who is at the same time always a speaking subject?

If speaker here simply means a subject using language, we have no problem since in this case speaking and reading are identical processes. However, if we approach speaking as a physical and corporeal, psychosomatic practice, its difference from reading is of fundamental importance.

The Surfaces

4.i. Speaking as a living act of linguistic practice always requires from the subject an awareness of the situation of peaking, and, at the same time, it reinforces the feeling or (mis)recognition that he/she has created, positioned and fixated him/herself in the linguistic act as an autonomous agent. Speaking enables the subject to consider him/herself as an origo of the signifying act and of the identity posited through signification. Thus, speaking (both corporeally and logically) is the *most solid, most yielding surface* for the mirroring of subjectivity. The sentiment of identity, the subject's awareness that s/he is the generator, predicator of self-identity is of course a *misrecognition*, but it works since this is the *ontological condition* or prerequisite for the constitution of the subject; the alternative is schizophrenia. This is why the technologies of ideological interpellation aim at containing subjects in the first person singular predication of positions and meanings (I love New York, I recycle, I vote for Clinton, etc.), so that the subject (mis)recognizes his/her position as a master of the linguistic situation instead of focusing on the semiotic logic of the (broader cultural) signifying practice in which s/he is entrapped by speaking.[6]

4.ii. Speaking is always reading at the same time, since the speaking subject speaks only by reading the exteriority of the Real, by situating, "reading" him/herself into the situation of speaking. However, we cannot theorize the concept of reading without discussing what is being read. We cannot avoid a definition of what is read, that is, a definition of the text.

4.iii. In order to proceed along the line of my argument, I will introduce some arbitrary and non-comprehensive definitions. A signifying practice is a process in which the subject can reflect on itself as an entity separate from the external world through signifiers from which the subject itself is absent. (This Lacanian thesis implies that the subject can never be totally present to itself, subjectivity is constituted through the *incapacity of the subject to represent itself totally.*)[7] Let us define the text as *any material basis* for the system of relationships with the external world. Reading is when the subject relates to the external world by activating the signifiers of the text. Thus, reading is nothing else but *occupying a position.* I have introduced these very rough definitions only in order to arrive at the realization that 1./ speaking is always a special way of reading; 2./ the subject is always a reading subject which is being read at the same time; 3./ during the act of reading it is always the *same primary text* which is being read. This primary text is the innermost, *traumatic kernel* of the subject's psychosomatic system, which surpasses all symbolization, which cannot be represented, which is the innermost lack of the subject

6. For a theory of interpellation as the function of ideological apparatuses, see Althusser 1986.

7. For an account of the subject as absent from the signifier, see Silverman 1983. "The Subject of Lacan."

constituted through loss and lack. In Lacan's terms this is the **sinthome**, the fundamental symptom, the only ontologically positive basis of the subject.[8]

4.iv. It is the sinthome which is being read in every signifying practice through the subject, and this is what I will call from now on *the primary text*. In every act of reading we have an attempt to compensate for the traumatic experience, the constitutive lack by occupying a system of positions in which the subject, through the signifier, can differ itself from the Other and attain consistency. In the act of reading the most important momentum is: occupying a position other than the Other, and, besides the archaic drive of the sinthome, this is enhanced by *secondary texts* which I here call *surfaces with different levels of solidity*.

We can define speaking as a solid surface because live speech is the most efficient context for the seemingly self-controlled mirroring of subjectivity: it is the easiest to occupy the position of the I here. Also, it is in live speech that the primary text is being read most intensively since the auto-eroticism and corporeal involvement of speaking brings the subject closest to its own unrepresentable self-presence which was radically lost when entering the symbolic order. Of course, in the live situation it is not only the primary text which is being read but also the components of the environment as secondary texts. However, the constituents of the environment do not hinder the subject in occupying the I-position. (Of course the environment here also includes the repertoire, that is the subject's stock of secondary texts.)

4.v. The case is somewhat different with written secondary texts since they function in different ways in providing a basis for the subject to occupy the I-position: they create surfaces of varying solidity for the subject's self-mirroring. In general, every written secondary text prefers, "invites" a specific subject-position from which the text is the easiest to operate. With great simplification, we can say that the question is how easy, how automatic is it to identify with the position of the implied reader. In this respect, a visual poem is a much softer surface than a sex film, a marching song or a badge.

5.i. As a conclusion we may argue that every time there is a WHO there is always reading as well, and it is the primary text of the subject which is being read in subject-positions that are occupied in accordance with the surfaces available in social signifying practices. But it should also be noted about surfaces that they incline subjects to *internalize* permanent positions through much more indirect, disguised strategies as well. Since every subject-position is a function of social conventions and discursive technologies, the text-surfaces position the subject in *dimensions and fields of meaning* the presence of which is hardly discernible to the subject because of their automatized, encoded, mechanical nature. An example of this is the question WHO READS?, which, at the beginning of our investigation, automatically fixed us in a position in which it appears natural and given that there is a general human being who can be defined as the agent performing and controlling the process of reading. This is the position encoded in us by the good old humanist tradition, and as long as the theory of reading grounds itself in that tradition, it will always remain incapable of accounting for the entirety of the experience of reading.

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8. For a provocative reading of Lacan's concept of the sinthome, see Žižek 1989. "Which Subject of the Real?"

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Katalin Halácsy

Formulaic Composition *vs.* Creative Talent in Two Anglo-Saxon Poems

The opinions of different scholars about the poetic quality of individual Old English poems stating that one was the 'work of a more accomplished artist' or another one was a 'boring repetition of formulaic expressions', etc. have always intrigued me. Most of the time I found it very easy to accept these statements which proves that the critic of the poem was subjected to the same emotive effect by something in the poem as I was, but what this was needs more careful analysis, i.e. what stylistic means the Anglo-Saxon poet had at hand and how he used his resources in individual poems.

This field is vast and although a fair amount of ink has been spent exploring it, progress can only be made very slowly. The critic would need to clarify vital issues which seem to have great impact on the style, but some of them, e.g. the issue of oral or written composition of Old English poems, notoriously resist such attempts. I intend to study more particular particular phenomena of style in this paper, and shall in the above issue join the authorities who agree that the whole corpus of Anglo-Saxon poetry was most probably composed in writing, but shows clear features of oral poetry, and, consequently, can be called 'orally based'.[1]

Another difficulty of this sort is what the standard or norm of expectation was towards an Anglo-Saxon *scop* in the composition of a poem as far as length, structure, images were concerned, and how individual poets in different works deviated from this ephemeral norm if such a thing ever existed in Anglo-Saxon poetry spanning more than five-hundred years, at least. The number of such issues can easily be multiplied. Instead of general statements one feels one can only make any valid contribution to the study of Old English poetry by retreating to the text.

I selected **variation** for my study as this is one of the most frequently used if not the most frequent stylistic element in Old English poetry which still is an optional feature comparable to metaphor in modern poetry and unlike e.g. alliteration which is a mandatory requirement.[2] Early Germanic poetry is rather characterized by the lavish use of synonyms for one concept than poetic thrift which is observable in the Homeric epics. But however much the thrift or lavishness of the use of variation is revealing further steps seem necessary in studying the character of variation in order to make any valuable contribution to the already existing body of knowledge.

1. Before taking any text under scrutiny, however, a workable **definition of variation** in Old English poetry must be established. No contemporary description of variation exists, the notorious phrase in Beowulf 875a: *wordum wrixlan* is the only —

1. The first proponent of this category was Benson, Larry D. "The Literary Character of Anglo-Saxon Formulaic Poetry." *PMLA* 81 (1966): 334-341.
2. Greenfield, Stanley B., *The Interpretation of Old English Poems* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 60.

questionable — reference to this technique, notorious because several translations are possible: 'to vary with words[?]'[3] or 'exchange words with somebody'[4] or still 'to vary (i.e. *change*, and taking it almost beyond the limit of stretching the meaning: *play* with) words'.

Variation can conveniently be classified under the category of synonymity, it certainly is the double or multiple statement of one thing in different words, but as Brodeur immediately adds in his definition 'with a more or less perceptible shift in stress'.[5] Variation then is much more of a **dynamic** than a static **image**, it seems to me that the poet exploits this feature to the utmost when using variation, and, it seems, this has not been adequately stressed in earlier studies which rather concentrated on studying the effect of the redundancy that variation causes.

I call the phenomenon **variation,** a series of variants belonging together a **cluster**, which has two or more **members**. I do not want to distinguish between the first member and the others as Fred C. Robinson[6] does, because it would give the false impression that the first member is a basis, the most straightforward statement of the object, person or idea, which the following members elaborate on, and this is not true. See e.g. Brunanburh 58b-59a:

cyððe sohton,
Wesseaxna land

where a qualifying nominal comes before the expression identifying the object; or Maldon 68-69 quoted later in the text where a personal pronoun precedes the content words.

Another point of argument among earlier opinions about variation is, whether members of a cluster do or do not have to be grammatically parallel[7] and be within the same clause. The earlier tendency toward strictness in this issue has been loosening up somewhat as we approach the present, but I wish to stretch even Greenfield's very 'compliant' definition — which I agree with, in other respects. 'Variation', he says, 'may be defined as a double or multiple statement of the same idea within a clause or in contiguous clauses (and sentences), each restatement suggesting through its choice of words either a general or a more specific quality, or a different attribute, of that concept;

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3. Greenfield, Stanley B., *The Interpretation of Old English Poems* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 64, where his question mark clearly indicates his dissatisfaction because of the uncertainty as well as the emptiness of the translation.
4. as in Beowulf 366a.
5. Brodeur, Arthur G., *The Art of Beowulf* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), 40.
6. Mentioned by Greenfield, Stanley B, *The Interpretation of Old English Poems*, (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 65
7. Paetzel, Walter, *Die Variationen in der altgermanischen Alliterationspoesie* (Berlin: Mayer and Müller, 1913), and Robinson, Fred C., "Two Aspects of Variation in Old English Poetry" in: *Old English Poetry: Essays on Style.* Ed. Daniel G. Calder. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 127-145. think syntactic variation is indispensable whereas Brodeur, Arthur G., *The Art of Beowulf* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), Leslie, Roy F., "Analysis of Stylistic Devices and Effects in Anglo-Saxon Literature." in: *Stil und Formprobleme in der Literatur.* Ed. Paul Böckmann (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959), 129-136., Greenfield, Stanley B., *The Interpretation of Old English Poems* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), and Greenfield, Stanley and Calder, Daniel G., *A New Critical History of Old English Literature* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1986) feel it is not.

and such statements may, ... or may not, ... be grammatically parallel.[8] I will argue — using a term for want of a better one — that the double or multiple statements of the same idea need not be within one clause or contiguous clauses, but they have to be *within memory* of each other. I am aware of how obscure this term 'within memory' sounds, but instead of dismissing it as unscholarly right away let me remind the reader that we are studying orally-based poetry where — in a classical case — the poem emerges and disappears in time the same way as a musical composition does at the time of performance, and the memory span of the listener plays an important role. Themes in music are also only a few bars long but variations can be prolonged as each variant recalls all the earlier variants as well as the original. Here is an example from The Battle of Maldon which would break all the rules of earlier critics, but which I consider one cluster since wælwulfas would be hardly understandable without the later referent wicinga werod:

Wodon þa wælwulfas, for wætere ne murnon,
wicinga werod, west ofer Pantan
ofer scir wæter *scyldas wegon,*
lidmen to lande *linde bæron* 96-99 Maldon

Greenfield argues at another place 'that some kind of parallelism is necessary for the effective recognition by the listener or reader, so that the implications of the form can be measured on the pulse, so to speak, even as phonetic parallelism (i.e. rhyme) functions to enforce notice of semantic links'.[9] I leave to others to judge what is more exact: the pulse or the ear.

'All content-words lend themselves to variation, and the figure may assume many forms', as Brodeur writes,[10] so members of a cluster may be nouns, adjectives, verbs, phrases or I add: even clauses. It is true that in the case of verbs or verb phrases it is very difficult to draw a dividing line between a series indicating only a shift in the meaning and one denoting consecutive actions.[11] We must be very permissive with meaning, too, as sometimes not the exact meaning of the word is registered by the listener but some kind of a general one:

Byrhtnoþ maþelode, *bord hafenode,*
wand wacne æsc, wordum mælde
yrre and andræd, ageaf him andsware: 42-44 Maldon

Here I consider *bord hafenode,* and *wand wacne æsc,* as synonyms, both meaning 'brandishing the weapon' while speaking.

Members of a cluster may be formulaic — e.g. in the description of God or the lord, weapon, etc. — as the same phrases describing the same concept or idea occur many times within the corpus of Old English poetry or whole clusters might be qualified as formulaic — e.g. when a person is identified as his father's son. Formula and variation are both prominent elements of *oral* poetry, they are both repetitions of certain phrases or clauses, but formula is an element of composition, when looking for formulaic expressions scholars survey the whole poetic corpus or at least the whole poem, whereas variation is a feature of style, members of a cluster follow each other relatively closely within a single

8. Greenfield, Stanley and Calder, Daniel G., *A New Critical History of Old English Literature* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1986), 127-128. and note.
9. Greenfield, Stanley B., *The Interpretation of Old English Poems* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 64.
10. Brodeur, Arthur G., *The Art of Beowulf* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), 279.
11. Greenfield, Stanley B., *The Interpretation of Old English Poems* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 69.

poem, and the effect is based on the 'local' repetition.

Variation definitely slows down the flow of the story, it has widely been agreed upon that this is necessary in oral poetry to support the memory but it might also be dangerous in the hand of a simple-minded poet.[12] 'Redundancy, repetition of the just-said, keeps both speaker and hearer surely on the track.'[13] Some stress however, that the poet's selection of variants is limited or even dictated by the alliterative pattern. 'Often within one sentence the poet repeats the same essential idea two or three times, always in words that fit a changing alliteration. The resulting stop-and-go narrative movement is one of the most prominent aspects of the Old English poetic style'.[14]

W. F. Whitman and others do not seem to appreciate the redundancy involved in formulaic composition, such a view would by implication play down the poetic quality of variation, too, or at least consider it as alien for a modern-day reader. In the summary of his article he says formulaic composition 'involves the use of words or phrases to give the verse its metrical character, without adding substantially to the denotative meaning of the units,'[15] i.e. formulas are used in a poem to serve for padding out the alliterative line. This is not much more flattering than Edward B. Irving, Jr. in his excellent study of Beowulf describing 'the ubiquitous and incessant Old English habit of variation, where a series of statements (they may be only descriptive adjectives, nouns, or phrases) is made about whatever is at the center of description, paralleling on the micro-scale the larger sequences of narrative.'[16]

Kennings may also be members of a cluster of variation, they are very welcome members as they describe objects in a dynamic or analytic way, and this is a characteristic of variation, too, as I said earlier, but large and poetically powerful clusters with more than three members can easily be found without any kenning among the members.

2. I selected two conveniently short poems for the study of variation: **The Battle of Maldon** consisting of 325 lines and the longest poem included in the Anglo-Saxon chronicle under the year 937, **The Battle of Brunanburh** with its 73 lines.[17] Their topic is similar and both are about historical events and although the two poets' motivation may be widely different — the Maldon poet describes a losing battle probabaly with an aim outside the event itself, like praising heroic virtues, the Brunanburh poets' most prominent goal is historical recording of the fight and panegyric of the Anglo-Saxon winners — they lend themselves to stylistic comparison.

The former, although fragmentary — the beginning and the end not surviving —, is usually considered a better poem, 'in the more scenic style of the older epics,'[18] it is also praised for better narrative technique, all together 'the comparative muscularity of

12. Brodeur, Arthur G., *The Art of Beowulf* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), 39.
13. Ong, Walter J., *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), 40.
14. Niles, John D., *Beowulf: The Poem and Its Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 140.
15. Whitman, F.H., "The Meaning of 'Formulaic' in Old English Verse Composition." in: *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* (1975): 529-537, 529.
16. Irving, Edward B., Jr., *Rereading Beowulf* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), 17.
17. I used the following editions: "The Battle of Brunanburh" in: *The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems*. Ed. Elliott van Kirk Dobbie. ASPR. (London, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Columbia University Press, 1942) 16-20., and Scragg, Donald G., ed. *The Battle of Maldon. Old and Middle English Texts* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981).
18. Greenfield, Stanley and Calder, Daniel G., *A New Critical History of Old English Literature* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1986), 149.

Maldon, ... assures its place in the forefront of Old English poetry'.[19] "*Maldon*, with its dazzling varieties of impersonated consciousness, has always been understood and admired as poetry, while *Brunanburh* is typically assigned secondary status as commemorative battle verse whose enthusiastic maker produced, in place of an annal entry, what Dobbie called 'an unrestrained song of triumph, in which the poet seems to know little, and care less, of the actual course of events'".[20] The Brunanburh poem is usually qualified as historical panegyric[21] or 'a tissue of heroic formulaic cliché, themes and stylistic variation',[22] or dismissed all together. Although much defence has already been put up to save the chronicle poem from such accusations, and there is a definitive study by W. F. Bolton about variation in this poem,[23] there is no general conviction about its high poetic quality.

The following comparative table shows the distribution of variations in the two poems. In the middle I inserted a column in which I applied a simple proportionate conversion of the numbers of variations in the Brunanburh poem so that they are easily comparable to the numbers of the Maldon poem as the first is about four and a half times shorter than the second. I realize how simplistic this sort of mathematical calculation is. I only intend to use this table as a starting point for my analysis and make every attempt possible to refine the picture in the further parts of the paper.

Clusters with:	**Brunanburh**	B. converted	**Maldon**
2 members	8	36	27
3 members	6	27	12
4 members	2	9	16
5 members	2	9	4
6 members	3	12.5	4
7 members	-	-	1
8 members	-	-	1
10 members	1	4.5	-
13 members	1	4.5	-
Clusters all together:	23	(100.5)	65

In Brunanburh there would be a cluster in every third line, if they were evenly

19. Whitman, F.H. "The Meaning of 'Formulaic' in Old English Verse Composition." *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* (1975): 529-537., 536.
20. Frese, Dolores W., "Poetic Prowess in Brunanburh and Maldon: Winning, Losing, and Literary Outcome." In: *Modes of Interpretation of Old English Literature. Essays in Honor of St. B. Greenfield* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986. 83-99), 83.
21. Greenfield, Stanley and Calder, Daniel G., *A New Critical History of Old English Literature* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1986), 148., and Frese, Dolores W. "Poetic Prowess in Brunanburh and Maldon: Winning, Losing, and Literary Outcome." In: *Modes of Interpretation of Old English Literature. Essays in Honor of St. B. Greenfield* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986. 83-99), 85.
22. Greenfield, Stanley and Calder, Daniel G., *A New Critical History of Old English Literature* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1986), 98.
23. Bolton, Whitney F., "'Variation' in The Battle of Brunanburh." *RES* 19 (1968): 363-372.

distributed, in Maldon less frequently: only in every fifth line. Those who qualified Brunanburh as formulaic, felt this redundancy in the composition. If we add that 8 of the 23 variations are descriptions of persons or geographical locations, it is evident why the poem is felt to be mere panegyric. On the other hand, the longest and most intricate clusters can also be found in this poem. These were very effectively analyzed by W. F. Bolton, who considered these long clusters as basic structural units of the poem.

The table also shows that the Maldon poet favored 4-member variations more than the Chronicle poet, and avoided the very complicated patterns. As I show later, the 4-part variation is a rather frequent type, as twice two synonyms can be woven together very easily.

In order to reach meaningful conclusions, however, the structure and the content of the variations has to be scrutinized in depth.

Structure

By definition a minimum of two members are needed to constitute a variation. These are often placed in the b-verse of one line and the a-verse of the next as if the poet intended to link the two lines with the repetition and facilitate the alliteration. But even in these cases the mentioned dynamism prevents the reader or listener from registering a mere repetition.

leofne fleogan
hafoc wið þæs holtes 7b-8a Maldon

The referent of the word 'leofne' is obscure in its context, its meaning is only restricted by the verb following it: the beloved something can fly. The word raises a certain expectation, creates tension which is satisfied when the word 'hafoc' appears in the next line.

The number of the members of this kind of **simple, linear or additive variation,** where one set of members are placed one after the other in the poem, can reach as much as five as in ll.48-51a of Brunanburh. This is the longest series I have found:

þæt heo beaduweorca beteran wurdun
on campstede, cumbolgehnastes,
garmittinge, gumena gemotes,
wæpengewrixles ... 48-51a Brunanburh

The reason why 'battle' is repeated five times is, clear from the context: the Vikings and Scots could not boast or laugh that they were better at fighting — runs the understatement of the Saxon poet in the previous lines. This is raised to the level of powerful irony with giving such a list of what the enemy was incapable of doing — this enemy must really be a group of weaklings. The list contains an interesting shift of meanings, but remains within reach of the original mood of the understatement, which is reinforced by the verb 'plegodan' in l. 52b. None of the synonyms suggest anything tragic, bloody or deadly. After the first rather neutral expression: war-work or war-deed, the clash of battle standards, the meeting of spears, the encounter of people and the exchange of weapons rather suggest a friendly sort of tournament if there had been any at the time than a deadly battle. All five synonyms are double compounds consisting of two nouns creating an effect of balance.

Besides the linear or additive pattern in variation, bifurcating or trifurcating ones are also used in both poems:

land calgodon,
hord ond hamas 9b-10a Brunanburh

The Saxon princes often had to defend their country (land) in which two key

things to save form the enemy attack were their treasure hoards and their homes, two important things are highlighted within a larger unit; or sometimes three as in:

he wolde þæs beornes beagas gefecgan,
reaf and hringas and gerenod swurd. 160-161 Maldon

where treasure is a general term, covering all the three kinds of valuable things listed in the next line.
The mirror images of these patterns also occur:

He willað eow to gafole garas syllan,
ættyrne ord and ealde swurd,
þa heregeatu þe eow æt hilde ne deah. 46-48 Maldon

together with a combination of the two patterns:

wigan unforhtne,
Ælfere and Maccus, modige twegen 79b-80 Maldon.

In each of the above three patterns the selection of the contained things makes the image dynamic.

Grammatically both the linear and the bi- and trifurcating patterns may consist of a series of nouns or adjectives as well as verbs, but there are also intricate combinations. Twice in Maldon the poet mentions a pronoun first which is later clarified in a content word or a series of expressions:

þæs him his þeoden þanc gesæde,
þam burþene, 120-121a Maldon

and

Hi þær Pantan stream mid prasse bestodon,
Eastscaxna ord and se æschere. 68-69 Maldon

In the latter one it is easy to see the bifurcating pattern. Or in case of another instance let me pose the daring idea, that the following lines can also be treated as a three-part linear cluster, the first and the last members being simple nouns, but the middle one a whole clause:

hæleða nanum
þæra þe mid Anlafe ofer æra gebland
on lides bosme land gesohtun
fæge to gefeohte 25-28a Brunanburh

Within one variation these lines tell the whole story of the Vikings attacking England: warriors came from over the sea in boats, but they were fated to die.

Beside the simple ones both Anglo-Saxon poets used interesting **combinations of patterns** in which one series of synonyms for one idea are built together with another set of synonyms about something else:

Four members can be combined in an **alternating pattern**:

eþel þysne
Æþelredes eard, *ealdres mines*,
folc and foldan 52-54 Maldon

Eþel, Æþelredes eard and folc and foldan — synonyms meaning Byrhtnoð's homeland are intensified by a synonym referring to the royal lord of Byrhtnoð: Æþelredes and ealdres mines. Eþel is an abstract notion concretized in the further members: it is the feudal lord's property (lower level of abstraction), and the people and the countryside, too.

Another possibility is the **enveloping pattern**:

Se eorl wæs þe *bliðra*,
hloh þa modi man 146b-147a Maldon

The last two patterns are very widely cultivated by the Maldon poet, I would venture to say they are the average for him.

In the next example a set of three synonyms meaning speaking is interlaced by a set of two referring to the enemy. This five-member group is 'framed' by two more synonyms defining the location of the scene thus creating a circular effect:

Ða stod *on stæde*, stiþlice clypode
wicinga ar, wordum mælde,
se on beot abead *brimliþendra*
ærende to þam eorle þær he *on ofre* stod: 25-28 Maldon

The intricacy of these patterns is infinite as the last two examples will show, which could be called "three storey" clusters. In Maldon 212b-14a each part of the sentence is repeated two or three times respectively:

Gemunaþ þara mæla þe *we* oft æt meodo *spræcon*
Þonne *we* on bence *beot ahofon*,
hæleð on healle, 212-214a Maldon

In Maldon 309-311 three alternating and enveloping patterns are combined:

Byrhtwold *maðelode*, *bord hafenode* -
se wæs eald geneat -, *æsc acwehte*;
he ful baldlice beornas *lærde*: 309-311 Maldon

Further analysis of the structural patterns of clusters does not seem to be rewarding in the case of the two poems. Neither poet seems to use one pattern more frequently than another, except for the mentioned case of the 4-member clusters, nor does the length of especially the Brunanburh poem allow for establishing typical patterns. But if we add the study of the topics, the scenes where variation occurs in these two poems a revealing conclusion can be reached.

Theme

In the largest number of cases (17 times in Maldon and 8 times in Brunanburh) variation is used when a person or geographical location is mentioned for the first time. This is far the most frequent occasion, and reasons are easy to find: the new person's lineage, his personal relationships will locate him in the story, he has to be remembered by the audience and this is also an opportunity, where the poet can conveniently run into redundancies, the new person will take part in the action only afterwards, before he does anything, the audience wishes to scrutinize him first. Other frequent occasions, especially in the Maldon poem, where variation occurs are: when a character starts speaking, or dies, or when fight or weapon are mentioned. Moreover there are three variations for 'the lord', and two for the 'sea' which are prominent topics in other Anglo-Saxon poems where variations would occur.

None of these occasions are 'busy' scenes when a series of actions is in the course of happening or dramatic ones, when a character is uttering his words; they are rather at the beginning or at the end of actions. This argument supports the view that the *scop* worked with conscious economy: he did not use variation at just any place where he needed an extra half-line to alliterate or when an apt synonym emerged in his mind, but he slowed down the story only where the situation allowed him to do so. This can be witnessed particularly well in The Battle of Maldon as the poem is built up of a repeated pattern: warriors are introduced, they speak, then fight and die.

Variation especially in **The Battle of Maldon** serves to emphasize the emotional content of the poem. When characters are introduced, their heroic prowess, their age, their loyalty are described, so that the listener can feel deep sorrow at their death, which is hard but heroic.

In Brunanburh the topic of the most dynamic variations comes from outside the central theme of the poem. One is a beautiful description of the passing of the day of the battle:

siþþan sunne up
on morgentid, mære tungol,
glad over grundas, Godes condel beorht,
eces Drihtnes, oð sio æþele gesceaft
sah to setle. 13-17a Brunanburh

This cluster consists of 6 members: 4 of them, all in the b-verses refer to the sun: the first is a simple noun: 'sunne', the second and fourth are adjective+noun constructions, the fourth one, being an abstract noun, 'sio æþele gesceaft', does not let the intensity of the picture decline to the level of the second member after the third one, which is the 'peak' of the variation, a kenning, 'Godes condel beorht'. It is reinforced by the embedded twofold variation: Godes, eces Drihtnes. The dynamism of the series is well supported by the three remaining phrases (the first one, lacking a verb but suggesting one: 'up on morgentid', the second and third verb+preposition+noun constructions).

The second long cluster is an enumeration of the beasts of battle:

Letan him behindan hræ bryttian
saluwigpadan, þone sweartan hræfn,
hyrnednebban, ond þane hasewanpadan,
earn æftan hwit, æses brucan,
grædigne guðhafoc, ond þæt græge deor,
wulf on wealde. 60-65a Brunanburh

The last one, the closing passage of the poem, is a description of the Anglo-Saxon invasion of Britain, with this passage the poet opens up the perspective of the poem to historical magnitude: the victors of Brunanburh are worthy descendants of the one-time conquerors of the land:

siþþan eastan hider
Engle ond Seaxe up becoman,
ofer brad brimu Brytene sohtan,
wlance wigsmiþas, Wealas ofercoman,
corlas arhwate, eard begeatan. 69b-73 Brunanburh

Besides the intricate pattern of the cluster the rhythm of the passage is remarkable: the a-verses contain the subjects and other nominal phrases, while the b-verses are all filled with verb-phrases, thus the endings sound like primitive rhyme. This bears witness to late composition, but there is nothing to prove that contemporary listeners registered this as anythting special.

Conclusion

One cannot resist the idea that the Brunanburh poet was a very talented *scop* given an inferior task, i.e. the description of a victorious Anglo-Saxon battle and he inserted brilliant passages into the otherwise average or middling poem which was expected from him in this particular case and which did not give him much inspiration: it was only a short summary to be fitted into the chronicle. He could not turn his otherwise great fantasy loose on the topic as he was restricted by the framework of the chronicle or he was not familiar with interesting details of the fight but still found some opportunity to show what he was really capable of.

The Maldon poet on the other hand was free in how and what to write. He used variation with measure beside other images of rhetoric. It is worth looking at the speeches of the Viking messenger and Byrhtnoð's answer to how he could use the rich storehouse of other figures of speech. This had been done by worthier critics earlier. He decided to allot the role of **emotional emphasis** to most variations he used and he could assemble his clusters so that they played this role well.

The final conclusion is a warning about hasty judgment on the basis of superficial impressions. The Battle of Brunanburh is a historical panegyric, it is also highly formulaic, but not the work of an inferior poet.

Nóra Séllei

The Reproduction and Rejection of the *Bildungsroman*: *The Mill on the Floss*

"School parted us"
George Eliot, *Brother and Sister*, XI.

This paper intends to discuss George Eliot's novel within the framework of the *Bildungsroman*, concentrating exclusively on Maggie's and Tom's diverse fictions of development, questioning some recent critical stances concerning these *Bildungs*, and drawing on certain assumptions in psychosocial theory to support the arguments.

"The assumptions underlying the earliest examples of the form," argue the editors of *The Voyage In*, "[...] demonstrate the gender bias inherent in the tradition" of the genre because it "presupposes a range of social options available only to men. Only male development is marked by a determined exploration of the social milieu"[1] which is basically benign and hospitable for the male protagonist. Male fictions of development, thus, can be labelled as voyages out, into the wider social context, where their teleological voyage is completed by realising their aspirations.

Presupposing individualism and mobility,[2] archetypal novels of formation for female protagonists have, from the beginning, been problematic as social options and role models for women have been heavily restricted. The linear chronological structure of the paradigm from childhood to maturity moves from apprenticeship not to social integration but to enclosure, i.e. female developments are paradigmatically voyages in.[3] Gynocritics, however, often interpret this enclosure in a positive aspect. Marianne Hirsch, for example, in her essay on *The Mill on the Floss,* subverts the paradigm of the male *Bildungsroman*, transforming Maggie's disastrous turning inward into success within the renovated paradigm, celebrating an absolute self-enclosure, an ultimately suicidal psychic situation.

Susan Fraiman, in her discussion of *The Mill* in terms of the *Bildungsroman* also considers Maggie's formation as "the critique of the conventional *Bildungsroman.*[4]4 Regarding the relative power of the two formations Fraiman argues that "[Maggie's] narrative deposes but does not wholly displace [Tom's]. [...] They tend, rather, to pull each other off balance, to conflict with and to contest each other."[5] Yet, she attributes to Tom's formation the "nominal status as *Bildungsroman,*" "an upwardbound

1. Elizabeth Abel, Marianne Hirsch and Elizabeth Langland (eds.), *The Voyage In. Fictions of Female Development* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1983), 5-7.
2. Susan Fraiman, "*The Mill on the Floss*, The Critics, and the *Bildungsroman,*" *PMLA* Vol. 108. No. 1. (Jan 1993), 136-151.
3. Abel 11.
4. Fraiman 138.
5. Fraiman 141.

Bildungsroman,"[6] although his formation fulfills human capacities in a social context only in a very limited, humanely deficient sense of the word.

My basic argument, as opposed to Hirsch's celebration of Maggie's turning inward and to Fraiman's acceptance of Tom's voyage out as the standard, is that neither Maggie's nor Tom's formation offers a positive version of the genre, as both of them are entangled in a claustrophobic and self-enclosing circularity in spite of Tom's apparent success. That is why George Eliot, after re-producing the *Bildungsroman* both in its male and female variants, rejects the genre as a narrative for a possibly successful unfolding of human capacities in a social context. The text focuses on the features of a gendered education which, in extreme cases like Maggie's and Tom's, creates a split between male and female, so that no communication is possible between these separate spheres, so that neither manages to negotiate with the environment: Maggie lacks mobility, independence and social space to act in, while Tom would need human ties, relatedness, bonding and open-mindedness.

"School parted us," writes George Eliot in her sonnet sequence recalling her brother Isaac and her own shared childhood memories and the tragic process of separation after which there is no return to the primal unity as "the dire years [...] / [...] pitiless shaped them in two forms that range / Two elements which sever their life's course" (XI). Schooling works as the major separating factor in Maggie and Tom's case as well, not only in the narrow sense of the word but also as an emblem of the whole social educational process: social structurally induced psychological processes and intentional role-training and role-identification as behavioral acquisitions.

Though in the text the separation of brother and sister in a physical form appears as related to actual schooling (in the opening chapter Maggie expects Tom's return from his first school), psychological distance and imbalance of power, pointing to deeper embedded psychological encodings can be traced back to early childhood experiences. To reveal these hidden psychic mechanisms I will apply a twofold, though interrelated theoretical framework: Nancy Chodorow's concept of gender differences in ego formation and Carol Gilligan's theory of the correspondence between gender and ethical judgements. The basic statement of Chodorow's theory is that "from the retention of preoedipal attachments to the mother, growing girls come to define and experience themselves as continuous with others; their experience of the self contains more flexible and permeable ego boundaries. Boys come to define themselves as more separate and distinct, with a greater sense of rigid ego boundaries and differentiation. The basic feminine sense of self is connected to the world, the basic masculine self is separate."[7]

Carol Gilligan bases her theory of the male ethic of justice and the female ethic of care on Chodorow's idea of gendered ego formation. Gilligan, though, is not a pioneer in making a distinction of moral judgements due to gender difference. The notion goes back to Freud, who states that women's formation of the superego is never "so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men" and he adds that "for women the level of what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men [...], [that women] show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection and hostility."[8] The misogynist implication of women's inferiority in Freud's conclusion is questioned and subverted in Gilligan's interpretation. She argues that "given the differences in women's conceptions

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6. Fraiman 140, 146.
7. Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering. Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 169.
8. Sigmund Freud, "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" (1925), in: *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (trans. & ed. James Strachey) (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961) Vol XIX, 157-158.

of self and morality, women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human experience in terms of different priorities"[9] and develops her theory of a gendered morality: "Women's construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules ties the development of their moral thinking to changes in their responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as justice ties development to the logic of equality and reciprocity. Thus the logic underlying the ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships, which contrasts with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach."[10]

As if experimenting with such psychic constitutions and carrying both to the extreme, George Eliot presents the two children's maturation process as entering this kind of femininity and masculinity. The first instance in which there is a conflict between Tom and Maggie is due to their gender difference. He returns home from school and finds that his rabbits all died owing to neglect by Maggie and Harry, who forgot to feed them. Typically, in this situation, the one who has to suffer under Tom's, "the lad of honour's"[11] retribution is Maggie (Harry to a much smaller extent and in another way), not only on account of being younger but basically because of her gender: Tom punishes her not for the sheer fact that the rabbits died, as he makes it clear that he has money to replace the dead rabbits but because Maggie failed in her primal feminine duty and required capacity: in nurturing, in caring and rearing; so on a minor scale she failed to be responsible for the physical needs and survival of the rabbits, she failed in maintaining life.

In this first explicit conflict between brother and sister the germs of all further discords and clashes are present. Maggie violates the psychosocial and behavioral code of femininity yet yearns for emotional attachment to Tom [as in this case "the need of being loved, the strongest need in poor Maggie's nature, began to wrestle with her pride" (*MF* 32)], yearns to maintain the unity between them that could give her a satisfied sense of belonging and continuity, also mobility, freedom and a space to move in. Tom instinctively knows what he can punish her most with: the first response is:" [...] I don't love you Maggie. You shan't go fishing with me tomorrow [...] and I never do forget things - *I* don't" (30). He poses in the attitude of a never forgiving rule-giver, that of a retributive Protestant God, acting as a man of maxims, according to what Carol Gilligan calls the ethics of justice, which is the direct result of male psychological gender formation.

In his decision taking and problem solving processes, Tom undeniably acts unemotionally, rationally, on the basis of fairness and righteousness [as in the case of the rabbits: "He meant to punish her, and that business having been performed, he occupied himself with other matters, like a practical person"(*MF* 32)]. This emotional detachment, cool-mindedness, willful separation from the private sphere of the home except in terms of taking economic, social and moral responsibility for the family (i.e. paying the debts, restoring the mill into the possession of the family thus regaining the lost social status and acting as the guardian of family honour) on the one hand make him capable of concentrating exclusively on his teleological progress, on achievement measurable in financial terms, while, on the other hand, these features bring about an ego construction that tragically lacks empathy, affection and attachment, which is absolutely characterised by separation and impermeable ego boundaries.

This is a process which goes through several grades of intensification, starting with the incident of the dead rabbits, when, after the declaration of never forgiving, he still returns to a mode of existence of perfect union with Maggie: "he behaved with a weakness quite inconsistent with his resolution to punish her as much as she deserved:

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9. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, Mass. & London, 1982), 22.
10. Gilligan 73.
11. George Eliot, *The Mill on the Floss* (London: Dent & Sons Ltd, 1969), 32. All further references to the novel in the text, abbreviated *MF*, are from this edition.

he actually began to kiss her in return and say - 'Don't cry, then, Magsie - here, eat a bit o' cake.' Maggie's sobs began to subside, and she put out her mouth for the cake and bit a piece; and then Tom bit a piece, just for company, and they ate together and rubbed each other's cheeks and brows and noses together, while they ate, with a humiliating resemblance to two friendly ponies"(*MF* 33-34). The animal imagery in the comparison suggests that this state of perfect unity cannot for long be maintained and must inevitably be surpassed in the course of Tom's ego formation, emphatically informed by the superego, and the instinctive and impulsive unity with the other will be replaced by conscious division and separation, by acting on the mechanical give-and-take reciprocity of fairness as in the case of dividing the cream puff into two and expecting the proper reward: the bigger share for being fair.

In the course of his further *Bildung*, Tom's social integration is fulfilled but at the expense of emotional sterilisation and petrification into the exclusive mode of individuation: no trace of empathic identification can be discovered in the later conflicts with Maggie. Without ever inquiring into Maggie's reasons, without ever making an attempt to understand her motives, he appeals to the Law of the Father: when he finds out about Maggie's affair with Philip in the Red Deeps to support his own judgment he calls on the help of their father's last will that they should never communicate with the Wakems, and also asks for the support of the symbol of patriarchal law and order: the Bible, and makes Maggie swear on it. In their last conflict, after Maggie's return from Mudport, he is already "master" and does not need external authority to aid his decision taking: frozen into the attitude of the man of maxims he turns Maggie away from his doorstep, maintaining as the only link between them the financial support, not because he takes care of Maggie but because he promised his father never to let "the little wench" be in need.

Non-relatedness and emotional sterility explain that Tom's *Bildung* cannot be concluded in a romance with Tom and Lucy marrying, giving her to him as a reward for his achievements and at the same time providing her as the basis of motivation for further aspirations. Tom is George Eliot's experiment in trespassing beyond a certain limit. He goes too far in the process of individuation and cuts all human ties of attachment, forming a monstrously sterile automaton. Tom's psychological formation, role models and social space are in harmony with his aspirations to rise on the social scale. All his self-denying struggle takes place in accordance with his psychic construction and within the public sphere, and these conditions predetermine him to have a linear progress and to be the epitome of the new type of businessman.

What makes Maggie's case more problematic and appealing for George Eliot is that Maggie yearns for power and independence against all odds: against her psychosocial formation, against feminine role models, and against women's confinement to the private sphere. The result of this adverse configuration is foreshadowed by both her parents at the very beginning of the novel: "she's twice as cute as Tom. Too cute for a woman, I'm afraid. [...] She'll fetch none the bigger price for that," says Mr Tulliver and Mrs Tulliver adds,"-wanderin' up an' down by the water like a wild thing: she'll tumble in some day" (*MF* 8). All Maggie's features: her unruly hair, her identification with Scott's dark women and the witches (i.e. frightening because powerful women of earlier times), her anger (as it is spent on her fetish doll in the attic), her constant troubles and accidents at family gatherings, her exceptional beauty, her yearning for knowledge and independence (even at the expense of breaking the Dodson code and going into "service', i.e. taking a position as a governess) indicate and are parts of her non-compliance, non-obedience and non-fitting, whereas what is required of her is complete immobility, submission, and repression of her desires for knowledge, power, even for a voice. Mrs Tulliver warns her: "Come and sit down on your little stool and hold your tongue, do" (*MF* 19). In this sense Maggie is a typical heroine of a growth novel who "must frequently struggle to voice any aspirations whatsoever."[12]

12. Abel 19.

Apparent compliance with feminine role models as a result of psychic encodings experienced at post-pubertal age, as in Maggie's case, is in conformity with Chodorow's analysis that girls fully develop the relational mode of existence on which their later nurturing and mothering capacities are built at this stage.[13] In *The Mill* it is at this time that Maggie reads Thomas a Kempis, whose ideas can find resonance in her *only* because by that time she has integrated the renunciation of all her desires and given up her longing although "it is like death. I must part with everything I cared for when I was a child" (*MF* 283). She goes on to argue, "I've been a great deal happier [...] since I have given up thinking about what is easy and pleasant and being discontented because I couldn't have my own will. Our life is determined for us - and it makes the mind very free when we give up wishing and only think of bearing what is laid upon us, and doing what is given us to do" (*MF* 284). This painful renunciation, the 'victorious' repression of her desires in supposedly harsh clashes with the reality principle is the cause of further conflicts in the novel and seems to have puzzled critics although, evidently, her renunciation and submission comprise a delicate balance that can be disturbed by the slightest temptation. Maggie first refuses a book offered by Philip saying "it would make me long to see and know many things - it would make me long for a full life" (*MF* 288), then she gives in and is met by proper retribution, i.e. complete prohibition on Tom's part.

The book entitled "The Great Temptation" in the novel is the culmination in this everywoman's progress: "After her years of contented renunciation, she had slipped back into desire and longing" (*MF* 352). What is of importance here is *how* she argues against the fulfillment of her desire both with Philip and Stephen: she thinks in terms of kinship, in terms of cutting across generations, in terms of relatedness and others' trust and reliance on her, all these, according to Chodorow, typical of feminine interaction. "I desire no future that will break the ties of the past. But the tie to my brother is one of the strongest. I can do nothing willingly that will divide me always from him" (*MF* 418), and on this basis she rejects Philip. When Stephen tries to persuade her that they should break all their previous ties she responds: "The real ties lie in the feelings and expectations we have raised in other minds. [...] [W]e should follow our strongest feeling; but then, such feelings continually come across the ties that all our former life has made for us" (*MF* 423), and she rejects Stephen too and returns to St. Ogg's.

Her priorities in this decision are symptoms of the ethic of care in the extreme: after drifting down the Floss with Stephen in an almost unconscious state, letting her libidinal desires take over after conscious repression, she regains her self-control and returns to those who rely on her as she "cannot take a good for [herself] that has been wrung out of their misery" (*MF* 451). Maggie's only concern here is Lucy, Tom and Philip, it is only the wish not to hurt them that counts in the final decision. In this way, all she is concerned with is the consequence of her action upon her own dependents and not on herself. Stephen argues in vain that she will be considered a fallen woman by the community. As opposed to general opinion she considers particular individuals, instead of herself as an individual, she posits herself in multiple relatedness and dependence, and falls into the deadly state of a social outcast even before the flood. In this way, her decision is self-enclosing and suicidal: whereas she wants to keep her ties, she is left alone. Though Lucy and Philip do believe her and let her know it, she cannot have any open connection with them and is left in a social vacuum, with a closed space both in the private and public world.

The final flood and Maggie and Tom's drowning in embrace are the symbolic consummation of their diverse formations. Neither of them can survive as both forcefully extinguish from themselves a part that is necessary for a humane survival: Maggie denies her desiring self and Tom rejects his capacity for empathy - they exemplify extreme cases of a gendered education due to which women have problems with individuation and men with relatedness, both causing fatal deformations in the psyche. They are protagonists in

13. Chodorow 166.

a fictional world modelled on an unbridgeable gender split, in which male and female *Bildungs* unavoidably deviate into opposite directions, but both, by way of their essence, are doomed to (self-)annihilation. The primal loss of androgyny is irretrievable in this world: the basic unity of self can only be achieved in the flood which devastates the whole social landscape. Considering the novel in this flight, *The Mill on the Floss* is George Eliot's annihilating critique of Victorian society: it presents a fictional world in which, as she states in a letter, everything is softened compared to her own experience.[14]

14. Cf. Gordon S. Haight, "Introduction" to *The Mill on the Floss* (Boston: Houghton, 1961), v-xxi.

Ferenc Zsélyi

The Forster Machine

We start out from the presupposition that it is true for each work of an author's life/work that it might serve as a model for the interpretation of all the other works' structure. So when we make an attempt to comment on any work of an author — considering both structure and meaning — the other work, which we then consider as "a/the model" (that is, *the other discourse*) will give an explanation of the particular semantic and semiotic features of the work examined, and, on the other hand, it would open up interpretative choices for the text. Our starting point is based on the assumption that a life's work is such an intertext in which each text is virtually an attempt made to *name the author*. I here refer to that author who the traditional literary history uses as a biographical model or plot when explaining the text or when it considers the work of art as an an exemplum for the life of the "author". I do not doubt the scope of biography–based commentary but I do think that we have to consider the fact that the biography itself has already been *written* — i.e. it is, to a certain extent, *fiction* — and, consequently, it is *intentional* and *discursive already* in itself. It inevitably provides us with the sense of an author(ity), an a priori meaning, a prior function or plot to the text — and not *of* the text. Yet, at the same time, I would not doubt that the authorial biography *act*ually consists of "brute" facts in the sense that when they are affirmed in sentences the statements have existential propositions and the question of truth/falsity can be raised against them. This fictive/factive attribute can be only coped with if we idealize *the name of the author*.[1]

Idealization lets us take the individual texts of the life/work as *the name of the author* because each text potentially unfolds, to the same extent, the aenigma as to why the author wrote the text and why the author wrote the text that way. The texts that we take as the oeuvre of the author's are variations of a non–existent but probable *other discourse*, which we identify with *the name of the author*. And because they mutually make up the intertext which is marked by *the name of the author*, we consider each text of the intertext as a variation of/for all the other texts of the same intertext, of all the other works by the same author. Thus interpretation collects the intertext–in a 'bible' ['*books*'], an anthology authored by *the name of the author*. Here then — to stay with the biblical analogy — the author itself becomes an *abscondite agent–in–the–text* and functions as the motor of that textual universe which is essentially identical with the author. The author's soul is the reason and cause of the (inter)text, *the author's gaze* is an overall defining discursive look which will always specify the sense and meaning of every single thing and

1. Foucault: "What is an Author" (transl. Bouchard, D. F. and Simon, S.), in: Con Davis, Robert (ed.), *Contemporary Literary Criticism* (New York: Longman, 1989), 236-275. — Foucault here sets up a model for the birth of the name of the author and tries to explain how this name will become a canonic focus when commenting a text labelled by this very name and how the name in itself will verify the statements of the text. The name actually provides the statements with functions and significance. *Auctorialisation* is part of the literary "process" and every/anything gains significance via the giving of the name of the author and the access of a position in the intertext of the life/work.

sign in the particular way of (*the name of) that* very author.

So when we make an attempt to describe the attributes of the personality of *the author hiding within the text* ("auctor absconditus") the "author" becomes, in this theoretical abstraction, equivalent to those text generating techniques, with that figurality, which, supposingly, gives birth to those texts which we consider as parts of the life/work. The Freudian textual exegesis places the soul between auctor and text, and the relation of the two textualities is taken as the rhetoric of the soul.[2] When we try to name the author the attempt takes the form of the setting up of a theoretical formula of the relation of texts within *that* intertext, within that life/work. The formula may be tried through the commentary of the text; and provided the formula was adequate, the interpretation gained will sound probable for the reader/exegete. This is being done when I try to set up *the authorial rhetorics* which is a seemingly mechanic order. It trans—late—s any signifier into its own discourse so that there this signifier would not signify what it ought to signify in the discourse of everyday life but what the "author" and the textual universe (*the other discourse*) labelled by *the name of the author* uses it for.

First we plot four basic constituents of the fictive world: the characters, the activities that can be attached to the characters, the values which also can be attributed to the characters and to the activities of the characters, and, the value—judgements which are responsible for the discursivity of the former three constitutents.

I want to prove that the four constituents make a very clear structure when the life/work consists of about five to ten longer texts (e.g. novels) and the structure can be visualized in a scheme. The matrices of the particular works are made up of those rhetorical devices which are characteristic of the name of the author. The selection (rhetoricity) is defining the "author" and the name of the author.

To put the previous argument in a nutshell we can simply say in the case of Forster that the Forster novel (i.e., *the Forster machine*) is always the same and always does the same thing. We suppose that there be a *plot* without the telling of which a Forster text could never bear *the name of E. M. Forster*. I am going to try to create a structure which we can, then, call *the primal story* of the Forster novel. I shall consider it the Forster machine, the model on the pattern of which a text by/of(?about) Forster can have been written/thought/narrated/issued.

To carry out my project I will have to "plot" the rhetorical (textual—syntactic) and semantic features of each text we are going to consider in this study. First the names of the characters of the narratives do not gain significance so that later they should come to assume a much greater "role" when we arrive at the question of various names with/of the same narrative function. I want to learn how the author hiding within the text (an author implied by the text) matches her/his own presence with the *Forster machine* so that in the end the text created would become identical with that author's soul.

We ought not to eventually come to the conclusion that the different texts are the same, yet I will state that they are identical in their *fictionally* meta*physical* way. But this is already the hermeneutic meaning of the *same but different* works. They have been written to show their essential identity in which they talk about the One and the same thing — about *the name of the author* — through their various differences. Each text breaks the rays of the authorial intension as if that work were one side of the prism of the name of the author, of the choices of the creative intellect. Our present approach is

2. Silverman, Kaja, *The Subject of Semiotics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 87-125. — The interrelatedness of texts gains its semiosis via two basic rhetorical functions — via condensation and displacement. Therefore the relation of texts can be traced through the analysis of these figures. And when we consider an intertext of many texts the traces will provide us with a rhetorical code which is characteristic of the particular (name of the) author. This rhetorical code reveals the interrelatedness of each text to all the other texts of the intertext.

being done per version but it could hardly be a perversion as its aim is the grasping of the essence of *the name of E. M. Forster*; we want to trace him (?her). Our final focus on these texts may be somewhat different from what we have been accustomed to when reading Forster's novels. One of the reasons for this is that the textual universe in which that fictional world which is being depicted by the text will not be the analogy of either the author's or the reader/critic's presence but, on the contrary, it will gain a semiosis of its own. It will not be *ab—out* something, rather anything can be related to it when the text is being read. It is something that exists though it does not have to because its existence has not been indicated by the creating power of our material existence.

The five books that I am going to comment on here are those Forster novels which have achieved popularity: *A Room with a View*, *Howards End*, *The Longest Journey*, *A Passage to India*, and *Maurice*. They are easily understood; they do not seem to carry on an avant garde narrativity which would expel the reader from the book. They are nice and easy. Are they? I examine the five texts from a morphological point of view: I will divide the plots into segments and I will try to find a narrative function to the particular segments. After segmentation and the morphological classification I will draw the semantic fields in which words get their meanings according to the discourse of *the name of the author*. In the case of a novel this semantic field is the activity range of the characters. The activities attributed to the characters define the probable functions of the characters, that is, they decide what kind of people the characters become. The semantics of the characters consist of archetypal character traces and symbolic attributes in addition to the hermeneutic and proairetic status of the fictive personality. These features reduce the activity range of a person when they are activated alone but if there is a mutual commitment in the the text among them they will lift the significance of the fictive person above the level of the here/now horizon of the "real" person as the "real" is selective reduction as such in opposition with the probable freedom of fiction.

The text may be taken, in fact, as a special allegory which is to manifest the model labelled by *the name of the author*. *The name of the author* refers to that plot — in fact it is the title of that plot — which we here, in this critical discourse, want to tell. The "truth value" of my approach is by no means secured due to the nature of the approach. What we can get is a commentary, and a model.

The plot that I am in search of is not necessarily a plot of a (fictive) personality's narrativity; it may well be a plot which we derive from a wider range of intertextuality in which case the plot will be attributed a more metaphysical authority than a quasi—historical auctor. In Occidental narrativity these more metaphysically authorized plots could be the story of the sacred family and the original Oedipal story. Each story we tell within Occidental culture is a (per)version of either or both of the above mentioned plots. Our stories' discursivity is being defined by these two plots. This way, of course, the "new" story's coherence gets stronger and, at the same time the two basic plots are being affirmed whenever there has been a paraphrase made ab—out them. Each telling is a trying of their cohesion and narrativity — generally — is the proof of their sublimity.

A Room with a View. The plot is set in two geographically different points so the story is narrated through the narrative rhythm of a journey. The first and the last parts take place in Italy; the last chapter repeats the first one and, at the same time, it is the reversal of its plotting. Lucy and her companion, Charlotte get a room in the pensione which does not "have a view" of the town. This way the sense of the subgenre — c.f. *journey* — loses its function. The scene of this initial failure is repeated in another room of the same pensione with a father and a son who have been provided with a (?the) view over the town. The difference between the two rooms is emphasized through the fact that in one of them people desire something to which those in the other room have access, but which those people in the other room think of as insignificant. The two Emersons visit places *live*. The position of their gaze is not the window of their room's but their eyes. For Charlotte *visiting, having been to* implies the use of the Baedekker. The two men verify experience as life/live while for Charlotte travelling is always the question of selection, care, censure. The Emersons let the world come to them, their name may refer

to the American Nature—metaphysician, Emerson, and, in addition to this their other name, i.e. *George* implies {earth}. In contrast with the Emersons' earthliness there is *Lucy* whose name invokes the sense of 'light'. The latter is rather abstract and spiritual while the Emersonian earthliness embraces man with the Earth. Soul and body.[3] The two rooms, the two "couples" are displaying the difference between heaven and earth and, at the same time they are an occasion for the meeting of the two principles. The names draw a fictive universe which covers *the* Universe. The narrative scope of the possible world of the book is so wide that we may expect something basically *arch*aic to happen here though the world of the English novel generally would not indicate this. The tension between probability and expectation can be undone via the rhetorics of the text. One single element of the novel is enough to relate the meeting or collision of heaven and earth. The simplicity of the telling gives space to the traditional narrative in which a great event (such as marriage, birth, death) is very much likely to occur. The whole story is plotted in two houses.

The novel *A Room with a View* places the church of *Santa Croce* in the focus of the invoking episode of the book. Dante's tombstone and Giotto's fresco are in the church. The name of the church *names* that story in which in the crucified body of Jesus Christ heaven and earth once met. Dante's *Divine Comedy* evokes the story—form of a life—as—a—completed—journey. The names — thanks to their enigmatic nature — have already told the plot of Occidental narrativity so the book itself can go on with the story of its own.

The generic features define, according to the "names" of the church and Dante, the discourse of *A Room with a View* a *passion play* in the sense of the Middle Ages. The archaic narrative formation of a "modern" story makes the plot happen in a rather symbolic universe the two poles of which are *Lucy*, 'the sky' and *George*, 'the Earth'. This book is not a picaresque novel in spite of the narrative frame of the journey. Nor is it a family story. It would anyway be too short for that purpose. The genre is very close to that epic form which preceded the birth of the novel. Activities are not the matter of proairesis in the discourse. They *tell* a symbolic story which gives way to hermeneutic interpretation. If there happens something in the story of *A Room with a View* it is not to carry on the plot but rather for the sake of rhetorics. It affirms our viewpoint concerning the archetypal functions of the characters. It is a matter of prejudice and not of experience; already told and not telling.

Why does nothing happen there? This can be the aenigma of the Forster machine. The question is slightly ironic, and, I certainly affirm via the existential proposition of the question [?{it is true for *x* that it "happens"}] that something does happen. The story remains latent. The visible situations are rather static, as static as when happenings are struck into the twelve positions of the *Passion*. We could hardly imply that nothing is happening. The static segments are like the shots of a film. No wonder Ivory could easily ad$^{a}_{o}$pt the Forster texts to film narratives. They have, actually, already been adapted to some screen that might be the reading consciousness. The inside of a room, the locations, the space of a church, the meadow, cars, the garden of a manor house are all places which secure the stability of characters in their being objective correlatives to the psychic narrativity of the characters. The analogy of the room and of the character[4] will strike the

3. Traditionally soul is attributed to man while woman is the archetype of the more deprived way of existence: 'Earth'. And, consequently, the womanly, the earthly has been understood as a more deprived way of being than the male's rather spiritual existence. Here, in *A Room with a View* this has been made upside down.

4. This analogy can be traced in its widest scope in the relation of God and Creation [earth]. In this analogy the single participants of earthly existence become the metonymics of God immediately. They name God though they cannot denote God. The recognition of this correlation may be the reason of the marriage of descriptive poetry and the poet's self-interestedness in Romantic poetry. A proper example is Keats' *Ode on a Grecian Urn*

happening into a pause. The Forster machine automatically checks whether the activities within the space would match the structural expectations of the novel's allegoresis, whether they could match the reader's prejudices that the reader has developed while reading the text itself. The two protagonists of the novel *A Room with a View* meet. We cannot define them as hero and heroine yet.[5]

The two characters fit each other in a reciprocal way, and this drives the story to be told like a narrative motor. The story which is being narrated is not really a story on the one hand, and on the other hand it is certainly not their narrative task to do this. The narrator and the author implied by the texts are there to bear the burden of telling. It is their job — and not that of the characters — to desire that the plot should get embedded in the words of the narrative. Yet these "outstanding" characters seem to strive for the utterance of words. It is more striking than their "passion". And since the characters themselves *are* allegories the discourse of the novel seems to be a study which is being written about itself. This is not different from that when one thinks of herself. The metadiscourse of the text is not alien to life but, on the contrary, this way we shall get a much more valid picture of the cognitive universe of wo/man, about her/his self—fictionality which might be her/his consciousness or character.

Their reciprocity is at work when the question of their games in the plot arises. Lucy's lover is Cecil, a pedant who mixes up snobbery with aestheticism. The result is alienation from live discourse and the lack of will. His name effeminates him into a mistaken wise not—man. What he may signify is improbable and cannot be visualized. His life is not able to happen because his choice is not narrative. His life principle is dogma instead of desire. He is not after something but rather stuck to that thing. His yearning does not have an object hence it/he does not exist. Cecil's presence is a kind of meta—danger for the narrative. If he does not get deprived of his role in the plotted games of the narrative then the novel will come to an end which will be Cecil's "happiness". Or in another way, if he stays Lucy will have to *act/live* more than it is probable. And an overactive maniac will ruin the image according to which Lucy is the girl who is the son of the sun, a version of Christ.

George does not have a here/now lover to equal Lucy's Cecil—game. George does not compete with Cecil they are not even counterpoints, at the most Cecil is a *constrast*, a rhetorical figure. Cecil became Lucy's here/now boy—friend after George and Lucy had *met*. Cecil's function is in fact that he is [*not George*]. This is displacement but it can any time be reversed. And so it will be in the meta—game of the plot in the end.

If we try hard we come to George's father as a character—analogon to Cecil. Cecil's role is simply proairetic, he is the archetypal *rival* to George. George's father's role is archetypal and symbolic. While Cecil affirms that the lack of George in Lucy's desire

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where the poetic memory becomes the divine space of post-neo-classical idylls. Creation gets inside the poetic mind, and, at the same time, it becomes a projection of the poetic mind. Writing/reading this phase of poetry is inevitably an overall Narcissism.

5. The hero/ine's life-story in the end always provides the novel with a proairetic structure which in many cases is the plot. We can say that the story is *about* (but not necessarily ab-out) them. But in case of *A Room with a View* I cannot say that the story is about them. Probably it is *upon* them, *on account of* them. They are the signifiers of the language which narrates something happening. This narrative implies the meeting of lovers, but it is actually the narrative success of Charlotte's and not that of the two young people. Through the narrative control of Lucy's (and George's) life Charlotte has been given the chance to tell again that single story of her life which she has been re-member-ing ever since it happened to her. After that adventure of hers her life arrived to a closure which is her present character full of reserves and repression. But this repression, at the same time, urges her to repeat the *primal story* of hers in others if not in herself. Lovers should be each others'. This is not affected by that fact that Charlotte's repressed loving essence is allowed through Charlotte's checking presence to get told only in negative sentences.

is the lack of a narrative horizon (there is not much to talk about then, as there is no *life to come*). The father amplifies young George's primal force of existence — he is the Earth, he is a kind of *mother* to *the life to come*. This role is extended into hermeneutics and metdiscursivity, his role is to recognize and acknowledge Charlotte's *compulsion to repeat*[6] i.e., that the story of archaic love ought to be told. Old father Emerson turns the plot into a symmetrical structure when he makes the end of the narrative the beginning of the plot, i.e. when heaven and earth meet. And it is the father who verifies that expectation of the reader as an ethically correct choice in which the reader chooses *the other discourse*, the unconscious plot, the *passion* manifested in symbols instead of simple proairesis. The father is plotting the reader. Old Mr Emerson can save the story from a mistaken closure because he can read the signs of young George and Lucy, and he can do this since he is familiar with *the other discourse* being the implied author(ity) of the text. Actually he himself interprets the story the same way the reader does: both read the story and the father decides and plots in place of a reader. As if the reader were implied within the text in the figure of the father.

The closure is the father's wisdom, sublime obituary of an end that has not yet come.

The mother function is rather unique. She is not the careful—loving mater since she does not get the chance to act like that. Yet there she gets one choice to become maternal and significaant when Lucy and Cecil have decided that they will marry. This decision changes the relating of life in the family. The mother provides Lucy with her either/or choice but it is not an actual either/or but an ethical one. Cecil's aestheticism changes the family narrative into a popularized cheap version of being which lacks arts and meaning. This perverted meaning must be done away with and it is the mother who recognizes the narrative solution for this: the Cecil version of telling their lives must be made an end to with the help of the mother's passion which is static, anti—narrative, compulsive and allegoric, or, in short: it is (she is) loving. This conforms to the maintenance of Lucy's repetition compulsion in which heaven ought to meet the earth, Lucy should meet George again. It is the excessive outsider George who the mater lets Lucy recognize as the proper object of her desire in contrast with the socially verifed Cecil.

The Forster machine places love, which can get both moral and spiritual support from the reader, beyond social morality. George invokes love or "light", i.e. Lucy's essence in Lucy in a way that does not fit social expectations. This *passion* remains latent even to the possessor of the passion, Lucy. For Lucy the kiss that happened *naturally* in the meadow seems to have been a mistake and it has been the object of forgetting. Cecil takes part in this forgetting and it is an ironic rhetorical invention in the story that he is responsible for letting this primal scene repeat itself. It is Cecil who meets the Emersons in the British Museum and advises them that they should move to Lucy's space. He is certainly as ignorant of this as ignorant he is of anything else. The British Museum seems to be the origin of narrativity in the novel. It is a place where the layers of narration are

6. C.f. *Wiederholungszwang*. Freud deals with the *compulsion to repeat* in his 1920 *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*). In narratology we may use the Freudian concept when the narration repeats a "story" in many episodes and this repeated "story" somehow binds the proairetic freedom of the hero/ine and also binds the author implied by the text. It does not allow them to change the repetitive (and antinarrative) mode of the telling. An example for the repetitive compulsion is Jane Eyre who escapes each episode of her life without fail or we can refer to Holden Caulfield in Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye*. He always leaves the episodes of his life—narrative so as to escape failing it. But he inevitably *falls* into another episode and into another failure again and again repetitiously. He goes on so as to avoid the same thing to happen to him again and doing this he actually does the s$_h$ame thing *again*. He cannot cope with this and breaks down on "anti—Fall" day, at Christmas.

being rearranged with the help of that primal wisdom that comes from the past with divine/implied benevolence. It undoes what society, the present has done wrong. The British Museum is the narrative space and figure of implied authorial intrusion, a "metaplace". It secures the reader's belief that everything will be told the way the reader expects it to be narrated at least unconsciously. Yet when we consider the structure of narration it is told in the form of *coincidence* which device indicates that the reasons for feelings, moral choices and symbolic activities will not be found in the discourse of the text. They are parts of *the other discourse* which is there in the words and figures of writing and speech and syntactic structure yet due to its coincidental and fatal nature it does not reveal itself, its *other discursive order* in the first reading.

We should mention Lucy's brother, Freddy next to the mother. The young man has just become a man, he is seventeen, a kind of Forster—Cherub who — due to his age — is the best nominee to be God's/gods' messenger, an angel or Hermes himself. Cecil looks down on Freddy. If it were Cecil's closure in the book Freddy would stay unnoticed in the plot, G/god unemployed. But when the discourse has decided on behalf of the symbolic plotting Freddy acts as the other *helper* besides his mother. The two of them transmit *eros*, the unspecified energy of love to everyone who deserves it and they can weave the narrative body of the personality of the text as Eros—Hermes. When unspecified, i.e. not yet sexual loving affection becomes the hermeneutics of a discourse we may call its genre a *passion-play*. *A Room with a View* is a/the Forster Passion, another name for the Forster machine. *Passion* is sublime in itself and that is the reason why both character and reader are awarded the Grace of the desexualized androgynous *choratic* bliss. This bliss is the pregnant woman's carnal wisdom which is the promise of another life, of another story yet the same discourse (the mother's discourse). This primal and *"repetitive"* humanity guarantees the happy ending for the reader both in case of a "happy" and a "sad" end.

It is Freddy who invites George to play tennis in their garden and to go bathing in the pond in the woods. I have taken the bathing scene to be the center of the discourse. The Emersons are moving in and Mr Beebe, the vicar and Freddy pay a visit to them. They invite young Emerson to the woods where there is a pond where Freddy and Lucy used to bathe in their childhood. Whoever bathes with Freddy in the pond is narratively a *Lucy—substitute* and consequently an object of fraternal *love*. George is willing to undress and bathe in the pond with Freddy. In this scene Lucy and Freddy are the horizon against which George acts most properly: he accepts the invitation to join being a horizon [*earth*] himself. Freddy, Lucy and George are symbolically united into the personality of the text. They are three faces of the same thing: affection. Bathing is acted out by nudes but it is not a sexualized episode, it is beyond it. Caresses and embraces do not intrude and do not make the otherwise inevitable conversion into socialized aggression in which men can cope with the taboo of touching the other male. Mr Beebe's presence accompanies Freddy's and George's archaically erotic but not sexual identity. Mr Beebe is a visualized metaphysical signifier who represents Apollo's consent to what Hermes is doing, his presence uplifts the episode into spiritual significance. The matter of bodies becomes the matter of souls.Mr Beebe carries the possession of love and light [Lucy] from one body (from Freddy's) to the other (to George's). This limits the scope of Lucy as a "heroine" in two ways: the grand love scene will be cancelled as it would turn out to be an overdone repetition of the bathing scene; or when it is done — and this happens in the chapter *Lying to George* — it will become a shameful quarrel. Freddy participates in Lucy's loving more than tradition would indicate. Freddy is also *loving* — but while Lucy is the subject of this affection and George is the *love object* Freddy himself will be the *modality* of the affection. As he is seventeen — and the number is the symbolic marker of the *infinite*, of things that cannot be constructed — the harmony which he communicates to the other two people will be also heading for the infinite. When Lucy and George, heaven and earth meet for the second time and they are in the same house in Italy where the story began they read a letter which informs them that *"Freddy thinks he has been dignified"* through their marital unity and bliss. Freddy has given the law of repetition and affection, he is Charlotte's companion in the constructing of the discourse.

But while Charlotte is hiding beyond the plot Freddy drives narration himself, he lives and *believes* the plot from his symbolic—herme$_{neu}$tic point of view.

The bathing scene is the carnivalesque trope of the novel where all the characters meet — and change. While the three men are bathing in the pond, by coincidence, Lucy, the mother and Cecil happen to be walking through the woods. In this merging point of the narrative some characters take over other characters' roles: Freddy transmits love — in place of Lucy — to George. Cecil is standing next to Lucy but actually he is negating his own presence, because Lucy ['light'] is symbolically in the pond in the/with the body of Freddy to accompany young George Emerson in the water of life and youth. The *other discourse*'s carnivalesque revaluation of narrative roles converts Lucy from Cecil's girl into sun of earth.

The other carnivalesque scene is the tennis quartet. Cecil has been the substitute for George in the story, but now George is standing in for Cecil who has been standing for him in the story. While they play tennis Cecil is reading out a novel which has been written by a woman who was there with them in Italy and who was informed by Charlotte about the primal scene when heaven met the earth. The revelation of Lucy's and George's inner feelings is matching the other *natural* phenomena acquiring full significance beyond and above all the other probable choices. The writer of the book, here, is the same way a neutral participant as neutral to the fourth member of the quartet, Freddy's visitor is. Neither of them shares any role in the proairesis but both catalyse it.

The *tennis quartet* repeats *the bathing scene* but here the participants include Lucy-in-body to the accompaniment of Freddy and George both of whom having been Lucy-substitutes for each other in *the bathing scene*. On whose behalf is Freddy an *amplification* in this episode, that is the question here. Is he for both of them? And then does he make his own reality—fiction, does he celebrate the partly fulfilled success of this attempt like Narcissus? I myself would still maintain that Freddy's role is that of *Psyche* or probably that of *Eros* who motors the story towards its closure, towards its end-ing.

Freddy's unique function is not inorganic in this discourse. An attempt for the non-stereotypical signification of love has already been made at the beginning of the novel. It happened in the square in front of the church. (This could be referred to as the *first carnivalesque scene*.) Two young Italian males had a row and in the heat of madness one of them kills the other one, his friend - fratricide. The murderer having recognized what he has done *"tried to kiss him"... "and gave himself up to the police!"* [Ch. IV. p. 42][7] This attachment of unusual depth will gain its correlative so that Lucy and George ought to live up to this and repeat it. This is indicated by the *accident* that the photographs of the Santa *Croce* which Lucy had bought before the accident got soiled with the blood of that youth who was killed by his beloved friend. The scar done to the photograph is metonymic yet it is abstractly signifying Lucy's body. It will signify there the depth of adoration - which is not necessarily sexual affection -, it will stay there as the path towards the latter one. This somehow makes Lucy marked for re-cognition. This is a clever rhetorical device for it will be obviously there in all of Lucy's activities and functions till the end of the narrative showing that she acts according to the inner drive of *philia* even if she is not aware of this. But, actually, this is significant for the reader.

Another enigmatic point is from whose point of view do we see this? It is still quite easy to decide whose point of view seems to be dominating the narration on the level of the *first reading*. But that point of view which is really definitive concerning the reader's suspense and surprise while reading the book is deriving from *the other discourse*. Mr Beebe's role is the most ambiguous in this double perspective. He seems to be there in the world of the book to be a spiritual guide, to verify and forbid. Yet it is clear that Beebe's function is reduced to episodic situations: he is of help in a narrative sense but his function does not exceed the significance of the conjunctive *and* in language. The one who is definitive in the "deep" narrative structure of the novel, who is likely to be an

7. Forster, E. M., *A Room with a View*. New York: Bantam Books, 1988.

implied authority to the discourse does not participate in those speech acts that are characteristically cultural phenomena. S/He is the author of the *discourse of love*. S/He can be too many characters - old George, Charlotte, Freddy (and his mother) - from the few who live in the narrative world and whose activities this authority checks and defines.

The most interesting thing is that the whole story is completed so that there is not one single negative value judgement in the narrative world. What could seem negative will prove to have been irony. The reader's expectations have been credited by Eros without reserve. When Cecil criticizes the vulgarity of the family it is less negative and it is much rather ridiculous since everyone Cecil despises has been the *friend* of the reader's, we love them. The lack of negativity fits well into the narrative strategy of *romance*.[8] This will not allow, however, this lack to manifest on the syntactic level. And due to this the novel's textuality will prove to be a dreamlike veil which is revealing vital enigmas in one of the simplest narratives of the world.. It could have been a fairy tale.

In my first hypothesis I assume, then, that the *Forster Machine* tells each story twice - each time in the discourse of an other code. The double telling makes the Forster-text allegorical which, consequently, draws a universal significance for itself. The story is not the stereotypical plot of love/death but rather that of *philia*, a kind of a paraphrased *Symposion* where the two young people will be one passing over the happiest moments to the third one present — the *lucky Pierre* of the narrative. This third person (these third persons) might be identical with *the name of the author*. His power over the proairesis is without doubt competing with that of the author and his/her point of view is promising revelation even in the simplest story.

8. Frye, Northrop, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 1973), 303-314. *Romance* is the counterpoint of *satire*. *Romance* undoes the boundary between reality and the probable other worlds for the sake of an aesthetic effect. While *satire*, on the other hand, does the same thing so that it makes the reader accept the excess of imagination in *hyperbole* and *meiosis*. In this case the aesthetic effect is ironic and rejective. Cf. *"The romancer does not attempt to create "real people" so much as stylized figures which expand into psychological archetypes"* [Frye 1973, 304].

Zsófia Bán

The Problem of Word and Image in W. C. Williams' Late Poetry: A Borderline Case Study

As the present conference aims at discussing "new perspectives" in the teaching of British and American Studies I would like first to highlight that aspect of my paper which might contribute to this specific line of approach. This aspect is none other than what is usually called the *interartistic* or *interdisciplinary* method which focuses on borderline studies of some sort, that is, a method which guides the student to a territory or frontline where, to use one of Williams' favourite words, *edges* meet, the edges of radically different things whose contact produces a spark of energy and, ideally, cross-fertilization, thus adding to what has been called the *epistemic order*.

American Studies programs all over the world have traditionally embraced this method arguing that the nature of American culture, and consequently its study calls, almost as a matter of course, for such a modus operandi. In Hungary, however, this method — let us now call it the interdisciplinary method — has traditionally been looked upon with no small suspicion and often condescension, and regarded as some sort of dilution or watering of the disciplines involved, which instead of widening the scope of our knowledge can only lead to a kind of superficial skimming above the surface of each field. Only since the relatively recent launching of independent American Studies programs in Hungary has the interdisciplinary method acquired a somewhat more respected status in the academic world resulting in a greater frequency of its application in other departments, not to speak of the founding of new programs like Cultural Anthropology, to cite only one fairly recent example, which discipline has at its very core this same methodology.[1]

In my paper, instead of focusing on and offering an analysis of a specific work or works by the author/artist of my choice, I shall attempt rather to pursue this methodological aspect and illustrate with one such "borderline case" how this approach might be used for a better understanding not only of the phenomenon under scrutiny but also, preferably, of the cultural background and context from which it springs along with the larger, international theoretical trends which may have influenced it.

The "borderline case" of my choice thus, is the late poetry of W.C.Williams (produced in the early 60s) which contains, in an essential, concentrated way one of the main — if not *the* main — concerns of Williams' poetry which, loosely defined, is the problem of word and image and which, more specifically, is the age-long, much discussed interartistic problem of trying to make the domain of language (writing) converge with that of art (in this case: painting). The coming of what has been called "the linguistic turn", brought about an unusually sharp focusing on the philosophical, aesthetic and psychological aspects of language which started already in the first decades of the 20th century with the work of the Russian Formalist and Czech Structuralist schools, culminating in the 1960s, a period that seems to have brought into the foreground the problematics of word and image with a new, striking urgency in various domains of art.

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1. Unfortunately, not long after this paper was written the Cultural Anthropology program at ELTE, along with other smaller programs, was discontinued as a result of the government's cuts in the financing of higher education.

It produced a new, strange variant of the traditional paragon, i.e. the debate between the practitioners of poetry and painting respectively, in which each defended his/her medium as being superior to the other. The late Modern phase of the paragon is characterized by a radical changing of positions in which the participants find themselves locked, as it were, into their respective media, finding it unsatisfactory from various points of view, as a result of which they are left forever longing for and reaching out to the opposite, supposedly more perfect mode of expression and representation. The issue lying at the heart of this aesthetic "drama" is the problem of *presence* versus *absence,* which has been the gist of the matter ever since the ancient Greeks first posed the question. One medium has always been deemed more perfect than the other from this specific point of view, and many artists, aesthetes and critics — among them Wendy Steiner, for example, in her excellent book — have tried to explain the *raison d'être* of the painting-poetry debate with "the desire of western art to incorporate life and presence in the work."[2]

The binary opposition of *presence* vs. *absence* inevitably opens up the scope of the study on the one hand towards the history of the genre of the Paragone, and on the other towards tracing the history of the problematics of the embodiment of *presence* and conversely, the hermeneutics of its lack. This topic offers itself for study from an overwhelming number of approaches. Those leaping most readily to one's mind are (among others): *theology* (along the lines of the dictum "the letter killeth while the spirit giveth life", as eg. Susan Handelman's fascinating book *The Slayers of Moses* does[3], tracing the origins of the problem to the differences between Jewish and Christian modes of theological interpretation; *linguistics,* starting out with the Saussurean theory of language which introduced the binary concepts of langue/parole and signifier/signified, whose evolvement can then be traced in semiology (as in eg. the work of Barthes) on the one hand, and postmodern *literary theory* on the other (with special emphasis on Derrida's reinterpretation of the role of writing; and to highlight one last example from among the many others that could be cited: psychoanalysis, with reference specifically to the work of Freud and Lacan, the latter's theories relying heavily on Saussure's concepts of language and offering a radical reinterpretation thereof.

It seems logical at this point to take a closer look at *one* of these mentioned lines of approach to our topic of inquiry, that is Williams' late poetry (with special emphasis on his poems on paintings). I have here chosen the psychoanalytic, and more specifically, the Lacanian viewpoint for the simple reason that this line of approach has — to my knowledge — not yet been used for the interpretation of Williams' said poems, even though Lacan's theories offer themselves as being strikingly applicable to them. I shall attempt to do no more than to point out a few possible points of departure for those who would wish to engage in a deeper analysis of the subject along these lines.

I will quote here Williams' poem entitled "Still Lifes" which may have been one of the last poems he ever wrote (published in the year of his death in the *Hudson Review*) and which concisely summarizes the nature of his main concern at that time.

> All poems can be represented by
> still lifes not to say
> water-colors, the violence of
> the Iliad lends itself to an arrangement
> of narcissi in a jar.
> The slaughter of Hector by Achilles
> can well be shown by them
> casually assembled yellow upon white
> radiantly making a circle

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2. *The Colors of Rhetoric* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 71.
3. *The Slayers of Moses: The Emergence of Rabbinic Interpretation in Modern Literary Theory.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982.

swart strokes violently given
in a more or less haphazard disarray

As a poet strongly influenced by the visual arts ever since the beginning of his artistic career — himself having tried his hand as a young man in the medium of painting — he persisted until the end of his life in the belief in the superior communicative power of the visual arts and experimented with rendering, as best as his own medium — language — would allow him, the verbal counterparts of visual experience. His continued distrust of language, more specifically of metaphor, reflected a renewed concern, characteristic of the general cultural scene of the period, with the problem of incorporating the power of presence in the work of art. Williams makes his point in the poem by comparing the Iliad, the greatest poem of western civilization with the fragile and definitely undramatic medium of water-color, presenting the latter as being superior because more simple and essential than linguistic representation. Williams stresses his point with his characteristic, unusual versification by which he pairs "still lifes" with "not to say" and "water-colors" with "the violence of" thereby suggesting that the speechless power of a visual representation has a much more violent, elemental and concentrated effect than the laboriousness and vagueness of language. By trying to reappropriate the methods of painting he strived to diminish the gap between the two media by concentrating as best he could on what he called "the thing itself" ("No ideas but in things...") instead of letting himself be trapped by "intellectual abstractions".

This is the point where one may want to introduce some aspects of the psychoanalytic approach to better understand the (conscious or unconscious) drives motivating this kind of poetry. What may be most meaningful for us in the studying of Williams' struggle with language (no small problem for a poet) is Lacan's famous dictum that "the unconscious is structured like a language". Lacan revolutionized Freudian psychoanalytic interpretation by systematically claiming,as Elizabeth Wright puts it in her book on *Psychoanalytic Criticism*, "that the unconscious is more than the source of primal instincts linked at random to ideas and images. Lacan rejects this randomness. Conscious and unconscious are asymmetrically co-present: the inner structure maps the outer conceptualizings. This mapping is above all governed by linguistic experience."[4] The new psychoanalytic approach to literature instead of concentrating on the analysis of the personal psyche (be it that of the author, the reader or the characters) focuses on the *text as psyche* based on the concept that the unconscious is structured like a language. It is especially interesting to study Williams' repeated attempts at offering verbal equivalents to already existing paintings (while trying to make his renderings as "painterly" as possible) as an example of what Lacan calls the linguistic equivalent of the "repetition compulsion" which he demonstrates in his analysis of Poe's "The Purloined Letter"[5], and which he sees as a clear example of the linguistic mapping of the structures of the unconscious. In his study of Poe's story it is the repeated structure rather than the plot itself that interests Lacan and similarly, Williams is interested in the repetition of the *method* rather than the picture itself.

Another Lacanian concept which may also be interesting for us here is the idea of the "sliding (or what has also been called the "floating" or "unstable") signifier". He reverses the original Saussurean formula s/S (S standing for the signifier and s the signified) criticizing Saussure's idea which affirms that the -although arbitrary — bond between the two, once formed, is as firm as the bond between the two sides of a sheet of paper. The medium of language is characterized first and foremost by the concept of *difference* not only because — as Saussure himself pointed out — it is a system based on difference (as opposed to painting, which is a medium more closely, if not exclusively associated with resemblance) but also because — as Derrida's coining of the term *différance* shows — it incorporates the act of deferral in which the signifiers enforce an

4. *Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice.* (London: Methuen) 107.
5. Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1977.

endless postponement of presence (every word indicating the absence of what it stands for) and consequently, the postponement of the satisfaction of the desire for presence. As Lacan puts it in his study "Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud": "We are forced, then, to accept the notion of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier..."[6] With the subject's entrance into language, which Lacan calls the entrance into the "Symbolic order", it has to accept the absence of satisfaction. As Elizabeth Wright puts it: "Language imposes a chain of words along which the ego must move while the unconscious remains in search of the object it has lost."[7] Williams' poetry is a par excellence disturbingly "raw" presentation of this — necessarily unfulfilled — desire for satisfaction and also of his heroic struggle with the "floating signifier" and the metaphor, the latter of which, as Freud already pointed out in his interpretation of dreams, is a form of censorship, transference, in other words, a form of repression of desire.

For lack of time, and thus space, I would like to call attention to only one other point that might be illuminating in our examination of Williams' poetry from a psychoanalytic, and more specifically, a Lacanian point of view. This is the problem of regarding all forms of visual representation as being rid of metaphor and intellectual abstraction. This was perhaps Williams' greatest misconception as he, in fact, did regard painting as being a medium which represents reality in a more direct and essential way than poetry (language). What Williams was trying to do in his poetry was indeed some sort of psychoanalytic procedure itself if we accept the idea that psychoanalysis is a way of *shrinking* the psyche back to its essence, down to its basics, to its "original size" (a process clearly referred to in American slang where the psychoanalyst is referred to as the "shrink"). Williams, no doubt, was also trying to "shrink" reality to its essence, to reach a maximum concentration of statement, a maximum concentration on "the thing itself". But in his attempt he tended to disregard (or perhaps unconsciously repressed?) two important facts: 1) that even in psychoanalysis the shrinking is done through speech (language) which consists of metaphors, metonymies, digressions, redundancies, etc.; 2) that painting, too, is a kind of visual troping, a form of intellectual abstraction. This is true not only of abstract, but figurative representation as well (no matter how realistic). Only color, line and texture can be concrete, whereas all forms of visual representation are intellectualizations of reality.

In his work *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*,[8] Lacan offers a detailed discussion of the "dialectic of the eye and the gaze", the *eye* being entrapped in the signifying system the moment the subject first enters into that system (language, or as Lacan calls it the Symbolic order), while the *gaze* pursues fantasies, repressed desires, which is thus, according to Lacan's terminology, a constituent of the world of the Imaginary. The eyes, according to Lacan, are one of the modes of access for the libido to explore the world, they become the instruments for this drive. But there is a constant oscillation between the *eye* and the *gaze*, and as Elizabeth Wright puts it in her discussion of Lacan's theory: "Lacan's concept of the dialectic of the eye and the gaze undermines that view of art which takes it to be an imitation of life. There is no comparison of a representation with a putative reality: mimetic art is still presenting a fantasy, a favoured view of reality. There is no pure seeing."[9]

It could be an exciting task to try to determine how Williams' *eye* and *gaze* function when he represents through language the way in which he looks (as spectator and artist) at visual representations based on the *eye* and *gaze* of the painters in question, thereby performing a double somersault. This line of approach would also take us to the examination of the ways in which the workings of desire and repression can be detected

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6. *Ibid.*, 154.
7. Wright, *Psychoanalytic Criticism*, 111.
8. Translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1979), 67-78.
9. Wright, *Psychoanalytic Criticism*, 118.

in his (and the painter's) work and whether these workings are acknowledged by the artists as, according to Lacan, they always are, or whether, following Freud's view of art as sublimation, neither artist nor spectator are aware of the repression that brings about the redirection of the sexual drive to socially accepted goals.

At this point I shall refrain from going further along this line of exploration as my aim was, as I have already pointed out above, simply to enumerate a few possible points of departure in this chosen area and to illustrate how the interdisciplinary approach might work in this field of study.

One last point remains to be made which is that after having examined the topic in question, using whichever kind of lens one may have chosen, one can always decide with the students if there is any possibility for extrapolation, i.e. for the constructing of a typology of American culture based on the examined topic. The study of Williams' poetry seems to lend itself well to that task. One could use as a starting point the statement quoted above referring to "the desire of western art to incorporate life and presence in the work", and begin investigating whether this statement is equally true for the art of *all* western cultures or whether, as I would like to suggest, it is more true of some cultures than others. It requires no great effort to make out a general tendency in American culture which concentrates more on *surface* than *depth* (a tendency certainly *not* to be interpreted as superficiality, as the phenomenon in question has nothing to do with that), with *effects* rather than *causes*, with the *material,* textural rather than the *spiritual* quality of things and which, in short, could be characterized as being a *horizontal* (synchronic) rather than a *vertical* (diachronic) culture. Or one could also try to express the suggested meaning by what has been called a *doing culture* as opposed to a *contemplating culture*.

From this point one could embark upon an exciting adventure by looking into the possible philosophical, economic, historical and sociological reasons for making this kind of distinction which, according to my hypothesis, would hopefully prove why American culture is involved to a much greater extent than others in the struggle for the *embodiment of presence* in art. At this point we have reached a Williamsian *edge* which, ideally, will stimulate the desire in us to make further investigations.

Judit Molnár

Bridge-Building: Historiographic Metafiction in Two Recent Canadian Novels

Introduction

The two novels I intend to compare, Keith Harrison's *Dead Ends* (1981) and Gail Scott's *Heroine* (1987), reflect a similar cultural milieu, that of the 1970s of Québec, in which they are profoundly embedded. Both Harrison and Scott have become cultural mediators between the segregated groups in Québec of earlier times. Recent changes have already inevitably shaped the writing scene of Québec; quite a few writers have tried to fulfil the role that is imposed on them in Sommer's view, i.e.,to act as "creative interpreter[s], whose identification with a social group [English-speaking Québecers] connotes responsibility to it" (1979, 38). Both works pursue similar ends; on the one hand, they encourage the formation of polyphonic identities on an individual level, on the other hand, they demonstrate the process of developing a *collective intercultural awareness*. In their identity-seeking Harrison and Scott try to define themselves by acting as "cultural ambassadors" among people. They share Todorov's (1986, 175) belief that "otherness is never radical", and multiple identities originate in the feasibility of moving beyond and even breaking up boundaries between cultures. They celebrate difference through multiple affiliations: "We are defined by what we reject, as well as by what we accept" (Sorrell 1982, 47). Both novels fall into the category of cross-cultural writing on the English-language literary scene of Québec. The two writers' shared cultural background can explain why the sociological, ideological and political underpinnings of these two novels are so close. In both of them the prevelant themes are the female artistic creation and the relationship between art and politics. Their fictionalizing processes have elements in common, too.

Socio-political Portraits

Both novels belong to what Linda Hutcheon defines as *historiographic metafiction*: "fiction that is intensely self-reflexive art, but is also grounded in historical, social and political realities" (1988, 13). Harrison creates a female author, a Montréaler, who writes about her creation of an American man visiting Vancouver checking out on logging operations as an "industrial spy" (118). *Dead Ends* is not only cross-cultural writing but also cross-regional writing: life in Montréal is compared to life in Vancouver from the point of view of ethnic cleavage. Socio-cultural identity is defined differently in the two parts of Canada. It is primarily based on bestial (63) racism in Vancouver if we accept Francis's definition of the term:

> By "racism" we understand a social doctrine that assumes a constant relationship of social with mental and cultural charateristics and which provides a legitimization of the discrimination against people exhibiting particular somatic characteristics by postulating their innate inferiority. (1976, 382)

The conflicts caused by interethnic mixing reflect different minority/majority concerns. The confrontations are mainly between white people and "visible" minorities in Vancouver; in Montréal they are lower-keyed and are primarily between the English and the French. Ethnic identity crisis, however, is one of the central preoccupations both in Vancouver and in Montréal.

On the one hand, the novel is about "the artistic process" (Hutcheon 1990, 87) but on the other hand, it is also grounded in political actuality: the time of Pierre Trudeau with René Lévesque's separatist provincial government in power in Québec. The time is still a transitional period in the province's history when it could not forget the past yet and is only half-ready for modernization.

The time in Scott's novel can be identified with the tenth anniversary of the October Crisis. The narrator delivers her internal monologue in a bathtub; her flashbacks evoke the events of the 1970s in Québec. The October Crisis has changed Scott's writing career. She was so shocked by the fact that the War Measures Act was declared that she left journalism:

> ... I can see now that what I learned during the October Crisis really changed my way of writing over the long run. I understood at that time what censorship and silence meant, and I understood the importance of constructing an image other than the images received, which were in the media. (Gould 1990, 71)

The narrator's interpretation of the 1970s is historically grounded and justified. Her joining the radical left is linked subjectively to a love affair and objectively to her interests in feminist and social movements without particularly considering the perspective of Québec's possible independence. While she deeply sympathizes with Québécois aspirations, she severely criticizes nationalism:

> A gathering of comrades and former group members watching the elections. When suddenly it's announced the indépendantiste Parti Québecois has won. Everybody's happy, although, of course, we'd spoiled our ballots. For revolutionaries cannot support bourgeois-nationalism in any form. A comrade looks at me, LA SEULE ANGLAISE, and says almost worried 'Well now how do you feel?' (89-90)

The narrator is originally from Ontario, so she has consciously chosen her minority status in Québec, which helps her gain a substantive insight into the history of English-Canada and that of Québec:

> The manual you bought was a collector's item from the 60s. Full of amateur directions for urban terrorism. *Comment faire une bombe. Tu prends du fil. Ça coute dix cents, la valeur d'un anglais.* We repeated to each other that sentiments like that will be normal as long as there are dominating and dominated people. From the slums of St Henri (mostly French) we raised our heads to look at the mansions climbing up Westmount Mountain (mostly English). Between the two, separating the oppressed from the oppressor, a huge chasm that the Canadian Pacific Railway trains run through. ... 'And there you have the history of Canada in a nutshell.' (124)

The throbbing life of Montréal permeates the text; the cartographic representation is animated: "... the city of Montreal surfaces in the novel almost as a character, full of painful lives that cross its surface — the bagladies, the prostitutes, the battered and homeless" (Sullivan 1987, n.pag.).

Analogous Narrative Techniques

Hutcheon classifies *Dead Ends* as a novel (1990, 87); however while compiling her

piece of fiction the protagonist asks herself if she is writing a short story, a novel, or a "long short story, a *provest*" (41) where internal monologues are disrupted by dialogues.

The experimentation is presented through the voice(s) of a distressed woman. The novel is postmodern in accordance with Hutcheon's definition of the term:

> From what I can glean from the *usage* of the term "postmodernism" would seem to designate art forms that are fundamentally self-reflexive — in other words, art that is self-consciously art (or artifice), literature that is openly aware of the fact that it is written and read as part of a particular culture, having as much to do with the literary past as with the social present. (1988, 2)

The articulation of experiences is based on dualities; the acceptance of the impossibility of fusing contraries is part of postmodern discourse (Hutcheon 1988, 4). The following are the structural and thematic juxtapositions in the novel: the male from Vancouver is linked to the female voice from Montréal; the relationship between the French and the English in Québec is focussed on; the white are contrasted with "visible" minorities; native people are differentiated from native settlers; goyim are presented in contrast with Jews; North Americans are made distinct from Asians; sailing and skiing, summer and winter, flying and drowning, the figures of doctor and patient, man and woman are compared. Jessica in Montréal and Richard in Vancouver face similar difficulties in life. Both are involved in writing, both have a "messy life" (89) are divorced and try to raise a child. Life is set against death, writing and reading are considered as separate and combined processes. The narrator says: "I am tired of seeing double" (77).

The metafictional self-consciousness persists in the novel with multidimensional relations that involve the locale, ethnicity, genre and authorship: "Postmodern texts tend to make self-conscious their writing, their reading and the various contexts in which both acts take place" (Hutcheon 1988, 17).

From the point of view of style, the parts related by the male voice are more staccato, while the female voice is more even, more regular, though with hesitations, which creates a delicate balance between the two distinct parts with constant tension within each at the same time.

Dead Ends finally ends with the drowning of the American entrepreneur on Canadian soil, which follows the imagery of the novel. The narrator's last deed is killing her American protagonist. She, however, stirs the sympathy of a Québécoise woman. Her activity is creativity that is closely linked to death. She opts for life, though, despite her dubious feelings concerning the Québécoise woman and her own self:

> *"Es ch'pe vs aider?"*
> "Non." I don't really need help. *"C'est O.K.' merci."*
> *"Why?"* The gentle old woman in three-quarters profile with her Québecois voicing of *"oui"* speaks my double feelings.
> "Why, merci, why." (135)

The intertextual mode of representation becomes unmistakable towards the end of the novel through constant references to other writers, in particular to Tolstoy. The last scene ends with the narrator pondering on death in a metro station in Montréal, which evokes the tragic railways in *Anna Karenina*. The resolution is formulated by a hidden allusion to Hugh Hood's short story "Flying a Red Kite" (1962), which symbolizes the potential achievement of harmony. In this regard, *Dead Ends* relinquishes postmodernism; the ray of hope surfacing in the end suggests the possibility of transcending chaos cretaed by human relationships. The lack of a tangible resolution at the end of Scott's *Heroine* does not deny a continuation into a progressive future either; thus the endings of the two novels are similar.

Genre classification could pose a problem in Scott's case if she did not provide us with her own definition according to which she is engaged in writing *fiction-theory* in the wake of contemporary Québécoises writers like Nicole Brossard and France Théoret. She

gives due weight to their influence:

> It was precisely in order to explore that gap between male-dominant culture and an emerging culture in-the-feminine, that feminists writing in Québec created, in the 70s, a new genre: *fiction-theory*. This was not *theory about fiction*, but rather ... a reflexive doubling back over the texture of the text. Where nothing, not even the "theory" escapes the poetry, the internal rhythm (as opposed to internal logic) of the writing. The better to break continuity (the continuity of patriarchial mythologies) into fragments in order to question syntax/context. This habit of stopping to reflect on the process within the text itself looks forward to a meaning in-the-feminine. (1989, 47)

Further she differentiates between *l'écriture féministe* (referring to feminist content) and *l'écriture au féminin* (referring to a distinctive narrative technique) while effacing the notion of "genre" as such:

> In Québec, for example, *l'écriture féministe* (feminist writing) has generally been rejected in favour of *l'écriture au féminin* (writing in-the-feminine), because *l'écriture féministe* is felt to point towards a content-oriented (and often narrowly political) interpretation of the text. While, in English, the term "feminist writing" is preferred to "writing in-the-feminine", because in our language "writing in-the-feminine" fails to invoke the assertive experimental note of female-gendered writing that the French l'écriture au féminin implies. (1989, 116)

Her novel is a relentless effort to create a female writer with a female voice no longer following a linear narrative discourse that the author largely connects to patriarchial traditions (1989, 34). (One has to note, however, that breaking up the traditional linear narrative does not happen exclusively in writing where "meaning in the feminine" is produced. Similar narrative techniques are applied by Robert Kroetsch, Jack Hodgins, Keith Harrison to name just a few from the Canadian literary scene alone.) Her "heroine" will possess a different emotional make-up from that of the narrator's, who has been trapped in nostalgic memories of a bittersweet love affair, and has never been able to overcome her dependence; the new "heroine" will not be a "loser" (154), however.

Behind Scott's revision of "genre" lies also the blending of fiction, excerpts from diaries, graffiti, dreams, songs, poems, radio announcements into which theoretical contemplations are interjected. The movement of her narration is progressively circular; she writes from within spaces that exist between language and body, real and surreal, male and female. The narrative pattern suggests the notion that reality cannot be fixed and defined (Sullivan 1987, n.pag.).

Bilingualism

As some of the quotations have already indicated, the two authors' attitude towards bilingualism is also worth comparing. The fact that they write in English, even if they produce bilingual texts to some extent, is not to their benefit in Québec at a time of strong linguistic nationalism: "One of the essential characteristics of candid nationalism is unity of language. Nationalism only grudgingly tolerates ambiguity" (Blodgett 1982, 17). Breaking through the insularity of the English community has heightened their cultural sensibility. By articulating their own voice(s) neither the Québec nor the Canadian sense of identity prevails over the other in their works.

Harrison's support of bilingualism is not overt but implicit; he manages to create interlingual and, structurally-speaking, interchapter puns, too (38,96). The protagonist is divorced from a Francophone man, but she would imagine a better life for her English-speaking friend in Québec, if only she could speak French, let alone *joual*, a form of the French language spoken in Québec. Her friend admits: "'If I could speak *joual*, even French, I'd be much happier here [Québec]'" (45). (emphasis added)

Scott's Anglo-Québécoise self-definition is reflected not only in her blending the two different trends of feminist writing characterizing the English-Canadian and the Québécoise practises respectively; her belonging to different cultures is also present in her use of language(s) as well. In Scott's *Heroine* the political polemics of the 1970s in Québec come to life through the eyes of a bilingual and bicultural female narrator whose memory is saturated with the radical changes of that era. The use of French comes naturally to her: "I often use French in my work, and the reason why I use French is that the characters speak French and find there are things they can't find words for in English" (Leith 1989, 24).

Conclusion

Harrison and Scott can be regarded as cultural intermediaries and their works both intercultural and literary discourses. Their conception of the self is based on cultural mediation. Their emphasis on communal values emerges from the socio-cultural climate of Québec. Being members of a minority within a minority, the writers dealt with encourage intercultural dialogue by trying to diffuse the tension between ethnic groups living in Québec. The authors selected have needed a new sociolect to respond to the transformed society of Québec; accordingly they have fabricated a new literary language by using French in a conciliatory manner. Their textual strategy, historiographical metafiction, was used to illustrate the development of a perception that is based on the appreciation of plurality and on close cultural and linguistic affinities. Their English-Canadianness nicely combines with their Québécicity.

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Éva Federmayer

The Black Daughter's Revision: Jessie Redmon Fauset's *Plum Bun* (1929)

In her introduction to *Plum Bun* Deborah McDowell remarks that whenever she cites Jessie Redmon Fauset as a writer of the Harlem Renaissance, she gets "the predictable response: Who is he?"[1] Indeed, black woman writer Fauset sank into oblivion after the 1930s and it is only through the efforts of recent feminist scholarship that her achievement has come to be acknowledged again. Deborah McDowell, Carolyne Wedin Sylvander and Thadious Davis are among the outstanding critics who, by revising the traditional male-dominated African American literary canon have succeeded in placing Jessie Fauset in a proper perspective in which she is no longer seen merely as a conservative representative of "Old Guard" gentility.[2] In fact, their discerning scholarly work has revealed Fauset's iconoclastic vision in her astute transgression of traditional boundaries of race and gender in her novels, a bold and almost sacrilegious attempt in the 1920s and 30s to re-form old images of the black woman.

In this essay I seek to explore Jessie Redmon Fauset's novel Plum Bun (1929) as a black daughter's revision in two senses. First I will briefly discuss Fauset, the author as a revising and revisionist black daughter unique in "breaking habits of expectations not only in pursuing a college degree but in attaining financial and personal independence in the professional world."[3] Then I will discuss her novel Plum Bun in detail by focussing on its revisionist strategy. I suggest that Fauset's novel turns on rewriting traditional mulatta narratives and negotiating conventional female roles by positing a black/mulatta protagonist Angela Murray/Angèle More, the daughter, who is intent on reinscribing her own life as a revision of her mother's.

Jessie Redmon Fauset was born in 1883 as the seventh child of Reverend Redmon Fauset, an African Methodist Episcopalian minister, and Anna Seamon, in Fredericksville, New Jersey. Her young life, though marred by racial discrimination at every turn, signalled the success a black American woman could achieve even under repressive social conditions at the turn of the century. She was born into a family which had been free since the eighteenth century and was inspired by the ambition of parents who encouraged her and her siblings to aspire to high intellectual achievement. Young Jessie was the only black student in the Philadephia Girls' High School when she graduated in 1900, and planned to continue her education at college. Prestigious Bryn Mawr, however, refused to admit her because of her color despite her outstanding academic achievements, but she eventually succeeded in obtaining a scholarship to Cornell University. Jessie Fauset was the first black woman to receive a B.A. and most

1. Introduction to *Plum Bun* (London, Boston, Melbourne: Pandora Press, 1985), ix.
2. See Deborah MacDowell's Introduction to Carolyne Wedin Sylvander, *Jessie Redmon Fauset, Black American Writer* (Troy, NY: Whitston Press, 1981), and Thadious Davis's Foreword to *There Is Confusion* by Jesse Fauset (Boston: Northern University Press, 1989).
3. Sylvander, 33.

probably the first black female student to be elected to Phi Beta Kappa. Her brilliant academic career nothwithstanding, when she tried to secure employment as a teacher, she was turned down everywhere in the segregated school system of Philadelphia, "the city of brotherly love." After a year in Baltimore, she took up teaching French at the M Street High School (later Dunbar High) in Washington, D.C. and then decided to resume her education at the University of Pennsylvania, where she obtained a master's degree in French. She traveled extensively in Europe (in 1921, for exmple, she attended the second Pan-African Congress in Paris and lectured in Brussels on the condition of African American women), and was one of the first black Americans who went to Africa.

Her writing began when she started sending articles to the Crisis, which was the cultural mouthpiece of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). She produced numerous articles, reviews, stories and poems and was instrumental in launching the career of Langston Hughes and Jean Toomer, as well as in supporting other black talents such as Countee Cullen and Claude McKay, who were later to become prominent figures of the period. In his autobiography *The Black Sea*, Langston Hughes pays homage to her organizing talents and editorial astuteness and regards her as one of the three major supporters of the Harlem Renaissance: "Jessie Fauset at the Crisis, Charles Johnson at the Opportunity and Alain Locke in Washington, were the three people who midwifed the so-called New Negro literature into being. Kind and critical--but not too critical for the young--they nursed us along until our books were born" (218).

Rejecting provincialism, dilettantism and narrow concepts of artistic value, her editorial practices represented high erudition and flexibility in acknowledging the legitimacy of a wide range of aesthetic commitments. Besides being a devoted supporter of black talent by also editing *Brownies' Book*, a magazine for black children and opening her home on Sundays to provide a forum for black writers, artists and intellectuals to discuss their works, as a creative writer Fauset was a pioneer in portraying the life of the new African American communities. Unlike Claude McKay, Carl Van Vechten and others who catered to the fashion of the 1920s by producing sensational stories about black dissipation and sordidness, Fauset was uncompromising in resisting the allure of the black primitive exotic in her writing, even at the cost of having her novels rejected by publishers. Her narratives boldly ran against the grain in exploring a new black middle-class in the ascendant with a special regard to black women, whose developing identity she saw constrained by the racist and masculinist limitations imposed on them.

After nearly seven years she left the Crisis, but for all her outstanding achievements as an editor she was unable to secure employment as a publisher's reader. Successful as she was on two magazines, she was rejected by the white dominated publishing world, even though she offered to "segregate hersef' by suggesting that "if the question of color should come up, I could of course work at home."[4] She consequently returned to teaching at a black high school in New York City and two years later married Herbert E. Harris, a businessman. After moving from New York to New Jersey she no longer participated in black cultural affairs, although she remained in contact with some black intellectuals. She died in 1961 of a heart disease.

Jessie Fauset's most sophisticated narrative is her second novel *Plum Bun*,[5] in which she not only successfully structured an exciting plot, but also displayed a good sense of humour and a remarkable disposition for satire. As Deborah McDowell notes, "Plum Bun is a richly textured and ingeniously designed narrative, containing plots within plots and texts within texts that comment upon one another in intricate combinations."[6] Intratextuality plays out intertextuality which fosters satire by re-presenting the stock-in-

4. McDowell, xiii.

5. *Plum Bun. A Novel Without a Moral* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1929). Reprints (London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Pandora Press, 1985 and Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990).

6. Introduction, xv.

trade of sentimental female romances of marriage in a slanted romance. Contrary to her three other novels (*There Is Confusion* /1924/, *The Chinaberry Tree* /1931/, *Comedy: American Style* /1933/), *Plum Bun* does not elaborate on the theme of black patrilineal reconstruction. It pursues a different trajectory, involving a young woman of African descent who commits herself to the search for a "freer, fuller life" (80). Of her four novels this is the most "liberated" in the sense that it provides the largest scope for the female protagonist to experiment with the Bildung plot of her life as well as with the masquerading script of her gender.[7]

Typical of the textual concerns of the novel, the very first words of the book in the title (Plum Bun) set semantic displacement in motion, since they evoke a nursery rhyme, a framing device which disruptively situates the narrative:

> To Market, to Market
> To buy a Plum Bun;
> Home again, Home again,
> Market is done.

In accordance with the framing device, the text is divided into five chapters titled "Home," "Market," Plum Bun," "Home Again," and "Market is Done." "Home" outlines the central romance which is played out by the pretty white-skinned Mrs. Mattie Murray, her brown-skinned husband June Murray and their two pretty daughters, Virginia and Angela. This is a pretty small world with pretty and loving people written in pretty language like a fairy tale. Mattie is the epitome of femininity whom "her husband considered a perfect woman, sweet, industrious, affectionate and illogical." June is the epitome of masculinity who "to her was God" (32-33). The binary gender division of this pretty fictional world surprisingly holds true for the girls too: Virginia is described as a transparent character appreciative of domesticity, happy with her color (dark) and her gender; she displays femininity at a very early age by playing mother to her own mother and wife to her own father. Starkly contrasted to her, Angela is portrayed as an opaque character whose anatomical sex and socialized gender jar with "masculine" ambitions of individualism and freedom. This part revolves around the injustices that Angela has to endure in racist Philadelphia, and ends with the parents' death and Angela's leaving for New York under a self-chosen name, Angèle Mory.

"Plum Bun" is set in New York, where Angèle studies art and puts herself on the "market." She is resolved to marry well by trapping a wealthy white man, and live a free life, but instead of rising to respectability, she becomes Roger Fielding's lover in a secret "love-nest." She passes for white even at the expense of disowning her sister. This part ends with her painful remorse, and her return to her sister, who has also moved to New York. "Home Again" works out the contrast from another angle between Jinny (Virginia) and Angèle: while the younger sister thrives as a teacher in Harlem with "her people," Angèle is agonizing under her white mask until she also finds her way back to her race. She finds another man, the light-skinned Anthony Cross, but by an unexpected twist in the narrative, her marriage plans get thwarted again. Instead of giving herself over to despair, this time Angèle acts differently. She begins to appreciate bonding with female friends, learns to develop a meaningful friendship with a white man without compulsively playing the female role in the war of sexes, confidently refuses Roger when he returns

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7. Masquerade is a psychoanalytic concept of the performative production of femininity which was first hypothesized in "Womanliness as a Masquerade" (1929) by Joan Riviere. Riviere's assumption was developed by Jacques Lacan ("The Meaning of the Phallus" /1958/), Luce Irigaray (*This Sex Which Is Not One* /1977/), and Judith Butler (*Gender Trouble* /1990/). Femininity regarded as a naturalized representation of women performatively and discursively produced is a non-essentialist concept and has come to be widely accepted in recent feminist thought.

with a marriage proposal, becomes aware of her "racial duty" and decides to become a strong portrait painter.

In "Market is Done" Angela is an independent woman finding delight in her work. She wins an art competition, but refuses to go to Fontainebleau in support of Miss Powell, a black art student who--though herself also an award winner--is denied the trip on account of her color. In sympathy with the girl, Angèle publicly declares herself black which causes her dismissal from her job as a fashion designer. Thanks to a group of white intellectuals, she can depart for France, where after a few months she receives Anthony, who has been sent to her by her sister Jinny as a Christmas present.

What constitutes Fauset's narrative is an ongoing negotiation at several levels involving the author, who negotiates conventional genres, and her protagonist, who negotiates conventional female roles. The master trope of the narrative is thus related to the market, which also maps out the space of her gender and race masquerade. As Deborah McDowell points out, *Plum Bun* is centrally concerned with the fairy tale and the passing genres, which Fauset successfully undercuts and subverts with a Bildung plot around her central character.

> Inherently self-reflexive, Plum Bun, like the protagonist whose story it tells, is passing. It passes for another novel of passing, for a modern fairy tale of age-old concerns. While white skin is Angèle's mask, Fauset's deft manipulation of familiar literary genres and conventions is the narrative's mask. Although *Plum Bun* borrows elements from the passing novel, the fairy tale, and the women's romance, it eludes classification."[8]

Indeed, the lynchpin of Fauset's narrative economy is the mulatta who, according to Hazel Carby is "a narrative device of mediation:" she "has two primary functions: as a vehicle for an exploration of the relationship between the races and, at the same time, an expression of the relationship between the races."[9] Though Angela Murray looks Caucasian enough to cross the color line easily, in the lax racial vocabulary she is still called a *mulatta* (female mulatto), since the term refers not only to persons of mixed parentage (a "full blood" white and a "full blood" black parent), but also to quadroons, octoroons and invisible mixtures. By using a mulatta as a central character, Fauset revisited and revisioned a long literary tradition which I will briefly survey in the following pages.[10]

The first significant American representation of the mulatto/mulatta was Cora Munro in James Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans* (1826), whose black hair and passionate temperament were to offset her half-sister's Caucasian fairness and sexless femininity. The first novel written by a black American, William Wells Brown's *Clotel, or The President's Daughter* (first version published in London in 1853) revolved round a mulatta telling the entangled story of a beautiful light-skinned slave, Clotel, who was the fictional counterpart of Thomas Jefferson's mistress, Sally Hemmings. Women and men of mixed white and black descent were from very early featured in American literature, since the mulatta/mulatto dramatically "fleshed out" at the crossroads of the color-line the flagrant anomaly of American democracy before the Civil War and after the Reconstruction. Characters who were white and black at the same time offered a particularly poignant dramaturgy of social conflicts triggered by racial anomalies.

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8. Introduction, xxii.
9. *Reconstructing Womanhood. The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 89.
10. Angela Murray, of course, is not Fauset's only mulatta. See Phoebe Grant, Olivia and Teresa Carby (*Comedy: American Style*), Mattie Murray (*Plum Bun*), Laurentine and Sarah Strange, Melissa Paul (*The Chinaberry Tree*). Yet Angela is the only major character who ties back into the protesting, race leading, passing and tragic mulatto/mulatta tradition.

Through the mediating mulatta/mulatto the mainstays of American democracy, the separate concepts of the "individual," "property" and "freedom," could be reexamined with regard to their interconnectedness. By doing so these novels posed the crucial question of what these concepts signify if the black/white (person?) is a chattel in bondage.

The mulatto in abolitionist tracts and fiction was typically portrayed as different from blacks on account of his being more intelligent, sensitive and rebellious. This character was mostly gendered male and was generally fathered by a white Southern gentleman like George Harris in Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. In spite of the implied racism in white abolitionist texts (which valorized mulattos on the basis of their also having "better," that is "white blood"), the fictional representation of the rebellious mulatto did a great service to elevate the Negro to the role of heroic victim who could more effectively appeal to white sympathy. In the nineteenth century a significant change was signalled by black women authors like Francis Harper in *Iola LeRoy* (1892) and Pauline Hopkins in *Contending Forces* (1900) by introducing mulattas as race leaders. These women, like their male counterparts in abolitionist fiction, rose to public visibility by virtue of their sensitivity, education and race consciousness.

Contrary to the female race leaders whose life was devoted to the advancement of Negroes, tragic mulattas urged for radical change by their death: it was their victimization through suicide or mysterious lethal fever and their subsequent absence from the narrative that paradoxically filled up the narrative space with meaning. The tragic character of mixed blood was predominantly gendered female, especially in white authors' mediocre melodramas, since "nothing supposedly inspire[d] sympathy more than the plight of a beautiful woman whose touch of "impurity" [made] her all the more attractive."[11] But black writers like William Wells Brown (*Clotel*) or Charles Chesnutt (*The House Behind the Cedars*, 1900) also preferred mulattas to mulattos in their tragic cast.

In another wave of this fictional tradition, narratives revolved around "passing mulattos", typically gendered male. While the pitiable tragic protagonist was felt better represented by a female character, the mulatta, indicating the writers' inclination toward a female figuration of victimization and death, the passing mulatto was felt better suited for males.[12] It is important to note that except for the mulatta as race leader (e.g. Iola LeRoy) the gender distribution of mixed blood characters lay along lines of potential power/powerlessness. This also implies that mulattas, especially in black authors, came to be figurations of white femininity through which other than white women could be represented in fiction. In antebellum literature, as Barbara Christian claims, for writers to make their black heroines effective "they would have to combat the negative images of black women.... They did this by creating a 'positive' black woman image. Since positive female qualities were all attributed to the white lady, these writers based their counterimage on her ideal qualities more than on the qualities of any real black woman."[13]

Fauset's figuration of Angela Murray not only springs from this rich tradition of mulattas and mulattos but is radically reinscribed across gender lines. Like the mulatto in abolitionist fiction she "was restlessly conscious of a desire for broader horizons" (79-

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11. Judith Berzon: *Neither White Nor Black. The Mulatto Character in American Fiction* (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 99-100.
12. To use Judith Berzon's arguments: "There is a greater likelihood for males to have the occupational skills needed to leave the black cast; light-skinned black women are desirable marriage partners and have the opportunity to marry into the upper class of the lower caste, and therefore have less motivation to pass; and finally, the female 'passer' has more difficulty in white society as a solitary woman with no family than does the male mulatto." See *Neither White Nor Black*, 142.
13. *Black Women Novelists. The Development of Tradition 1892-1976* (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 22.

89), a "freer, fuller life" (80) which was denied her. Like those intelligent and rebellious masculine characters of "good blood," she is described as tough, persevering and adamant to attain her goal: "nothing about her life ever made her really afraid; she might hurt herself, suffer, meet disappointment, but life could not alarm her; she loved to come to grips with it, to force it to a standstill, to yield up its treasures" (155). Similarly to passing mulattos her resolve is to change identity in the hope of better prospects in life: "I'm sick, sick, sick of seeing what I want dangled right before my eyes and then of having it snatched away from me and all of it through no fault of my own (64).... [A]fter all I am both white and Negro and look white. Why shouldn't I declare for the one that will bring me the greatest happiness, prosperity and respect?" (80).

Angela is also, like her mulatta predecessors, aware that erotic love is a viable avenue to personhood by her possible promotion in legal status as a legitimate sexual partner (wife) of a white man. Her affair with Roger Fielding, in which she consciously wields her femininity to trap him, seems to follow the traditional trajectory of the tragic mulatta woman "fallen into disgrace." Nevertheless Fauset does not kill her off to save the narrative and moreover, the loss of her heroine's chastity and with it her good prospects of legal promotion to marriage conspicuously elude the traditional tragic closure. Instead, it is Angela's mistaken decision to choose the white man over her dark-skinned sister at the railroad station that gains grave significance. Though Angela does not reach the stature of race leader mulattas, the growing awareness of her racial loyalties and the espousal of the cause of her fellow-student evokes even this configuration of the mulatta tradition.[14]

Fauset's renegotiation of the American mulatto/mulatta tradition takes on further significance in its revisionary interplay with the female romance of marriage tradition. When Angela Murray leaves Philadelphia and her home for New York brimming over with enthusiasm for a new life of a larger scope, she feels she is "on the threshold of a career totally different from anything that a scenario writer could envisage" (92). Fauset suggests that in order to build a life of her own design, that is, to work out a narrative of her own, Angela needs to move beyond a scenario preinscribed for her gender, race and class. Yet the heroine's project is not shown groundbreaking by any means. What she basically has in mind is an improved variety of her mother's narrative, which eventually boils down to a strenuous effort to tie together incompatible narratives in patchwork fashion.[15] Angela Murray's aim with her classy self-chosen French name Angèle Mory is to set herself up as the happy new heroine of a much too eclectic fairy tale of blissful marriage, successful passing, individual freedom and power--all within the framework of her mother's fairy-tale of the Holy Family. She wants "to capture power and protection in addition to the freedom and independence which she had so long coveted and which now lay in her hand" (88).

The incompatiblity of her narratives of desire first surfaces in her romance with her fellow-artist and classmate, Anthony. He offers Angèle intimate love bordering on worship, which recalls her father's affection toward her mother along with the "coloration" of the dynamic of their marriage (Anthony is darker than Angèle as June was darker than Mattie). This would be a perfect re-enactment of the "primal scene of romance" in Angèle's mind, but eventually it turns out that Anthony doesn't rate so high on the marriage market. In exchange for unconditional adoration Anthony asks her to

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14. True to the spirit of the Harlem Renaissance, Fauset's *Plum Bun* is one of the earliest narratives to suggest that passing and identification with the wite race is no longer a viable alternative for a person of mixed parentage. See other passing narratives of the Harlem Renaissance: Rudolph Fisher's *The Walls of Jericho* (1928); Nella Larsen's *Passing* (1929); Claude McKay's *"New-White"* (1932).

15. For a theoretical discussion of the mother-daughter plot, see Marianne Hirsch, *The Mother/Daughter Plot: Narrative, Psychoanalysis, Feminism* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989).

relinquish her aspiration to economic advancement in romance: "Could you, for the sake of love, for the sake of being loyal to the purposes and vows of someone you loved, bring yourself to endure privation and hardship and misunderstanding, hardship that would be none the less hard because it really could be avoided?" (141) Obviously, such a proposal causes Angèle's economic interest to collide with her heart's interest, since heart conflicts with heartless economy. Furthermore, Anthony is tormented by an almost pathological racial anxiety stemming from the tragic loss of his black father at the hands of his white killers in the South. The white criminals murdered him for marrying an "almost" white woman (a South American) and subsequently robbed Anthony of his sizeable inheritance. Scarcity and racial destiny are, however, the encumbrances from which Angèle Mory has chosen to dissociate herself in the first place.

Her next endeavour to reconcile "power" and "protection" within her mother's romance is painfully stymied. She tries very hard to reenact blissful domesticity with Roger Fielding in a simulation marriage: "[n]othing gave her greater joy really than this playful housekeeping" (193). No matter how resourcefully she seeks to remodel her mother's feminine role in the gender economy of ideal marriage (as she perceived it at home), her make-believe marriage results in greater restriction than she ever had to endure on Opal Street, Philadelphia. Roger wants practically to incarcerate her in the classic cage of the kept woman (a handsome house in the country hidden from the disapproving social gaze) and intends to seal her up in the secrecy of an illicit affair. Even when Angèle rejects his plan and moves to her own apartment, she finds herself pinned down and contained by sexual desire in constant waiting for him. Contrary to her fairy tale beliefs, her white man and simulation marriage thus bring disempowerment and confinement instead of power and freedom.

In seeking to renegotiate her racial heritage by passing for white and to fight out her life on her own terms, Angèle embroils herself in another tangle of incompatible narratives. Fauset intimates that this is a conflict between her white individualism and black heritage, involving a confrontation across racial and gender lines. When Angela confronts her sister with her decision to leave for a "freer, fuller life" in New York, her sister Jinny's response is meant to highlight Angela's individualistic interest in relation to the interest of the racial community. Angela's "reason" seems to be well-grounded, against which there is apparently "[n]o reason in the world," says Jinny, "except that since in this country public opinion is against any infusion of black blood it would seem an awfully *decent* thing to put yourself, even in the face of appearances, on the side of black blood and say: 'look here, this is what a mixture of black and white really means!'" (emphasis mine; 80) The textual configuration of Virginia's discourse suggests the imbrication of moral, racial and gender issues: if Angela stayed put in Philadelphia--as she herself does--and submitted her individual interests to the interests of the black community by sharing their fate of marginality but at the same time seeking to alter it, she would be decent. Virginia, who is emphatically troped in the narrative as feminine by virtue of her propensity for nurturing, clearly considers it a moral issue to give priority to the black community by self-sacrificing mothering, over selfish individualism. In Fauset's first novel *There Is Confusion* protagonist Joanna's displacement of her ambition to her black husband signalled a textual turn to usher in the recuperative black patriarchal family strengthened by regenerated black patrilineal memory through the willing sacrifice of the black woman. Joanna's creation of and participation in black patriarchal desire was compensated for in the textual economy of desire, since she suddenly recovered her true feminine self anchored in renunciation itself. Within this textual logic, Angela's project to leave Philadelphia and commit herself to a life outside of her racial community is, by definition, indecent, and moreover, *un-feminine*.

Fauset's *Plum Bun,* however, does not short-circuit race matters by sentimental moralism imbricated into renunciatory femininity. Her novel rather suggests that the boundaries of femininity are to be stretched to make it inclusive of women who seek to call into question the traditional womanhood that Mattie Murray (Angela's mother) represents in the narrative. Seen from this perspective, Fauset's second novel is an enterprise concentrating on the intersection of race and gender in which various models

of femininity are negotiated through the mediation of Angela Murray. The protagonist encounters several models of womanliness (Paulette, Martha, Miss Powell, Virginia, Mrs. Denver, Rachel) of which Paulette Lister, one of her friends in New York, strikes her most. Paulette represents extreme independence and audacious individualism which derives from her conscious manipulation of the gender masquerade to her own advantage. Curiously enough, what she calls her "philosophy" can even be traced in Mattie, but while Mrs. Murray has internalized exaggerated femininity, Paulette is described as displacing it from its "natural" source in the female body to deploy it as an empowering performative device to her own advantage in the gender masquerade:

> I've learned that a woman is a fool who lets her femininity stand in the way of what she wants. I've made a philosophy of it. I see what I want: I use my wiles as a woman to get it, and I employ the qualities of men, tenacity and ruthlessness, to keep it. And when I'm through with it, I throw it away just as they do. Consequently I have no regret and no encumbrances (105).

Unlike most women for whom "there must be the safety, the assurance of relationship that marriage affords" (275), Paulette is described as "a remarkable personage, a woman apart" (275) for whom marriage is not "the only, the most desirable and natural end" (274). Due to her daring independence, she is capable of penetrating naturalized romances of patriarchy. For instance, she gives a pungent insight into the configuration of the patronymic law to which Roger Fielding happily submits himself in order to partake of his father's wealth and the privileges of his name. At an early stage of their affair Angela, curious about Roger, asks Paulette what he in fact does, to which she succinctly snaps back: "What is there for him to do? Nothing except have a good time and keep in his father's good graces. His father's some kind of a personage and all that, you know, crazy about his name and his posterity. Roger doesn't dare get drunk and lie in the gutter and he mustn't make a misalliance" (127).

Though Fauset is far from advocating her character's feminist position (which goes as far as to argue for the viability of "free love" over marriage), she is certainly sympathetic to some aspects of it, so much so that we can discern Paulette's daring critique of patriarchy resurfacing in the interstices of the novel. A typical example is the narrator's bitter commentary on Roger's flippant dismissal of Angèle. In this episode he arrogantly reminds his former mistress that having let herself be seduced she practically asked for ruthless treatment:

> She could only stare at him, his words echoing in her ears: "You knew perfectly well what you were letting yourself in for."
> The phrase had the quality of a cosmic echo; perhaps men had been saying it to women since the beginning of time. Doubtless their biblical equivalent were the last words uttered by Abraham to Hagar before she fared forth into the wilderness (231).

White Paulette has the privilege of belonging to the dominant culture/color, which diminishes her risks when performing her displacing strategy of gender masquearade. By contrast, mulatta Angela/Angèle chooses full participation in gender and race masquerade, though apparently for the same reason as Paulette: she wants to perform as white and womanly as possible to her personal advantage. The reader recalls from the first part of the novel that Angela has been initiated into racial and gender masquerade by her mother Mattie, whom she joined on her shopping tours on fashionable (white) Market Street in Philadelphia. Fauset suggests that the two pretty white-skinned women played out a double game by passing: they were engaged in the performative production of whiteness as well as upper-class white femininity:

> [Shopping] was not an occupation which she [Angela] particularly enjoyed, but like her mother, she adored the atmosphere and its accompaniment of well-

> dressed women. No one could tell, no one would have thought for a moment that she and her mother had come from tiny Opal Street; no one could have dreamed of their racial connections (58).

Angela/Angèle's plotting for a "fuller, freer life" which is informed by a double masquerade is also suggested by Fauset's skillful play with tropes of masking and veiling across gender as well as race. In the crucial scene of Angèle/Angela's fall (which is not the scene of her defloration, only conducive to it), she is described as wearing a veil. Fearful of Roger's discovery that she has a colored sister, she goes to meet Virginia at New York Pennsylvania Railroad station under a disguise: "She wore her most unobtrusive clothes, ... [and a] bell-shaped hat.... She pulled it down even farther and settled her modish veil well over the tip of her nose" (155-56). While waiting on the tumultuous platform, she, however, inadvertently "[t]hrust[s] up her veil to see better," but this unconscious gesture immediately discharges events of which she will be no more in control. Roger turns up out of the blue, joins her and thus unwittingly conduces to Angela's revelation of her loyalties, that is, her racial "unveiling". When Virginia emerges from the train and asks for acknowledgement by repeating the silly text of passing (which the two girls concocted to amuse themselves in Philadelphia), Angela/Angèle is cornered but resolves to opt for the white lover instead of the colored sister. Her self-imposed game of veiling obviously traps her: instead of laying the trap she is trapped herself.

The intimation that her white veil as well as her seductive feminine veil covers a "genuine" self constituted of her "real" race and "real" femininity comes into the open after her break-up with Roger. Angela's literal unveiling at the railroad station is thus a prefiguration of the second part of the novel which involves her conscious unveiling of herself in search of her genuine gender and racial identity. In abandoning her double masquerade of passing and feminine trapping by gradually recognizing her "racial duty," Fauset again makes her heroine evoke the mother's female fairy tale of marriage which now refigures in Angela's dreams as having "the joys of ordinary living, home, companionship, loyalty, security, the bliss of possessing and being possessed" (253). Her mother is revisited in Chapter V in a conversation with her friend Martha in which Mattie turns out to be one of the "blessed women" whom God permitted "to be their *normal selves and not having to play the game*" (emphasis mine; 146). When Angela revalorizes "blessed poverty" with colored Anthony, she also seeks to recover the "elsewhere" of her femininity, which is virtually identical with the mother's "normal" self in a blessed marriage in which she can "give all" and her man likes her "the better for it" (146). At this point *Plum Bun* suggests that the market economy of masquerading desire can be replaced by a prelapsarian plenitude of oceanic love whose endless tiding and ebbing is beyond masquerade and desire and is only operated by feminine giving and masculine taking.

This wondrous recovery of *jouissance*,[16] however, escapes linguistic representation--as it transcends repressing social institutions in Fauset's third novel, *The Chinaberry Tree* (1931)--because Fauset does not marry Anthony and Angela in the book. Instead (after duly expiating for her wrongdoing to Virgina by giving up Anthony to her), Angela leaves for France on an art scholarship, and finds herself

> engrossed in her work. She went to the Academy twice a day, immersed herself in the atmosphere of the Louvre and the gallery of the Luxembourg. It was hard

16. The *Dictionary of Feminist Theory* (Columbus: Ohio, 1990) defines jouissance as a term in French theory "which means a totality of enjoyment--sexual, spiritual, physical and conceptual. Jouissance exists outside of linguistic norms in the realm of the poetic. Julia Kristeva defines jouissance in a similar way to Jacques Lacan but where Lacan speaks of *'jouissance sexuelle'* and *'jouissance phallique,'* Kristeva defines sexual pleasure as *'plaisir'* and *'jouissance'* as total joy or ecstasy". p. 108.

> work, but gradually she schooled herself to remember that this was her life, and that her aim, her one ambition, was to become an acknowledged, a significant painter of portraits (375).

Though true love between black identified woman and man has been suggested by the text to know no market, only the economy of prelapsarian bliss, Fauset stealthily reinstalls Anthony in the market economy of desire when she makes him encounter Angela again. He arrives at Angela's Parisian boardinghouse as a Christmas gift shipped by surface mail: "His eyes on her astonished countenance, he began searching about in his pockets, slapping his vest, pulling out keys and handkerchiefs. 'There ought to be a tag on me somewhere,' he remarked apologetically, 'but anyhow Virginia and Matthew sent me with their love'" (379). *Plum Bun* ends on this note leaving a blissful void for the reader to negotiate his/her way to jouissance in the hope of finding "destination" even without a "tag."[17]

Though at the cost of an ironic twist in the narrative, Fauset's novel eventually reinstitutes the mother's romance in the daughter's revisionary reading. White-skinned mother Mattie Murray's fairy tale of blissful marriage, capable of both consummating her femininity and securing black June Murray's human integrity in a racist society, comes to be revised by the daughter. Though she fails to reenact her mother's pretty fairy tale, Angela Murray succeeds in pursuing a corrected trajectory and attains subjectivity, human integrity and mature femininity "out of wedlock," which incidentally becomes awarded with intimations of the magic of heterosexual black romance.

17. See the famous dispute by Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida and Barbara Johnson about Edgar Allan Poe's "The Purloined Letter", which revolved around the letter (signifier/desire) that has no final destination; instead, it assumes meaning only in relation to its chain of interceptors. See *Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text*, ed. Geoffrey Hartman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

Katalin Orbán

Tactics of the Self in *Gravity's Rainbow*: An Ethical Investigation

(1)

Postmodern fiction has often been blamed for its utopian or nihilistic relativism disabling its capacity to engage with the lived relations of control and domination and to address the problem of value and ethical choice in a non-negative way. Truly enough, there are postmodern works celebrating textual play, the creative energy of language reading and writing the world. There are those in which the powerful textual game is "all work and no play": ever-expansive coding systems imposing a grid of very real control. Much of postmodern fiction, however, clearly diverges from these "classic" models which derive from the "exhaustion" (to quote Barth) of a narrative tradition. Relativity is often further complicated and remapped in such works. Such temporal and spatial remapping of the relative seems essential for an engagement with the postmodern "ethical paradox," the problem posed by the restoration of personal choice without salvaging knowable good and evil. Apparently, there are writers who hold on to worlds and characters which exist in an ethically meaningful way. This possibility is always presented "in spite of everything," but while in some cases this "everything" is excluded from the text in an act of intentional anachronism, a purposeful disregard of all that has called ethics in question, in other cases it is yielded by a meticulous survey of all that needs to be considered. *Gravity's Rainbow*,[1] published by Thomas Pynchon in 1973 is an example of the latter. In what follows I shall attempt to show how Pynchon's novel addresses the problem of ethics in relation to identity and history.

Zygmunt Bauman, in the introduction to his *Intimations of Postmodernity*,[2] speaks of the ethical paradox of the postmodern condition. He presents what he calls the "privatization" of ethics as a sizzling short-circuit in which the moral decision-makers are connected to themselves without the interposition of systems of rule and value held to be universal. This seems imprecise in drawing the crucial and apparently clear boundary between the private and the public, a boundary which is becoming increasingly leaky with the advance of the information revolution, for instance. The personal provides a more accurate distinction than the private, let alone privatized, particularly because the paradoxical postmodern ethics he investigates is an eminently anti-appropriation one. Besides being personal, it also seems to be a crucially interpersonal one. Bauman's model, which ascribes a new solitariness to moral decisions, posits interpersonal relations as due to a coincidence of isolated privatized decisions. Those who coincidentally come to indentical "privatized" decisions then protect their interests and legitimize their decisions by forming imagined communities. The solitariness of moral decision-making and the imagined quality of communities has a history somewhat longer than the postmodern, whatever that may be. (See for instance Benedict Anderson's excellent *Reflections on the*

1. New York: Viking, 1973.
2. Routledge 1992.

Origins and Spread of Nationalism conspicuously entitled *Imagined Communities*.[3]) Of course, how solitariness and potentially imaginable communities have *changed* are crucial questions closely related to the problem of identity.

We are used to conceiving of ethics as a coding system or master narrative. It is exactly from the vantage of such systems and narratives that the autonomous self truly seems to be receding, partly as the effect of the work of such systems. Therefore the proper question may not be so much how ethics can survive *without* institutionalized master codes and narratives, but rather how it can survive *them*.. It may be a property of the field of vision relentlessly imposed by such systems that the autonomous individual self is erased to the point of being incapable of ethical action. In order to conceive how ethical value may coexist with a postmodern subjectivity, it seems necessary to take into account the shift of "self" and "ethics" simultaneously. Instead of operating with an earlier concept of ethics and lamenting the loss of the subject it posits or the other way round, it seems more fruitful to allow a shift of perspective which makes visible a different self capable of an ethics which is neither a system of cultural conventions, nor a code derived from a master narrative of origin and salvation. A self less committed to totality and boundary enables an ethics which purposefully evades systemic coding and historical emplotment. One might claim that once ethically meaningful actions and what govern them do not derive from and cannot accumulate into a code, there is no longer any point in speaking of an ethic. There seems to be a zone in certain works of postmodern fiction in which intentional action as well as good and evil have a meaning, however circumscribed and local. I shall call it ethics in this sense only and the "retentive" terminology aims to affirm *connection* rather than *continuity*. Far from ignoring its radical difference from ethics in a conventional sense, this investigation aims at that very difference from the vantage of its chosen text.

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Edward Mendelson has justly placed *Gravity's Rainbow* in a tradition of encyclopedic narrative (including *Don Quixote*, *Moby-Dick* and *Ulysses*).[4] Pynchon's white whale is the V-2 rocket, the prototype of the delivery systems for nuclear weapons developed later in the US. Yet, there is something peculiarly counter-encyclopaedic in *Gravity's Rainbow*: the Order of the construction and presentation of "general knowledge" vanishes from sight due to the compound effect of too much order of too many kinds, a vigorous proliferation of Melville's cetologies.

The two main forms in both the narrative structure and the cosmography of *Gravity's Rainbow* are the arc and the circle. They are related to two aspects of the novel. One participates in and engages with stories of origin and salvation (in other words "history") and systems operating on the basis of rational analysis. The other does not. The arc is characteristically the classic form of the novel, whereas the circle/cycle is eminently the form of oral narrative. The contrast of the eventual printed title, *Gravity's Rainbow*, and the working title of the book, *Mindless Pleasures*, also express this distinction. Pynchon is *disassembling* the novel by inserting myriads of poems, stories, popular songs, arias as well as a whole range of languages, foreign and jargon, into the narrative. Still, in this age of "fiction" Gravity's Rainbow, the hulking monster of American postmodern writing, is steadfastly novelistic, even though instead of the battles of the Napoleonic wars, its characters wander in the Zone: in a Europe of unclear boundaries at the curious time when the war is over, but post-war has not yet started.

The main character of the novel is Tyrone Slothrop, an American GI whose erections are linked (apparently by Pavlovian conditioning) to the explosions of the V-2 rocket and who begins a quest for the solution of this mystery as well as for his "real"

3. London: Verso, 1991.

4. Edward Mendelson, "Encyclopedic Narrative: From Dante to Pynchon." *MLN* 91 (December 1976) 1267-75.

unconditioned self. As the narrative unfolds with its over 300 characters, any attempt to follow and integrate all plotlines, relations and situations soon becomes one among the forms of paranoia in which the novel abounds. Yet, even as it is taken apart, the novelistic shape is never quite deconstructed: it is also expanding towards its maximum capacity, to the verge of explosion, but always a Δt away from it. As the two structures simultaneously exert their narrative force, the text proceeds in a lazy, proliferous spiral.

In line with the above, the possibility of ethical meaning in *Gravity's Rainbow* may be approached from two directions. There seems to be a personalized ethics, which does not derive its meaning from any origin-salvation trajectory. This emerges from and governs the practice of "small arrangements" the novel fully affirms. Secondly, there is a marked ethical aspect to the trajectories appearing in the historical continuum. I shall proceed to examine the former.

The operations of the personalized ethic in *Gravity's Rainbow* can be described rather accurately with the help of a term Michel de Certeau offers in his *The Practice of Everyday Life*.[5] Dedicated to "the ordinary man," who in all ages "comes *before* texts," his book is a counter-Foucauldian venture, a worm's-eye complement to Foucault's panoptic visions of Western systems of control. De Certeau's primary goal is to make explicit and visible those operational models (particularly in the form of use and consumption) which are "concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture" (v, emphasis added). This "liberatory" attempt which permeates the book is obviously related to questions of freedom, always intricately connected to those of ethics. De Certeau's main interest is the precise mapping of the microdynamics of certain cultural practices rather than following up the ethical possibilities they generate. Nevertheless, the "Preface to the English Translation" makes it clear that De Certeau is fully aware of the ethical aspect of his investigation:

> . . . [w]hat I really wish to work out is a science of singularity; that is to say, a science of the relationship that links everyday pursuits to particular circumstances. And only in the local network of labor and recreation can one grasp how, within a grid of socio-economic constraints, these pursuits unfailingly establish relational tactics (a struggle for life), artistic creations (an aesthetic), and autonomous initiatives (an ethic). (de Certeau ix)

The term de Certeau uses for the practice which I am marking as ethical in *Gravity's Rainbow* is *tactics*. Strategy and tactics are contrasted in his schema by their crucially different relations to time and space:

> Strategies pin their hopes on the resistance that the establishment of a place offers to the erosion of time; tactics on a clever utilization of time, of the opportunities it present and also of the play that it introduces into the foundations of power. (de Certeau 39)

The prerequisite for a strategy is a subject of will and power with a place postulated as its own from which it delimits an exteriority it seeks to manage, "a mastery of time through the foundation of an autonomous space" (36). A tactic, on the other hand, is an action "determined by the absence of a proper locus" (37). De Certeau points out, furthermore, that tactical action is consequently forced to occur in the space organized by the law of the strategic other; it can never view its adversary as a whole, and the expense of its mobility is that it cannot accumulate what it wins.

In other words, this "art of the weak" is an art of the present. The most important protection for tactics is precisely the fact that tactical practice loses its meaning as soon as the diachronic succession of present moments is translated into a trajectory. Even as strategy organizes space by repressing temporal relations, it is making itself unable to see

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5. Translated by Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

certain practices heterogeneous to it. If there is any chance of indeterminacy for the *constituted* as well as *constitutive* subject in relation to the competing systems seeking to classify and control, it is not the result of defective totality, but — ironically — the result of the overefficiency of systemic work, an excess of classification and inscription.

For the characters of *Gravity's Rainbow*, too, the way to achieve this momentary margin of indeterminacy is to utilize the temporal fraction: a present as yet unsubsumed into the historical continuum privileged by the system. This present is not the inert eternal moment of what the novel calls the Other Side, but discrete temporal points dynamically succeding each other. Such a concept of time is revealed by Slothrop's comment when he sees a graffiti by one of his many personas in the novel:

> His first thought was that he'd written it himself and forgot. ... Might be he was starting to implicate himself, some yesterday version of himself, in the Combination against who he was right then. ... Past Slothrops, say averaging one a day, ten thousand of them, some more powerful than others, had been going over every sundown to the furious host (GR 624)

The practice of this Now is the kind of interpersonal "small arrangements" Pynchon never seems to undercut. This is how Pirate Prentice meditates about his relationship with Katje Borgesius:

> But how is it both of them kept from vanishing from each other, into the paper cities and afternoons of this strange peace, and the coming Austerity? Could it be there's something about ad hoc arrangements, like the present mission, that must bring you in touch with the people you need to be with? that more formal adventures tend, by their nature, to separation, to loneliness? (GR 620)

It is in this tactical Now that a kindness and grace can be exercised, sometimes though not dominantly linked to eros (one of the few occasions in the novel when eros is not indissociable from thanatos). I strongly disagree with those thoroughly deconstructive readings of *Gravity's Rainbow* which discount these acts as the "Utopia of Togetherness," the utopian space of love carefully ironized.[6] These connections are rather consistently affirmed in the novel and the label of utopia is only true in the much stricter sense of anti-topian, non-spatial indeterminacy..

The morally meaningful moments neither derive from, nor accumulate into a code or a master narrative. They give up the past and the future (which exert a constant pressure on them), but their value in the given moment is clear and absolute. Naturally, these moments can be arranged in a line and translated into systemic space and historical continuum, but it follows from the strategic "blindness" that the ethical meaning generated in the interpersonal, tactical Now will not survive the trip. In another discussion of small "arrangements," their invisibility to history is made explicit:

> "It's an arrangement," she tells him."It's so unorganized out here. There have to be arrangements. You'll find out." Indeed he will — he'll find thousands of arrangements, for warmth, love, food, simple movement along roads, tracks, canals. Even G-5, living its fantasy of being the only government in Germany now, is just the arrangement for being victorious, is all. No more, no less real than all these others so private, silent, and lost to History. (GR 290-291)

6. Hanjo Berressem, *Pynchon's Poetics: Interfacing Theory and Text* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 197.

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The self which is neither integrated into the systems, nor subsumed through its antagonism to them, the self which dwells in these indeterminate and indeterminable tactical movements, is clearly not identical with the autonomous Cartesian subject. It is one committed to the confusion of boundaries, one with great resources for transformation. Slothrop, a case in point, undergoes a long series of transformations, his various personas (complete with attire) include "ace reporter" Ian Scuffling, comics hero Rocketman, soldier Max Schlepzig and the pig-hero Plechazunga. This "Slothropian" self is similar to Donna Harraway's cyborg (that is a hybrid of machine and organism) as presented in her "A Cyborg Manifesto." Harraway's cyborg is "resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy and perversity," it is "wary of holism, but needy for connection." And crucially, the cyborg's incarnation is "outside salvation history".[7] The latter is quite explicit in *Gravity's Rainbow* through the use of the Puritan terminology of preterition. The use to which the Puritan terminology is put in the novel turns the doctrine inside out, as it were: in the circumstances where the freedom ethic requires is only conceivable tactically, the only hope for ethical action becomes the privilege of the preterite ones, those passed over in the master scheme for salvation. (It must be added, however, that although the same positive opportunities which are affirmed by Harraway's cybernetic vision are present in the novel, Pynchon does not link them with he concept of the cyborg; the blurring of the animate/inanimate boundary seems much less desirable in the cosmography of *Gravity's Rainbow*.)

Slothrop's remarkable "thinning" or "scattering" towards the end of the narrative corroborates the implications of tactics, ethics and the Slothropian version of the postmodern self. In a passage often quoted by critics, rocket engineer Kurt Mondaugen enunciates the law that "Personal density [...] is directly proportional to temporal bandwidth," which the narrator begins to elaborate:

> "Temporal bandwidth" is the width of your present, your now. It is the familiar "Δt" considered as a dependent variable. The more you dwell in the past and in the future, the thicker your bandwidth, the more solid your persona. But the narrower your sense of Now, the more tenuous you are. It may get to where you're having trouble remembering what you were doing five minutes ago, or even — as Slothrop now — what you're doing *here* [...] (GR 509)

This has been interpreted by several critics as a final "disappearance for the role of the 'self' in the modern novel,"[8] as the complete loss of "personality, individuality,"[9] and Slothrop becoming "less a character than a sort of thematic trace."[10] In fact, this temporal bandwidth seems identical with that tactical present of successive integrals which has been discussed before. Thus, Slothrop's scattering and becoming invisible makes perfect sense as the practice of the art of invisibility, as a series of tactical operations which make the self invisible to the strategic power's panoptic field of vision. The following passage clearly presents the phenomenon of scattering as a systemic — in this case, scientific — inability to find, detain and classify. (By this point in the novel the image of albatross has become the most direct reference to the concept of the self.)

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7. "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century" in *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 151, 150.
8. Thomas H. Schaub, *Pynchon: The Voice of Ambiguity* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 75.
9. Kathryn Hume, *Pynchon's Mythography: An Approach to Gravity's Rainbow* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 100.
10. Molly Hite, "Postmodern Fiction," in Emory Eliott (gen. ed.), *The Columbia History of the American Novel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 706.

> [... Slothrop] has become one plucked albatross. Plucked, hell — stripped. Scattered all over the Zone. It's doubtful if he can ever be "found" again, in the conventional sense of "positively identified and detained." Only feathers . . . redundant or regenerable organs, "which we would be tempted to classify under the 'Hydra-Phänomen' were it not for the complete absence of hostility . . . . — Natasha Raum, 'Regions of Indeterminacy in Albatross Anatomy," *Proceedings of the International Society of Confessors to an Enthusiasm for Albatross Nosology*, Winter 1936 [. . .] (GR 712).

In the introduction to *The Practice of Everyday Life* de Certeau compares the operational logic of this "invisible" practice to the "age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise and transform themselves in order to survive [...]" (xi). Rather than the disintegration of the self, it may be its mode of survival. Slothrop is scattered inasmuch as he is unclassifiable. This does not necessarily entail, as Berressem suggests, a loss of self, an "entry into the state of pure sensation that actually *excludes* subjectivity" and is "out of time".[11] Instead, it is perhaps a ruse of the self to avoid full subsumption into systemic classification and a temporal continuum which produces difference from a supposed original unity and advances towards the telos of a positive or negative totality. At variance with the most steadfast post-structuralist readers of the novel, I join those maintaining that *Gravity's Rainbow* does not fully dismantle itself. In fact, Slothrop's becoming invisible *for the text* is the measure of the degree to which the narrative abstains from fully deconstructing itself and remains in discursive (narrative-historical) continuity.

11. Berressem, 179, 183.

Ágnes Surányi

The Creative Writer as Critic: Angela Carter

The subject of the present paper is the relationship between fiction and criticism as reflected in Angela Carter's fictional and non-fictional writings. My point of departure is prompted by her non-fiction volume entitled *Expletives Deleted*, especially her reviews of Christina Stead's fiction.

First I should like to address the general problem of criticism written by creative artists. Before outlining my views, I should like to resort to great writers who were major critics at the same time, and whose suggestion and advice have always proved to be very helpful in (my) understanding of literature.

As Henry James puts it in his essay "The New Novel":

> The effect, if not the prime office, of criticism is to make our absorption and enjoyment of the things that feed the mind as aware of itself as possible, since that awareness quickens the mental demand, which then in turn wanders further and further to pasture.[1]

Apparently he marks the scope for the uses of criticism quite broadly and generously.

In "How It Strikes a Contemporary" Virginia Woolf remarks that the only advice the contemporary critic can give the common reader, who is rather sophisticated by average standards, is the following: to respect one's instincts, follow them, and "... rather than submit them to the control of any critic or reviewer alive, to check them by reading and reading again the masterpieces of the critical past."[2] She adds that it was not always so and goes on to say, "Reviewers we have but no critic; a million competent and incorruptible policemen but no judge.... A great critic, they say, is the rarest of beings."[3]

Let me return to the initial problem and raise the question: to what extent does it promote our understanding of, say, fiction, if the creative writer publishes criticism as well? Upon first thought, one might argue, if criticism comes from the pen of the creative writer, so much the better. No doubt, it is a convenient source because it should be authentic, support one's argumentation and solidify the foundations underlying critical evaluations.

But what can we make of it, if the modern writer-critic flatly refuses to function as an authority, which is often the case, unlike the representatives of academic criticism? Or if he/she writes subversive criticism challenging the mainstream, or if he is very emotional by nature?

The fiction of Angela Carter already signals that she does not respect academic criticism, she also refuses to be intimidated by it. In her novels she inventively improvises

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1. James, Henry, *Essays on Literature: American Writers, English Writers*. Comp. by Leon Edel. (New York: The Library of America, 1984), 124.
2. Woolf, Virginia, "How It Strikes a Contemporary." *Common Reader*. First Series. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1948), 294.
3. *Ibid.*

on themes supplied by myth, fairy tales, and even criticism. Carter's sceptical attitude can be spotted in certain comments of Fevvers, the heroine of *Nights at the Circus*: "'Look, love,' I says to him, eventually, because I am not in the mood for literary criticism.'"[4] (Fevvers' occupation has nothing to do with literary criticism, she is a trapeze artiste.) In the same vein, no labels should be attached to Carter's fiction. A permanent interplay can be discovered between her fiction and non-fiction, in her novels the characters deconstruct and reconstruct themselves all the time.

In an interview, to the question how she felt about labels "neo-gothic" and "magic realism," she replied,

> I don't feel either abused or understood if these labels are applied to me. I know what "magic realism" means in painting, and I don't do that. I write fiction, that's all.[5]

The reply is evasive, there is no trace of noble indignation, she even amuses herself by making allusions to the label "magic realism" in her above-mentioned novel: "It could be said that, for all the peoples of the region [Siberia], there existed no difference between fact and fiction, instead a sort of magic realism."[6] Does that mean that Carter does not respond to criticism at all, her own critical views are unreliable, and she cannot be trusted as a critic? The answer is definitely 'no'. In her fiction she may indulge in metafictional games, but her criticism surely must be more serious.

A comparison of the careers of Angela Carter and Christina Stead produces the following data: Stead was born in Australia, lived from 1902 to 1983, was young in the thirties, wrote ten novels, published a volume of four novellas and a collection of short stories in her life-time. Carter was born in England, lived 52 years, the 60s were her formative years, she wrote 9 novels, 3 volumes of short stories and several volumes of non-fiction, and did a translation of Charles Perrault's *Fairy Tales*, which was also published.

Stead was equally at home in Britain, Europe, the USA and Australia; Carter remained rootless, she visited not only the USA but also Japan (where she lived for two years), and was somewhat infatuated with French and French literature. Christina Stead was mostly ignored by the critics in her life-time, Angela Carter was granted two prestigious literary prizes in the 1960s, but in the 1970s became, increasingly, an outsider.

For *Expletives Deleted* she selected several of her earlier non-fiction writings, including two enthusiastic reviews of Stead's *The Beauties and Furies* in 1983, and of *I'm Dying Laughing*, published posthumously, in 1987, combining the two subsequently under the title "Christina Stead." Carter was commissioned to do the reviewing of these books for Virago on both occasions. She may have written in a tone of great admiration for Stead because of the conventions of writing reviews — the reviewer has to bend over backwards to find merits in the work of art reviewed.

There is just one slight snag, in her critical appreciation she mentions nearly all of Stead's significant books, but deliberately seems to ignore the novel entitled *Little Hotel*, which was published in 1974. Having read *Little Hotel*, I was really puzzled, and started to muse about the possible reason for this silence. The dates of the two reviews are 1983 and 1987, respectively; *Little Hotel* was published in 1974 and Angela Carter's *Nights at the Circus*, which, in my opinion, is indebted to *Little Hotel*, was published in 1984. One of the possible explanations is perhaps suggested by Ron Geering, who thinks that Stead's last two novels are very different from the former ones. The lack of an absolutely certain answer leads to a series of important related issues.

From the two reviews, especially the first one, it is clear that Angela Carter, fiction writer, was very personal and passionate in matters of literature, even though she was a

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4. Carter, Angela, *Nights at the Circus*. (London: Pan Books, 1984), 244.
5. Farzon, Alex R., "Interview." *European Messenger* Vol. 3 (1994), 21.
6. Carter, Angela, *op. cit.*, 260.

critic of fine perception and keen insight. A lot of problems she outlines are connected with the art of fiction, her own creative writing.

Virginia Woolf pointed out that for the modern writer there is no taboo with regard to the proper stuff and methods of fiction, and let me add here that reading fiction written by other (contemporary or ancient) writers, may, of course, result in changes in one's 'property box,' subjects, characters, plots, motifs and narrative methods alike. It is obvious that after receiving impressions, the critic should pass judgement and then compare. In criticism written by creative writers one of the phases referred to is often missing. The best way, however, to understand what the other novelist is doing is to write. In the case of "the common reader" it is a praiseworthy effort, in the case of the creative writer a significant experiment and test. Virginia Woolf warns us that at the second phase "... we are no longer the friends of the writer, but his judges..."[7] The best way then is to compare his work "with the greatest of its kind."[8] Unfortunately, "There is always a demon in us who whispers: 'I hate, I love..."[9] And only with the passing of time is it possible to make a judgement with some kind of control.

In the Introduction to *Expletives Deleted* this is precisely what Angela Carter seems to have done — she tried "to give a more balanced and objective overview[10] — deleting the instantaneous, impulsive reactions. That's why the volume is entitled *Expletives Deleted*. Yet the fact that Carter's criticism in the volume is passionately personal, cannot be questioned. In comparison, in her earlier criticism, where she did not control herself and was rather intuitive and self-defensive, the expletives are there all right, in "Notes from the Frontline," for example, she freely uses phrases which far exceed the spontaneity or informality being so characteristic of Woolf's reviews and essays. Carter's essay in the volume mentioned above abounds in expressions such as "dammit," "so what," "but all this bores me stiff" "pet fabulist," and "a lot of crap like that".[11] It is clear that here Carter wanted to subvert the genre of essay. She does not conceal her likes and dislikes, according to her, Plato is "the father of lie",[12] Baudelaire as a man even much worse. But even with expletives deleted, the fact that she is a vulnerable personality shows through her writing in a similar way, no matter what she writes.

The famous essays and reviews of Virginia Woolf collected in *The Common Reader* are allegedly "informal and personal in tone, suggestive rather than authoritative, and have an engaging air of spontaneity."[13] In the anthology cited it has also been pointed out that her *Letters* and *Diary* are "more informal and more revealing as a reliable source of her understanding."[14] There is a contradiction here, what is meant by "more revealing"? While in *The Common Reader* the greatness of Joyce's *Ulysses* is acknowledged somewhat reluctantly, in the *Diary*, where Woolf gives way to jealousy, it turns out that "Joyce is underbred, a queasy undergraduate scratching his pimples."[15]

Since letters and diaries are more personal, free of the responsibility and constraints of published criticism, the risk of misleading information and blunder is, in my opinion, greater. It is true, however, that much can be learnt about the writer's working methods, writing habits, personal relationships and everyday life from sources of

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7. Woolf, Virginia, "How Should One read a Book." *The Common Reader.* Second series. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1948), 267.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Op. cit.*, 268.
10. Carter, Angela, *Expletives Deleted: Selected Writings.* (London: Vintage, 1993), 1.
11. Carter, Angela, "Notes from the Frontline." In: *On Gender and Writing.* Ed. by Michelene Wandor. (London: Pandoras, 1983), 69-77.
12. *Op. cit.*, 75.
13. Abrams, M. H., *et al.*, (eds)., *The Norton Anthology of English Literature.* Vol. 2. New York: W.W. Norton, 1962, Fifth edition. 1987.
14. *Ibid.*
15. As cited in Batchelor, John, *Virginia Woolf.* (Cambridge: Union Press, 1991), 35.

this type.

It is well-known that for the creative writer writing reviews has its financial benefits, for Woolf this activity was also a kind of holiday, a kind a therapy, perhaps the same may be true of Angela Carter, sometimes she directly contacted the publishers and asked for a commission to review, if she particularly liked a work of art.

Angela Carter's criticism seems to be impulsive and excessively personal, it seems to be governed by emotions, nevertheless it reflects very keen and fine perception. (A far more detached critic with an outgoing personality and a personal touch is Salman Rushdie in his *Imaginary Homelands*.)

I am aware of the dangers of making generalizations, but it seems to me that in our days there is a definite shift towards a much more personal, impulsive, unconsidered, "uncensored," and capricious criticism on the part of creative writers, and that there is a definite interaction between their works of art and their criticism. The ground is becoming especially dangerous when works of contemporary writer are being explored.

So how should one react? One should be very cautious at taking most (or all) of the unconsidered comments made by the writer-critic at face value, and check in other sources provided by the writer (in fiction, biography or poetry written by the author in question), or elsewhere.

So Angela Carter ignored *Little Hotel*. In this case, one must have a close look at her novels, and see, if she really ignored it. In *Nights at the Circus* I have come upon several elements which may have been the result of an indirect influence of the whole of Christina Stead's fictional world (for this world is consistent and unique), but there are elements that Carter must have borrowed wholesale from *Little Hotel*.

To mention some of these: 1. at the level of structure the writer approaches the psychology of the characters by collecting them in a closed little society, it is the Swiss-Touring Hotel in Stead's novels, and the brothel, Madame Schreck's institution, or the travelling circus in Carter's book; 2. at the level of characters: the figures of the Mayor of B., the Admiral, Luisa and Lina in *Little Hotel*, their counterparts being the figures of Colonel Kearney, the capitalist entrepreneur, Ma Nelson (wearing an admiral's uniform and a sword by her side), and Grig and Grog, the musical clowns, in *Nights at the Circus*; 3. the female characters of Stead are deaf, partly deaf or pretend to be deaf as a rule; the "eloquent" servantman in Madame Schreck's institution in Carter's novel was born with no mouth; 4. at the level of language and communication: the funny way Luisa uses Italian and English alternately reminds one of Fevvers' hilarious internationalism with languages, furthermore Mayor B. writing his messages on the hotel towels, and Carter's Grand Duke writing Fevvers' name with vodka bottles; 5. several references are made to the circus in Stead's novel; Mayor B., who receives letters addressed to Mayor A., is a "circus number," and later, "You could run a whole circus with just one number like that!"[16] Also Hotel Swiss-Touring puts up artists of the local night club, the Toucan.

Naturally Brian McHale's explanation that "representations of circuses, fairs, sideshows and amusement parks often function as residual indications of the context of postmodernist fiction"[17] may account for the similarity (John Barth's *Lost in the Funhouse*, Bulgakov's *The Master and Margerita*, and Angela Carter's *The Infernal Desire Machines of Dr Hoffman* are given as illustrations), but with her brilliant and unique talent for improvisation, this hint may have been sufficient to make her entitle the book *Nights at the Circus*.

We can say that silences and omissions can be very revealing in the investigation of creative writers' criticism. Apart from keeping silent about *Little Hotel*, Angela Carter as a creative writer is a keen observer of Christina Stead's fiction, even though her criticism is emotion-based. She notices things that might come in useful for her own fiction, at the same time she gives an excellent general overview of the other writer's *oeuvre*.

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16. Stead, Christina, *Little Hotel*. (N.p.: Griffin Press, Sirius edition, 1988), 29.
17. McHale, Brian, *Postmodernist Fiction*. (London: Routledge, 1987), 174.

According to Carter, Stead is not a naturalist or social realist as other critics state, but a novelist concerned with the human condition. Carter highlights the most characteristic feature of Stead's fiction, her relentlessness, detachment, or "lack of pity."[18] As to her use of fictional techniques she fully realizes that in Stead's story-telling language is only a tool. Carter appreciates Stead's peculiar expressionism as well.

Finally, I should like to remark that Carter cannot get rid of her emotion-based attitude. From the review we learn that Doris Lessing's *Golden Notebook* is a far lesser novel than Stead's *Cotter's England* without getting any explanation. Carter also proclaims that Dreiser is a bad writer, "an incompetent practitioner of applied linguistics" and Borges a good one, who "...constructs metaphysical alternative worlds based on the Word."[19] She states her opinions as facts without making further comments.

The emotions, the demon are here again, but can we blame Angela Carter? Even though she fails to mention her indebtedness to *Little Hotel*, she reminds us that it is necessary "to fill new wine in old bottles," and sometimes "old wine in new bottles."[20]

18. Carter, Angela, *Expletives Deleted*, 180.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Carter, Angela, "Notes from the Frontline." 77.

Tamás Bényei

Critical Narratives of Post-War British Fiction

This paper is, lamentably, a narrative about narratives about narratives — my story about critical narratives on post-war British fiction. The simple fact of being "about" and "after" would seem to confer on my narrative a kind of superiority, and its rhetorical complacency is evidence that it enjoys its illusory mastery over narratives which, from the height of metadiscourse, are duly exposed as naive, suffering from moments of blindness whenever their own assumptions seem to clash with their practice.

I shall examine some of the dominant critical narratives on the post-war British novel — or rather, I shall present my distilled version of that narrative construction called "the post-war British novel," and try to reveal some of the underlying assumptions behind it. I shall do this through viewing these critical narratives as stories that obey the basic formal requirements of narrative organization. Critical stories, like other stories, must have a beginning, a point of origin — and an accompanying, sometimes only implicit conception of the story's "before." As these stories are not the simple chronological reiterations of facts, they must have a plot, a particular type of emplotment which determines their logic (in the case of post-war British fiction, the possible stories are those of decline, stasis, evolution or dialectical alternation) and provides them with narrative coherence as well as with a telos towards which every event in the narrative will lead. Their narrative organization is based on an underlying, albeit rarely explicit taxonomy of forms and values. They are inevitably equipped with characters (often heroes and villains, or as the case might be, antiheroes); in our case the protagonist is usually called the novel or Englishness, and their stories are played out in a series of conflicts or encounters with foreign influences and assumedly "marginal" forms of fiction. These stories possess a very strong — though usually unacknowledged — rhetorical structure (most evident in their relationships to the counter-stories they set out to retell or refute), and they might be given to occasional moments of self-reflection when their own procedures and assumptions are examined.

My point — and the origin of my rhetorical complacency — is that the dominant critical narratives of post-war British fiction are in many ways inadequate. What I want to explore here are some of the reasons for and consequences of this inadequacy.

In very general terms, the main reasons behind the deficiencies and blind spots are: (1) a certain naïveté or lack of self-awareness; (2) a neurotic quality in the rhetorical organization of these stories, the result perhaps of an uneasy relationship with what could be called the ghost of F. R. Leavis, and of the constant presence behind the stories of a mythical Other, usually incarnated in French or American fiction and criticism; and (3) the prominence in these narratives of the character called "Britishness" or "the English mind" or "the English imagination." The main negative effects of these factors are (1) an inadequate and confused taxonomy; (2) an oversimplified dichotomy (usually between Realism and Experiment) as the key organizing principle; and (3) the dominance of contextual explanations for changes in the novel. The ultimate and practical consequence of all this has been an inability to appreciate the achievement of some major novelists of the period (Lawrence Durrell, Anthony Burgess, Iris Murdoch, Anthony Powell, Muriel Spark, Robert Nye and others).

For the sake of brevity and convenience, I shall be dealing primarily with what seems to me the most powerful version of this critical narrative: Malcolm Bradbury's

influential story that he has been retelling several times over the past twenty years.[1] I shall refer to other important variations of the story (those of Bernard Bergonzi, David Lodge, Patrick Swinden and others) when they significantly differ from what I, for my own purposes, will be considering as the canonical version.

The origin of Bradbury's story is clearly rhetorical — at least, it was rhetorical at the time of its first formulation in *Possibilities* (1973) and has not really lost much of its rhetorical edge since then. His aim has been twofold throughout: to remedy the critical neglect surrounding contemporary British fiction in Britain, and to refute the critical narrative dominating the Sixties.

Here is a version of the arch-narrative which called forth Bradbury's rival story. The Sixties version of the history of post-war British fiction is a story of decline, of the slow agony of the British novel brought about by its inordinate allegiance to the outmoded strategies of "realism" which, whatever it may be, is not an adequate response to the reality of the nuclear age. The protagonist of this story is Britain (or the British mind) rather than the novel, the deterioration of which is only a symptom of an overall national decay, shrinking, and increasing insularity. The Other of this story is on the one hand the paralyzing achievement of high Modernism, and on the other hand the assumedly much superior post-war American, French and Latin-American fiction. This narrative was prevalent in Britain in the 1960s (see C. B. Cox, Michael Ratcliffe, Giles Gordon etc.[2] and it persists even today (see D. J. Taylor's devastating summary or Christine Brooke-Rose's comment[3]), but its academic, comprehensive version is an American product (Rubin Rabinowitz, Frederic R. Karl, James Gindin[4]).

The same story or "fabula" existed in another widespread version that accepted some of the "facts" of the former story but read and plotted them in a contrary way: the English novel in the Fifties had come back into its own, returning to the time-tested and home-grown values of realism, humanism and common sense, and very wisely repudiating the foreign-inspired deviation called Modernism as well as the extremes of contemporary French and American fiction. It is perhaps not surprising that this version of the story was the creation of English critics (Walter Allen, John Bayley, G. S. Fraser). The most sophisticated and open-minded variation of the story of decline, however, also came from an English critic, Bernard Bergonzi, who embedded his narrative in an overview of the history of the novel and did much to perpetuate the critical opposition between the British and the American novel by admitting his aesthetic preference for the

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1. For versions of Bradbury's narrative, see especially "The Postwar English Novel," in: *Possibilities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 167-180; Preface (with David Palmer) to *The Contemporary English Novel*, Bradbury and David Palmer, eds. (New York: Holmes, 1979), 7-16; Introduction to *New Writing*, Bradbury and Judy Cooke, eds. (London: Minerva, 1992), 1-10; "The Novel No Longer Novel," *No, Not Bloomsbury* (London: Arena, 1987), 87-114.
2. C. B. Cox, *The Free Spirit* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 11; Michael Ratcliffe, *The Novel Today* (London: Longman, 1968), 17; Giles Gordon, Introduction, *Beyond the Words: Eleven Writers in Search of a New Fiction*, Giles Gordon, ed. (London: Hutchinson), 14.
3. D. J. Taylor, *A Vain Conceit: British Fiction in the 1980s* (London: Bloomsbury, 1989), 14; Christine Brooke-Rose, *Stories, Theories and Things* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 183.
4. Rubin Rabinowitz, *The Reaction Against Experiment in the English Novel, 1950-1960*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1967; James Gindin, *Postwar British Fiction*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1962; Frederick R. Karl, *A Reader's Guide to the Contemporary English Novel*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1963.

expansiveness of the latter while also declaring his moral allegiance to the humanistic values embodied by the former.[5]

The narratives of Bradbury (and David Lodge), then, have to be seen as readings, retellings, refutations of a powerful counter-narrative. It is this sense of urgency perhaps that explains their neurotic, defensive rhetorical strategies and their blindness to their own rhetorical strategies. Of the two, Bradbury's version has gained by far the greater currency, probably because Lodge's in some ways more convincing narrative was too theoretical for the English literary establishment.

Bradbury's narrative undercuts the decline-story in several ways. True, he admits, there was some sort of creative twilight in the Fifties, not unrelated to the return to small-scale realism. However, a story that talks about the general and continuing decline of the British novel after 1945 is false. First of all, the Fifties are over and the British novel has been changing fast, becoming more receptive towards foreign influences and more doubtful about the possibilities of realism (that is, the Fifties must be considered as an episode that does not really represent the diversity of post-war British fiction). His second move is much more polemical: the Fifties, as the decade appears in the decline-story, is a critical construct, a myth: it never was a homogeneous period (and here the names of Beckett, Lowry and Durrell are cited). The strategy here is to refute the counter-narrative by broadening the canon (even if this does not really happen, for the above three writers will shortly be declared marginal), and to detect the beginnings of then unsuspected tendencies in the Fifties (Golding, Murdoch, Spark). Another possibility, not taken up by Bradbury himself, is to revaluate the dominant novelistic discourse of the Fifties and to suggest that the realism of the period was more problematic and experimental than it seems; hence the attempts to present Kingsley Amis as an experimental writer (by Neil McEwan, for instance[6]).

Here comes Bradbury's key move: the establishment of a mainstream that still seems to dominate critical discourse. By identifying some important experimental, "visionary" writers working in the Fifties and the Sixties, Bradbury is able to create a bipolar system, seeing these visionaries as one extreme and pushing the Fifties ecriture to the other; whoever he thinks is really important can thus be placed in the mainstream of post-war British fiction (Angus Wilson, Iris Murdoch, Doris Lessing, Muriel Spark, Golding and usually Burgess). The result of this important rhetorical move is double. First, Bradbury contrives to undercut the story of decline by playing down the significance of the Fifties, and second, by positing a group of mainstream writers he implies that the course followed by the career of these writers will be the main story of the period: a story of evolution, expansion and growing pluralism. By establishing a mainstream, Bradbury seems to transcend the Realism-Experiment dichotomy; in fact, however, he entrenches it by pushing it to the background. It becomes an invisible organizing principle, beginning to work whenever the status of a given writer has to be decided: admittance into the mainstream will surely depend on the healthy mixture of realism and experiment displayed by the mainstream novelists.

By placing these writers in the mainstream, Bradbury has created the critical myth that has been slowly replacing the myth of decline and coming to dominate critical discourse by the Eighties. The myth, supplying the story with a telos, is the following: English fiction, since the Sixties, but especially more recently, has been able to forge out a typically English reconciliation between Realism and Experiment, Tradition and Postmodernism, Englishnes and foreignness, representation and fictional self-scrutiny etc. The peak of this evolution seems to be the typically English version of Postmodernism of the Eighties that has not given up entirely its allegiance to realism and manages to be exciting, technically and thematically innovative without being wildly experimental (for

5. Bernard Bergonzi, *The Situation of the Novel*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972.
6. See Neil McEwan, *The Survival of the Novel*, London, Macmillan, 1981.

reiterations of this myth, see Richard Todd, Neil McEwan, Marguerite Alexander or Alison Lee[7]).

Malcolm Bradbury's narrative has done an invaluable service to contemporary British fiction by refuting a powerful story of decline and by directing critical attention to its subject. However, Bradbury's story (and especially its weaker versions by other critics) is not exempt from the deficiencies listed at the beginning of this paper. I shall now present a very biased reading of the most ambitious and comprehensive incarnation of his story (*The Modern British Novel*[8]) and attempt to point out some of the deficiencies that are due to his often suppressed rhetorical and narrative structure.

Some of the most serious deficiencies in his narrative derive from the decision to retain the Realism-Experiment dichotomy; it seems that Bradbury was unwilling to rewrite the basic pattern of his story that had been laid down by 1973. He adds, as it were, a sequel to the original story — a sequel which does not rewrite what happened before -, ignoring Jauss's imperative of the necessity of the repeated rewriting of literary history. If the terms of the story he is telling are Realism and Experiment, this is surely an insufficient dichotomy, and one that seriously damages Bradbury's critical insights by its coercive power. One danger lies in the fact that a simple binary opposition invariably implies a hierarchy of values (not always as evident in Bradbury as in some other critics). What much of the English critical discourse seems to be doing is to challenge the model of literary history worked out by the Russian Formalists and invert its value hierarchy of original versus traditional — a model usually considered applicable to the Romantic-Modernist tradition of thinking about literature (for a similar, theoretically grounded attempt see Franco Moretti's "The Soul and the Harpy"[9]).

The second factor which limits the force of Bradbury's narrative is the hidden presence of some aspects of Leavisism, especially the considerable gravitational force of the critical construct called "the English novel" and of the traditionally English mode of criticism (contextual, content-oriented, dedicated to realism and humanism, regarding the critical enterprise as primarily a moral and cultural practice). In his account of the critical climate of the Fifties, Bradbury mentions the influence of Leavis, Trilling and Auerbach; from the post-war period, one could also mention the influential names of Ian Watt, John Bayley, Barbara Hardy, Bernard Bergonzi, Patrick Swinden, David Lodge or the Pelican Guide to English Literature, edited and written mostly by *Scrutiny* critics. One result of the presence of this tradition in Bradbury is the obvious valuing of Realism over experimental fiction (at least in the post-war period), using the former as a starting-point and not as one possibility among others. The other, equally important consequence is that Englishness, the English mind remains a protagonist in his story as much as the novel itself: "there are certain shaping aspects to a natural tradition, though many writers are consistently diverting from it" (x). This innocuous sentence at once renders marginal whatever does not fit neatly into the not even vaguely defined national tradition; what happens in Bradbury's narrative — and in most British critical discourse — is that the two oppositions (Realism-Experiment, English-foreign) are implicitly translated into other, value-laden, hierarchical oppositions: central-marginal, and ultimately valuable-less valuable. For rather obtrusive examples of this bipolar thinking, see, for instance, Michael Ratcliffe, who claims that Golding wrote "a sequence of increasingly unEnglish novels"

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7. Richard Todd, "The Presence of Postmodernism in British Fiction: Aspects of Style and Selfhood," in: *Approaching Postmodernism*, Douwe Fokkema and Hans Bertens, eds. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1980), 94-117; Marguerite Alexander, *Flights from Realism*, (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), 107; Alison Lee, *Realism and Power* (London: Routledge, 1990), xi-xii.
8. Malcolm Bradbury, *The Modern British Novel*, London, Secker and Warburg, 1993. Page references are to the 1994 reprint.
9. Franco Moretti, "The Soul and the Harpy," in: *Signs Taken for Wonders*, trans. Susan Fischer et. al. (London: Verso, 1983), 13.

and explains the failure of Christine Brooke-Rose and B. S. Johnson by saying that they are examples of "an expansive, entirely English intelligence trying to cram itself into the strait-jacket of an unsympathetic form".[10]

The persistence of Englishness as a main theme or character in Bradbury's story is especially evident in the teleology of the story which turns out to be the rise of a particularly English version of Postmodernism. Bradbury outlines the ways in which British Postmodernism might be different from its American counterpart (394), and after a very laudatory discussion of the work of Doris Lessing and John Fowles, concludes: Fowles and Lessing have much in common with international metafiction, "But it may be a part of the distinctive 'Britishness' of both writers that, though they question realist conventions, they do not dispense with them entirely... These are not novels aspiring to be pure texts" (362). By the end of the Seventies, a distinctively British version of Postmodernism had evolved, represented and prepared for by Bradbury's mainstream writers who are self-reflexive and experimental, yet their novels are "also about the need to sustain fiction's humanist authenticity, or preserve the realm of social, moral and metaphysical truth (378); "in all these writers the task of fiction remained that of finding a structure for wisdom, or truth, or experience. The human figure had not disappeared, and the concern for character was one of the distinctive features of British fiction" (378). The rather pompous phrasing and ultimate banality of such statements are due, I think, to the conflict between Bradbury's critical insights and rhetorical strategy: he admires writers whose work does not conform with the English tradition; in order to be able to praise them, he is forced both to misrepresent their fiction and to distend the meaning of the English tradition until it is identical with good, honest literature. The myth of a typically British version of Postmodernism has become extremely influential; all the more so, perhaps, because it fits nicely into a long and vigorous critical tradition of talking about the novel in terms of a rhetoric of compromise, reconciliation, starting probably with Henry James's speculations, and exemplified by terms like Leavis's "significant form," Ian Watt's "formal realism," or David Lodge's "aesthetics of compromise."[11] This rhetoric, even though it suggests the heterogeneity of styles and modes within a single text, domesticates postmodernist works by intimating "compromise," "convergence," a resolution of tensions instead of, as contemporary theorists would do, emphasizing the divergent, conflictual, aporetic logic of these texts. Indeed, if the mythical other of English critical discourse reappears in Bradbury's text, it is probably no longer Modernist or Postmodernist fiction but the deconstructionist way of talking about literature — something which Bradbury treats with English skepticism, common sense and irony.

Some of the deficiencies and distortions are clearly the results of the constraints of Bradbury's plot. For instance, it is necessary for his narrative logic to reinvent the Fifties as a period when Realism was "debated," as a time of considerable diversity and pluralism; he even revaluates the role of the return to realism which, he interestingly claims, did not really mean a rejection of Modernist experiment (273-4), and which, instead of being a regression, "had generated a renewal of fiction," it was "a way of looking back and stepping forward" (333).

Another harmful consequence of the power of Bradbury's narrative logic is his treatment of some of the major writers of the period; once he has identified a group of writers as representatives of the mainstream and also identified the direction of the mainstream, he is compelled to demonstrate how the careers of his chosen writers obey the logic of his story by becoming increasingly self-reflexive and doubtful of realism. Even though Angus Wilson and perhaps Doris Lessing are the only mainstream writers whose careers seem to follow the pattern, Bradbury is forced to place Murdoch, Spark, Golding and Burgess in a context where they do not fit (367,378). Most importantly, he is now forced to treat early Murdoch and Spark as realists, which they clearly were not. If there

10. Ratcliffe, 22, 26.

11. For an account of critical constructions of the British novel, see Daniel R. Schwarz, *The Humanistic Heritage*, London, Macmillan, 1986.

is a growing self-questioning and experimental strain in their work, it appears within another context — that of the allegorical-parabolic novelistic discourse (and the same is probably true in Golding's case).

It has already been mentioned that Bradbury's narrative lacks self-awareness, any kind of theoretical framework for his project (apart from the Realism-Experiment dichotomy). Undoubtedly, this is what accounts for the occasional appearance in the text of singular statements like the following comment on *Lucky Jim*: the novel's innovation, says Bradbury, "lay not in its form but its spirit, tone and voice" (320). Here, in his attempt to avoid saying that Amis's novelty resided in his subject matter, Bradbury is compelled to come up with this equivocal statement where voice is construed as an opposite of form.

The most conspicuous and self-defeating effect of Bradbury's lack of self-awareness is his inadequate and inconsistent taxonomy of genres. It is a critical commonplace that the novel is an anti-genre, a carnivalistic genre, resistant to taxonomic classification. Indeed, as David Perkins argues, fiction has "no taxonomic system, but only a confused aggregate of overlapping classifications from different points of view".[12] Also, Derrida has shown, perhaps not quite convincingly, how the whole concept of genre is a radically self-subverting notion, how a literary text can neither truly belong nor truly not belong to any genre.[13] Even so, Bradbury's lack of criteria for classification is somewhat striking — and this seems to be perhaps the basic flaw in the critical discourse of post-war British fiction (the one exception is David Lodge, whose example, however, has not been followed[14]). We do not really learn, for instance, what the text means by "late modernism" and "Postmodernism," whether they are periods, strategies of writing or situations of writing and reading.

A telling example of how this self-imposed austerity of generic terms hinders Bradbury's appreciation of a novelist is his discussion of William Golding. He starts by the confident assertion that *The Lord of the Flies* belongs to what Robert Louis Stevenson called the "romance" (317). In his attempts to provide some framework for Golding's work, he mentions the Modernist connections in his fiction, Golding's own opposition between myth and fable, refers three times to the allegorical strain in his work and notes Golding's "realism of vivid specificity" (327-8). His hesitation is perpetuated by the closing remark of the Golding-section: there is, he writes, a "certain timelessness about the prose — though not the technique — which makes it stand monumentally apart from much contemporary writing" (329). One could perhaps sense here a Crocean attitude, according to which literary history is impossible and pointless because each major work is inaccessible for any kind of classification; Bradbury, however, does not voice such qualms in the course of his narrative. In other chapters, this inconsistency leads to unexpected groupings of authors and to a switch of criteria within a chapter (especially disturbing in his survey chapter on writers of the Thirties and the Forties); criteria multiply endlessly, becoming alternately generational, gender-based, generic, thematic or coincidental or expediential. (To be fair, a number of counter-examples could also be mentioned: for instance, the chapters on Lessing and Fowles, or the section juxtaposing D. M. Thomas and Salman Rushdie.)

One could speculate about the causes of this vagueness in an otherwise excellent critic. As it does not seem to stem from a Crocean doubt about the possibility of literary historiography, one is led to the conjecture that Bradbury's aversion to classification and the resulting inconsistencies might be attributed to the weight of the dominant critical discourse, the decidedly anti-theoretical, pragmatic, vaguely nominalist attitude still prevailing in Britain (a nominalism not in terms of value but in terms of a hostility

12. David Perkins, *Is Literary History Possible?* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 68-9.

13. Jacques Derrida, "The Law of Genre," in: *On Narrative*, W.J.T. Mitchell, ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 55, 61.

14. Especially Lodge's *The Modes of Modern Writing*, London, Edward Arnold, 1979.

towards metaphysically or theoretically grounded conceptions of genre). What seems certain is that this vagueness, together with the rhetorical and narrative pull of the story, keeps him from the proper appreciation even of some of his own chosen mainstream writers, and from fully working out the consequences of his own critical insights. The problem is that the inadequacies in his story are much more prominent in the work of other critics, reviewers and writers of monographs. As an example, one could cite John McDermott's book on Kingsley Amis. In his confused, often hysterical defense of Amis, McDermott wants to present him as someone who has already done the work of the postmoderns ("Amis's achievement has been built on the areas apparently annexed by the post-modernists"[15]), dismissing at the same time the time-shifts and unreliable narrators in Modernist fiction as "extreme devices",[16] parts of a bogus artistic mystique. This confusion concerning Amis is, incidentally, symptomatic of post-war British critical discourse, wavering — often in the same passage — between championing him as the staunch defender of the English tradition and trying to present him as an innovator of considerable originality — and all this because his work must be seen in the context of Realism and Experiment and because his importance must ensure him a place in "the" mainstream of contemporary British fiction. Patrick Swinden has shown that for a proper appreciation of his work it is enough to detach him from this context and see his novels as examples of metaphysical, non-realist farce.[17] This appreciation of Amis would imply inserting into the Realism-Experiment dichotomy another genre, or rather, another mode of novelistic discourse. A more elaborate typology would contribute to the loosening of the persistent, paralysing dichotomy, to the broadening of the canon by acknowledging the coexistence of several modes of novelistic discourse (not only as the feature of the postmodern age), and to the admission that many of the major writers of the period have not been working according to the prescriptions of the mainstream. Thus, I would suggest the recognition of the avant-garde as an identifiable mode of discourse, present in "experimental" texts of many kinds (in Lessing and B. S. Johnson, for instance) and dominant in others (as in Alan Burns). Late modernism could also prove a useful category,[18] especially because the critical appreciation of the work of Waugh, Henry Green, Ivy Compton-Burnett and Anthony Powell suffers from the same inconsistency and lack of terms that I have referred to in connection with Kingsley Amis. It is especially Anthony Powell whose outstanding achievement has fallen victim to a particularly serious case of critical blindness that tried at all costs to read him as a social realist, and when *Dance to the Music of Time* did not respond to such an inquiry, the book was blamed and pigeonholed as a minor idiosyncrasy.

The most important taxonomic addition one would be tempted to make is the recognition of an independent and powerful allegorical and parabolic mode in British fiction from the Thirties, to which Golding, Mervyn Peake, Muriel Spark and Iris Murdoch belong. This could put an end to the futile critical endeavour to make the work of Spark and especially Murdoch satisfy the criteria of realism in order to be able to admit them into the mainstream. Instead, the recognition that they are primarily allegorists should suggest a reconsideration of what the mainstream of post-war British fiction actually is.

15. John McDermott, *Kingsley Amis* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 229.
16. McDermott 51.
17. Patrick Swinden, *The English Novel of History and Society, 1940-1980* (London: Macmillan, 1985), 180-209.
18. Especially in the sense in which Alan Wilde uses the term in his *Horizons of Assent* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), chapters 3 and 4.

Attila Kőszeghy

Epiphany: Raymond Carver and a Tradition of the Joycean Short Story

Epiphany as a term was established or introduced in modern literature by James Joyce. By epiphany Stephen of Joyce's *Stephen Hero* "means a 'sudden spiritual manifestation.'"[1] The theory of epiphany is of fundamental importance in Joycean aesthetics. The "radiance" of everyday objects, the transfiguration of the mundane environment play a decisive role among the aesthetic merits of *Dubliners*, too. William York Tindall says, "Without radiant body *Dubliners* would be a diminished book".[2]

It was Ewing Campbell who drew attention to the kinship between Joyce's early fiction and Carver's stories by pointing out that "Carver's relation to Joyce's early fiction was rarely, if ever, emphasized during Carver's life and has apparently been overlooked by critics since his death, although he cited *Dubliners* as an influential work".[3] As regards the relationship between Carver and Joyce, Campbell emphasizes that "Carver was able to transform the Joycean readings within his experience, inclinations, limitations, and abilities to produce a quality indisputably his own".[4]

It is Carver himself who hints at something similar to the Joycean concept of literary epiphany. In his essay *On writing* he recalls a fragment of a sentence from a story by Chekov: "...and suddenly everything became clear to him" and goes on to comment,

> I find these words filled with wonder and possibility. I love their simple clarity, and the hint of revelation that's implied. There is mystery, too. What has been unclear before? Why is it just now becoming clear? What's happened? Most of all -- what now? There are consequences as a result of such sudden awakenings. I feel a sharp sense of relief -- and anticipation.[5]

Later on in the same essay he says:

> It's possible, in a poem or a short story, to write about commonplace things and objects using commonplace but precise language, and to endow those things -- a chair, a window curtain, a fork, a stone, a woman's earring -- with immense, even startling power."[6]

The moments of revelation, as he confesses here, are of primary interest for Carver the storyteller, too.

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1. William York Tindall, *A Reader's Guide to James Joyce* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), 10.
2. *Ibid.*, 12.
3. Ewing Campbell, *Raymond Carver: A Study of the Short Fiction* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 4.
4. *Ibid.*, 4.
5. Raymond Carver, *Fires* (New York: Random House, 1989), 23.
6. *Ibid.*, 24.

In the present essay I chose -- not entirely arbitrarily -- four stories by Carver that share a common element of something very similar to the Joycean epiphany. Observing the foci -- I call them epiphanies in the Joycean sense where "radiant bodies" (W. Y. Tindall's term) lie -- I also present my interpretation concerning the nature of these focal points.

Why These Stories?

Three of the four stories are from *Cathedral*, a volume published in 1983. Critics seem to agree that this volume indicates the beginning of a new phase in Carver's art. I, too, agree with William L. Stul that the stories of this volume are "uneven"[7] at least in the sense that some of them still share the qualities of previous volumes. They are more of a bleak landscape of despair so typical of the former stories. The three stories I chose from *Cathedral* are definitely of this type. I also agree with Zoltán Abádi Nagy, according to whom the most palpable shift concerning the tone of these stories is in "A Small, Good Thing",[8] which -- in this sense -- is the pivot of the volume. However, the reason I chose "The Bath" -- which is an earlier version of "A Small, Good Thing" -- as the fourth story for my essay was neither to demonstrate the difference in the tone nor to show the resemblance these stories have to those in the previous volumes. I chose "The Bath" from the volume titled *What We Talk About When We Talk About Love* (1981) because the comparison of the two short stories -- "A Small, Good Thing" and "The Bath" -- does contain an element which is relevant to the point I am going to make about this group of Carver's stories at the end of this essay.

The Carver Story -- The Carver Hero

> To be inside a Raymond Carver story is a bit like standing in a model kitchen at Sears - you experience a weird feeling of disjuncture that comes from being in a place where things appear to be real and familiar, but where a closer look shows that the turkey is papier-maché, the broccoli is rubber, and the frilly curtains cover a blank wall. In Carver's fiction things are simply not as they appear. Or, rather, things are more than they appear to be..."[9]

Thus says Larry McCaffery in the introduction to his interviews with Raymond Carver. Then he comments that a significant distinctive feature of Carver's short stories is that they usually present down-and-outs. Carver has this to say about that:

> The things that have made an indelible impression on me are the things I saw in lives I witnessed being lived around me, and in the life I myself lived. There were lives where people were really scared when someone knocked on their door, day or night, or when the telephone rang; they didn't know how they were going to pay the rent or what they could do if the refrigerator went out. Anatole Broyard tries to criticize my story "Preservation" by saying, "So the refrigerator breaks - why don't they just call a repairman and get it fixed?" That kind of remark is dump.[10]

Carver says he is writing about a "submerged population" and adds "Chekhov was writing about a submerged population a hundred years ago. Short story writers have

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7. Abádi Nagy Zoltán, *Az amerikai minimalista próza* (Budapest: Argumentum Kiadó, 1994), 57.
8. *Ibid.*, 57.
9. Ewing Campbell, *Raymond Carver. A Study of the Short Fiction* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 98.
10. *Ibid.*, 111.

always been doing that".[11]

Carver's stories seem to be charged with characters of this "submerged population" or heroes of "low-rent tragedies"[12] as Carver calls them. Most of these heroes are expecting something to happen. They seem to be ready to contemplate upon a scene in which they themselves are slaughtered. (This state of mind could again remind one of the "paralysis" that is so often regarded as the basic feature of the heroes of *Dubliners*.) This readiness for the acceptance of any catastrophe to come makes the lives of the heroes of the Carver story so fragile. They are either victims of their circumstances or otherwise incapable of action. The are inhabitants of a world of absolute determinism, and they are aware of it. This kind of determinism is sometimes taken to extremes and reaches the state of physical paralysis (see "Preservation"). However, society, the other determinant of human fate is always excluded from these stories. As Zoltán Abádi Nagy puts it: "Social dimensions are excluded. It is a world without metaphysical dimensions, the realm of quotidian existence".[13] As a result, it is always the microcosm of the individual that is pictured here.

A couple recently married, visiting their friends, or another couple who divorced a long time ago but recently decided to live together again, or a teenage boy who suffers from his parents' marriage falling apart, or a waitress who cannot believe her eyes when a huge fat man enters the place where she serves - they all share some qualities in their lives. And the common denominator in the life of these people is that they are portrayed at the threshold of change. A change they are not at all aware of but they are frightened by. A change that will probably ruin their lives, that can radiate through rare moments of their lives. A change that they still, somehow, can anticipate.

"Feathers"

A visit and a preparation for a visit two people are going to pay to their acquaintances, implies the idea of anticipating something. This is how the story starts: Jack and Fran, a married couple are preparing for a visit to Bud and Olla. The men are colleagues at work, the women do not know each other. Fran, the wife does not seem to be keen on the idea of a visit, but she knows that Jack and Bud are good friends. Among a few reminiscences of the story of Jack and Bud working together, the reader is informed that Bud and Olla have one child in their family while Jack and Fran have none. Jack and Fran, for the time being, did not want a child. "But one thing we didn't wish for was kids. The reason we didn't have kids was that we didn't want kids".[14] The couple seems to live in harmony: "Why do we need other people? she seemed to be saying. We have each other".[15] Before the visit there is a hesitation between the couple over what to take with them to Bud and Olla. This indicates a kind of tension in Jack and Fran. Jack is driving to their friends and Fran is giving instructions for Bud and Olla live twenty miles from town and they have to follow Bud's instructions on a map. They find the place and when they arrive at the house, suddenly "something as big as a vulture flapped heavily down from one of the trees and landed just in front of the car".[16] The sight of the bird is one of the breathtaking moments of the story. The bird itself is not named while the incident is being described. After the description of the movements of the bird, there follows the description of the reactions of Jack and Fran, and only then comes the name of the bird: "We both knew it was a peacock, sure, but we didn't say the

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11. *Ibid.*, 111.
12. Arthur M. Saltzman, *Understanding Raymond Carver* (University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 17.
13. Zoltán Abádi Nagy, Ph.D. lecture. Debrecen, January 6, 1994.
14. Raymond Carver, *Cathedral* (New York: Vintage Contemporaries, Random House, 1984), 5.
15. *Ibid.*, 4-5.
16. *Ibid.*, 7.

word out loud".[17] The bird is behaving in a most unusual way from the point of view of the guests and from this time on, with its multiple-eyed look, it is always present on the scene - either physically present or the guests and the hosts are talking about it or they can hear its wail on the front porch or its cackle on the roof. A most surprising phenomenon is - the reader knows it through Jack's narration - that while the peacock is a comfort for Bud and Olla and their baby, it is a nuisance for Jack and Fran. "The peacock wailed again, and I could feel the hair on the back of my neck".[18]

This incident is interrelated with the other shocking incident in the story, when Olla brings her baby to her guests. The baby does not appear for a long time when the guests are already in the house. And when it appears, it is a real shock for Jack and Fran, for "it was the ugliest baby I'd ever seen",[19] Jack, the narrator comments. The moment the baby is shown to Fran a strange conversation starts:

> "Ah!" said Fran.
> "What is it?" Olla said quickly.
> "Nothing", Fran said. "I thought I saw something at the window. I thought I saw a bat".
> "We don't have any bats around here", Olla said.

Fran is obviously shocked at the sight of the baby and she wants to disguise her embarrassment. But the fact that she mentions bats takes us back to birds, as in the case of the previous incident with the peacock. A bat does not belong with birds but is usually associated with flying creatures of which itself is probably the ugliest. Later on, when the baby is described, some elements of its description remind us of the body of a bat. It has "pop eyes" and "no neck", and "its ears stuck out from its bald head".

The two striking moments of the story, which I call epiphanies, are probably interrelated not just in their frightening nature. In both cases a bird or a bird-like creature represents the 'object', the couple (Jack and Fran) represents the 'subject'. An epiphany, in its Joycean sense, is a "sudden spiritual manifestation" in which the 'subject' realizes the true nature of the 'object'. Obviously, the nature of this realization is not that of the logically structured understanding of the meaning of a verbalized message, for example. However, the message is there, but the 'subject' is only capable of grasping its relevance to his or her life. It is not incidental that the term epiphany was preserved by Joyce: it is capable of expressing the intensity and vagueness of the experience at the same time. Twice during their visit, Jack and Fran are confronted with a striking vision: first with that of a huge bird, and then with that of an ugly baby. Because of the recurrence of the bird motif, as described above, it is very likely that both convey similar messages. Furthermore, if we add what Greek mythology provides us with - the peacock as the bird of Hera, who is associated with childbirth[20] - the conclusion offers itself: Jack and Fran's life is on the brink of change, and this change is in connection with the baby "they didn't wish for". And the revelation the two startling events is charged with is that it is their not-yet-born baby who is going to change their life.

Jack and Fran are leaving Bud and Olla's home soon to become the parents of a boy. However, this experiment seems to be unsuccessful: the boy has a conniving streak, of which Jack is not willing to talk to Bud, the couple talk less and less, Fran gets fat and cuts her hair, the marriage is falling apart. Fran, even years after the visit, associates that evening with the beginning of the change.

"Chef's House"

Wes is a recovered alcoholic, who divorced his wife long ago. Now he is renting

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17. *Ibid.*, 7.
18. *Ibid.*, 19.
19. *Ibid.*, 20.
20. Zoltán Abádi Nagy, Ph.D. lecture. Debrecen, January 6, 1994.

a house from another recovered alcoholic, Chef, who is happy to help him. Wes phones his divorced wife Edna, and asks her to move in with him. She is suspicious and tries to say no, but Wes is insistent. Finally she gives in, and moves in with Wes.

Everything seems to be all right, almost idyllic. Signs of recovery are frequent and very promising: Edna puts her wedding ring back on, Wes buys presents for her, they go fishing together. When Edna writes to their kids, she signs her letters, "Love always".[21] It is only their past and future that loom over this idyll of the present. The expression of the fragility of the present is very subtle and - as usual in Carver's stories - by the way: "I found myself wishing the summer wouldn't end".[22] One day when they go fishing, Edna lies in the grass and sees "clouds passing overhead toward the central valley"[23] which indicate the passing of precious time and the coming of uncertain and imminent future. Knowing flashes from the couple's history, Edna's state of mind, her uncertainty is perfectly understandable.

The hit of change, however, comes in an unexpected disguise and Edna's comment makes it explicit:

> One afternoon Wes was in the yard pulling weeds when Chef drove up in front of the house. I was working at the sink, I looked and saw Chef's big car pull in. I could see his car, the access road and the freeway, and, behind the freeway, the dunes and the ocean. Clouds hung over the water. Chef got out of his car and hitched his pants. *I knew there was something.*[24]

The last sentence of this passage emphasizes the preceding moment of epiphany in the story. She is working at the sink looking out of the window. She is looking at the landscape in front of their house, which she sees every day. Then Chef's car appears, which again she sees day after day. Yet the way Chef hitches his pants makes her realize that "there was something".

Chef has to ask Wes and Edna to move from his house at the end of the month, for his daughter, Linda has lost her husband and Chef wants to help her. Chef is leaving, and Wes and Edna find themselves struggling with resignation. Actually, it is Edna who is fighting Wes' resignation and despair. The present seems to be sinking down to the level of the past: "I caught myself talking like it was something that had happened in the past".[25] And the past is dangerous, its message is, as Wes puts it: "We were born who we are".[26] No matter how strong we wish to change our lives, we are just marionettes on the strings of our fate.

It is Wes who has already given up. He is no longer able to change things in his life or believe that things could be changed. Edna has not given up yet. She has already experienced that "there was something", but she has not realized yet that something was over for good. She is trying to balance Wes by talking about their kids then with the idea of a fresh start: "Suppose, just suppose, nothing had ever happened. Suppose this was for the first time. Just suppose. It doesn't hurt to suppose".[27] Wes' answer indicates the fact that he has already "made up his mind" and his fatalism: "Then I suppose we'd have to be somebody else if that was the case. Somebody we are not".[28]

The story ends with Edna realizing that their fragile happiness of summer is over. But this realization, too, comes through the epiphany of a simple utterance that has

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21. Raymond Carver, *Cathedral* (New York: Vintage Contemporaries, Random House, 1984), 29.
22. *Ibid.*, 28.
23. *Ibid.*, 29.
24. *Ibid.*, 29.
25. *Ibid.*, 31.
26. *Ibid.*, 32.
27. *Ibid.*, 31.
28. *Ibid.*, 32.

nothing to do with the fact or factors it sheds light on: "Fat Linda, he said".[29] Fat Linda is Chef's daughter and her name has been recurring representing the inevitability of fate. So far, however, her name has preserved a kind of humorous effect, too. Wes goes as far as stating that Fat Linda's husband probably has not died but has escaped from Fat Linda. It is the first time when her name is mentioned without any explanatory details. It is the first time when her name is simply uttered. That is what makes Edna realize that "She was nothing. Just a name".[30] A name that bears relevance to her life. A name that stands for something else.

"Preservation"

> Sandy's husband had been on the sofa ever since he'd been terminated three months ago. That day, three months ago, he'd come home looking pale and scared and with all of his work things in a box. 'Happy Valentine's Day', he said to Sandy and put a heart-shaped box of candy and bottle of Jim Beam on the kitchen table. He took off his cap and laid that on the table, too. 'I got canned today. Hey, what do you think's going to happen to us now?'[31]

The husband seems to be spending the rest of his life on the sofa "as if, she thought, it was the thing he was supposed to do now that he no longer had any work".[32] Sandy finds it more and more frightening. She discovers a few other most unusual things about her husband. The man reads everything that comes out of the post box, newspapers "from the first page to the last". He joins a book club and receives a bonus titled *Mysteries of the Past*, which he seems to be reading at about the same place for a long time. "Sandy picked it up once and opened it to his place. There she read about a man who had been discovered after spending two thousand years in a peat bog in the Netherlands".[33] Sandy confided a friend at work about her husband spending all his time on the sofa. The friend told her about her uncle, who did not get up from his bed after he had passed forty. Sandy is threatened and even more depressed by her friend's story of her uncle.

One afternoon, she comes home to find that their fridge has gone out with all the preserved food and meat being spoilt. She cries out, her husband comes from the living room and they decide that they need another fridge. They find an auction in the classifieds, and she decides to go right away as the auction was on that very day. But the husband is not willing to go. He has never been to one, anyway, and he seems to be afraid of leaving their apartment. Finally they are having dinner together. After dinner she wants to leave for the auction but she is not able to. She is paralysed just as her husband.

Preservation, the title, is a key word to the story. The first meaning of the verb 'preserve', according to *Webster's New World Dictionary*, is "to keep from harm, damage, danger, evil, etc.; protect; save". Preservation or the lack of preservation is too frequent in the story. Whether it is a mummy of two thousand years getting up alive from a peat bog in the Netherlands, or a man of sixty-three who has not got up from his bed for twenty-three years, or the write-off fridge that lost its Freon, the idea of preservation is central throughout the story.

The first epiphany is when Sandy picks up her husband's book and reads about the man staying alive for two thousand years in the peat bog. The mystery of the story and the mystery of her husband's reading make her sense that her husband is in a very dangerous state of mind that might last for a very long time. The other (the "main")

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29. *Ibid.*, 33.
30. *Ibid.*, 33.
31. *Ibid.*, 35.
32. *Ibid.*, 36.
33. *Ibid.*, 36.

epiphany of the story is when Sandy looks at her husband's bare feet on the kitchen floor next to a pool of water. "She looked down at her husband's bare feet. She stared at his feet next to the pool of water. She knew she'd never again in her life see anything so unusual. But she didn't know what to make of it yet".[34] She looks at her husband's feet just as startled as when she looked at the ice cream and the bowl of Spanish rice all thawed, rotting away in their fridge.[35] She looks at her husband just as at another object of her household that is no longer preserved from decay. Everything that is frozen solid - even a human body - can last for ever. Everything that is melted, thawed leaking water is irreversibly decaying. She sees her husband's destruction and decay in the pool of water.

"The Bath"

The boy called Scotty has his birthday on Monday. His mother orders a chocolate cake for the occasion. She goes to the baker's shop on Saturday so that the cake should be ready on Monday. Scotty, the boy's name, will be iced on the cake, which has the shape of a spaceship. Monday morning, on his way to school, the birthday boy steps off the curb and is promptly knocked down by a car. He turns back and goes home, where he tells his mother what has happened to him. He falls asleep and is taken to hospital, where he sleeps on without waking for a second. The party is obviously cancelled, and the parents stay in the hospital with their kid. After midnight the father goes home to have a bath and to feed the dog. While at home he receives two phone calls, both from the baker who made the cake for Scotty, but the father does not have any knowledge about his wife's project with the chocolate cake so he hangs up thinking the chap on the other end has called the wrong number. Back in the hospital the boy is still asleep, and his sleep is turning into a coma.

When the mother goes home after two days in the hospital where her son's state has not changed the least, she is totally exhausted. She makes herself a tea and settles on the sofa with it when the telephone rings.

> 'Yes!' she said. 'Hallo!' she said.
> 'Mrs. Weiss', a man's voice said.
> 'Yes', she said. 'This is Mrs. Weiss. Is it about Scotty?' she said.
> 'Scotty', the voice said. 'It's about Scotty', the voice said. 'It has to do with Scotty, yes.'[36]

The story ends with this disrupted conversation.

Menace, according to some critics, is a key to many of the Carver stories. It seems to be more than obvious in the case of "The Bath". The whole story is structured to demonstrate the growing menace. Even the presentation of the mother's ordering of the birthday cake is not free from menace. The description of the baker with his "curious apron, a heavy thing with loops that went under his arms and around his back and then crossed in front again where they were tied in a very thick knot" and "his wet eyes examining her lips", the way "he kept wiping his hands on the front of the apron"[37] are all more like a description of a butcher than that of a baker.

The father's drive home is, in a sense, midway between the menacing description of the baker at the beginning of the story and the culmination of the menace in the mother's disrupted conversation with the same baker at the end of the story. The father's journey is described like this: "The man drove home from the hospital. He drove the streets faster than he should. It had been a good life till now. There had been work,

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34. *Ibid.*, 46.
35. *Ibid.*, 39.
36. Raymond Carver, *What We Talk About When We Talk About Love* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1981), 56.
37. *Ibid.*, 47-48.

fatherhood, family. The man had been lucky and happy. But fear made him want a bath".[38]

The man realizes that something has changed. He verbalizes this change for himself. This is what I call epiphany in a Carver story. Nevertheless, the climax of the story is in the final epiphany, the mother's conversation with the baker on the phone. The reader is not given a verbal solution: what has happened to Scotty is left in the shade. The reader is left alone with a sentence as it is echoing in the mother's mind: "It has to do with Scotty, yes".[39] Scotty has probably died or will die soon, and the mother is sensing that in this very moment.

Conclusion

As I have mentioned above, "The Bath" has a rewritten version. Carver came from among writers who kept rewriting, correcting their manuscripts to the end.[40] He rewrote the same story because he felt "there was unfinished business that needed attending to. The story hadn't been told originally;"[41] The rewritten version of the story is called "A Small, Good Thing" and was published in the 1983 volume titled *Cathedral*. Apart from a completely different atmosphere and externalities - the nine-page-long story of "The Bath" was rewritten into a thirty-two-page-long story of "A Small, Good Thing" - the characters, the setting, and the plot are obviously the same. It is here, in the rewritten version that we learn what happened to Scotty. The Scotty of "A Small, Good Thing" after spending one more day in coma in hospital, opens his eyes twice and passes away without recognizing his parents beside him.

An obvious characteristic of these Carver stories is that death is not present in them in an explicit form. However, the idea of 'the end' is always lurking somewhere hidden in them. In my view, epiphany, the main focal point of these stories, hides the idea of 'the end.' Whether it is the end or final destruction of a relationship - as in the case of the visiting couple in "Feathers" - or the end of happiness and harmony between two people - as it is with the reunited couple in "Chef's House" - or the end of safe, reliable "normal" life - as is the case in "Preservation" - or the death of a son - as in "The Bath" -, it is that moment of the story when the hero or the heroine, through an intuitive scene - epiphany -, is confronted with the idea of the end that lies in the "deep structure" of these stories.

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Dan Popescu

An Odd Messiah

One of the main ideas of poststructuralist thought is that "Literary works should not be regarded as sublime and transcendent expressions of the human spirit, but as texts among other texts".[1] A compromise between the beginning and the end of this quotation is "literary texts". Starting from here, one may say that "there are certain texts among literary texts". Such texts might belong to science-fiction, for instance, though some voices claim that science-fiction is not a literary genre, but a parallel literature, having its distinct and corresponding categories such as heroic fantasy, the socio-political science fiction, new wave, swords and sorcery, and so on.

Both literature and science-fiction are subjected, more or less, to history. Literature may take the risk of representing certain events of the past, which can never be available to us in their pure form. The same thing applies to the future, it being largely the realm of science-fiction. The past and the future are not compact, unified entities, so they may be constructed, de-constructed and re-constructed from texts of all kinds, already written or in course of being written.

That is exactly the technique adopted and adapted by Frank Herbert in his saga of the planet Dune, a saga not very successfully re-told in a film directed by that famous "Tzar of the Bizarre", David Lynch. At the beginning of each chapter Herbert makes use of what seems to be different fragments from: a handbook, an infant or boyhood story, extremely simplified biographical sketches, a book of family comments, an analysis of a planetary crisis, secret files, essays, parables, memories, popular songs, introductions, sayings, forewords, conversations, personal reflections, chronicles, profiles, secret messages, legends, reports, etc., etc.

Joyce himself would have been proud of such a display, but they are all texts, unless we call them *fiction*, and that is an acknowledgement of the fact that they belong to a special , different order of textuality. They are verbal structures, too, and "As all verbal structures have some kind of sequence, [...], they are all mythical in this primary sense..."[2] And here is the shifting point from a virtual textual analysis to something else, because this very flood, this abundance of fragments, texts or verbal structures is not meant to construct varied degrees of the so-called "ecriture", but to shape, first of all, a mythology.

It's a saga about an old civilization coming into a new life, and such a process needs and deserves new myths or, at least, new individuals incorporating and being incorporated by the old mythology. To what extent can science-fiction fight against Literature, which is "the direct descendant of mythology" and "an integral and inevitable part of a myth's development"?[3] Is science-fiction only the ideal case of a trivial literature?

Frank Herbert's response to these difficult questions is to choose the most challenging among all myths, that of the Messiah. Dostoievsky himself testified about

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1. See Raman Selden, *A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory.*
2. See Northrop Frye, *The Great Code: The Bible and Literature.*
3. *Ibid.*

the burden of such a challenge in portraying his "Idiot", Prince Mishkin. Mario Varga Llosa might have been confronted with the same problems in "The War of the End of the World." These two exceptional accomplishments of the Messianic myth in literature proved the power of their authors to deal with a "sacred" myth, as opposed to a "profane" one, with which the poet, generally speaking, is free to do as he likes.[4]

The saga of Dune is not an ordinary science-fiction saga, which has to reconcile a scientific attitude with an aesthetic one. It is not dominated by the technical perspective, nor is it characterized first by action, pulp fiction or other elements such as the erotic triangle of the hero, the princess and the monster. It is concerned, above all, with the man of the future, who may perfectly be, and this is a paradox, an archetype. For "individual stories are being made to fit the pattern".[5] The individual story of Paul Atreides, son of Leto, Duke of Dune, turns into a Science-Fiction Gospel not only for the sake of, or as a direct response to the natural environment described in the book. Though the desert is a very appropriate support for legends and myths, the fact is that one has to insulate him/her self through imagination against a hostile environment. This works for the people of Dune and works also for the twentieth-century science-fiction writer. So it is not entirely odd that, instead of writing about a new weapon, a new machinery or a strange, abominable mutant, Frank Herbert prefers to dream of a Messiah.

Perhaps we, too, need a Messiah, as much as the people of Dune needed one. The myth of Paul Atreides, or Usul, or Muad'Dib, — these are three names of the hero each having a particular significance, finally takes its place within the mythology of the planet. But myths are not only stories worth being re-created in literature, they are also programs of action, having a specific social function for a specific society. Paul Atreides knew that the people of Dune were waiting for a Messiah, he knew he had the powers of a Messiah but in the same time he was afraid, so he deliberately started to cooperate, in order to meet their terms, their mythical frame, their prophecies.

One may easily recognize types of stories from the Gospels: Vocation or calling stories in which someone responds to a call by Paul to follow or believe; Recognition stories in which someone recognizes that Paul is the Messiah or Saviour: Witness or testimony stories in which either Paul or another character testifies about who he is or what he has done, — for instance, when he drinks the so-called water of life, an elixir obtained through the drowning of a huge sand worm, he acknowledges that he is Kwisatz Haderach, a name meaning the one able to be at the same time in different places and ages, such a person being announced by old prophecies on Dune and also expected by the Order of the Bene Gesserit Mothers. (Jessica, Paul's mother, is herself one of the members.)

The Bene Gesserit Mothers received a special education, and many of them never married or lived with a man. If they did, they would not have been allowed to give birth to a masculine descendant. Jessica breaks the pattern, and from this point of view, she represents an antitype of the Virgin Mother. She is, in fact, the Duke's mistress, and Paul will reinforce the new pattern not marrying Chani, his mistress from Dune, but making her the mother of their children. He will never touch his legal wife, princess Irulan, another Bene Gesserit bride, who remains a kind of a Virgin Wife, and keeps the record of Paul's sayings, conversations and memorable events.

Things are a little complicated and confused, but what is obvious is that a certain pattern has to be prescribed and constantly improved, for that's the way a myth develops. "The mere attempt to repeat a past experience will lead only to disillusionment, but there is another kind of repetition which is the Christian antithesis of Platonic recollection: 'Behold, I make all things new' — says the God of Israel".[6] Paul Atreides is not the son of a god, nor is he crucified in the end. He represents the

4. See folktales and other related "genres".
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*

embodiment of the royal metaphor, and for him the name Messiah may be used as it had been used for Saul or Cyrus the Great, in the sense of a legitimate ruler, the king of his people. Paul may be compared to Moses as well, leading his adoptive people out of the desert, to a future green promised land, which he will never see. And if we consider Moses a type of the Old Testament, then Christ is the antitype, from the New Testament perspective. Christ is not exactly what the Jews had been thinking the Messiah would be, as Paul is not exactly what the readers of Herbert's saga expected.

The writer settled the preconditions for a Messiah but ended in showing how his hero established both anew empire and a new religion, and therefore his dilemma starts: "the principle that one should render to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's runs into trouble".[7] Becoming aware of what he had done — he had turned the inhabitants of Dune into soldiers of a regular army and started a sacred interplanetary war, a jihad — Paul Atreides attempts to take back the place he had been awarded in the mythology of Dune. All he has to do is wait for the proper moment. After getting blind during a battle, he goes away to die in the desert, because blind people were useless, according to local beliefs. But the priests of his new religion betray his ideal, and that's how things happened with the Christian Church, the role of which was "to enter into a dialogue with the word of God, and not to replace it as the source of revelation".[8] So he is forced to come back and fight against them under the mask of a prophet finally being killed in the middle of a confused gathering of people.

The restoration of his myth is a partial one, the author proving his incapacity to sustain the Messianic pattern up to the end. Yet the present paper is both a record of a failure and a celebration of an attempt. Because Frank Herbert has succeeded in transcending the barriers of the genre and has made us forget that science-fiction is a collection of texts among others, literary texts, or that it belongs to a different order of textuality.

The weakness comes from the balance between prophecy and fantasy, a balance biased by fantasy, although carefully and masterly handled up to a certain point. If the variety of texts introducing new chapters provides a mythical halo of a very special quality, the narrative gives up, step by step, in relating to faith, hope and vision. Too many names, character and episodic events consigned to a language that seems to have lost its metaphorical and metonymic phases in favour of the descriptive one. And when someone speaks/writes about sacred, legendary characters such as Christ or Moses, it is through metaphor or metonymy the way to faith, hope and vision goes. But probably Maurice Blanchot was right when he said that the power was no with the hand that wrote, but with the one that stopped writing. Many writers, science-fiction included, might have only one hand. Don't ask me which ...

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7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*

Jeremy Parrott

What's in a name? Onomastic appropriacy in *Wuthering Heights*

In this paper I propose to deal with literary onomastics, or the naming of characters, in Emily Brontë's unique novel, *Wuthering Heights*. I will, however preface my remarks with a disclaimer for any potential and unintentional plagiarism. I have read no other nor know of any other work which deals with this topic in any detail. Given the vast amount of critical writing which *Wuthering Heights* has spawned, it would be quite surprising if this subject has been missed. All I can say is that the ideas expressed in this paper have been worked out independently and represent my own original thoughts.

My starting point was a consideration of the fact that the Brontës all adopted pseudonyms for the publication of their poetry and fictional works. These were clearly not names selected at random. They agreed upon the resonant surname of Bell and three rather puzzling, certainly obscure Christian names: Acton, Currer and Ellis. The avowed intention was that they should be seen as men's names and that the three sisters would therefore be judged as male writers in an era when women writers were treated by the literary establishment with condescension if not outright contempt. And yet, the names they chose, unlike say, George Eliot, can not be read as unambiguously male. They remain perplexingly androgynous and opaque. They do, of course, provide a clue to the real names of the authoresses, as the pseudonym which each sister adopted has the same initials as their given names; AB, CB and EB. It seemed to me therefore that if an authorial pseudonym had been invented with such care, then it might be legitimate to seek hidden meaning in the names of Emily Brontë's fictional creations.

The central figure in the novel, Heathcliff, can be dealt with quite briefly. The origins of his name are explained in a few words by Nelly Dean:

> I found they had christened him "Heathcliff": it was the name of a son who had died in childhood, and it has served him ever since, both for Christian and surname. (chapter 4, p. 46)*

The fact that the solitary Heathcliff has only one name seems entirely appropriate; like the name, his passion and monomania are solid, unchanging, monolithic. And, of course, the onomastic propriety of his name is obvious. He is both 'heath' and 'cliff', wild, lonely, desolate places, perfectly befitting the moorland landscape which is his domaine and the character of a Byronic, Romantic hero. As the elder Catherine says in her key, impassioned confession to Nelly:

> My love for Heathcliff resembles the eternal rocks beneath: a source of little visible delight, but necessary. (Chapter 9, p. 81)

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* All references are to the Penguin Popular Classics edition of *Wuthering Heights*, Penguin Books, 1994.

Necessary, like the eternal rocks, like the heath and the cliff of which he is composed and to which he will return. Indeed the closing image of the novel is of the three gravestones — Edgar's, Cathy's and Heathcliff's — of which Cathy's is 'half-buried in heath', whilst Heathcliff's is 'still bare' (he has only recently died, after all) but we are encouraged to imagine it rapidly being covered and submerged by the heath in a mystical reunion with his beloved beneath their wild and windswept landscape.

Whilst Heathcliff's name is transparent, that of his spiritual son and heir, Hareton, is opaque, but the key nonetheless to cracking the naming code in this novel. On a superficial level his name seems fairly appropriate. It comprises the elements 'hare' — a moorland game animal — and 'ton', which could be read variously as the Old English toponymic for a town or village, the measure of weight (suggestive of Hareton's heaviness or slowness of wit) or indeed 'tun' — a barrel — evoking similar connotations. There the matter might be left, linking Hareton with his natural father, Hindley, whose name also consists of the elements 'hind' — a deer -another moorland game animal (suggesting that they are both game, or victims of Heathcliff's malicious revenge), and 'ley', another Old English toponymic — suggesting that they both derive from ancient English moorland stock. Whilst this analysis is, I believe, plausible and satisfying as far as it goes, the name has other secrets to reveal. Let us return to the conversation between Catherine and Nelly, part of which Heathcliff overhears and which leads to the tragic denouement of the novel. Nelly tries to turn Catherine away from her proposed topic of conversation — a bad dream — by pointing out the infant Hareton beside them:

> "Look at little Hareton! *he's* dreaming nothing dreary. How sweetly he smiles in his sleep!" (chapter 9, p.79)

To which Catherine ripostes:

> "Yes: and how sweetly his father curses in his solitude! You remember him, I dare say, when he was just such another as that chubby thing: nearly as young and innocent." (*ibid.*)

Just such another. Hareton is just such another, for his name is an anagram of 'another'. Which 'other' is he though? In this key passage he is compared to his father, Hindley, of whom he is the offspring, the reproduction, the nearest other, biologically, that there can be. Heathcliff, when contemplating his own feeble progeny, exclaims in exasperation to Nelly:

> "Now, if it had been Hareton! — Do you know that, twenty times a day, I covet Hareton, with all his degradation? I'd have loved the lad had he been someone else." (chapter 21, p. 187)

Heathcliff wishes for him to be someone else, to be another — his own son. Later on in the novel, however, Heathcliff mutters, as Hareton walks away from him:

> "when I look for his father in his face, I find *her* every day more. How the devil is he so like? I can hardly bear to see him." (chapter 31, p.253)

For Heathcliff, he has become another Catherine, a physical likeness which may be attributable to the fact that he is her nephew, though in Heathcliff's permanent waking nightmare he is almost her doppelgänger. Later still, as Heathcliff's madness deepens, he confides to the ever-present Nelly his ambiguous feelings towards Hareton:

> "*He* moves me differently [from young Catherine]: and yet if I could do it without seeming insane, I'd never see him again. You'll perhaps think me rather inclined to become so," he added, making an effort to smile, "if I try to describe the thousand forms of past associations and ideas he awakens and embodies. But

you'll not talk of what I tell you; and my mind is so permanently secluded in itself, it is tempting at last to turn it out to another.

"Five minutes ago, Hareton seemed a personification of my youth, not a human being: I felt to him in such a variety of ways, that it would have been impossible to accost him rationally. In the first place, his startling likeness to Catherine connected him fearfully with her. [...] The entire world is a dreadful collection of memoranda that she did exist, and that I have lost her! Well, Hareton's aspect was the ghost of my immortal love; of my wild endeavours to hold my right; my degradation, my pride, my happiness and my anguish." (chapter 33, pp. 268-9)

In the end, Hareton comes to represent for Heathcliff not just another Hindley on whom to wreak his revenge, not just another Catherine, by whom he is to be haunted, but another Heathcliff, an alter ego, a personification of his lost youth and the ghost of his immortal love. Thus Hareton is, symbolically, more than an-other — he is many others, metamorphosed; anagramatically jumbled and transformed.

Having perceived the possibility of reading the names of characters in this novel as anagrams (perhaps inspired by a love of cryptic clues in crossword puzzles), I continued to apply this approach to see what it might yield. Remaining with Hareton for a while longer, he is not only 'another' but also 'on earth'. This anagram is also appropriate, as he is so very much a son of the soil, brutalised and denied any possibility of self-transcendence from his animal condition by Heathcliff's harsh treatment. The remorseless grinding down which he is forced to endure leaves him virtually devoid of emotion. As Isabella casually observes in her account to Nelly of her hurried flight from Heathcliff:

"I knocked over Hareton, who was hanging a litter of puppies from a chairback in the doorway." (chapter 17, p.160)

Lacking in any natural emotion or affect he has 'no heart', being the inhuman monster of Heathcliff's creation.

Let us turn our attention now to Catherine, or rather the Catherines. We know the importance which the elder Catherine attached to her surname, for Lockwood found etched on the window-ledge:

a name repeated in all kinds of characters, large and small — *Catherine Earnshaw*, here and there varied to *Catherine Heathcliff*, and then again to *Catherine Linton*. [...] the air swarmed with Catherines; (chapter 3, p.32)

And indeed these multiple Catherines do all exist — two Catherine Earnshaws, two Catherine Lintons, one legal Catherine Heathcliff and another spiritual one — the elder Catherine who cries out to Nelly: "I *am* Heathcliff!" (chapter 9, p. 81). But what of the name Catherine itself? Unlike Hindley or Hareton, it is a real name, even a relatively common one. Could it however have any particular poignancy or resonance for Emily Brontë? I applied the cryptic clue technique again and looked for anagrams.

Locked inside the name Catherine I discovered 'nice earth', and it is to the earth the elder Catherine belongs. When recounting her dream to Nelly she feels that:

"heaven did not seem to be my home: and I broke my heart with weeping to come back to earth; and the angels were so angry that they flung me out into the middle of the heath on the top of Wuthering Heights; where I woke sobbing for joy." (chapter 9, p 80)

In her final illness she mentions several times the prospect of being underground, in the earth, almost yearningly, though she can only imagine being finally at peace with Heathcliff by her side, united in death, in their earth, together for eternity. The

importance of earth as a complex image in the novel — a symbol of both life and death, belonging and separation — is emphasized by the fact that 'earth' is the very last word of the novel, as the ingenuous Lockwood contemplates the three headstones and wonders:

> how any one could ever imagine unquiet slumbers for the sleepers in that quiet earth. (chapter 34, p. 279)

Lockwood wonders elsewhere if young Catherine will prove to be 'a second edition of the mother!', and so she is, with some of the modifications one might expect to find in a new, reset edition.

She does not have the same burning passion as her mother but demonstrates on numerous occasions, through the affection she shows her father, Nelly and Linton, that in her breast beats a 'nice heart'. And it is, of course, her nice heart which finally softens and rehumanizes the animal Hareton, 'nice heart' conquering 'no heart' to suggest optimism and hope for their future life together, on earth.

Having linked Catherine and Hareton onomastically, what of the central relationship in the novel, that of Catherine and Heathcliff? The following discussion may be seen as a reading of what is probably the most famous line in the novel — Cathy's exclamation that: "I *am* Heathcliff!" (chapter 9, p. 81) This suggests a mystical union or the interpenetration of souls, a notion which is confirmed by both Catherine and Heathcliff during her final illness. Catherine laments to Nelly:

> "I shall love [my Heathcliff] yet; and take him with me: he's in my soul." (chapter 15, p.143)

whilst shortly afterwards Heathcliff, in an access of passion, cries out:

> "Do I want to live? What kind of living will it be when you — oh, God! would *you* like to live with your soul in the grave?" (chapter 15, p. 144)

Their souls have interpenetrated and, as Catherine's name reveals, they are 'inter each'. This mystical intermingling occurs across the names as well, for in Catherine's name we find, from Heathcliff's perspective, 'her' and 'I', and in Heathcliff's name, the reassurance for Catherine of 'he' and 'I'. Heathcliff's name begins with 'he', a proclamation of maleness, and also the word 'heat', suggesting the fire of his passion. And that heat we find hidden in the heart of Catherine, whilst Heathcliff has the name of his beloved, 'Cath', locked away inside of him. The names, like the characters themselves, are inextricably intertwined in an onomantic marriage — a magical union in which the very letters of the names assume a mystical resonance.

The Linton family should not be ignored in this analysis of names, for whilst Isabella is quite transparent — she is a bella, a beauty — the names Edgar and Linton repay some closer scrutiny. What sort of a man is Edgar? He is a man of quality, of dignity, of conventional values, of worth, of grade. And the word 'grade', the quality which Edgar embodies in his name, is of crucial importance in the novel. Referring once again to Catherine's seminal confession to Nelly, she feels that, even though her heart is not in it, she has to marry Edgar as: "It would degrade me to marry Heathcliff now" (chapter 9, p.80), and Nelly picks up this word when she continues her narrative to tell of Heathcliff's departure:

> He had listened till he heard Catherine say it would degrade her to marry him, and then he stayed to hear no further. (*ibid.*)

Marrying Heathcliff would degrade her, would de-Edgar her. As for the name of Linton, it offers up its secret by the simple process of reversal: Edgar Linton stands for grade, values, standards which are 'not nil', not unimportant, not to be gainsaid as a powerful determining force in human conduct. However, the offspring of Heathcliff and

Isabella, born out of contempt and hatred, also bears the name Linton, this time as a Christian name. This cringing creature, dismissed as worthless by his father, can barely even command young Catherine's respect for five minutes at a stretch. As Linton grovels at her feet she complains to Nelly:

> "Ellen, tell him how disgraceful his conduct is. Rise, and don't degrade yourself into an abject reptile – *don't*!" (chapter 27, p.224)

This Linton is both 'not' and 'nil', a double negation of worth, the quintessence of nothingness.

I would like to conclude with a highly speculative analysis of the name of the virtually omnipresent narrator, Ellen Dean. Her role in this novel has been the subject of much debate, but it is generally agreed that her presence, and her testimony that certain events took place, that certain things were said, serve to ground the story in some sort of realism. Without her mediation and commentary much of the action might appear to be overblown, Gothic horror. Charlotte Brontë, in the editor's preface she wrote for a new edition of *Wuthering Heights*, had this to say of the strangeness or puzzlement which readers from the city might experience in attempting to make sense of the novel:

> I have just read over *Wuthering Heights*, and, for the first time, [...] have gained a definite notion of how it appears to other people – to strangers [...] who are unacquainted with the locality where the scenes of the story are laid; to whom the inhabitants, the customs, the natural characteristics of the outlying hills and hamlets of the West Riding of Yorkshire are things alien and unfamiliar.
>
> To all such, *Wuthering Heights* must appear a rude and strange production. The wild moors of the north of England can for them have no interest; the language, the manners, the very dwellings and household customs of the scattered inhabitants of those districts, must be to such readers in a great measure unintelligible, and – where intelligible – repulsive. (p. 13)

Perhaps Charlotte overstates the case and underestimates the mediating role of the narrator, but it is interesting that she recognizes the importance of rendering intelligible to metropolitan readers the language, characters and events of the novel. So what about the name of the narrator and mediator, Ellen Dean? Anagrams reveal nothing of any apparent significance, and the only important resonance I can discern is in the initial syllable 'Ell' and the diminutive Nelly, both of which echo, bell-like, knell-like, the pseudonym of the authoress, Ellis Bell, suggesting a strong identification of Emily with her narrator. I was tempted to admit that I had drawn a blank in my quest for hidden meanings, when I was somehow reminded of the fictional city where much of Salman Rushdie's "Satanic Verses" is set – Ellowendeeowen – a syllabic spelling of the letters L, O, N, D, O, N – London. This, with the vowels omitted, as in Arabic or Hebrew (YHWH or Yahweh for Jehovah, for example), is also the name Ellen Dean – L, N, D, N. Although she is a Yorkshirewoman herself, her role is to mediate and communicate events in an intelligible way to a wider readership and, principally, to the capital, London.

A question which will doubtless be raised in many minds by this analysis is the extent to which such onomastic appropriacy was present in Emily Brontë's consciousness – the age-old problem of authorial intention. This can never be satisfactorily resolved, as no rough drafts or notes indicating Emily's thought processes in naming and shaping characters have survived. My own feeling on the matter is that she was aware of the Hareton – another anagram and consciously exploited this richness in plot and character development. I am then tempted to believe that if she played around with anagrams at all, she may well have been lucid and fully intentional with respect to all the other meanings with which I have sought to imbue characters' names. In the end, however, the notion of authorial intention, being unknowable in this case, should perhaps be dispensed with. If any given critical or exegetical approach leads to new insight or enhanced

appreciation and enjoyment of a work of art, then perhaps the realisation of that goal should be considered as sufficient justification in itself of the critical endeavour. The plausibility, coherence and interest of this particular endeavour are now for you to judge.

THEATRE

Péter Dávidházi

The Rhetoric of Apology in Early Shakespeare Criticism

The apologetic arguments of early Shakespeare criticism tended to follow latent theological patterns. To understand the genesis of this curious similarity one has to ask a preliminary question about the increasingly religious vocabulary of 18th century Shakespeare criticism in England: how far and in what sense were all those sacred and transcendent qualities taken seriously when attributed to a mere playwright? It would be hardly more than begging the question to point to the well-known humanist tradition of laudatory rhetoric that was ready to call a man of letters divine if his fame survived his mortal part. The psychology of that practice is no less far from self-evident; when Petrarch for example gave the epithet "divus" or "divinus" to Roman emperors as well as to Homer, Cicero or Augustine,[1] all we can safely assume is that he did not mean it in the strictly theological sense. Besides, there is a striking difference between simply calling a poet divine and actually treating him as a perfect and unfathomable transcendental authority who is beyond criticism and deserves an elaborate system of quasi-religious metaphors and similes to glorify him.

Some elements of this sacralizing vocabulary, still mixed with a secular and heterogeneous language of praise, can be discerned as early as the 1660s and they are not rare in the writings of the major critics of the Restoration. But what exactly is the status of such rhetorical devices as John Dryden's admission in the *Prologue* to his *Aureng-Zebe* (1676) that "a secret shame / Invades his breast at Shakespeare's sacred name"? Or what is the status of the poetic statement in his Prologue to *The Tempest, or The Enchanted Island* (1670) that "Shakespeare's power is sacred as a king's"? And what degree of seriousness should be attributed to the adjective "divine" in the *Preface* to Dryden's *All for Love* (1678) where he "professed to imitate the divine Shakespeare"? In his *Of Dramatic Poesy: an Essay* (1668) Dryden mentions "the incomparable Shakespeare", but apparently he does not take his enthusiastic adjective literally, otherwise it would paralyze comparison and preclude relativity. For him Shakespeare is "the man who of all modern, and perhaps ancient poets, had the largest and most comprehensible soul", which not only compares the incomparable and calls Shakespeare a *man*, but cautiously qualifies the praise by a disenchanting "perhaps". Characterizing Ben Jonson, the relativizing impact of a comparison with Shakespeare is even more unmistakable, despite Dryden's emotional preference for the latter. In his *Preface to Troilus and Cressida* (1679) he elaborates several contrasts between Shakespeare and Fletcher, and though finally the distribution of values is much more favourable to Shakespeare, their difference is certainly not that of God and man. In some respects Dryden condemns both playwrights and Shakespeare receives the heavier sentence. "In the mechanic beauties of the plot, which are the observation of the three unities, time, place, and action, they are both deficient; but Shakespeare most." In his *Defence of the Epilogue, or An Essay on the Dramatic Poetry of*

1. Klaniczay, Tibor: "A nagy személyiségek humanista kultusza a XV. században". *Pallas magyar ivadékai.* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi. 1985), 45.

the Last Age (1672), having admitted that "all writers have their imperfections and failings" (an admission that may sound harmless but is a powerful weapon against idolatry), he maintains that Shakespeare's and Fletcher's absurdities, their frequent and gross verbal improprieties, their "lame" plotting and breaches of decorum can only be explained, though not explained away, by remembering the ignorance of their epoch and its relatively undeveloped state of language and literature. All in all, Dryden finds Shakespeare "the very Janus of poets", with one face to admire, one to despise; he could write better than any other poet anywhere in the world, but "he writes in many places below the dullest writer of ours, or of any precedent age". The sporadic and casual occurrences of sacralising epithets hardly invade and can not control Dryden's critical procedures; he knew the difference between the occasions (panegyric, prologue, etc) when excessive eulogy (of the poetry of Shakespeare or even the Earl of Dorset) can remain unsubstantiated and the realm of criticism proper where every literary phenomenon should be subjected to comparative analysis and relative evaluation.[2]

In the course of the 18th century the more and more frequent use of transcendental epithets, whether still coupled with analytical criticism or not, signalled a transformation of the intellectual climate. For Pope Shakespeare is "divine" (1737), for Johnson, despite some "faults" in the plays, "immortal" (1747), for various authors in the last quarter of the century his genius is "divine emanation", therefore "inexplicable" and "incomprehensible".[3] When Elizabeth Montagu maintained (1789) that Shakespeare "was approved by his own age, admired by the next, and is revered, and almost adored by the present", she did not exaggerate the sentiments of her contemporaries.[4] The propriety of quasi-religious adoration was reaffirmed by the communal presentation of eulogies. William Havard's *Ode to the Memory of Shakespeare*, set to music by William Boyce, was sung at Drury Lane Theatre in 1757, calling Shakespeare's inspiration "yet more divine" than the Muse of Homer or the Delphic Oracle, declaring his merits so vast and various that they reveal, partly at least, their higher origin ("How can we sep'rate what's Divine?"), and in its final chorus appealing both to national pride and religious piety. "Then, Britain, boast that to thy Sons was giv'n / The greatest Genius ever sent from Heaven!" Recommending this ode to the readers of the London Chronicle Arthur Murphy emphasized that unlike most contemporary odes this is not a thoughtless patchwork of borrowed praises but something more balanced and substantial ("at the same time that it is poetical, it is a Critique on Shakespeare"); Havard's ode, however, is definitely not critical, in fact it applauds Shakespeare for soaring boldly high "Above the Rules / Of Critic Schools, / And cool Correctness of the Stagyrite".[5] David Garrick's *Ode* to Shakespeare (*An Ode upon Dedicating a Building, and Erecting a Statue, to Shakespeare, at Stratford Upon Avon*), partly recited, partly sung (with Thomas Arne's music) at the 1769 Stratford Jubilee, first calls Shakespeare a "demi-god", and "the god of our idolatry", then wishes Fame to proclaim Shakespeare's "lov'd, rever'd, immortal name", and in the final chorus exhorts everybody present to "Sing immortal *Shakespeare*'s

2. John Dryden: *Selected Criticism*. Eds. James Kinsley and George Parfitt. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 53, 56, 58, 94, 121-122, 126, 130, 132, 147, 157, 159-161, 166, 170-171, 177, 210, 215.
3. Cf. Louis Marder: *His Exits and His Entrances: The Story of Shakespeare's Reputation*. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), 18; Robert Witbeck Babcock: *The Genesis of Shakespeare Idolatry 1766-1799. A Study in English Criticism of the Late Eighteenth Century*. (New York, 1964), 121-125.
4. Elizabeth Montagu: *An Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakespear, Compared with the Greek and French Dramatic Poets. With Some Remarks Upon the Misrepresentations of Mons. de Voltaire*. (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970), 10.
5. Shakespeare: *The Critical Heritage. Volume 4. 1753-1765*. Ed. Brian Vickers. (London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), 289-291.

praise!"[6]

In Garrick's *Ode* the phrase "the god of our idolatry" was meant to suggest no pejorative implications whatsoever; neither had its variant ("the god of their idolatry") disapproving overtones in the Advertisement in *Bell's Edition of Shakespeare's Plays* (1774), but the phrase (and the phenomenon) evoked much less enthusiastic responses as well. The 1769 Jubilee was meant to be pillorized by Francis Gentleman (oddly enough the editor of Bell's edition) when (1770) he remarked dryly that it "deserves no better title than theatrical idolatry".[7] When, in 1774, an anonymous treatise (written by Edward Taylor) blamed Shakespeare for ignoring the requirements of poetic justice, the three unities, and other norms of dramatic composition, the reviewer of *Gentleman's Magazine* predicted tongue-in-cheek that "the enthusiastic adorers of Shakespeare will scarce forgive this sacrilegious attack on that *god of their idolatry*".[8] The irony of such remarks revives Ben Jonson's sober preference for staying this side of idolatry, and their polemic edge indicates the extent to which the psychology of adoration was felt to threaten the down-to-earth procedures of literary criticism. Whether or not the first transcendental epithets of Shakespeare were meant seriously, by now the criticism of his works was in danger of being castigated as sacrilege and blasphemy.

Among scholars we see a reluctance to accept the intimidating implications of the new quasi-religious worship. Attempting to restore Shakespeare's text by removing the errors of Pope's edition, Lewis Theobald confessed "a Veneration, almost rising to Idolatry, for the Writings of the inimitable Poet", but (as if elucidating what he meant by the sober "almost") he challenges the overawed attitude of his predecessor. Quoting Pope's avowed principle of editorial self-effacement ("I have discharged the dull Duty of an Editor [...] with a *religious Abhorrence* of all *Innovation*, and without any Indulgence to my private Sense or Conjecture") Theobald retorts that reverence should not paralyse editorial intervention, and recommends a similar strategy in religious matters as well. "I cannot help thinking this Gentleman's *Modesty* in this Point too *nice* and *blameable*; and that what he is pleased to call a *religious Abhorrence* of *Innovation*, is downright *Superstition*: Neither can I be of Opinion that the Writings of *SHAKESPEARE* are so venerable, as that we should be excommunicated from good Sense, for daring to *innovate properly*; or that we ought to be as cautious of altering *their* Text, as we would That of the *sacred Writings*." The policy of editorial non-intervention is all the more unjustifiable, argues Theobald, as the scholarly editorial work of Dr Bentley revealed "some Thousands of *various Readings*" in the biblical texts themselves. The editor should not treat the text with tyrannical arbitrariness, but if he is overawed to the extent of shying away from all emendations, his behaviour will be "almost as absurd as the Indolence of that good honest *Priest*, who had for thirty years together mistakingly, in his Breviary, read *Mumpsimus* for *Sumpsimus*; and being told of his Blunder, and sollicited to correct it, *The Alteration may be just*, said he; *but, however, I'll not change my old MUMPSIMUS for your new SUMPSIMUS*". Having defended the rights of scholarly criticism in the editing of religious texts as well, Theobald makes no distinction between sacred and profane texts when he concludes that "whenever a *Gentleman* and a *Scholar* turns *Editor* of any Book, he at the same Time commences *Critick* upon his *Author*; and whenever he finds the

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6. Shakespeare: *The Critical Heritage. Volume 5. 1765-1774.* Ed. Brian Vickers. (London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 344-355. Cf. Robert Wheler: *History and Antiquities of Stratford-upon-Avon.* (Stratford: J. Ward, [1806]), 175-185.; Martha Winburn England: *Garrick's Jubilee.* (Ohio State University Press, 1964), 251-263.; Christian Deelman: *The Great Shakespeare Jubilee.* (London: Michael Joseph, 1964), 138-143, 214-225.

7. *Dramatic Censor*, I. 387. Cf. Babcock 1964. 202.

8. [Edward Taylor]: *Cursory Remarks on Tragedy, on Shakespear and on certain French and Italian Poets, principally Tragedians.* (London, 1774); for the review, see *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. XLV. (1775) 90.

Reading suspected, manifestly corrupted, deficient in Sense, and unintelligible, he ought to exert every Power and Faculty of the Mind to [...] restore Sense to the Passage, and, by a reasonable Emendation, to make that satisfactory and consistent with the Context, which before was so absurd, unintelligible, and intricate."[9]

This last imperative, when employed indiscriminately, would overrule the principle known as *lectio difficilior* (the editorial assumption that out of any two variant readings it is the more unusual that is likely to be authentic), and it would often lead to the banalisation of the text. In his editorial practice, however, Theobald was alert to the possibility of obsolete words or strange usage, and after due consideration he acknowledged their authenticity even at places where his professedly devout and anti-innovationist predecessor chose a later variant for its smooth grammatical correctness. A good case in point is Hamlet, act I, scene 2, lines 36-37, where Pope (as well as Rowe) had accepted the 1676 quarto reading ("Giving to you no further personal pow'r / OF TREATY with the King, &c") and Theobald rejected it as an erroneous later correction. "This is a Reading adopted, and of a modern stamp, as I take it; either from Want of Understanding the Poet's genuine Words, or on a Supposition of their being too stiff and obsolete." He replaced "of treaty" with "to business", which he found in all his "old Copies", explaining that "to business" meant "to *negotiate*, or *transact*" with the king, and quoting "a few" (no less than twenty-five!) examples to prove that it "is a Licence in our Poet, of his own Authority, to coin new *Verbs* both out of *Substantives* and *Adjectives*; and it is, as we may call it, one of the *Quodlibet audendi's* very familiar with him".[10] This is very far from a Dryden who had confidently declared that any reader ("who understands English") will find "in every page" of Shakespeare (or Fletcher) "some solecism of speech, or some notorious flaw in sense", and who listed cases of "false grammar" or "ill syntax" in *Catiline*, finding enough in the first pages "to conclude that Jonson writ not correctly".[11] Theobald is far from such prescriptive dogmatism, though he is not always consistent in restoring the grammatically deviant phrase and defending the poet's right to differ from the accepted norms of later usage. Occasionally we see him wavering between the requirements of contemporary grammatical ideals (considered absolute by most editors) and the acknowledgement of Shakespearean (or generally Elizabethan) irregularities. Having collected examples of unorthodox pronominal usage (nominative instead of accusative) he ascertains "a Liberty which *SHAKESPEARE* purposely gave himself", but this time, considering such cases unpardonable violations of grammar and idiom, he endorses Pope's emendations, and finds sufficient reason to make Shakespeare *"now*, at least, speak true *English*".[12] At moments like this he seems to identify *true* and *contemporary* norms of usage, an identification haunting textual criticism ever since Dryden's evolutionist remark that Shakespeare and Fletcher, "had they lived now, had doubtless written more correctly".[13] But whether Theobald accepts or rejects Shakespeare's irregularities, his decision is always substantiated by wholly secular arguments, working on the assumption that it is both the right and the duty of the editor to exercise his reasoning faculty. Right or wrong, his voice is that of an undaunted professional protesting against the unconditional acceptance of dogmas, whether those of Bardolaters or grammarians.

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9. Lewis Theobald: *Shakespeare Restored: or, a Specimen of the Many Errors, As well Committed, as Unamended, by Mr. Pope in his late Edition of this Poet.* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970), iii-v.
10. Theobald 1970. 7-12.
11. John Dryden: *Defence of the Epilogue, or An Essay on the Dramatic Poetry of the Last Age.* (Dryden, 1970), 121-125.
12. Theobald 1970. 40-41. Cf. Peter Seary: *Lewis Theobald and the Editing of Shakespeare.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 69-70.
13. *Defence of the Epilogue, or An Essay on the Dramatic Poetry of the Last Age.* (Dryden, 1970), 125.

The more and more apologetic arguments of 18th century Shakespeare criticism tend towards a secularized version of a pious genre that pervaded the literature of the period although it originated in religious philosophy: the *theodicy*, or the treatise that seeks to justify the ways of God to man. All the diverse and ingenious rescue operations that sought to explain away any flaws in Shakespeare's text relied on the assumption that the parts are manifestations of a design both perfect and unfathomable. There is an interesting similarity between the theological argument from design, the attempt to prove the existence of God by postulating that the coherent order of the universe must have required a supreme designer, and the amazement of late 18th century critics who seriously wonder whether the inexplicable perfection of Shakespeare's design could have been invented and executed by a mortal author at all. Ironically it was the same age in which David Hume challenged the argument from design[14] that gave birth, to mention but one example, to Maurice Morgann's rapture of overawed self-humiliation in front of a dramatic oeuvre that seemed to have been planned and executed by a quasi-transcendental authority. In Shakespeare's works "every thing seems superior", because showing the motives and results of human behaviour he conveys an unmistakable sense of necessity yet he "submits himself so little to our judgement" that we are unable to account for it in any analytical way. "We discern not his cause, we see no connection of cause and effect, we are rapt in ignorant admiration, and claim no kindred with his abilities. All the incidents, all the parts, look like chance, whilst we feel and are sensible that the whole is design. [...] I restrain the further expressions of my admiration lest they should not seem applicable to man; but it is really astonishing that a mere human being, a part of humanity only, should so perfectly comprehend the whole [...]."[15] Yet this admission of the critic's own (human) inadequacy to comprehend the full depth and intricate workings of Shakespeare's superior design was not followed by self-negation or surrender; in fact Morgann's essay analyses Falstaff's character to retrieve no less than Shakespeare's true intention and to refute the suggestion that the playwright "ever meant to make Cowardice an essential part of his constitution".[16] In spite of the critic's admiration, admittedly in danger of exceeding the degree "applicable to man", he does not abstain from scrutinizing what the designer may have *meant* to make.

Neither does the Reverend Richard Stack in his reply which refers to Morgann's essay as "one of the most ingenious pieces of criticism" but objects to its misconception of Shakespeare's design that he feels confident enough to rectify by a close rereading of the entire play. He thinks "it might be shown that Shakespeare has designed cowardice, rather than constitutional courage, to be a part of Falstaff's real character" and goes on to marshal evidence from details Morgann overlooked or ignored. The procedure is analytical, patient and painstaking, the argument is rational, and instead of Morgann's self-deprecating admiration in front of a superior intelligence the reply attempts to reconstruct the logic of an equal. "Can we suppose then that Shakespeare, if he had designed to exhibit Falstaff as naturally brave, would in the first scene of our acquaintance with him have given strong intimation of his cowardice? which he has unquestionably done in the scheme laid for him by Poins, and in the observations made upon the probable conduct of Falstaff." Demonstrating that by such self-serving omissions Morgann "slurred over" details which could have revealed "plainly the poet's design", and that to substantiate his erroneous view Morgann had to resort to "systems of malice in the plot which certainly the poet never designed" the author of the reply seems to feel that he *proved* his own point with the certainty of any scientist concluding a decisive experiment. It is no mere coincidence that this thoroughly secular refutation was

14. David Hume: *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. Ed. Henry D. Aiken. (New York and London: Hafner Publishing Company, 1969).
15. Maurice Morgann: *An Essay on the Dramatic Character of Sir John Falstaff* [1777]. In: *Shakespeare: The Critical Heritage. Volume 6. 1774-1801.* (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 170-171.
16. Vickers 1981. 165.

conceived by the Reverend Richard Stack, a priest, scholar and scientist, the vice-president of the Royal Irish Academy, whose energies were divided between writing studies on the Bible and an introduction to chemistry. In the role of literary critic a priest can be no advocate of evil but the Reverend Stack clearly refuses either to explain away or to exaggerate the moral problem implied in his own conception of Falstaff's character. He notices "the strange arts by which Shakespeare has drawn our liking toward so offensive an object; or to speak with more precision, has contrived to veil the offensive parts of his character" but he does not condemn Shakespeare's art (say) for demoralising the audience.[17] The implication of his method suggests that for him Shakespeare criticism is not the proper occasion for overawed worship, self-paralysing reverence or moral preaching.

It is only in view of the competing assumptions about Shakespeare's human or superhuman mind that one can understand the reasoning of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the great romantic poet-critic, deeply concerned with theological issues, but also endowed with diverse talents for psychology, philosophy, and natural sciences that he sought to reconcile with his quest for a religious meaning of life.[18] A superficial glance at his Shakespeare criticism might show him as he is often taken to be: the paragon of bardolaters. On closer inspection, however, we discern a fascinating dilemma of secular and quasi-religious attitudes in his reasoning. In an intricate passage of his seventh lecture on Shakespeare and Milton he mentions two distinct kinds of self-paralysis in the face of enigmatic details the critic finds too difficult to interpret. Although both are connected to "a characteristic of Shakespeare, which belongs to a man of profound thought and high genius" Coleridge dismisses them as unnecessary and unacceptable. The first would give up the hope of understanding a text because it seems to be (now or maybe forever) transcending our abilities. "It has been too much the custom, when anything that happened in his dramas could not easily be explained by the few words the poet has employed, to pass it idly over, and to say that it is beyond our reach, and beyond the power of philosophy - a sort of terra incognita for discoverers - a great ocean to be hereafter explored." The other way of retreat is chosen by those who would accept and indeed revere disconnectedness as absolute, sublime, even sacred, treating "such passages as hints and glimpses of something now non-existent, as the sacred fragments of an ancient and ruined temple, all the portions of which are beautiful, although their particular relation to each other is unknown." So far the argument seems to imply the necessity of an alternative rationale, egalitarian and secular, to sustain the hope of intelligibility, but the subsequent refutation of critical surrender almost explicitly resorts to apologetic strategies Coleridge must have known from theological discussions. To maintain that it is not hopeless for us to try to understand Shakespeare ("study, and the possession of some small stock of the knowledge by which he worked, will enable us to detect and explain his meaning") Coleridge exhorts us to have confidence in the consistency of the superb order created by an omniscient intellect that knew even the "most minute and intimate workings" of the human mind, a consistency reliable enough to be used as our aid to detecting scribal error and making sense. "Shakespeare [...] never introduces a word, or a thought, in vain or out of place: if we do not understand him, it is our own fault or the fault of the copyists and typographers [...] He never wrote at random, or hit upon points of character and conduct by chance; and the smallest fragment of his mind not unfrequently gives a clue to a most perfect, regular, and consistent whol"[19]Surprisingly enough, Coleridge's argument resembles an 18th century

17. Richard Stack: *An Examination of an Essay on the Dramatic Character of Sir John Falstaff* [1788]. In: Vickers 1981. 469--479.
18. W. Jackson Bate: *Coleridge*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1987), 182, 213.
19. S. T. Coleridge: *The Lectures of 1811-1812*. In: *Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Shakespearean Criticism*. 2 vols. ed. Thomas Middleton Raysor. (London: Dent; New York: Dutton,

mode of thinking he treated with ever growing aversion: the operations of an excessively rationalist theological tradition that was still flourishing in his day. Reiterating that nothing is random in Shakespeare's works, excluding the possibility of anything accidental or unintended, considering even the smallest details of his text as necessary and justifiable parts in a perfect design of an omniscient mind, and attributing all the apparent obscurities to the frailties of transmission or those of the recipient, Coleridge (perhaps unwittingly) fuses the apologetic strategies we might call literary theodicy with the very technique of Christian apologetics he was otherwise more and more reluctant to accept: the argument from design. Just as William Paley (1743-1805) sought to prove the existence of a benevolent God by pointing to omnipresent 'evidences' of a transcendent design in nature, Coleridge exhorts critics to assume an all-pervading and perfect design in each Shakespearean play and to rely on this assumption whenever they are facing any problem of establishing the text, interpreting its meaning, and ascertaining its value. One cannot but agree with the observation that Coleridge "approaches Shakespeare with greater reverence than Paley approaches Holy Writ" and that "this reverence involves a recognition of symbolic tension"[20] but it is no exaggeration to add that Coleridge read Shakespeare precisely the way Paley read nature: with a firm belief in an underlying design of absolute authority and with the resolution to treat even the smallest detail as evidence of its manifestations.

Similar as these apologetic reading habits seem to be, they were applied to different phenomena, hence neither their philosophical value nor their moral impact could be the same. For the subtle analytical mind and ethically tuned religious sensibility of Coleridge it was but a question of time to discover the philosophical and moral problems lurking behind Paley's theology. After a relatively brief period of youthful enthusiasm for Paley he began to suspect an untenable circular reasoning in the argument from design. In *Aids to Reflection* he mentioned the possibility that a crucial passage in Paley was impaired by "dialectic flaws" like *petitio principii* and *argumentum in circulo*;[21] in *Table Talk* he suggests that even Kant had to fail when trying to prove the existence of God and sums up the problem with admirable lucidity. "Assume the existence of God, - and then the harmony and fitness of the physical creation may be shown to correspond with and support such an assumption; - but to set about *proving* the existence of a God by such means is a mere circle, a delusion. It can be no proof to a good reasoner, unless he violates all syllogistic logic, and presumes his conclusion."[22] When applied to Shakespeare's texts, one might add, the self-serving circularity of such reasoning is no less evident, yet a wholesale condemnation of its impact would be unfair. Meant as an exhortation to unfold and discover, it encouraged analysis even if it triggered off pre-structuralist analyses that precluded the possibility of any inner conflict or incoherence in the text as artistic flaws incompatible with the assumed unity of the author's supreme design. The results and conclusions of this apologetic method were difficult to falsify, at least within the orbit of its ruling assumption, but in literary interpretations a residue of circularity can be accepted as a hermeneutical necessity. And one would think (innocently) that in Shakespeare criticism there is less at stake than in theodicy proper and therefore the chances of philological self-correction are slightly better.

But are they? When reading late 18th and early 19th century Shakespeare criticism

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1967), II. 109.

20. Stephen Prickett: *Romanticism and Religion. The Tradition of Coleridge and Wordsworth in the Victorian Church.* (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 28.

21. Samuel Taylor Coleridge: *Aids to Reflection and The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit.* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884), 232-233.

22. Samuel Taylor Coleridge: *Specimens of the Table Talk.* (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1905), 307-308.

one has the uneasy feeling that the assumption of Shakespeare's impeccable design was largely responsible for fostering those soaring eulogies of pseudo-criticism an eminent scholar used to label *idolatry ad astra*.[23] Coleridge propagated the assumption to urge his contemporaries not to be overawed and keep up their efforts to explore hidden meanings, nevertheless many of his fellow-critics followed an easier path. Reading these bardolaters one wonders about the actual moral impact of Paleyite apologetics both in theology and in Shakespeare criticism. Although initially Coleridge himself defended Paley's theology on moral grounds,[24] and in his Cambridge days once (1793) welcomed it as a means to pacify human discontent (including his own),[25] he soon realized that Paley's approach led to double-edged ethical consequences. In 1806 he severely criticised Paley's "mode of defending Christianity" because it made people look outward instead of inward and thus it "has increased the number of infidels",[26] and in *Aids to Reflection* (1825) he wages war on Paley's dangerously spreading doctrine: "I believe myself bound in conscience to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of this triumphal car, on which the tutelary genius of modern Idolatry is borne, even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels!"[27] In Shakespeare criticism the assumption of perfect design could have encouraged infidel behaviour in the good sense of the word (after all, Coleridge used it to persuade critics not to treat enigmatic texts as the sacrosanct ruins of some ancient temple) but in fact it served the tutelary genius of idolatry. Coleridge's own Shakespeare criticism is dominantly secular, and justifies the opinion that "his *relative* freedom from idolatry [...] can be reasonably maintained if we admit the crucial distinction between extravagant praise and transmutation of the thing praised",[28] but the assumption he propagated could easily be assimilated by a quasi-religious transmutation of Shakespeare and his works. In addition to apologetic critical strategies the manifestations of this transmutation included a whole range of devout (verbal and ritual) acts, from the worshipful use of transcendental epithets to the pious yet carnivalesque anniversary celebrations. The Shakespeare cult of his age, unlike that of Ben Jonson, was hardly "this side idolatry".

23. Babcock 1964. 199.
24. In his notebook 26 October, 1803. Cf. Prickett 1976. 82-84.
25. To Mrs Evans, February 5, 1793. *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 1785-1800; 1801-1806.* 2 vols. Ed. Earl Leslie Griggs. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1956), I. 48.
26. To George Fricker, October 4, 1806. *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 1785-1800; 1801-1806.* 2 vols. Ed. Earl Leslie Griggs. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1956), II. 1189.
27. *Aids to Reflection and The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit.* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884), 273.
28. Alfred Harbage: "The Myth of Perfection". In: Alfred Harbage: *Conceptions of Shakespeare.* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 31.

Péter Szaffkó

Shakespeare and After. A New Approach to the Classification of English Historical Drama

History Play vs. Historical Drama

"Apart from a few belated survivals, among which *Perkin Warbeck* [...] and Shakespeare's *Henry VIII* stand out, the chronicle history seems to have died with Elizabeth," says Anne Barton in an essay on the Stuart history play (69). Her statement appears to be a reaffirmation of a generally accepted critical view that the Elizabethan history play (commonly identified as 'chronicle history/play') "may be considered in the development of the English Drama practically as a thing apart" (Schelling 3). Although several outstanding English and American scholars like Felix E. Schelling, Tucker Brooke, E.M.W. Tillyard, Irving Ribner, and Graham Holderness have made serious attempts to define and classify what they considered as the English history play, the term, as Barton claims, "had been, from the beginning, an amorphous and ill-defined genre, always inclined to blur or submerge its identity in its neighbouring, and more established, forms of comedy and tragedy" (70). She also rightly observes that "the decline, after one year of James's reign, in the popularity of a dramatic genre which flourished so richly under Elizabeth raises questions about the genre itself" (69).

One of the basic questions to be answered here is this: what is the relationship between such terms as 'history play,' 'chronicle history' and 'historical drama'? Most scholars dealing with Shakespearean or Elizabethan history plays have tended both to distinguish between the various types of histories and to separate them from tragedies or such pseudo-historical plays as romances, mere spectacles or legendary histories. This fact supports my argument—which I have elaborated on elsewhere—that *historical drama can be understood only as a collective term* including several different categories or types of drama which have undergone both historical and typological changes. Consequently, the term 'history play' cannot be identified with the much wider category of 'historical drama' as has been frequently done in English and American literary criticism. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that any distinction between various types of historical drama should be based on some objective criteria and not on critical preconceptions or aesthetic values.

To me, then, historical drama is a collective and aesthetically neutral term including all those plays, whether written for performance or for reading, for adults or for children, with artistic/aesthetic aspirations or with a didactic/educational purpose, which are set in a recognizable historical period preceding that of the time of their composition dealing with characters, events and/or situations typical of that period. The definition of the genre as a collective term implies that it can be divided into several groups. An adequate classification of historical drama, however, must be based on historical (vertical) and typological (horizontal) criteria because, as a result of the particular nature of dramatic composition, its evolution—as that of some other literary genres—is not at all linear.

The development of European—including English—historical drama, like that of drama itself, shows a gradual evolution from the general to the particular, i.e. from a symbolic history of man representing mankind through the more specific crucial moments of a people's story towards the local history of smaller communities such as a social class, an ethnic group, a town, a village or a region. This linearity, however, does not mean that the forms and variants of the various stages exclude or replace each other. On the contrary, all of them have been preserved and further modified to broaden the scale of historical approaches to the drama (or dramatic approaches to history) both in form and subject matter. This evolutionary process is evident not only in the general history of European drama but also within national boundaries. Consequently, the more mature a national literature becomes the more complex and colourful the range of historical drama proves to be. Furthermore, the accelerated cultural and political interactions among the countries of the world in our century have resulted in a parallel emergence of new forms in almost all branches of art, more and more eliminating national differences, especially in the field of historical drama which, partly, tends to use those segments of the past that are thought to be common knowledge to an ever growing general public. Since history in our century has become a matter of everyday experience more than ever before, historical drama can keep up a living connection not only between the past and the present but also among readers and audiences of different cultures and different political systems.

Historically, then, we can distinguish at least four stages in the evolution of the genre. Each of these stages produced radically new elements reflected in most of the works of the given period but the forms of the earlier phase lived on either in an unchanged pattern or in a slightly modified form to meet the requirements of the day. These stages are the following: prehistorical (Antique), classical (basically Shakespearean), romantic (mostly national tragedies of the 19th century) and modern (starting with G.B. Shaw).

A horizontal classification of historical drama can be based on several criteria among which the most important ones are as follows:

Table 1. The relationship between subject matter and history

quasi-histories	plays in which mythical or historical figures and events are used by the playwright to illustrate some moral, political or social issue pertaining to his age
political histories (history plays)	plays in which characters embody and represent major historical forces in serious conflict with each other, revealing essential turning-points or crises in the development of a given community, including social groups, ethnic communities, nations or countries
costume histories (pseudo-historical plays)	plays in which the historical setting is only an excuse for the playwright to present a story of sentiment, excitement or spectacle

Table 2. The object of the focus of the play

biographical histories	plays in which the central focus of the plot is on one individual's life either in full or in one crucial period
epic histories	plays in which the central focus of the plot is on historical events with or without real historical figures
sociological histories	plays in which the focus of the plot is on the everyday reality of a recognisable historical period

Table 3. Dramatic form or genre



The above list of the various forms of historical drama is not at all complete but it may be helpful to illustrate the complex system of continuities and overlappings among them. In Table 3 black cells indicate those kinds of drama which have been most frequently associated with the four major historical forms whereas the diagonally shaded ones show those kinds of historical plays which may be encountered within the given categories.

This list of the great variety of historical drama has been devised on an all-European basis which means that no national dramatic literature has produced all of the possible types. On the other hand, there are certain forms which are special to

one national literature, such as, for instance, the English chronicle and heroic plays.

Major Periods of English Historical Drama

1. Medieval Prehistorical Drama

"It was in the medieval Biblical Cycles performed on Corpus Christi Day that English playwrights first attempted to represent history on the stage," argues John R. Elliott maintaining that "the form of their drama ... they took directly from history itself: the structure of the Corpus Christi Play is the structure of the Providential pattern of Christian history, as this was articulated in Biblical exegesis and in the liturgy of the Church" (22). Medieval English drama is commonly thought of as religious, didactic and moralistic but as Glynne Wickham has pointed out:

> Storyline, assisted by the rhetorical skills of the actors, with its power to awake faith and to stir emotion where largely illiterate audiences were concerned, was allowed to assume an importance in Miracle Plays and Saint Plays overriding all other considerations: for these were reenactments of historical events in time-present, and to be regarded by their audiences as of abiding significance for the whole community time-without-end. (47)

Thus, the medieval cycles, miracle and saint plays and even the moralities represent the first major stage of English historical drama. These dramatic works, however, should not be regarded as 'history plays' which are—in the present classification pattern—political histories. Rather, they are prehistorical quasi-histories in which the aim of the playwright was to teach and/or reflect Christian morals and doctrines by using a story from the past. We may agree with David Scott Kastan who has claimed that "medieval cycles have been shown to be a complex and sophisticated imitation of *historia sacra*, drawing shape and significance from the playwright's understanding of the shape and significance of history" (4) but this relationship between the form of history and dramatic form is yet another element that distinguishes prehistorical plays from the later stages of historical drama. Such late moralities as *A Mirror for Magistrates,* which Tillyard has considered "not a History Play but a Morality with a princely turn," (92) or John Bale's *King John,* "the first secular history play" (Elliott 23) can be regarded as transitions between quasi-histories and political histories. Referring to *King John*, Elliott emphasizes that "for Bale ... there was an actual historical continuity between the past and the present, a continuity that he made real on the stage by the change of time from the past to the present in the last section of his play" (24). True as it may be, Tillyard's comment on the same play that "although John is a kind of English Everyman, the life of the play is contemporary Protestant propaganda" (93) seems to assert that because of their strong links with the medieval dramatic tradition these moralities basically belong in the category of prehistorical quasi-histories displaying at the same time some of the elements which were to be dominant in the political histories of the next period.

2. Classical Historical Drama of the Renaissance

The emergence of what is commonly called the 'history play' is closely connected to the establishment of national drama practically in all European countries. The English chronicle play, which is the first mature specimen of political history in dramatic form, has been shown to be produced and enriched by national sentiment, an awareness of history and a flourishing political and cultural situation in Renaissance England. This special kind of drama, however, cannot be identified automatically with the English history play which is a more general term applicable to different periods of English literature. Such terms as the 'Elizabethan' or 'Stuart history plays' are more acceptable but even in this case the group of chronicle

histories must be understood in a more general sense than it has been suggested by some scholars. It was Samuel Taylor Coleridge who first said that "in order that a drama may be properly historical, it is necessary that it should be the history of the people to whom it is addressed" (108) and his romantic misconception has been taken up by twentieth-century scholars who have tended to study Shakespeare's works on the past rulers of England as history plays usually ignoring any other chronicles or historical plays.

According to F.E. Schelling at least "a hundred and fifty plays of the general type of chronicle history were written and performed" (2) between 1586 and 1606, i.e. during the Golden Age of English drama. In recent English and American literary criticism there is a growing interest in reconsidering the terms 'chronicle play' and 'history play' extending them both in time and scope. In my classification classical historical drama—as a very wide category—covers a long period starting in the early Renaissance and ending around the end of the eighteenth century. Since there is no time here to deal with all the historical plays written during more than two centuries, let me refer you to Table 4 which illustrates some of the main trends represented by well-known examples.

Table 4

	HISTORY PLAYS	QUASI-HISTORIES	COSTUME HISTORIES
RENAISSANCE			
chronicles and tragedies	*Gorboduc* Shakespeare's English and Roman histories *Perkin Warbeck*	*King Lear, Macbeth, Hamlet, Tamburlaine* *Edward II*	revenge tragedies *The Spanish Tragedy* horror tragedies *The Duchess of Malfi* *The White Devil*
mythological plays		*David and Bethsabe* *The Jew of Malta* *Doctor Faustus*	masques
comedies			*Merry Wives of Windsor, Friar Bacon* *James IV,*
tragicomedies			*Bonduca*
neoclassical tragedies	*Sejanus, Catiline*		*Bussy D'Ambois*
RESTORATION			
heroic plays and tragedies	*Venice Preserv'd*	*Conquest of Granada* *The Indian Emperor*	*Empress of Morocco*
musical drama			*Siege of Rhodes*
18TH CENTURY			
pseudo-classic tragedies	*Cato, Jane Shore,* *Lady Jane Grey*		

As can be deduced from the titles in Table 4, historical plays of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries display a wide range of aesthetic quality, and if

the list were complete, the situation might be even 'worse.' However, as I have already mentioned here and elsewhere, no historical and/or typological classification can be based on critical evaluation. Whether a certain play belongs to any of the types of historical drama depends not on its artistic value but on more objective criteria. If Addison's *Cato* or Nicholas Rowe's *Jane Shore* are found to be inferior to *Julius Caesar* or *Henry VIII* it does not mean that the former two plays cannot belong in the same group. As a matter of fact, the real value of a work of art can be most properly defined within its own genre or category.

3. English Historical Drama in the Nineteenth Century

It is a commonplace that the Romantic and Victorian periods in English literature were the least productive times of significant drama. As Allardyce Nicoll has put it: "Drama ... from 1790 onward is seen to divide itself sharply into acted and unacted plays, the former becoming, with the passage of the years, more and more trivial, the latter more and more divorced from theatrical needs" (305). The lack of great works, however, does not mean that drama disappeared. On the contrary, nineteenth-century theatre attracted larger audiences than ever before. Theatre was alive and theatre-going became a regular habit of the constantly growing middle class. The main attraction of nineteenth-century theatres was spectacle in many different forms: Gothic drama, romantic melodrama, spectacle plays, etc. What might have been of more literary value was written in the form of closet drama but these plays, in most cases, lacked a genuine spirit of the theatre and stage experience. England, in this respect, stands somewhat apart from the rest of Europe where Romantic drama produced an outburst of a new type of historical drama belonging to the third stage of its development. The most important form of Romantic historical drama, the *national history play,* had a similar function to that of the English Renaissance history play: to raise national consciousness either by myth-making or through a conscious search for, or confirmation of, natioal identity. Since social and political circumstances in nineteenth-century England differed significantly from those in such European countries as France, Poland, Russia, the Habsburg Empire and what was to become Germany the role of history in English Romantic and Victorian drama was relegated to the level of triviality and spectacle. In Martin Meisel's words: "the history play of the nineteenth century was characterized by three qualities: elaborate spectacle, romantic intrigue and flamboyant histrionics" (qtd. in Harben 22). Even such works as e.g. Shelley's *The Cenci,* Byron's *Sardanapalus* and *The Two Foscari* or Browning's *Strafford* and *King Victor and King Charles* must be regarded as quasi-historical dramas in which historical events or figures are no more than a consciously chosen framework to accommodate the poets' ideas. On the other hand, the successful Romantic dramas and melodramas with a historical setting (e.g. Bulwer-Lytton's *The Lady of Lyons* and *Richelieu, or The Conspiracy* or Boucicault's *The Colleen Bawn*) are undoubtedly costume histories.

4. Modern English Historical Drama

It is a most striking phenomenon in English and American literary criticism that modern English historical plays began to attract critical attention only in the past few decades. Despite the fact that about 500 English historical plays were written between 1890 and 1975 (cf. Garstenauer 1), the first book-length monograph on twentieth-century English history plays was published in 1988 by Niloufer Harben—Professor of English at the University of Malaya. Other important studies touching upon the same subject but not only English drama include Herbert Lindenberger's *Historical Drama* (1975) and Paul Hernadi's *Interpreting Events* (1985).

It is commonly accepted that modern English (and European) historical drama starts with G.B. Shaw whose *Saint Joan,* a play that "illustrates the new tradition of history play stimulated by Shaw, with his emphasis on discursive rational elements, an

anti-heroic tone and diction, an overtly modern perspective and a consciousness of different possible views of an event" (Harben 22). Just as in the earlier stages, the distinctive feature of modern historical drama is not its dramatic form, which ranges from traditional to experimental, but its novel approach to history. Playwrights of the modern historical play may be said to possess a more sophisticated understanding of social and historical progress, a recognition of social classes in conflict with each other, and a serious distrust in traditionally accepted value systems. As a result, there is a clear tendency in modern historical playwriting to reassess the role and significance of historical personages or events, frequently leading to demythifying or deheroizing. The other two important features are the introduction of a sociological aspect into the study of history and a deep interest in minorities and ethnic groups whose story in the past of a given society or a nation had been either fully neglected or depicted in a manner both unhistorical and humiliating to the members of the respective social groups.

While in the earlier periods historical plays showed a relatively limited variety of forms and styles, twentieth-century English historical drama has displayed a richness incomparable to any other period. Shaw is the first of those playwrights whose works may be characterised, in Hernadi's words, by a "detached, ironic, often paradoxical, and almost always tragicomic spirit" (9) but at the end of this line we would find such works as Arnold Wesker's panoramic *Chicken Soup with Barley,* Tom Stoppard's parahistorical *Travesties* or Edward Bond's unique and frequently shocking histories. T.S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral* is very much an independent work having its own individual form and style whereas Rober Bolt's *A Man for All Seasons* and Peter Shaffer's *Royal Hunt of the Sun* represent a more popular form, the former belonging to quasi-histories (together with other plays like Osborne's *Luther*) and the latter to costume histories. Irish playwrights from W. B. Yeats to Brian Friel have created a special kind of national history interspersed with mythological and legendary elements.

The list is endless and the length of such a paper is not enough to cover every form and every trend. I do hope, however, that I have managed to prove that what is still frequently regarded as the English history play, i.e. Shakespeare's and his contemporaries' historical plays, is a misleading term, not only because it usually excludes several types of historical drama in the same period but also because the English history play—however the term is understood—did not die with Elizabeth.

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Richard Allen Cave

The State of British Theatre

To even a casual observer of the theatrical scene, it appears that, despite the presence of an economic crisis and of a government hostile towards intellectual and artistic activities, the performing arts (certainly in London) are currently enjoying something of a renaissance. Perhaps some facts at this point would be valuable. At the time of writing this article (early January 1995) *Time Out* lists over 150 venues as offering theatrical performances in three main categories: West End and Subsidised theatres; Off-West End; and Fringe houses. While over the last twenty years a number of West End theatres have closed, the plethora of fringe venues has more than doubled: the most surprising spaces — over pubs and cafes, one-time warehouses, converted schools and chapels — now regularly offer theatrical performances. Not all fringe companies playing in London will necessarily run to the expense of advertising in *Time Out*, but will rely on local circulation of flyers describing their shows, which may be directed strongly at a particular community; consequently the 150 listings are by no means a complete summary of performances actually available for viewing this week. Significantly of the 150 shows listed, 85 fall into the Off-West End or Fringe categories. The picture looks a particularly healthy one.

Let us pursue the statistics a little further and see how the numbers break down into types and genres of dramatic entertainment. We are of course still in the midst of the Christmas season, so there is a substantial number of pantomimes (14) which are popular with actors since they require large casts, are generally well-paid, play to enthusiastic family audiences and have longish runs (usually from mid-December till the end of January). Equally substantial is the number of long-running musicals (21), though this is exceeded by the wealth of new playwriting (10 plays in the West End; 28 in the other two categories). Of revivals of classic drama a total of 33 plays breaks down into the following sub-sections: 15 modern classics of which 3 happen to be Strindberg and 5 by British and American dramatists of the 1920-40 period; 12 revivals of plays by Shakespeare and his contemporaries; 3 Restoration comedies; 2 eighteenth-century comedies; and 1 Greek tragedy. Three further statistics are worth recording here in anticipation of developments in my later argument: 12 of the 150 performances are dramatisations of novels (of these by far the most popular author is Dickens); 11 are plays by black Caribbean, black African or farEastern dramatists and companies; and 4 are by gay writers and performers (two of these are West End successes). Some of the shows listed in *Time Out* are not easily grouped by genre and so have not been included in my sub-sectioning; several productions, however, fall comfortably into two sub-sections and have been counted in both (such as Lilian Hellman's *The Children's Hour*, which has been recorded under the groupings "American" and "Modern Classics in Revival"; though, given its lesbian subject-matter, the play might also as easily have been placed in the "Gay" section, raising that last total to 5). The issue of *Time Out* from which I collected these statistics was also carrying advertisements for a number of productions, many by international artists, that are to be part of the annual London Festival of Mime and these were not included in the calculations. However, it is worth recording this fact to illustrate the range of theatrical fare on offer during this month, when Modern Dance enthusiasts also have access to a second festival, "Resolution! 1995" bringing a multitude of national and international small-scale experimental dance companies and performance artists to

the capital, usually for single performances and often in shared billings (two or even three separate companies performing as part of the same evening's programme and sharing costs). The picture is again a decidedly healthy one, though quality is not necessarily commensurate with quantity.

Londoners clearly do very well. Frustration is frequently felt at the amount of good work a dedicated theatregoer has to miss, because of the sheer volume of choice rather than a lack of it. But is the situation similar in provincial cities and communities? Here the picture varies considerably from geographical area to area. The Midlands are well catered for with the Royal Shakespeare Company's three theatres in Stratford that offer a range of work in; the form of new writing as well as revivals and there are good local repertory theatres nearby in Birmingham, Coventry, Leicester, Nottingham, Derby. There are state-Subsidised opera and ballet companies based in major cities that undertake a considerable programme of touring throughout local regions. Where there is cause for concern is in respect of the running of many of the local repertory theatres, where reductions in Arts Council funding and a failure on the part of some local town councils to make up the deficit has led to the closing by many such theatres of their experimental studios, where throughout the late sixties, seventies and early eighties new dramatists could be sure of finding space to stage their work and the funding to do so on a modest scale. The increasing lack of such spaces on a national scale may well account for the large number of new plays getting a first production in fringe venues in London.

Non-London theatregoers miss out on new playwriting for another reason. Many of the fringe companies included in the statistical tables above will be operating on what has come to be known as a "profit-share" basis. This means that the actors involved and sometimes the director, designer and technicians are not directly paid even the Equity minimum wage (that is the figure set as a base for salary negotiations for actors by their, union, Equity). Instead they give their services over a rehearsal period and for a set number of performances free, but on the understanding that, if the production makes any kind of profit, the monies involved will be shared equally between all the personnel engaged on the production. Actors, young directors and designers will often agree to these terms, because it is WORK; and working even on such terms is preferable to "resting", which today means being "on the dole" and in receipt of social security payments; instead actors are allowed to be in receipt of such payments while to all intents and purposes working for nothing, because in the eyes of the relevant state bureaucrats they are undertaking necessary training to remain skilled for future employment. The attraction is that, because such projects are always London-based, the actors' agents can take casting directors from theatre, television and film along to see them in performance, which could well lead to more profitable roles in the longer term. Also the casual set up of projects like this are such that actors feel free, when occasion demands, to take off a day or two from rehearsals to do a minor role in a television or radio show or quickly film a commercial advertisement, which helps pay for their involvement with what (in creative terms) may be the more rewarding fringe production. Needless to say this is not a situation that is wholly free of abuses of various kinds; and it does mean that most innovative work (even from major dramatists who wish to try out a new vein of writing which established venues are reluctant at first to handle till it has "proved itself") is staged in London. Only a very dedicated provincial theatregoer will be prepared to meet the expense of a journey to the metropolis to view such work.

Far too few local repertory theatres are prepared to take risks with their programming than a decade ago; or, if they do attempt something rather out of the ordinary, they minimise the risk by inviting "star" names, usually from popular television series, to play the leading roles and the resulting productions tend to be lacking in invention and devoid of those qualities of committed ensemble acting that a successful revival properly demands. There have been notable exceptions, but this is a noticeable trend resulting from Mrs. Thatcher's government's rather drastic treatment of the Arts, which succeeding governments have not seen fit to rectify. Though such governments' stated aim has been devolution to encourage district and borough councils to take a greater pride in their local theatres sufficient to offer substantial increases in their

funding, in practice the effect of these changes has led to a greater focusing of dramatic activity on the capital. What this means is that most new playwriting and revivals of less popular classic drama are increasingly to be found on the London fringe. Such companies as do venture on a provincial tour with a classic revival (and it is a risky financial business setting up such a tour initially, unless a company has some reserves to fall back on to cover the period till box-office receipts begin to flow in) find that they are likely to play to near-capacity houses, so great is the thirst in such provincial venues for that kind of work, whereas if they then bring the same production for a short run to a fringe London venue, they are likely to play to very small audiences — however "rare" the play being revived — simply because London theatregoers are sated for choice. It is a saddening situation, again compounded by a questionable Arts Council policy of offering support funding to a small company attempting a provincial tour only when they have proved they can attract provincial audiences by successfully completing at least two such tours on their own (unaided) initiative.

Though these governmental-inspired changes in funding have been described by their perpetrators as in the interests of rationalisation, there is scant common sense or vision to be detected in their devising when one views the consequences. There has been much Tory lauding of the proposal to devote to the Arts a fraction of the income evolving from the new National Lottery. As it currently stands the intention is to devote 28p of every £1 lottery ticket to be divided between the arts, sports, charities, the National Heritage and the Millennium Funds. While theatre is likely to take the largest portion of the slice pushed in the direction of the Arts (particularly when opera is included in the calculation), it is not in fact the magnificent fortune that Tory ministers are wont to try and conjure up before the public's imagination. The main difficulty lies in the terms that accompany such apparent "munificence", namely that the monies are to be devoted by the Arts Council to deserving "capital projects", which effectively means the building of new venues for the arts. The new funding is neither to be used to help companies meet the escalating costs of running existing venues so that seat-prices can be kept at a viable level nor to sponsor actual creative work. Theatre generally does not need glossy new venues; the greatest practitioners of the last few decades (Brook, Grotowski, Boal, to name but three) have shown just the opposite, as have the many fringe companies that nightly in seemingly untheatrical spaces create excellent experiences of theatre by working inventively with their audience's imaginations. But the government has remained impervious to such arguments, that funding for theatre should mean assisting the financial security and productivity of practitioners. They have not learned the lesson proffered by the new British Library project: an unwanted, elephantine building that has far exceeded its original estimated costs, which has repeatedly had its opening delayed to the point where there is considerable doubt about its ever proving functional. The original and current housing of the British Library in the British Museum is aesthetically far more pleasing and conducive to the kinds of activity that ought properly to go on there than the edifice near St. Pancras station will be. The new British Library is a monument devised by Mrs. Thatcher's government to stop the then world of the arts from "whingeing" about the lack of governmental interest in their concerns. The sickening factor behind the British Library project and the new Lottery monies is that they are both overly preoccupied with ostentation: they have each been designed to meet the government's need to be SEEN to be doing something for the arts. What is really wanted is the financial means to enhance the morale of theatre personnel by increasing subsidy in ways that will firstly improve the quality of performances and foster experiment of a kind that will ensure a lively future for theatre as an art-form and secondly help reduce the overheads (mainly the results of overt and hidden taxes) involved in running a company and a theatre building so that ticket prices can be kept at a rate that makes it viable for a keen playgoer to sustain a regular programme of theatre visits. Actors merit incomes and they merit audiences prepared to experiment with the unusual and the innovative at a cost that is not prohibitive; and ideally this should be possible without artistic directors or theatre managers having to spend valuable time going cap-in-hand to the business world for private subsidy.

It is necessary to appreciate this unjust situation promoted by the current government (unjust to actors and other theatre personnel, to audiences, and above all else to the theatreworld of the provinces) as the context within which to take a second look at the statistics I began by outlining. If the situation in London is to be described as healthy, then it is at the expense of theatregoers in the country at large and it relies on the good will of a great many unpaid (or pathetically remunerated) theatre personnel whose creativity will find a means of expression at whatever personal cost, despite the very subtle efforts of the government to restrain them. That theatre flourishes in London (and to a lesser but significant extent in the Midlands and one or two other major cities) is not because of any truly generous disposition, genuine insight or vision on the part of the Tories in power.

But the fact is: theatre flourishes in some form; and circumstances seem to promise a favourable future. This last remark needs some explanation. Drama since Renaissance times has been seen by educational theorists as a valuable mode of instruction in the ways it may be used to teach and heighten a pupil's powers of expression, self-confidence, projection (as well as in previous centuries a means of learning the skills of oratory and rhetoric). Where once it may have helped a pupil discover the finer points of Latin and of the native tongue as a spoken language, it has in this century been increasingly deployed as a means of encouraging pupils to explore different perspectives on to situations of some moral, emotional, social and even political complexity. Drama has been used to heighten skills in reasoning and intellectual flexibility by inspiring participants to debate about the characters and situations that they are being required to present theatrically. The infamous Schools' Curriculum propounded by Tory Ministers of Education saw fit to virtually expunge drama studies from the educational agenda. This political move coincided ironically with the creation of the possibility of studying drama and theatre first at A-level (the advanced examinations taken by eighteen-year-olds) and then at GCSE level (for sixteen-year-olds). These courses are undoubtedly popular, as are courses in theatre studies offered by the university sector, where applicants currently out-number available places by a ratio of roughly 5:1. Inevitably the students successful in gaining admission to these advanced courses and also to Acting Schools have a high intellectual calibre; these are the people now turning as graduates to theatre for a career; and they in large measure account for the increase in theatre venues around central London and the significant change in the types of performance offered on the fringe. Back in the sixties and early seventies, the fringe was where one looked for rather way-out, experimental work inspired by the sudden interest in Artaud's theories, Grotowskian concepts of actor-training, new forms of physicalised theatre inspired by the likes of Julian Beck, and the kind of performance that was not at a great remove from the "happening". There are remarkably few of those original fringe companies in existence today; many of their techniques and modes of rehearsal have now been absorbed into mainstream theatre practice. The fringe is now the place to look for the work of new playwrights; drama celebrating the cultural differences of ethnic minorities; gay and lesbian plays; and increasingly new revivals of "difficult" plays from the dramatic heritage (such as Marston's *Antonio's Revenge*; a comedy by the Restoration woman dramatist, Catherine Trotter; or, as at present, re-stagings of works by Giraudoux, Anouilh, Sartre). The increase in new writing on the fringe is doubtless a reaction to the fact that the National Theatre and the RSC stage fewer new plays than they used to do in their smaller auditoria and, though the Royal Court continues its policy of chiefly staging new work, that work in the main house tends increasingly to be the most recent offerings of established dramatists, unknown writers having first to prove themselves in the far smaller Theatre Upstairs and show that they can make the grade.

It might be expected from this picture of the state of things that the contemporary British stage would be powerfully engaged politically. Resistance is certainly manifest in the very proliferation of companies and playing spaces outlined above, the indefatigable staunchness has a decided political motivation. But the new drama is not political in as central a manner as in previous decades. Only David Hare has continued to face up to the demands of epic-scale theatre with his recent trilogy on British institutions (the

Church in *Racing Demon*; the legal system in *Murmuring Judges*; and governmental politics in *The Absence of War*) but the last was disappointing, as Hare seemed to get side-tracked into analysing why the Labour party had failed to win at the last election and the extent to which this could be attributed to the public persona of Neil Kinnock (thinly disguised as George Jones). We were confronted by issues to do with personalities, not by a thoroughgoing examination of the processes of politics in action. At least Hare was attempting a large-scale vision with the trilogy. None of his contemporaries have attempted works requiring spaces of the size of the Olivier or Barbican theatres. Brenton, Hare's one-time collaborator, has been virtually silent of late. David Edgar with *The Shape of the Table* and his more recent play for the RSC, *Pentecost*, has been investigating events in former communist-block countries, but these are essentially chamber works, lacking the breadth of scope demanded by his fascination with patterns of historical consequence that made *Destiny* and *May Days* such thrilling experiences in performance. The older generation of political writers have all but disappeared from our stages except for the occasional revival. *Roots* and *The Kitchen* clearly have proved they can withstand the test of time, but there has been no new work from Wesker beyond a massively meandering autobiography; Osborne died in relative seclusion on Christmas Eve last; Arden languishes impoverished in Ireland; Bond has not even been dignified with any revival; and Pinter after exploring disturbingly political territory in *Party Time*, reverted to his more lyrical style with *Moonlight*, exploring a consciousness hovering perilously close to dying but resisting all promptings to redeem the past.

Younger dramatists, such as Doug Lucy and Howard Barker, seem preoccupied with the loss of morale that individuals have suffered through the years of Thatcherite rule; the focus is on styles of personal moral anguish, its several possible causes (social and selfinduced), the likelihood of the individual effecting a cure, rather than on a statement about the condition of the country. Such drama is political in the way it records how a prevailing sense of cynicism has induced people to retreat from direct forms of political engagement and attack, but the plays that result risk becoming character-studies in solipsism. Barker confronts his perception of the dominance of political apathy within society with startling attempts to jolt his characters (and, through them, his audiences) into awareness of the need for an alert attentiveness to their social predicament; but all too frequently the baroque convolutions of his plot-structures threaten to undermine the clarity of his theme and his moral argument. The method suggests he is writing political allegory, but the intricate terms of that allegory elude precise and illuminating definition. If the most trenchant political writing is coming from what are conventionally termed "marginalised" groups (blacks, gays, feminists) that may be a reflection of the fact that there are now a number of London fringe or Off West-End venues that have a conscious artistic policy of setting out to foster such work and that having these established outlets for their work has given writers representing such groups a welcome security. The newly constructed Tricycle Theatre at Kilburn under the artistic directorship of Nicholas Kent offers a repertory almost exclusively of Irish and Caribbean writing that is directed at the local community and its concerns. Not only does the Tricycle cater for new playwriting from either Ireland and the Caribbean or from British dramatists of Irish or Caribbean descent but also regularly hosts companies from Ireland and the Caribbean. This is decidedly a community theatre and attracting West-Enders is not essential to the Tricycle's well-being. Much the same is true of the Battersea Arts Centre, south of the river, and the Watermans Arts Centre in West London, where the mix of interests attended to is perhaps more wide-ranging, involving gay and feminist companies, Asian and black troupes (many groups actually move from a week's booking at one venue to a week at the other) since the likely appeal is to a local and therefore select audience (though not 'select' in the sense of an elite). Lesbian and gay artists have for a good while now been the staple of the repertory at the Drill Hall in Chenies Street, which being situated a short walk north of Oxford Street, is virtually in central London, compared with the three venues just mentioned. This venue attracts a metropolitan audience, as does the ICA theatre in the Mall (right in the heart of what, politically, might be termed 'establishment' territory in being only a metaphorical stone's throw away from both

Downing Street and Buckingham Palace) which also offers in its small experimental theatre a platform for innovative gay, lesbian and feminist performance groups. There is a regular influx of companies from America to this venue, especially from San Francisco; but they also showcase native English talents from London and the provinces. Though this is a healthy situation in many ways and is certainly productive of vital, committed work, there is always the risk that the siting of such companies and artists in what are fast becoming recognised as *specialist* theatres is ghettoising their work, when such voices ought to be heard within the full spectrum of London theatre, playing to a more variously constituted audience than is perhaps currently the case.

If politics is not a dominant issue in contemporary playwriting, what are then the preferred thematic tendencies? Not surprisingly given the prevailing political climate, nostalgia features markedly, though it is not necessarily treated without criticism. Nostalgia is a strange emotion concerning the relationship of the present with the past and the motives that underlie the creating of such a relationship within a given consciousness. The most intricate examination of the subject is to be found in Stoppard's *Arcadia*, which — as the title implies — is preoccupied with the impulse to locate within the past a conception of life as in some way idyllic. The play juxtaposes contemporary late twentieth-century experience alongside an evocation of early nineteenth-century life in a stately home where the grounds, formerly laid out according first to Italianate principles and next to the naturalistic school of landscape gardening championed by Capability Brown, are about to be rusticated and gothicised, rendered sentimental and awesome after the tenets of a new fashion promoted by Repton. The gardens become in many ways a metaphor for our potential to re-vision the past; this serves as a kind of groundbase throughout the action against which various other themes are sounded and developed to illuminate the range of possible responses that might be contained within the term 'nostalgia': the brashly crude and sensational way of looking back to unearth examples of human folly and duplicity; and the more sensitive imaginative ways of engaging with minds from former ages with a view to understanding their modes of endeavour and creativity (the play explores both scientific and artistic engagement). The one mode ultimately focuses on human banality, the other celebrates human achievement. It is a rich and rewarding play that has sustained four changes of cast to date and long runs at the National Theatre and the Haymarket as well as a national tour.

Another remarkable work to explore the positive and the dark sides of nostalgia is Terry Johnson' s *Dead Funny*, which has recently ended a long run at the Vaudeville to which it transferred from Hampstead Theatre Club (from Off-West-End to West End proper). In many ways this play is a companion piece to Trevor Griffiths's *Comedians* from the 1970s since it too is concerned with the art of the stand-up comedian and how and why audiences take pleasure in particular styles of humour. The characters of the piece form a club to preserve the memory of certain great artists of the music hall and television who are now deceased (the action is situated in time between the death of Benny Hill and that a few days later of Frankie Howard); the club know their favourite comedians' routines, the silly songs, the gags and the timing of the pratfalls by heart and happily recall them for each other's amusement. The 'turns' the now defunct comedians popularised are seen steadily to be genial (rather than cruelly satirical) portrayals of human inadequacies, absurdity, quixotic mannerisms and personality-defects. The members of the club are themselves as steadily exposed as impotent, withdrawn, desperate and despairing individuals, for whom such a style of comedy offers a measure of reconcilement with temperaments they fundamentally despise. Nostalgia alone saves them from admitting that their lives are loveless and pathetic. This analysis of why the art of the comedian serves a necessary function in society is at a far remove from Griffiths's near-Aristotelian defence of that art as inviting in audiences moral and emotional catharsis: a yearning for self-acceptance which Johnson argues is all that such comedy satisfies falls markedly short of Griffiths's belief that comedy, when scrupulously handled, effects complex forms of personal growth by confronting and easing tensions in the depths of the psyche. Johnson sees comedy as confirming and endorsing inadequacy. not as offering a means of transcending human weakness. *Dead Funny* is a decidedly

black comedy, in which nostalgia is ruthlessly dissected.

Several recent plays have examined nostalgia in the context of the processes of ageing and death. Pinter's *Moonlight* has already been discussed in this context, but Albee's *Three Tall Women* is also exemplary of this trend. In Act One an elderly woman rages against the dying of the light as she recognises that there is no way of going "gently" into her particular "good night" as senility remorselessly invades her consciousness despite her every effort to halt its advance. In Act Two that woman's younger self is watched over by two predatory manifestations of herself from her late-middle and from her old age. Nostalgia here offers few consolations and little ease of conscience, only a sharp recognition of the need to accept a past which can in no way be redeemed, compensated for, or erased.

An equally searching exploration of the perils of nostalgia was offered by Neil Bartlett in his adaptation of Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray* for the Lyric Theatre Hammersmith. This production provoked ire in some audiences because it was not a straightforward dramatisation of the novel; instead Bartlett supposes a gathering of several of Wilde's more intimate friends (Ada Leverson, his revered "sphinx"; Reggie Turner, Robert Ross and Sidney Mavor, one of the young men accused with Wilde at his trials) on the anniversary of his being transported to Reading Goal; they meet in Wilde's favourite suite at the Savoy Hotel, where they intend to read the novel together in its author's memory. Reading repeatedly turns into enactment as the tale at various moments grips the imagination of a particular reader. All these one-time friends of Wilde are now facing old age and they have met to remember the occasion when social disgrace precipitated him towards a premature death. The story is a fantasy about humankind's perennial desire for eternal youth, a wish that is fulfilled in this instance in a form that brings an unexpected retribution with it: the wish is granted at a cruel price. Clearly the Wilde that his friends remember so vividly was a man whose charm and wit could relieve his coterie for a while of any sense of the pressure of time; he could enable them to transcend the moment and the reality of themselves. The novel is a record of that charm and that wit, qualities which still have a power to transform the group momentarily; but the ensuing return to social and personal reality is for them all cruelly painful. One was reminded in watching a performance of some lines by the Irish poet, W. B. Yeats: Wilde clearly possessed the power to feed the hearts of his friends with fantasies; and those hearts have grown not "brutal" (Yeats's term) but intensely fragile on such fare. Thirty years on in time the friends are still in thrall to the spell of Wilde's genius, the mesmeric brilliance of his ideas. What begins in the play as a seeming act of piety in remembrance of a dead companion is shown by the conclusion to be a very different matter: the reading is informed by a nostalgia which is a mode of psychological entrapment, the pursuit of a moment of transcendence brings no spiritual grace, only a haunting sense of delusion. Nostalgia here is deconstructed with an exacting attention to the levels of irony that make up its emotional texture.

Bartlett is an enterprising and highly original dramatist, perhaps the foremost English playwright that one might describe as post-modern in technique and sensibility. While there have been numerous adaptations of novels on the London stage in recent weeks (*The Mill on the Floss*; *Great Expectations*; *A Tale of Two Cities*; *A Christmas Carol*; *Out of a House Walked a Man...* (based on the fictional writings of Danil Kharms) ; *The Woman in Black*; *Oliver!* ; *The Three Lives of Lucie Cabrol*; *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie* – to list but a few) not many of these progress beyond mere adaptation to become, like Bartlett's *Dorian Gray*, works of dramatic artistry in their own independent right. Most seem determined to confine invention to the demands made by the narrative of the source, the focus is on telling the story as imaginatively and as economically as possible (this was a fashion created by the company, Shared Experience, when it was directed till some years ago by Mike Alfreds). Theatre de Complicite bring a brilliant array of miming skills to their work with novels which undeniably excite certain aesthetic pleasures at the way, for example, that animate bodies can be deployed to define inanimate objects, or physical groupings of persons within the stagespace can powerfully and instantaneously evoke a precise dramatic atmosphere; but it is arguable whether these skills enable them

to transcend a dominant need to realise the plot of the work of fiction they are dramatising. Bartlett by contrast deconstructs his source so as to defamiliarise a familiar storyline and render it *strange*; he situates Wilde's novel in a specific but complex historical continuum so that the work can be read both as a period piece and from other temporal perspectives; in consequence the play becomes a commentary on the novel, illuminating and debating its central themes and posing for the audience searching questions about their reasons for granting it an enduring popularity. The play interrogates the fictional text to see if it will in itself explain why the plotline had such a fascination for the author and what the moral tenor is of the hold which that narrative exerts over a reader. The particular plot acts here as a springboard into an investigation into the nature of the art of fiction, the motive both for writing and for reading narratives. It might be argued that this was very text-based theatre (indeed *texts* of Wilde's *Dorian Gray* were actually carried by the actors for most of the performance); yet in its power to transcend the limits of the printed text, to highlight by dramatic means the nature of the imaginative act of reading, Bartlett's stage-play and its performance-technique came remarkably close to the work of such established practitioners as Brook or Grotowski, for whom the inherited text is also a springboard into areas of personal (almost meditational) enquiry that extends well beyond the narratives or themes of their various sources. Brook's dramatic rendering of Oliver Sacks's *The Man Who*, which came to the Cottesloe Theatre earlier in the year, similarly released the mind into a complex of issues by the most austere of theatrical means that were wholly directed at focusing our attention on the art of the actor. Bartlett's achievement in *Dorian Gray* does not suffer by the comparison.

While a number of new directorial talents have been proving themselves over the last few years (Deborah Warner, Katie Mitchell, Phyllida Lloyd, Stephen Daldry most notably), Barlett alone shows a career with the potential to measure up to some of the international practitioners who have over recent decades shaped our conception of theatre. He has translated plays extensively from the French repertoire (Racine, Moliere, Marivaux) with considerable elan; he is a playwright-director with a profound sense of the value to current theatre practice of continental schools of aesthetic theory, though his work never becomes merely cerebral; he has his own company that specialises in exploring new kinds of stylisation in performance deploying music and movement in inventive ways; he is himself a gifted performer; he has published novels, criticism and historical research; and he has within the last six months been appointed as artistic director of the Lyric Theatre, Hammersmith where he is fast proving himself a masterly organiser of a wide-ranging, nonpredictable repertoire. What impresses about his work is his absolute dedication to a purposeful theatricality: plays like his *Sarrasine*, while owing a debt to Barthes' analysis of Balzac's story, exploit the arts of the theatre not merely to deconstruct the fictional source but also to deconstruct traditional concepts of gender (the play is conceived for actress and orchestra; and a soprano opera singer, an ageing male transvestite and a young, gay, androgynous man who all three at various moments impersonate Sarrasine). As in *Dorian Gray*, the source material is at once dramatised, deconstructed and made the subject of a commentary that engages an audience imaginatively and emotionally in an exploration of their attitudes to dissident manifestations of what constitutes the masculine and the feminine. Few contemporary theatre practitioners in England are creating such complex works that challenge performers and audiences, conveying them effortlessly beyond traditional boundaries relating to genres, dramatic forms, conventionalised ways of thinking and feeling, and their attitudes to sexuality and gender, all of which Bartlett contrives to achieve with remarkable economy and simplicity of expression. It is this wonderful richness of implication coupled with a marked austerity of presentation that makes it possible to refer to Neil Bartlett as an English heir to the mantle of Brook and Grotowski.

And there is no hyperbole in this claim: like them he frequently uses a known text as a stimulus to creativity, but rapidly the created drama moves beyond the limitations of the known to become a performance-work of considerable intricacy and originality. Over the last two decades much new playwriting was preoccupied with "revisiting", "re-

visioning" or "interrogating" the classic repertoire and especially the works of Shakespeare. This questioning of the cultural heritage has not been such a prominent impulse to creativity of late (though there was last year a brilliant staging of Sheridan's *The Rivals* in modern dress with an all-male cast that used the eighteenth-century text without significant alteration as the basis of an investigation into contemporary gay relationships and the ways they choose to find expression in society). Bartlett's work can be seen to be a part of that tradition of cultural interrogation, but it has been carried into areas of experience and intellectual enquiry that are far less insular in appeal or in method of analysis than was previously the case; and the impulse to interrogate, to deconstruct in order to re-vision is both more scrupulously structured and more searching. There is no loss of political incisiveness in Bartlett's technique, but the focus has changed significantly to the sphere of gay and gender politics. To write that Neil Bartlett is one of the few contemporary British director-dramatists that one can link with continental developments in theatre practice might suggest that the theatre in England is currently very insular. In terms of current playwriting and staging methods, this is arguably the case. But that would be to ignore the achievement of the Gate Theatre in Notting Hill, which has consistently over the last seven years built up a repertoire of foreign plays in translation. There has been a link with theatre personnel in Valencia, out of which has grown a project to stage a range of Spanish "golden age" plays by Lopez de Vega, Tirso de Molina and Calderon. But these works have been interspersed with revivals of rarely performed plays by Strindberg and Goldoni, contemporary Austrian and German drama, eighteenth-century comedies by women dramatists and less popular Greek tragedies the like of Euripides' *Hecuba*. One very enterprising small publishing company, Absolute Classics, has worked in tandem with the Gate, making available copies of all the translations that are staged in their seasons. This record far exceeds that for either the National Theatre or the Royal Shakespeare Company in terms of staging non-British theatre. The National Theatre does regularly invite foreign companies for short seasons (including Strehler's Piccolo Teatro during the last twelve months); and both the NT and the RSC have hosted productions by Ninagawa's company from Japan (*The Tempest*, *Macbeth*, *Medea*, *Peer Gynt*). Both theatres nowadays employ the good offices of Thelma Holt (previously best known as the leading actress and co-director with Charles Marowitz of the Open Space Theatre) as an Associate Director with responsibility for organising such visits.

By far the greatest influx of world theatre, however, comes to London biennially with the LIFT Festival (London International Festival of Theatre). Not since the famous World Theatre Seasons promoted by the late Peter Daubeny at the Aldwych Theatre throughout the Sixties and early Seventies, has London had the opportunity to see so much of the best of theatrical innovation from abroad. Interestingly the most popular performances are those from so-called Third-World countries, especially from South America, the Caribbean and Africa. Newspaper reviewers tend to demonstrate a marked chauvinist response to work seen during the Festival, but their attitude is not shared by audiences or by British theatre practitioners; and evidence of sharing of techniques, learning by experience, and direct influence is to be detected, especially on the Fringe, in the months following the LIFT seasons. This is partly because most of the companies are encouraged where possible to conduct workshops for both amateurs and professionals while resident in London. (A similar pattern of workshops related to performance techniques also occurs in respect of the annual London Festival of Mime referred to above.) If the LIFT seasons differ appreciably from the Daubeny seasons of the past, it is in respect of the kinds of companies invited: where Daubeny tended to foster links with well-established companies from abroad, the LIFT organisers seem to prefer to invite smaller, new and innovatory performers that challenge our expectations of particular national theatrical trends. What has proved fascinating to study is the way innovation is achieved within different cultural circumstances and traditions by these companies without the resulting work declining into a nebulous kind of internationalism (inspired by the likes of Grotowski, Barba or Boal) that quite loses all marks that distinguish a national individuality.

This sense of sharing and discovery evident as the legacy of the LIFT festivals makes one conscious of a particular and major loss that has afflicted British theatre practice of late. Many fringe groups work on a corporate and collaborative basis (in part a consequence of the "profit-share" nature of their projects discussed previously); but the exciting possibilities to be learned from wholesale collaboration in the process of creating a performance that were provoked by the work of groups such as Joint Stock seem an experience now decidedly of the past. Collaborative work certainly goes on in the National Theatre's Studio and the RSC regularly invites groups from overseas to train alongside their actors, but none of this work gets to be seen by the general theatregoing public and much of it remains definitely an inhouse event. What repercussions these endeavours have on the quality of the performances and productions mounted by either Subsidised company is largely a matter for speculation. Joint Stock ceased to function nearly a decade ago and the RSC no longer pursues a policy of inviting an established but young dramatist to workshop a series of ideas with a group of actors and compose a play out of the resulting explorations in the fashion that produced both Timberlake Wertenbaker's *The Love of the Nightingale* and Frank McGuinness's *Mary and Lizzie*. Caryl Churchill was arguably the one dramatist to work with Joint Stock whose subsequent output showed a direct influence from their style of collaborative improvisation in works like *Cloud Nine* and Fen. She seems to have wished to go on pursing that mode of shared creativity, but has turned her attention now towards breaking down the boundaries that exist between forms of theatrical expression. Her new collaborators are from the world of music, opera and dance in works like *The Lives of the Great Poisoners* and *The Skriker*, where her focus has shifted to a preoccupation with metaphysical concerns about the nature of evil or the way folk-myth found a means of articulating a sense of other worlds beyond our social comprehension hovering however at the edges of our consciousness and subtly influencing our modes of perception. With her recent adaptation of Seneca's *Thyestes* she explored a collaboration in terms of design with an artist interested in small-circuit television. Collaboration in these instances is less to do with sharing skills in improvisation than with pursuing some modern conception of the *gesamtkunstwerk*. The effect has consistently been of work in progress, as if the gestation of a wholly new art-work or dramatic structure is imminent and slowly seeking definition.

But this is all a far cry from the politically motivated collaborations of the Seventies, which were seeking to break down the hierarchies within the process of theatrical production, subverting the primacy and privilege of both the director and the dramatist as shapers of the performance-text. This change would in itself appear to be a reflection of the current political crisis: a further manifestation of a pervasive refusal to make a confident artistic statement which might be interpreted as an expression of left-wing sympathies and principles. Thatcherism has left an indelible mark on the practice of British theatre. Innovation has clearly not been wholly stifled; but it has had to adopt tactical strategies in relation to the prevailing political *status quo*. Whether the current theatrical scene is to be interpreted as unreservedly healthy depends on one's political perspective. To ask whether that scene can be described as *politically* healthy is a question that most assuredly cannot be answered in 1995 with an affirmative.

Mária Kurdi

Brian Friel and American Drama

During their first tour of the United States in 1911, the Abbey Players presented works by Synge, Yeats, Augusta Gregory, T. C. Murray and Lennox Robinson. A young man in the audience, the Irish-American Eugene O'Neill, attended these performances with great enthusiasm and started his own playwriting career inspired by Irish drama. Synge's influence on his early period can be seen in the field of "theme, treatment, mood and motif" as Peter Egri has pointed out.[1] Early in his career Irish playwright Brian Friel (1929-) spent several months of 1963 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, observing director Tyrone Gutherie at work and becoming acquainted with American theatre in general there. Following this experience he wrote:

> ... those months in America gave me a sense of liberation - remember this was my first parole from inbred claustrophobic Ireland - and that sense of liberation conferred on me a valuable self-confidence and a necessary perspective so that the first play I wrote immediately after I came home, *Philadelphia, Here I Come!* was a lot more assured than anything I had attempted before.[2]

Although it would be risky to assert that American drama has exerted influence on Friel's oeuvre, some parallels are hard to overlook.

In the 1950-60s Arhur Miller's *Death of a Salesman* was so ubiquitously present on the English-speaking stage that certain themes and motifs of this masterpiece crop up in Irish works as well. Thomas Murphy's *A Whistle in the Dark*, first performed in 1961, depicts a self-deceiving father and his sons, the eldest of whom makes desperate efforts to free himself from the father's influence. Although in Murphy's play the source and unfolding of tragedy differ from what *Death of a Salesman* (1949) presents, the concern with identity is recognizable in both. In *A Whistle in the Dark* the father is remembered to have once stolen a coat that he did not need at all from the golf club and to have thrown it over a wall in frustrated revenge on the more lucky and prosperous. The motif is reminescent of Biff's theft of the millionaire, Oliver's, valuable pen, an act being equally meaningless. An early, now "disowned" play of Friel from 1959 bears the title *A Doubtful Paradise*. Its protagonist, Willie Logue proves a relative of Willie Loman, not only on account of his name, but also because "his life falls into the focus of his self-deception."[3] At the same time, Friel has started his playwriting career showing great

1. Peter Egri, "Synge and O'Neill: Inspiration and Influence." In: Wolfgang Zach, Heinz Kosok (eds.), *Literary Interrelations: Ireland, England and the World. 2. Comparison and Impact* (Tübingen: Günter Narr Verlag, 1987), 261-268.
2. Brian Friel, *Self-Portait,* quoted in: Ulf Dantanus, *Brian Friel, A Study* (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), 51.

sensitivity to the problems of the Catholic community in Derry, similarly to Miller's consciousness of social issues. According to Christopher Murray, Miller can be mentioned "in the catalogue of possible influences" on the work of Friel.[4]

Philadelphia, first performed in 1964, divides its protagonist, the 25 year-old Gar O'Donnell into a private self and a public self, played by two actors on stage. Many critics have found the device similar to O'Neill's *Day's Without End* (1934), where the protagonist is represented by two figures, John and Loving, and the latter's face is a mask. Friel, however, denied any knowledge of that play before writing his *Philadelphia.*[5] By having the much louder Private Gar beside Public Gar his aim was to reveal not only the outer side of the young man but also his thoughts, the deeper layers of his mind that are not available for others. The dramatization of the inner life of one particular character while the others are seen from the outside only, establishes his/her limited point of view in the work.[6]

Friel acquaints his audience with Gar's aspirations, dreams and fears by making his inner side seen and heard. The play premiered at the Gate Theatre in Dublin, where Alpho O'Reilly designed the set in a way that instead of Friel's originally planned scenes "the whole should be seen together, rather in the mode of Arthur Miller; so he cut the house in half and revealed its internal ramification, upstairs and down."[(7)] O'Reilly rightly felt a parallel with *Death of a Salesman,* originally titled *The Inside of His Head,* where the flashbacks have a great "psychological complexity, for what is revealed is not simply the memory of an earlier event but a new experience, a fusion of past and present."[8] At several points in the play Willy Loman's mind begins to wander toward past events mingled with their painful implications for him in the present. The audience tends to form a picture of the major issues filtered through Willy because, due to Miller's method, his point of view dominates the play.

After the humiliation of waiting for the millionaire in vain, Willy's elder son, Biff, demonstrates a marked change in his overall attitude. He expresses his realization that both of them have been struggling with identity problems. At the end more emphasis shifts to Biff and his realistic self-awakening, which underscores Willy's lifelong self-deception:

> BIFF: I am not a leader of men, Willy, and neither are you. You were never anything but a hard-working drummer who landed in the ash-can like all the rest of them! I'm one dollar an hour, Willy! ... I'm not bringing home any prizes any more, and you're going to stop waiting for me to bring them home![9]

In Friel's *Philadelphia* the dominant point of view is also somewhat challenged by the other major character, Gar's father at the end of the drama. The old man has been monosyllabic and extremely reserved till then; one could even feel a lack of concern on his part for his son who is planning to emigrate to Philadelphia in the morning. The flashbacks in the play show only Gar's memories of his past life in Ballybeg. In the final scene he makes a desperate effort to capture his father's attention by recounting a childhood memory about the two of them fishing together, sailing in a blue boat. Gar's

3. Desmond Maxwell, "'Figures in a Peepshow': Friel and the Irish Dramatic Tradition." In: Alan Peacock (ed.), *The Achievement of Brian Friel* (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1993), 52.
4. Christopher Murray, "Friel's 'Emblems of Adversity' and the Yeatsian Example." In: *Ibid.*, 69.
5. Cf. Anthony Roche, *Contemporary Irish Drama* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1994), 79.
6. See Edward Groff, "Point of View in Modern Drama" in: *Modern Drama,* December 1959, 270.
7. Christopher Fitz-Simon, *The Boys: A Biography of Micheál MacLiammoir and Hilton Edwards* (London: Nick Hern Books,1994), 276.
8. Edward Groff, *Op. cit.*, 275.
9. Arthur Miller, *Death of a Salesman* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962), 105.

father recollects something too, though his story contains very different elements. Gradually his feelings and doubts about a lonely future become articulated. Looking inside the father this way throws an additional light on Gar, suggesting that the younger man is surely not the sole sufferer and victim in the microcosm of Ballybeg, and "the play is tilted towards a more objective, broader perspective."[10] The essential resemblance between father and son is underlined by Madge:

> When the boss was his (GAR's) age, he was the very same as him: leppin, and eejitin' about and actin' the clown; as like as two peas. And when he's (GAR) the age the boss is now, he'll turn out just the same.[11]

The use of a dominant point of view in drama, exemplified by *Salesman* and *Philadelphia*, proves an excellent vehicle to portray the inside of a character's head. Nevertheless, the resulting restrictedness calls for testing it against another consciousness in order to draw a fuller picture.

Most of Friel's later plays are interwoven with different approaches to and conflicting interpretations of events and experiences from *The Freedom of the City* (1973) to *Molly Sweeny* (1994). His frequent implementation of techniques of distancing and self-reflection has been "attentive to the development of modern European and American theatre."[12] In *Living Quarters* (1977) he uses a unique dramatic figure, called Sir, who is neither a narrator nor a mere commentator, but a combination of the two and a great deal more. An American parallel can be seen in the Stage Manager of Thornton Wilder's *Our Town* (1938), who introduces, interrupts and intrudes into the action and then closes the whole. Both appear as kind of directors of the respective plays, fulfilling a complex role to build up a distancing effect "which emphasize(s) the fact that the drama is at one level a contrivance - a matter of selecting, condensing and aesthetically ordering depicted human experience."[13] Wilder's Stage Manager and Friel's Sir are voices of Fate at the same time, in their own fashion. The former with his suprahuman power, the latter with his ledger containing the account of past events as they live in the minds of those who took part in them. Through this device, in both cases there is "the presence of a formidable auctorial mind"[14] which makes the plays intellectual and geared toward the unfolding of an idea. In *Our Town* that central experience is describable as "the pathos of the great commonplaces of human life, birth, marriage and death."[15]

While admittedly a product of the other characters' imaginations, Friel's Sir embodies how imagination, as an authority, can become master of man. What the ledger contains passes for the reality of the unaltarable past, accepted as such by those who have, in their separate collectivity, created it all. Nevertheless, the characters tend to wish to change the fixed script in the re-living situation which makes up the play itself. According to Sir,

> ... out of some deep psychic necessity, they have conceived me - the ultimate arbiter, the powerful and impartial referee, the final abjucator, a kind of human Hansard who knows those tiny little details and interprets them accurately. And

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10. Anthony Roche, *Op. cit.*, 101.
11. Brian Friel, *Philadelphia, Here I Come!* In: *Selected Plays*, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 98.
12. Terence Brown, *Ireland. A Social and Cultural History 1922-1985* (London: Fontana Press, 1990), 319-320.
13. Alan Peacock, "Translating the Past: Friel, Greece and Rome." In: Alan Peacock, *Op.. cit.*, 117-118.
14. Thomas Kilroy, "Theatrical Text and Literary Text." *Ibid.*, 94.
15. Francis Fergusson, *The Human Image in Dramatic Lierature* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 55.

> yet no sooner do they conceive me with my authority and my knowledge than they begin flirting with the idea of circumventing me, of foxing me, of outwitting me. Curious, isn't it?[16]

Our Town lacks this (postmodern?) interplay between reality and imagination, but is unmistakably American in portraying small-town life in New England. At times even a touch of satire manifests itself, for example in Mr. Webb's negative answer to the question whether there is "any culture or love of beauty in Grover's Corners": "Well, ma'am, there ain't much - not in the sense you mean."[17]

The way individual characters in *Living Quarters* rebel against the course of events or question their authority allows us to see their most obsessive private features, which in turn is relevant to the Irish in general. The local Chaplin, for one, betrays insecurity of identity. Anna, the Irish Phaedra of the play subtitled "after Hippolytus," seems tortured by the moral burden of her infidelity and impatiently tries to get her confession over. Her cuckolded husband, Commandant Frank Butler, on the other hand, self-pityingly harps on the depth of injustice and the wounds he has had to suffer.

The individuals' inclination to forge their own versions of reality appears more emphatically in Friel's *Faith Healer* (1979), a play based on the Irish storytelling tradition. In the monologues of its three characters, Frank, Grace and Teddy, the shared past is fictionalized in different ways, making reality private without one unchallengable version. A similar tendency can be identified in the second half of Arthur Miller's career. In *The Price* (1968) the two brothers, Victor and Walter, cultivate diverging memories and opinions of their relationship with their father as well as their own decisive choices in life. Walter's remark sounds rather revealing: "We invent ourselves, Vic, to wipe out what we know. You invent a life of self-sacrifice, a life of duty; but what never existed here cannot be upheld."[18] Friel's technique of separated monologues intensifies the characters' inventing and fictionalizing not only themselves but each other. At the end of her speech Grace claims to be but one of the fictions of her husband.

Faith Healer leaves ambiguity behind, as it has touched the core of human experience, the desire to shake off the doubts, suspense and fear that constitute existence. Impending death through self-sacrifice brings relief to Frank: "Then for the first time there was no atrophying terror; and the maddening questions were silent."[19] Of *The Price*, its author said: "... *The Price* is about - the tension. ... The satisfaction is the perception of the tension. 'Cause it is not solved, and life isn't. It can't be solved."[20] At the end of the play old Solomon, who has observed the verbal fight of the other two from a distance, remains alone and starts listening to the Laughing Record on the phonograph. In Friel's play Teddy, the outsider and survivor, puts on his record at the end of the third monologue. These gestures suggest continuity, the larger realm of life lying beyond the individuals' misgivings and struggle for meaning.

The first monograph on Friel mentions the indirect influence of Edward Albee, although without giving an example.[21] One particular motif, however, characteristically crops up in the work of both dramatists, namely stories about animals which throw more light on some of the crucial aspects of their plays. Albee's shaggy dog tale, an uncommonly long inbedded story within the larger one about Jerry's life in *The Zoo Story* (1958) is a shocking allegory of misunderstanding, failure of communication and resulting

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16. Brian Friel, *Living Quarters.* In: *Selected Plays*, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 177-178.
17. Thornton Wilder, *Our Town* (Harmondswworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967), 36.
18. Arthur Miller, *The Price* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), 90.
19. Brian Friel, *Faith Healer* in: *Selected Plays*. All further references are to this edition.
20. "Appendix: A Conversation with Arthur Miller" in: Leonard Moss, *Arthur Miller* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1980), 121.
21. D. E. S. Maxwell, *Brian Friel* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1973), 109.

indifference. In fact, it mirrors the central crisis of the play itself. Friel's *Faith Healer* is a complex of stories with a great range of minor stories in them. Teddy's monologue contains "shaggy dog allegories that reflect back on his relationship with Frank and Grace."[22] In contrast with Albee, Friel's animal story is both amusing and fantastic. The two dogs Teddy claims to have had once differed in talent and ambition: the female brilliant at everyday chores but no performer, while the male, a whippet, a sensational genius in front of an audience but "subnormal" in other ways. Frank and Grace srike one much like this, different and also complementary.

Friel's last play to date, *Molly Sweeney* (1994) is also built out of the monologues of three characters. The central one, the initially blind Molly, possesses an inner sight and highly developed senses using which she makes a world for herself devoid of self-pity and resignation. After having both eyes operated on, the abundance of visual sensations conveying reality in all its harshness to her proves too inhospitable and alarming. From the growing dizziness of partial sight she withdraws into private fantasy, peopled with ghosts and visions. One of her adventure-loving husband, Frank's stories sounds like an ironical parallel to her case, in that it also depicts shrinking back from the untravelled and instinctively returning to the familiar:

> Billy Hughes and his crazy scheme. He had heard that there was a pair of badgers in a sett at the edge of the lake. When Anna was flooded in three weeks time, they would be drowned. They would have to be moved. Would I help him? ... the moment we cut them out of the nets and tried to push them down the new hole, well naturally they went blind ... And where did they head for? Of course - of course - straight back to the old sett at the edge of the water - the one we destroyed with all our digging! Well, what could you do but laugh?[23]

The badgers go blind when they are forced out of their natural environment, and Molly cannot adapt to the fundamental change the eye-operations involve, partial sight bringing greater blindness for her. She lands feeling at home only in a "borderline country," where the real and imagined mingle and are accepted together, unquestioned.

Jerry's darkly grotesque, shocking story in Albee's play is narrated as parable "for the benefit of Peter" and as "the means whereby he arrives at the meaning of his own experiences."[24] In *Faith Healer* and *Molly Sweeney*, narrated by stage Englishman and stage Irishman figures, the comic animal stories reinforce the plays' themes with an ironic effect. As both Albee and Friel are known to have been influenced by Beckett, the source might be common, in spite of apparent differences. In the middle of *Waiting for Godot* Vladimir sings about a dog whose story returns to its beginning like the whole play itself does.

Seven decades before Friel's *Faith Healer*, which premiéred on Broadway, American poet-playwright William Vaughan Moody wrote *The Faith Healer* (1909), his most successful play that Friel may or may not have known about when conceiving his. Moody's main character, Michaelis also practises faith healing, and the play begins following his arrival at the home of the Beeler family. After wandering from place to place healing people with varying success, he realizes that the covered route makes the shape of a cross on the map. In Friel's play Frank Hardy's incantation of the names of Welsh and Scottish villages gives the audience a sense of place, that of the Celtic fringe. In contrast with the religious implication of Michaelis's cross-shaped itinerary, the chain of place-names used by Friel draws on ancient Irish lore. For both faith healers, it is the completion of their long journeys that involves the real and decisive test: their power is

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22. Anthony Roche, *Op. cit.*, 123.
23. Brian Friel, *Molly Sweeney* (Loughcrew Oldcastle: The Gallery Press, 1994), 60-61. All further references are to this edition.
24. C. W. E. Bigsby, *Modern American Drama 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 132.

needed to cure an invalid in a wheelchair.

Having been conceived in two eras and cultures widely apart, Moody's and Friel's faith healers differ considerably in their characters and aims. Michaelis is fulfilling a mission; he has been given power by God to do good to mankind after years of preparation in the mountains. He is a Christ-like figure who relates having heard a voice sending him forth to begin to heal the sufferers. Subsequently he raised a young Mexican boy from his grave as his first miraculous act:

> Just before daylight, when the other watchers were asleep, the power of the spirit came strong upon me. I bowed myself upon the boy's body, and prayed. My heart burned within me, for I felt his heart begin to beat! His eyes opened. I told him to arise, and he arose. He that was dead arose and was alive again![25]

Friel's Frank Hardy bears pagan characteristics, which description is supported by the reference to the ritual of his final sacrifice as a "Dionysian night. A Bacchanalian night." (340) In his healing activity no sign of altruism or sense of mission manifests itself, but it proves a series of attempts at self-healing, the power coming from God knows where:

> ... when I stood before a man and placed my hands on him and watched him become whole in my presence, those were nights of exultation, of consummation - no, not that I was doing good, giving relief, spreading joy - good God, no, nothing at all to do with that; but because the questions that undermined my life then became meaningless and because I knew that for those few hours I had become whole in myself, and perfect in myself... (333)

Frank Hardy's personality and "craft" are seen in a most complex way. The fact that he sets up one-night performances places him in the role of the artist, whose talent remains a mystery for both himself and others. He is an artist in the ancient sense, relying on the magic of words, a Druid fulfilling the priest's functions as well. The pagan side, however, becomes fused with the Christian element reflecting the texture of modern Irish culture. Described in Teddy's monologue, Frank's most memorable success took place in the old Methodist church of a Welsh village, where he cured "every single person" out of the ten coming to the performance. The actual healing sounds more significant in spiritual than in physical terms: "Hardly a word was spoken. It was like as if not only had he taken away whatever it was was wrong with them, but like he had given them some great content in themselves as well." (359) Frank utters his last words in the final monologue of the play with his hat taken off "as if he were entering a church." (376)

In Moody's play the faith with which Michaelis is healing other people remains dominantly connected with Christianity and religion. The play is, however, not without a shade of the more ancient and pagan aspects of human culture. A picture from the supplement of the Sunday paper is pinned on a wall in the Beelers' home, entitled "Pan and the Pilgrim." It shows a forest meeting between the Pilgrim, the representative of Christian belief, and the nature god, Pan. The latter's pipe pouring forth an enchanting tune seems to influence the Christian wanderer. On the other hand, the meeting of these two figures foreshadows what will happen to Michaelis, the faith healer. He starts losing his power earned from God when he finds himself in earthly love with Rhoda, the Beelers' niece. Nature and faith appear incompatible: Michaelis's rapidly waning power is demonstrated by the fact that the invalid, Mrs. Beeler, whom he rendered able to walk earlier, sinks back into her wheelchair powerless. The healer's situation turns critical as a crowd waits outside to be cured, and disappointing them would involve a fate similar

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25. William Vaughn Moody, *The Faith Healer*, in: *The Poems and Plays of William Vaughn Moody*. Vol. II. (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1912), 211. All further references are to this edition.

to that of Frank Hardy, whose inability to cure the invalid McGarvey is suggested to have resulted in his assassination.

Moody's play, however, provides a turning point which renews the healing belief, and brings triumph over the coldness of scientific facts. The beloved Rhoda confesses to being wounded in her soul and in need of being healed through refilling her with faith and trust. To carry out this task the power of Michaelis returns, and love and faith form a harmonious union promising happiness as well as Christian work for others. At the same time Michaelis gains spiritual and moral victory over the heartless and faithless physician, Rhoda's former lover, who considered her as a mere object and plaything. *The Faith Healer* ends on the note of idealistic faith in good capable of winning and healing power restorable through love, by "the mystery that is man, and the mercy that is God." (334) On Easter morning, when the action closes, the sick baby whom Michaelis failed to cure earlier, is discovered resurrecting from its death-like, hopeless state.

In the postmodern era there is hardly any space for such unambiguity. Grace's need of Frank cannot prevent the tragic outcome. When Frank feels that things have been "lean for a long time" (338), the three of them return to Ireland. This homecoming confronts him with the postcolonial sickness of a country, against which he is powerless. However, Friel's Irish world is not entirely devoid of hope either. Frank's Dionysian death, a sacrifice at harvest time with a wedding celebration in the background, promises resurrection. In the words of Anthony Roche,

> He (Frank) is not only the sacrifical scapegoat for a community's inherited ills, as Christy Mahon was before him; but the play's closing act, which is both an act of destruction (annihilation) and re-creation from nothing, is one rife with possibilities for a new post-colonial identity and drama.[26]

Moody uses conventional dramatic form, Biblical allusions and a large cast to convince his audience of the renewed force of faith in the modern world. The name of Michealis recalls archangel Micheal in the Bible, who successfully contends with the devil. *The Faith Healer* offers a Christian version of faith healing and self-sacrifice to revitalize belief in turn-of-the-century America. Friel's *Faith Healer* is a pagan version that ends with the violent sacrifice of the Dionysian healer for the possible resurrection of a whole community. The scene is Ireland, where everything points to the deepest, sorest layers of the past. Frank Hardy's name carries the tone of sincerity and difficulty.

Next, Tenessee Williams's dramatizing memory into play is worth comparing with aspects in the work of Friel. As Fintan O'Toole succintly summarizes,

> The connections between *(Dancing at) Lughnasa* and *The Glass Managerie* are reasonably obvious ones. The use of the narrator as a device for the suspension and conflation of time, the elegiac tone of the narration, the use of a mentally disturbed young woman (Laura, Rose) whose sexuality takes on a critical edge, the guilty departure of the narrator, the sense of a family trapped as an anachronism in an increasingly hostile world, the persistence of old ceremonies, and, above all, perhaps, the use of music, all link the plays together.[27]

It may be more than an interesting coincidence that the two plays were running at the Abbey Theatre during the same period in 1990.[28] Both plays take place in the 1930s when Ireland and the American South were entering a new phase of their development, toward

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26. Anthony Roche, *Op. cit.*, 121.
27. Fintan O'Toole, "Marking Time: From *Making History* to *Dancing at Lughnasa*." In: Alan Peacock (ed.), 209.
28. Richard Pine, David Grant and Derek West, "Brian Friel's New Play for the Abbey." In: *Theatre Ireland* No. 22 (Spring 1990), 7.

modernization. "Williams pictures a society on the turn. Not for nothing was Chekhov his favourite playwright."[29] These words of C. W. E. Bigsby are equally true of Brian Friel, who even re-translated/adapted two great Russian predecessors, Turgenev and Chekhov.

In both *Lughnasa* and *The Glass Menagerie* there widens a gap between the individuals and the community they belong to. The Mundy girls created by Friel live isolated and cannot take part in the harvest festival because their Christian way of life is no longer reconcilable with pagan practices. To compensate for this loss, dance is central to *Lughnasa* as a release of energy as well as a language beyond words, with which the most personal experience can be articulated and the harmony between body and soul restored. In *The Glass Managerie* the women do not have company and friends, and Tom knows little about the people he meets day by day at the warehouse. Laura lives in her private dream world, among her fragile glass figures. Her dancing with the Irish-American Jim means also a temporary stepping out of the usual limitations her life and personality impose on her, but the venture ends in frustration and disappointment. Before she blows out the candles to end the play, her mother is said to be comforting her with "slow and graceful, almost dancelike"[30] gestures.

Both Laura and the sisters in Friel's play face loneliness and corresponding lack of prospects in a changing world. The act of dancing in *Lughnasa*, however, is more liberating because more universal and Dionysian, similar to Zarathustra's dance of life, and the play opens up toward a broader vista. Laura's glass unicorn, the breaking of which symbolizes the loss of illusions, has an earthy, comic parallel in the single-horned, winking brown cow of Gerry's story, walking on the road to Ballybeg in *Lughnasa*. The brown cow is a traditional symbol of Ireland, whose fantastic features added here may suggest the grotesque transformations of the Irish society.

The memory technique does not work in the same way in *The Glass Menagerie* and *Lughnasa*. In the former play, Tom, the narrator, is one of the protagonists; he enters the stage and takes part in the events of the recalled past. Therefore all seems real and convincing about the family's decline and Tom's subsequent pangs of conscience. Michael, the narrator of *Lughnasa*, does not transform into his younger self to accompany his sisters, although they take him to be there. This creates a larger distance between past and present, and there asserts itself a greater ambiguity about what is real or imagined than in Williams's play. Michael's first monologue reports "some awareness of a widening breach between what seemed to be and what was,"[31] introducing a dream-like atmosphere. The play, however, closes with Micheal's allusions to one haunting memory, in which the "actual and illusory" mingle and "everybody seems to be floating on ... sweet sounds" (71). The memory dissolves in dancing itself, the ritual, wordless ceremony that connects past, present and future and transcends individual tragedies.

Arthur Miller, rather exceptionally compared with his whole oeuvre, included a timid and embittered woman's dance in his 1993 play, *The Last Yankee*. The ageing Karen's pathetic tap-dancing in a ridiculous outfit is a climactic point of the work in that it involves a test for all the four characters to accept or reject her thus articulated wish for individual freedom and self-expression. Her unfolding performance proves too much to bear for her convention-bound husband whose outburst into furious shouts brings back a look of fear to Karen's face and the dance comes to an abrupt end. According to Nada Zeineddine, it was not until the later phase of his career that Miller gave a greater role

29. C. W. E. Bigsby, *Op. cit.*, 43.

30. Tennessee Williams, *The Glass Menagerie*. In: George McMichael (gen. ed.), *Anthology of American Literature*. Vol.II. (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 1646.

31. Brian Friel, *Dancing at Lughnasa* (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 2. All further references are to this edition.

to women in his plays.[32] The change was marked by *Elegy for a Young Lady* (1980) and *Playing for Time* (1981), in which women are connected with suffering and art. Placing a large amount of emphasis on women figures, *The Last Yankee* is also very much a play of women, where artistic activity appears as an escape from the world of maddening routines.

In his study of the contemporary Irish theatre, Anthony Roche discovers the "development of a more woman-centered drama ... anticipated by Samuel Beckett in some of his most important later plays."[33] Such examples in Beckett's oeuvre range from *Happy Days* (1961) to *Rockaby* (1980) through *Not I* (1972) and *Footfalls* (1975). It is a tendency Roche sees in Irish drama growing up beside the other significant tendency marked by moving "away from the idea of a single leading man and towards the sharing of the stage space between two male protagonists, neither of whom predominates."[34] Later in their careers some other dramatists' turning to women characters is well observable too, both in Ireland and in America. Beside Miller's example one finds that of Albee who, three decades after his two-male *The Zoo Story* produced an all-female play entitled *Three Tall Women*, first performed in 1991.

In the first part of Friel's career there is a dominance of male protagonists, although women lend memorable colours to the plays as well. *Philadelphia* rests on the male pair of Private Gar and Public Gar. *Making History* (1988) focuses on debates between the last Gaelic chieftain, Hugh O'Neill, and Lombard, the historian, about how to present and interprete the past. Two years later, *Lughnasa* entered the stage as Friel's first women's play par excellence. As discussed above, the technique employed in *Faith Healer*, where the figure of Frank Hardy is dominant, re-occures in *Molly Sweeney*, but now centering on a woman. The number of the protagonists remains the same, two men and a woman, but the rearrangement of emphasis is unmistakable. Frank Hardy is a portrait of the artist as faith-healer and self-healer. Molly's story addresses seeing in the broadest possible sense and the wish for and ways of making one's own reality.

In Thomas Murphy's dramatic oeuvre the move from male-centeredness to female-plays is even more conspicuously marked. *The Sanctuary Lamp* (1975) and *The Gigli Concert* (1983) use two men and a woman, the latter playing secondary roles while the former work out their ways to reconciliation and self-realization, respectively. *Bailegangaire* from 1985, however, has three women characters and no males. Compared with the former two where tension becomes released, in the women's play Murphy achieves even more: a sense of homecoming and a new beginning.

Can there be a deeper reason for this non-negligible pattern of switching from male to female worlds in the drama of exclusively male authors? The following is a tentative hypothesis. Friel's male protagonists tend to wrestle with particular constraints and choices, as in *The Enemy Within* (1962), *Philadelphia*, *Faith Healer* and *Making History*. They are bound to be connected with particular activities and fields like spiritual life, healing, writing, assessing the past, politics and historiography. American parallels can be seen in *The Price* and Sam Shepard's *True West* (1980). The women characters of the later Frilean plays, on the other hand, are more likely to embody general and universal concerns. The Mundy sisters in *Lughnasa* dance over the gap between drab reality and suppressed desire. Molly Sweeney, in the latest play, is confronted with the great test of life: to accept an imposed and fragmented existence or to go back to the privately developed - she does the latter. In the American arena, Albee's *Three Tall Women*, brings together the major cycles of life itself in the three women of the second act who represent one and the same person at different ages.

The present inquiry leads to the conclusion that there are many bridges resting on

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32. Nada Zeineddine, *Because It Is My Name. Problems of Identity Experienced by Women, Artists and Breadwinners in the Plays of Henrik Ibsen, Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller* (Braunston Devon: Merlin Books Ltd., 1991), 209.
33. Anthony Roche, *Op. cit.*, 283.
34. *Ibid.*, 79.

the use of similar themes, motifs and techniques between the historically and culturally related national theatres of Ireland and America. A view of them as comparative study, however, necessarily identifies dissimilarities as well. Significant American drama was born in an independent country, while Irish drama emerged as part of a colonial culture. The former always remains closer to facts and contains at least a shade of pragmatism. Even when uncertainty dominates the American dramatic characters' worlds, they strive toward less ambiguity and discrimination. On the other hand, the century-old blurring of reality and imagination has left its mark on the drama of Ireland. Irish people have counterbalanced the painful and unbearable pressures of the (post)colonial situation with their own dreams and stories. Fact, fiction and myth often continue to permeate each other in the contemporary playwrights' works as well. For Friel this heritage seems to be a blessing and a burden at the same time, and he dramatizes their interrelations in a great variety of contexts. Making stories does not really help Gar among the deprivations of Ballybeg in *Philadelphia*. In *The Freedom of the City* (1973) and *Making History* fictions under various banners overshadow private truth. *Faith Healer* blends reality and fiction with exceptional originality, becoming Friel's "most Irish" play.[35] The painful necessity to face facts becomes an issue in *Aristocrats* (1979) and *Translations* (1980). After following the uncertainties of sight, *Molly Sweeney* ends in ambiguity accepted, a possible *ars poetica*:

> It certainly doesn't worry me anymore that what I think I see may be fantasy or indeed what I take to be imagined may very well be real - what's Frank's term?- external reality. Real - imagined - fact - fiction - fantasy - reality - there it seems to be. And it seems to be alright. And why should I question any of it anymore?(67)

35. Ulf Dantanus, *Brian Friel, A Study* (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), 172.

Lenke Németh

Conversational Dissonance in David Mamet's *American Buffalo*[1]

The reader of David Mamet's play *American Buffalo* may be baffled at the unusually powerful use of language characterized, as it is, by a strict rhythm, broken sentences, sputterings and collapses into silences. Mamet's play was first staged in Chicago in 1975 and it won the New York Drama Critics' Award in 1976. Although it was not unanimously praised mainly on account of its language, the essence of the play's dramatic effect lies in the way Mamet handles the dialogue. The latter is a particularly important structural element due to the lack of traditional sequential plot which would allow the characters to act out their fate. The contrast and tension between what is said and what it meant by the characters creates conversational dissonance in their verbal world, which, as I will argue in this paper, ultimately mirrors their inner world. The plot of *American Buffalo* can be summerized very briefly: three crooks — the owner of a junkshop, Don and his friends, Teach and Bob — plan to rip off a coin collection, but they fail to do it due to incompetence and lack of cooperation. Their inability top act appropriately, disregarding the fact that their actual act is a crime, is closely related to their inability to communicate effectively.

Thus my focus of interest in this paper is limited to the linguistic manifestations of the characters' beliefs and thoughts as represented in a short stretch of dialogue from Mamet's play. My intention is to demonstrate how two characters can be described relying entirely on the inferences it is possible to make based on a conversation between them.

Following Malcolm Coulthard, who argues that "drama texts, being scripts for the performing of pseudo-conversations, can be successfully approached with techniques originally developed to analyze real conversation" (Coulthard 182), first I will apply certain rules of naturally occurring conversation to study some features of the dialogue in the selected extract. Then I will discuss what insight is achieved when the Gricean maxims of Co-operative Principle are used to examine the same stretch of dialogue.

As I intend to focus on two aspects, namely the significance of pauses and the working of question-answer pairs, it will be useful to cite the relevant findings of conversational analysts with regard to the extract of Mamet's play chosen for the study. A group of sociologists (Harvey Slacks, Emanuel A. Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson), known as ethnomethodologists, have observed that conversation is characterized by a turn-taking system (that is, **A** talks, stops, then **B** starts, talks and stops) and it is governed by a set of rules with ordered options. A slightly simplified version of these rules is listed here as summed up by Stephen C. Levinson:
(C=current; N=next; TRP=transition relevance place, where turn change may take place)

1. I wish to thank Professor Zoltán Abádi-Nagy and Dr. Alec Gordon for their suggestions and useful comments.

(a) If C selects N in current turn, then C must stop speaking, and N must speak next, transition occurring at the first TRP after N-selection.
(b) If C does not select N, then any (other) party may self-select, first speaker gaining rights to the next turn.
(c) If C has not selected N, and no other party self-selects under option (b), then C may (but need not) continue (that is claim rights to a further turn-constructional unit). (Levinson 298)

However, turn-taking does not happen smoothly because absences of speech and delays occur. Silences are not tolerated well in Western cultures so they signal some kind of problem between speakers. Thus different meanings can be mapped on to them depending on their place of occurrence in actual conversation. The turn-taking system assigns different values to pauses within conversation and it discriminates between *gaps* (delays in the application of Rules 1(b) or 1(c), *lapses* (non-application of the rules) and the next speaker's *silence* (after application of Rule 1(a)).

The chosen extract from Mamet's play presents a 'pivotal' moment between the two main characters, Teach and Don, so it may bring out on to the surface some aspects of their relationship.

Here is the dialogue extract that will be analyzed. For easy reference, each utterance is numbered.

(1) Teach: So what is this thing with the kid?[2]
Pause.
(2) I mean, is it anything, uh...
(4) Teach: Yeah.
Pause.
(5) It's what...?
(6) Don: You know, it's just some guy we spotted.
(7) Teach: Yeah. Some *guy*.
(8) Don: Yeah.
(9) Teach: (Some guy...)
(10) Don: Yeah.
Pause.
(11) What time is it?
(12) Teach: Noon.
(13) Don: (Noon.) (Fuck.)
(14) Teach: What?
Pause.
(15) Don: You parked outside?
(16) Teach: Yeah.
(17) Don: Are you okay on the meter?
(18) Teach: Yeah. The broad came by already.
Pause.
(19) Don: Good.
Pause.
(20) Teach: Oh, yeah, she came by.
(21) Don: Good.
(22) Teach: You want to tell me what this thing is?
(23) Don (Pause): The thing?
(24) Teach: Yeah.
Pause.

2. All quotations from the play are to this edition: David Mamet, *American Buffalo*, New York: Grove Widenfield, 1976.

(25) What is it?
(26) Don: Nothing.
(27) Teach: No? What is it jewelry?
(28) Don: No. It's nothing.
(29) Teach: Oh.
(30) Don: You know?
(31) Teach: Yeah.
Pause.
(32) Yeah. No. I don't know.
Pause.
(33) Who am I, a policeman... I'm making conversation, huh?
(34) Don: Yeah.
(35) Teach: Huh?
Pause.
(36) 'Cause you know I'm just asking for talk. (Mamet 26)

Fist let us consider the absences of speech.

Teach's first utterance is addressed to Don, but it is followed by a silence attributable to Don since he refuses to answer.

(1) Teach: So what is this thing with the kid?
Pause
(2) I mean, is it anything, uh...

There are two more slightly different examples for silences attributable to Don: utterances (14) and (22) are questions posed to Don, who is willing to give some sort of an answer only after a momentary hesitation. Here he cleverly transforms the uncomfortable silences into less rude gaps, which are merely delayed responses.

(14) Teach: What?
Pause.
(15) Don: You parked outside?

The frequent occurrence of gaps after Teach's utterances clearly shows his attempt to maintain the flow of conversation by self-selecting himself. Since there is no response or comment from the other party he tries again. A typically used option occurring between utterances (4)-(5) and (24)-(25) is the following: comment - gap - question re-initiated.

(4) Teach: Yeah.
Pause.
(5) It's what...?

Don resorts to this option only once, after utterance (10):

(10) Don: Yeah.
Pause.
(11) What time is it?

Teach's final outburst (lines 31, 32, 33, 35, and 36), inserted as it is, by gaps, is both embittered and ridiculous since now he cannot control his accumulated anger but he still uses the same strategy, that is, expects responses.

The structural location of non-speeches has a double function here: firstly, it sheds light upon some aspects of the relationship between Teach and Don and, secondly, the recurrent types of pauses contribute to the dramatic and rhythmic effect of the play. As all the silences are attributable to Don, he is the one who tends to ignore Teach's questions or employs another strategy (transforms them into gaps) to avoid giving a satisfactory answer. He is unco-operative as is clearly shown in his withdrawing himself from taking an active part in the conversation. The large number of gaps in Teach's utterances also signals that no real interaction takes place between the two participants since one of them constantly has to self-select himself and make the efforts to keep the conversation going. On the other hand, the fact that Teach's longer series of utterances is broken by gaps may express a lack of coherent thought.

Judging from the significance of the pauses, not much progress is achieved in the

two-party conversation. However, an analysis of the turn-construction could show more convincingly whether the interactants have any common communicative goal to realize or not.

The ethnomethodologists isolate the fundamental units of conversation and term them adjacency pairs, such as greetings-greetings, offer-acceptance, question and answer. Their common features, as defined by Sacks and Schegloff, are the following: they are produced by different speakers, and a particular first requires a particular second, though the relevant response may be utterances apart or may not occur at all. Numerous levels of embedded sequences in the forms of insertions or side sequences are frequent between the first and the expected second; thus they effectively structure considerable stretches of conversation. The difference between the two is that insertion sequences merely hold in abeyance the answer, whereas side sequences provide clarification of some sort when the flow of speech is halted. However, both of them are orientated towards the main topic, which signals efforts made by the interactants to work to arrive at a common communicative goal.

Let us now see the turn construction in the selected extract from Mamet's play:

(1) first part of a question-answer adjacency pair
(2) *re-initiating of q (1)*
(3) reject answer
(4) confirmation
(5) *re-initiating of q (1)*
(6) vague answer
(7) - (10) repetition, confirmation
(11) - (21) diversion
(22) repetition
(24) confirmation
(25) *re-initiating of q* (1)
(26) reject answer
(27) *re-initiating of q (1)*
(28) reject answer
(29) - (32) confirmation
(33) - (36) reasoning

Two main features can be observed:

(a) It is conspicuous that question (1) is re-initiated five times (2, 5, 22, 25, 27) and the answers to them are rejections (3, 26, 28), a repetition (23) or a vague answer (6). Utterance (6) cannot be viewed as a relevant answer since no re-initiation of question (1) would then take place.

(b) 12 utterances of repetition and confirmation make up a considerable part, one third of the whole exchange. The characters seem to confirm and repeat what they both already know, so no new information is provided.

It is worth having a look at the turn construction of the sequence between utterances (11) - (21):

(11) *question A*
(12) *answer A*
(13) repetition of answer A
(14) request for clarification
(15) *question B*
(16) *answer B*
(17) *question C*
(18) *answer C*
(19) comment
(20) repetition of answer C
(21) comment

(22) re-phrasing of question (1)

The striking features of this stretch of dialogue are the following: within this relatively short stretch of dialogue three new topics are introduced and discussed very briefly; they do not relate either to each other or to the main topic; repetitions also occur (twice); a request for clarification is rudely ignored (14 and 15). It follows that this sequence cannot be regarded as either an insertion or as a side sequence because it does not sort out the preliminaries of the main topic; therefore I classify it as a diversion. In the light of this analysis the two characters' crippled worlds are characterized by a total breakdown of communication, a restricted use of language and an intention to deceive the other.

Applying selected rules of turn-taking and turn-construction has yielded some insight into the communicative strategies of the speakers, but it has failed to consider their respective motivations. Now the focus of interest is shifted on to the meanings as in the language, which can be analyzed by having a closer look at the differences between what is said and what is meant. I will draw on the Co-operative Principle as worked out by H. Paul Grice and discussed in his work entitled *Logic and Conversation* (1975). Grice's approach aims to account for meanings as they develop in conversation.

Grice defines the Co-operative Principle as follows: "make your conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Cole 45). He claims that people entering into conversation tacitly agree to co-operate to achieve communicative ends, thus they obey the regulative conventions of the Co-operative Principle. At least four conventions, or *maxims*, govern:

(1) *the maxim of quantity*: make your contribution as informative as is required - don't give too much or too little information;
(2) *the maxim of quality*: make your contribution one that you believe to be true;
(3) *the maxim of relation*: be relevant;
(4) *the maxim of manner*: avoid unnecessary prolixity, obscurity of expression and ambiguity, and be orderly.
(Cole 45)

However, these maxims are frequently broken because a participant "may ostentatiously violate, opt out or he may flout a maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfil it" (Cole 49). It is under the final specification that conversational implicature is generated, since the speaker does not give a direct and relevant answer, so the hearer has to work out the implicature. This is a key term coined by Grice to account for indirect context-determined meaning.

Now I will attempt to specify the characters' implicatures in the stretch of dialogue under discussion from Mamet's play. Teach's first question is entirely ignored by Don so he has to ask it again. The implicature for Teach is the Don is unwilling to talk about that topic. Don's answer in utterance (3) is a kind of paraphrase of Teach's question, that is "You don't know anything about it, that's a fact", so it is the violation of all three of the maxims of quantity, quality and relevance. Teach has to re-initiate (5) and now Don's response is the infringement of the maxim of quantity because he is not as informative as required. The use of 'some', the indefinite pronoun, and 'just' lessens the importance of his statement. The implicature for Teach is that this vague answer further arouses his suspicion about something important that Don is trying to conceal. Utterances (7) to (10) are short monosyllabic repetitions of information already known to both parties. For Don the implicature here may be that he has given just enough information so he changes the topic (11) and initiates a question on an entirely new subject. Teach gives the relevant, brief answer, and this is followed by Don repeating the same information. It is implied for Teach that Don is not particularly interested in his response because instead of clarifying what he means (14) Don introduces a new topic (15) and in so doing he again

flouts the maxims of quantity, quality and relevance. The only progression in their interaction seems to take place between utterances (15) to (18), where no infringement of maxims occurs, since Don's questions are answered in a relevant manner. However, utterances (19) and (21) are again repetitions and confirmations of knowledge already known. Teach comes up with his initial question again in utterance (22). Don's response to it is a question, whereby he again flouts all the maxims (23). Their talk continues in this manner between utterances (24) to (28): Teach re-initiates and Don refuses to answer. Utterances (29) to (31) are confirmations of the already known, whereas utterance (32) is a significant one because it shows what a confused state of mind Teach is in as he cannot work out what Don means. Utterances (33) and (36) give some reason for Teach's questions pretending that it is just a basic need for genuine talk, that is effective and meaningful communication.

The frequency of the violation of the maxims is a clear sign of an aborted relationship between the two speakers, and their attempt to mislead the other.

Relying on the foregoing interpretation of the analyses of the stretch of dialogue, the following dialogue exchange pattern typical in Mamet's play can be observed: lines (1) to (6) are the introduction of a theme, lines (7) to (10) are repetition, confirmation of the theme, lines (12) to (21) are diversion from the main theme, it is a new theme, while in lines (22) to (36) the original theme recurs in a modified way until a new theme is introduced.

Hence the schematic pattern of the dialogue is:

Introduction of topic
Diversion
Recurrence of topic
Solution

Each part contains repetitions and confirmations of the relevant topic. (This structure has some parallels with the first main part, the exposition of the classical sonata form in music, as it also has an introduction of the theme followed by transposition, which matches the 'confirmation' part here, then comes the side theme, that is the 'diversion' here and finally the closing theme, which is always the slightly modified version of the original theme.) The proportions of the parts may vary but on the whole this pattern holds whenever the characters try to converse with the desire to get some information.

Summing up, a conversational pattern of this type encapsulates an implicature which is aimed at misleading, deceiving, giving false information or no-information at all to the hearer on the one hand and, on the other, the incomplete, broken sentences in which information is transmitted mirror the speakers' inner world which seems to be devoid of thought and feelings. The rhythm of the play can be attributed to the recurrence of this pattern cyclically within it, and also to the fact that the pattern itself has its own inherent rhythm, which is maintained by the alternation of longer and shorter, frequently broken, unfinished utterances and pauses. The significance of the absences of speech lies in the fact that they are not merely 'spaces' in the text, but also in the characters' minds. They function as a kind of defensive strategy on the part of the speakers: it is better and safer not to ask or say anything to avoid getting into closer contact with each other, though this is what each character would very much like, but they are unable to do so.

It is interesting to note that both the unity of time and place (the events happen over a 24-hour period in a junkshop) and the cyclical dialogue pattern in *American Buffalo* are in contrast with the conversational dissonance occurring in the language of the characters. Thus perhaps Mamet suggests that after all harmony and consonance between them are not entirely lost.

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LINGUISTICS

Alistair Wood

Texts and types of meaning

In their 1986 book *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson put forward a radical view of communication which saw all kinds of communication in terms of the concept of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986). The theory put forward in this work, known as relevance theory (hereinafter RT), was later developed to cover a large number of examples of different forms of communication. According to the theory, it in fact applies to all kinds of communication, but in practice little work has been done within the framework of the theory on written texts. What I shall be concerned with in this paper is the application of the theory to such texts. More particularly, I am going to examine a claim made by Wilson and Sperber in a later paper that there are four different kinds of meaning and try to extend these four types of meaning to give them a specifically textual dimension (Wilson and Sperber 1993).

These four types revolve around two different parameters: conceptual/procedural on the one hand and truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional on the other. Putting these two together it is easy to see that we therefore have 4 different types of meaning. The first, conceptual and truth-conditional, is the basic type of meaning shared by the vast majority of content words. These encode concepts which go make to make up the proposition expressed by the utterance and thus contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. The second type, conceptual and non-truth-conditional, refers to various illocutionary force indicators, sentence adverbials etc which, although they encode concepts, do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance, but to a higher level explicature. Speech acts like this are seen as higher level explicatures in RT.

These then are the two types of conceptual meaning. The other two types are types of procedural or non-conceptual meaning. What do we mean by this? It is argued by Diane Blakemore that discourse connectives like 'after all' should not be seen as encoding concepts and thus that they are not conceptual (Blakemore 1987). They also do not contribute to the truth conditions of utterances and so are non-truth-conditional, thus giving the third type, i.e. procedural and non-truth-conditional. The function of such words is in Blakemore's terms to act as "semantic constraints on relevance", in other words to guide the hearer towards the expected contextual effects of an utterance. Thus the use of a word like 'so' indicates to the hearer how he should interpret the proposition, rather than being part of the proposition itself.

The fourth category is that of procedural and truth-conditional. At first sight it would seem rather difficult to imagine how these two types could go together. Wilson and Sperber, however, argue that personal pronouns illustrate this type, in that they are not conceptual, since only by determining the referent is specific content given to the expression. They are truth-conditional in that they contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition. Like discourse connectives, pronouns constrain the hypothesis space that must be searched by the hearer to arrive at the intended interpretation. But the latter constrain the search for the explicature, since by assigning the reference the hearer is led to produce the full propositional form.

Having given you the basic conception of these four different kinds of meaning, as expressed by Wilson and Sperber, what I would like to do now is to try and extend the

concept to the level of the text. You will have noticed that the original four types of meaning were at the level of the words, which then went together to express explicatures and implicatures, in RT terms. As I am interested in the application of RT to texts, I thought it would be interesting to see if the same sort of conception could be applied to this higher level and examine what sort of implications this might have for an RT theory of discourse analysis.

Just as the basic concept with which the original theory was concerned was the word, which went together to make up implicatures/explicatures, I am concerned at the basic level with the sentence, since it is sentences that go together to make up texts. If we look then at the sentence where the original theory was concerned with the word level we find that the basic type, corresponding to normal content words, would be the normal sentences of a text. In addition to the intuitive parallel we can see that sentences can be clearly seen to be both conceptual and truth-conditional. They obviously encode concepts and they express a proposition of which we can say that it is truth-conditional. However, it must be noted that if we are working at the level of the text it is not enough to say that sentences are conceptual and truth-conditional at the sentence proposition level. This would be no more than is true of words.

If we raise our attention to the level of the text as a whole, we can see that just as words can be said to go together to make up propositions sentences can go together to constitute macropropositions. Many discourse analysts have used this concept, the most well-known description being that of van Dijk and Kintsch, but my argument is compatible with a number of different formulations of the concept (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). These macropropositions at the textual level are clearly just as truth-conditional as any lower level propositions in that they can be declared to be true or false in the same way. These macropropositions can apply at different textual levels, i.e. paragraph, section of the text or whole text, but the same arguments apply at any of these levels.

Similarly, if words encode concepts so too do sentences. And the concepts in these sentences go together to make up the macropropositions of different levels of the text. The parallels with the original argument are clear and it seems safe to say that sentences of a text are both conceptual and truth-conditional.

The second type, you will remember, was also conceptual, but differed from the first in that it was not truth-conditional. By this it was meant that words of this type do not contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition expressed but instead operate at a higher level, what in RT terms is called a higher level explicature. For example, if Mike says "Frankly, John is mad", then he is expressing a basic proposition that 'John is mad', however 'mad' might be interpreted. But he is also expressing another concept, indicated by the word "frankly". This does not contribute at all to the truth conditions of whether or not John is in fact mad, but expresses another additional explicature at a higher level, i.e. 'Mike is stating frankly', or something similar.

Notice, then, that the second explicature operates at a different, higher level and does not as a result contribute to the truth conditions of the level below. To find a parallel in texts, therefore, we need to find a part of the text which, although part of the text in the same way that a sentence adverbial is part of a sentence, does not contribute to the truth conditions of the text as such. Instead it should stand outside the text and refer to the rest of the text as a whole in the same way that an adverbial like "frankly" refers to the rest of the sentence it is in. This might seem like a tall order at first sight. In fact, though, it is not so difficult as it seems. Some texts, although not all, do contain such a part. Thus if we take a text of the type I am working on, popular science texts, practically at random, "Cornering a Killer", we find that it contains a picture and diagram. (Nash 1994). This is just the type of thing we are concerned with. They are part of the text, since the beginning and end of the text are marked by two little blocks, in the style of Time and they fall within these boundaries. However the rest of the text can be read and understood without paying any attention to the picture or diagram. They do not contribute at all to the propositions expressed at any level in the rest of the text but rather constitute a higher level. Similarly they in no way contribute to the truth conditions of the text of which they are a part. In themselves too a picture or diagram cannot be

said to be true or false and thus this type is obviously non-truth conditional. Instead they work at a higher level to show how the text as a whole is to be interpreted. They help the reader to fit the text into a wider whole.

Nevertheless pictures and diagrams are clearly conceptual. They do not actually encode a concept at the word level in that they are non-linguistic, but they are certainly conceptual in that they generate concepts in the mind of the reader. These concepts will then go together to make propositions. Notice, however, that such propositions would not be part of the text in that they would be idiosyncratic and dependent on the individual reader. They thus differ from the propositions of type 1, which are clearly directly drawn from the text. Type 2 then seems to be made up of parts of the text which relate to the whole of the rest of the text and place the text as a whole into a wider framework. Not all texts contain pictures and diagrams, i.e. type 2, but this is to be expected. In a similar way, not all sentences contain type 2 meanings either. We should not, therefore, expect all texts to contain pictures or diagrams.

The final two types have in common the fact that neither of them are conceptual, but the opposite type, procedural. As mentioned above, the basis of this type at the sentence level is the type of discourse connective discussed by Blakemore, which has no conceptual meaning as such, but merely serves to constrain the hearer's search for the implicature (Blakemore 1987). The text level equivalent of such discourse connectives is not hard to find. The type of discourse connective discussed by Blakemore as having the property described is those such as 'so' or 'moreover', which lead the hearer to access a particular type of rhetorical connection between propositions. At textual level this type of connection goes by various names, either functional or rhetorical, and different discourse analysts, e.g. Meyer and Rice, Mann and Thompson, have listed several types of rhetorical connections (Meyer and Rice 1982; Mann and Thompson 1988). Nevertheless the principle is clear that here we are concerned with the rhetorical relationships or the types of rhetorical connection between different parts of the text. If we take the approach of Mann and Thompson (Rhetorical Structure Theory or RST), they establish that different sections of the text have a particular rhetorical relationship between them, e.g. that of concession, solution etc. Without going into the details of their approach it may be stated that the type of rhetorical relationship described is obviously procedural in type. Two different sections of texts may be linked in a problem-solution relation but this does not mean that there is any sort of conceptual meaning of problem in the section of text labelled as such. The relation 'problem' does not lie in any words or sentences of the text as such but in the relation of a section of text to another section. In RST the relations are hierarchical so that levels of text from the highest to the lowest relate together in a hierarchical structure covering the whole text.

One objection that may be raised at this stage is that up till now each type has had a clear textual exponent, whereas this type seems to be divorced from any direct linguistic expression. First of all, there seems to be no principled reason why there necessarily must be a direct linguistic expression of such relations. Mann and Thompson specifically point out that there may be a specific marker of the relation, but that this is not necessarily the case. Nevertheless, a direct parallel to the original type would mean that there would be some aspect of the text that would indicate this level. As indicated, there may indeed be such a marker, but we would not want to restrict it to the type mentioned by Blakemore, since these are a small subclass of connectors which do not contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition. Thus 'so' would be non-truth-conditional but 'because of that' would be truth-conditional and not of this type. Taking the argument to the textual level, however, this distinction need not concern us, since none of these connectors would be part of the macropropositions of the text, but they would all be likely to reflect the rhetorical relationships between the macropropositions.

Another type of exponent, though, is a direct indication of this level. This is the type of indication we have, most clearly, in academic scientific papers, where section headings like 'Procedure' or 'Discussion' gave a clear signal of the type of rhetorical relation there is between the section of the text with such a heading and the text as a whole. Here we have at its most explicit the type of textual meaning we are discussing.

But it would be too severe to restrict this type of meaning purely to texts where such a relation is overtly signalled. Thus this text has a first section whose relation to the rest of the text is one of 'background', where I introduce the ideas of Wilson and Sperber's original paper as background to the exposition of my extension of their ideas. This section is not labelled as 'introduction' or 'background' but nevertheless functions as such.

Such relations, it would seem, are procedural, in that they do not encode concepts which become part of the macropropositions of the text. Rather they are similar to the type of discourse connectors described by Blakemore in that they function to indicate to the reader how he is to interpret the relationship between the different macropropositions of the text. Similarly, they are non-truth-conditional in that they are not constitutive of these macropropositions.

The final type, procedural and truth-conditional, is the most problematic. In my defence, though, it must be pointed out that the original formulation is somewhat of a problem for Wilson and Sperber also. In 'Relevance' Sperber and Wilson indicate that the sentence "She carried it in her hand" is non-propositional in that it must first be enriched by completing the reference of "it" and "her" before it can be considered fully propositional and thus capable of being described as true or false (Sperber and Wilson 1986 72-73). However, in their later paper they describe personal pronouns as being truth-conditional (Wilson and Sperber 1993 20). They are truth-conditional in that they contribute to the truth conditions of the propositions they help to constitute. On the other hand they are procedural, because, as we have just seen, they do not directly describe a concept. What they do is guide the hearer's search for the intended referent, thus acting to constrain the inferential phase of comprehension in the same way as discourse connectors. Pronouns, however, constrain the search for the explicature.

Given these difficulties, what could we consider as an analogue at textual level? At the textual level the analogue that when filled out produces a textual macroproposition is the headline or title. Normally such a headline is not a full macroproposition. Thus in the text mentioned earlier it is the phrase "Cornering a Killer", which needs to be filled out by completing the missing elements to produce a full proposition referring to the whole text (Nash 1994). Thus headlines are truth-conditional in the same sense as pronouns in that they contribute to the constitution of a fully truth-conditional proposition.

This is not so problematic, but are such headlines procedural? To help us answer this question, it must be borne in mind that the function of the procedural type is to constrain the search for inferences on the part of the hearer, to reduce the hypothesis space that must be searched by the hearer. In the case of the pronoun it is a constraint on the possible explicature. Pronouns guide the hearer to a referent which enables the hearer to construct the explicature. Headlines guide the search for the macroproposition that governs the whole text. In this sense they also guide the search for the explicature, in this case a higher level explicature at the level of the text.

It might be argued that headlines are surely conceptual in that they clearly encode concepts. Certainly, they encode concepts at the word level. However, we are concerned here with the higher textual level, at which level headlines are not conceptual. By this I mean that at sentence level the idea of conceptual would imply full propositions, since conceptual representation is defined as having the logical properties of entering into entailment and contradiction relations. At sentence level this would constitute a full proposition. Headlines as they stand are not full propositions.

But the clinching argument for procedural status is the defining characteristic of guiding the interpretation of the hearer rather than constituting a proposition as such. It seems clear that they do this. Again, it might be objected that not all headlines are such: some are in fact full propositions. Those that are would indeed not be of this type, but would be of type 1. But this is not a problem in that again there is a parallel here with pronouns. Not all sentences have pronouns; those that have nouns and are otherwise fully explicit would be type 1 also. So we would not expect in theory all headlines necessarily to be type 4 - this is something which is allowed for in the theory, not a necessary characteristic, just as pronouns are a possibility not a mandatory part of any sentence.

It has been argued then that corresponding to the word level types of meaning identified by Wilson and Sperber there are corresponding types of meaning at the textual level. The remarks in this paper on this score are still to some extent speculative but it would seem likely that such a powerful phenomenon would find expression at other linguistic levels. The suggestions put forward are a first step towards suggesting how these four types of meaning might be expressed at the textual level.

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Péter Pelyvás

On the Syntax and Semantics of Epistemic Grounding

1. Introduction

In an attempt to bridge the gap between semantics and pragmatics, and to provide a framework for a unified account of a set of phenomena that have so far been considered to be unrelated (and in most instances, also highly problematic), Langacker's cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 1993) introduces the notion of epistemic grounding.

Epistemic grounding, a special type of reference point construction, can be regarded as the cognitive equivalent of Hare's *neustic* (the speaker's sign of subscription, or the *I say so* component in an utterance, cf. Lyons 1977).

In Langacker's cognitive system the function of the grounding predication is to relate (the linguistic expression of) a process or a thing (a verb or a noun) to the situation of its use: speaker/hearer knowledge, time and place of utterance (subsumed under the term *ground*).

Langacker (1987) defines epistemic grounding in the following way:

> An entity is epistemically grounded when its location is specified relative to the speaker and hearer and their spheres of knowledge. For verbs, tense and mood ground an entity epistemically; for nouns, definite/indefinite specifications establish epistemic grounding. Epistemic grounding distinguishes finite verbs and clauses from nonfinite ones, and nominals (noun phrases) from simple nouns. (Langacker 1987: 489)

Langacker (1991) gives the following version:

> [Grounding is] a semantic function that constitutes the final step in the formation of a nominal or a finite clause. With respect to fundamental "epistemic" notions (e.g. definiteness for nominals, tense/modality for clauses), it establishes the location vis-à-vis the ground of the thing or process serving as the nominal or clausal profile. Langacker 1991: 549)

The first of these definitions lays emphasis on the nature of epistemic grounding, the second concentrates on its structural (syntactic) aspects. We shall be following the same order in our discussion.

Both definitions indicate that grounding plays a crucial role in the formation of (finite) clauses and noun phrases and also that it is to some extent the formalization and reformulation in cognitive terms of what is usually referred to as **deixis** in the traditional approach, with the major difference that since language use is considered to be within the scope of linguistic analysis in cognitive grammar, the phenomenon will not have to be relegated to pragmatics, one of the 'discarded rag-bags' (a term used by J. Anderson (1971)) of objectivist theories.

Epistemic grounding proposes to describe modality (along with tense for verbs and

determiners for nouns) in terms of a special kind of predication that Langacker calls a **grounding predication.** In this paper, the main concern of which will be grounding on the clause level and elements of language that can establish it, we shall briefly examine the emergence of the grounding predication (which can be regarded as a special kind of **reference point construction**) through the process of **subjectification** (the speaker [conceptualizer] appears as reference point), critically examine Langacker's application of the concept to English, including the system of English modal auxiliaries, and propose several improvements to the theory.

2. Reference point constructions

The grounding predication has its origins in what Langacker (1985, 1987, 1991, 1993) calls reference point constructions and is the result of subjectification (or the egocentric viewing arrangement, cf. Langacker 1985).

In a reference point construction an entity (the reference point) is invoked for the purposes of establishing mental contact with another entity (the target) located within its dominion, as shown in Figure 1 (Langacker 1993: 6):



Figure 1
(C stands for conceptualizer, R for reference point, T for target, and D for dominion, the 'neighborhood' (in a loose sense) of the reference point.)

A crucial factor of this construction is its dynamic nature: a shift of attention from the reference point to the target once contact has been established. As a consequence, the construction, although it may retain some prominence of the reference point, will ultimately profile the target.

The reference point construction has been found useful (Langacker 1993) in the description, among other things, of possessive and quasi-possessive constructions, prepositional constructions involving inalienable possession (*I tapped her on the shoulder*), the "dative shift", some cases of metonymy, embedded locative constructions, topicalization, raising or exceptional case marking - an essential property of non-factive predicates.

3. Subjectification

According to Langacker (1991: 215-6),

> **subjectification** (...) is a semantic shift or extension in which an entity originally construed objectively comes to receive a more subjective construal.'

Subjectification can occur in two degrees, as shown in Figure 2. (Langacker 1991: 216).



Figure 2

In (a), the objectively construed relation, no reference is made to the speaker/conceptualizer (an element of G, which stands for **ground**). The ground is shown outside the box that represents the scope of the conceptualization. The dashed arrow represents the construal relation and is also called the **subjective axis**, the ellipse delimits the immediate scope of predication, 'the locus of attention within the overall scope, also known as the objective scene or onstage region **(OS)**'. **X** and **Y** are elements of the profiled relation between the trajector and the landmark. Relationship **XY** runs along the **objective axis**: it holds within the objective scene (no reference is made to the ground).

In (b), which represents subjectification of the first type, the situation changes radically. One element of the profiled relationship **XY**, originally between the trajector and the landmark, has been replaced with a similar element **X'**, which, nevertheless, holds between G and the rest of the original profile: **one facet of the profiled relationship has been reoriented from the objective to the subjective axis**. As a consequence, G (the speaker/conceptualizer) is now part of the objective scene: is brought into profile (in the cases that particularly interest us: at least temporarily, as a reference point). In this extension G is construed more objectively, and the relationship between the trajector and the landmark - more subjectively, than in (a).

To illustrate the point, Langacker introduces the sentences in (1):

(1) a Harvey crawled across the table
b A famous movie star is sitting across the table (from me)

In (1a) the atemporal relationship ACROSS is independent of the conceptualizer (construed objectively), in (1b) it is clearly not. It is construed subjectively, with the conceptualizer as a reference point (at least in the default case).

In (c)

> subjectification of **X** is carried one step further by a diminution in the salience of **X'**. (...) **X'** recedes into the base, leaving **Y'** to stand alone as the profiled relationship. The resulting configuration is equivalent to that of a grounding predication (...): although both **G** and the relationship it bears to the designatum are essential to the expression's meaning, and thus included in the scope of predication, they remain offstage and unprofiled. There is reason to believe that epistemic predications can indeed arise in this fashion, and that the full progression (a) > (b) > (c) of Figure [2] represents a possible course of historical evolution. (Langacker 1991: 216)

To illustrate this type of subjectification, Langacker compares the sentences in (2):

(2) a The balloon rose slowly
b The hill gently rises from the bank to the river

(2b) differs from (1b) in that in (1b) the applicability of *across* depends on the position of the conceptualizer. In (2b), however, the objective configuration is independent of the (mental) path covered by the conceptualizer. Subjective directionality is therefore an unprofiled facet of this situation (Langacker 1991: 218).

Grounding and the modals

In Langacker's (1991) view, epistemic grounding, when not left unmarked (which is the default case), can only be established by a modal auxiliary, regardless of whether it has the 'root' (deontic) or the epistemic meaning. Pelyvás (1994) contests this view, pointing out that

- there are substantial differences in the semantics of the root and epistemic modals, with the result that only epistemic meanings can serve as grounding predications.
- Langacker's view can be traced back to his acceptance of Sweetser's (1990) analysis of metaphorical extension in modals, where all the essential structural aspects of the root meaning appear to be preserved in the extension into the epistemic domain. If this were the case, there could be no differences (e.g. in the degree of subjectification) between the two types of meaning.

Pelyvás (1994) analyzes the differences between the two meanings of MAY in the following way:



Figure 3 Deontic MAY



Figure 4 Epistemic MAY

The 'backbone' of the deontic meaning is the **doer's** (tr) relative strength (and intention) to bring about an action which the **speaker** (S/G) is relatively weak to oppose or prevent (Y' vs. X'). Since the speaker, in addition to his 'normal' role as the ground, is involved in this objectively construed relationship, he is also part of the objective scene (OS).

In the epistemic meaning (the source of which is taken to be a now extinct *ability* meaning, in which only the **doer's strength** is in profile), a radical reinterpretation has taken place: the **doer** (with his strength and intentions) is no longer present. The objectively construed relationship (Y' vs. X') no longer applies and, as a consequence, the **speaker** is no longer part of the objective scene: it only occurs in its 'normal' role, that of the **ground**. This is described in detail in Pelyvás (1994a, b).

Deontic MAY is (close to) subjectification Type 1, its epistemic counterpart is clearly Type 2. Nevertheless, deontic MAY permits (requires?) external grounding, which can be regarded as evidence that, contrary to Langacker (1991), the deontic meaning is not a grounding predication.[1]

4. The syntax of the grounding predication

Langacker's system

On the clause level, Langacker's system presupposes a one-to-one correspondence between finiteness and grounded status. His treatment of the syntax of grounding is based on the premise that **every finite clause has to be grounded, by definition**. This is an assumption that we will contest in this section, partly because it can be shown to have undesired consequences, and partly because it does not permit the unified syntactic treatment of phenomena that are, semantically, all connected with epistemic modality.

• Since a grounded clause profiles a process, and the grounding predication always profiles the grounded entity rather than the subjectively construed grounding relation, the structure to be grounded (in Langacker's terminology, the *grounded head*) must also profile a process. But, since in Langacker's system only a finite structure can profile a process, the grounded head must also be finite. This means that, for Langacker, the main verb after an auxiliary has to be a finite form (Langacker 1991: 248). This is clearly an undesired consequence, analyzed in some detail in Pelyvás (1994a).

• Another undesired consequence is that, since the subordinate clause is finite in all the following examples

(3) a Maybe it is too late now
b I think that you are wrong there
c I don't think that this is the right solution
d It is possible that he has forgotten
e I know that he is basically honest
f I regret now that I called you a liar,

their grounded status should be equal. But, since the matrix clauses in (a) to (d) contain cognitive non-factive predicates, only (e) and (f) can be said to be grounded in immediate reality. To overcome this problem, Langacker has to assume that grounding can be 'overridden':

1. It would, nevertheless, be an oversimplification to identify subjectification Type 1 only with deontic meanings, relegating epistemic grounding to subjectification Type 2. Pelyvás (1994a) argues that the dividing line between the two types of subjectification is indeed hard to establish, and that both can occur in grounding predications, e.g. subjectification Type 1 can be regarded as a grounding predication in the case of cognitive matrix predicates taking object complement clauses, when the matrix clause is first person (singular). In other words, both types are capable of expressing epistemic modality.

> (...) it must be realized that the grounded clausal head represents a particular level of conceptual organization whose import is not absolute but may be overridden at higher levels. Standing alone as an assertion, *He likes her* indeed implies that the speaker accepts the profiled situation as part of immediate reality (...). However, in larger expressions such as *Perhaps he likes her, It is doubtful that he likes her*, or *The nurse believes that he likes her*, the conception of the situation being located in immediate reality is embedded as part of a larger conception which assesses its validity or confines it to a particular mental space. (Langacker 1991: 247)

Curiously, 'overriding' only appears possible when the grounding is unmarked, i.e. assumed to be the strongest, but also the default case, *known reality*. Consider the sentences in (4):

(4) It is likely that he is a genius
*It is likely that he must be a genius
Perhaps he is a genius
*Perhaps he cannot be a genius

Co-occurrence only seems possible when the two elements corroborate rather than contradict each other, as in

(5) He may perhaps be a genius

In addition, immediate overriding of an established value would seem to violate the principle that Lyons (1981) calls **the epistemic commitment of the speaker**:

> Anyone who states a certain proposition is committed to it (...) in the sense that his subsequent statements (...) must be consistent with the belief that it is true. (Lyons 1981: 190)

This explains why sentences like

(6) a It is raining but I don't believe it
b It is raining in Chicago but it may not be raining there

are 'pragmatically' not acceptable. The difference that the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause is **presupposed** rather than asserted in the case of non-epistemic predicates does not appear to be too relevant. Anyone saying

(7) It is tragic that it is raining again

would normally be assumed to hold the belief that it is raining. A clause subordinate to a non-factive predicate (the prototypical cognitive predicate?) does not have such a presupposition. It would be difficult to argue that such a clause is epistemically grounded but is not presupposed to be true by the speaker.

The outlines of a solution

If we consider epistemic grounding to be semantic in nature, then we may have the intuition that at least some of the 'overriding higher order relations', such as *perhaps, likely, I think*, etc., may in certain cases express epistemic grounding in very much the same way as (epistemic) modals do, with the 'matrix clause' serving as a grounding predication for the 'subordinate clause'. But in that case what Langacker sees as overridden epistemic grounding in the complements of non-factives (which, before 'overridden', expressed known reality) must be taken to be an ungrounded predication.

This treatment, argued for in detail in Pelyvás (1994a), presupposes two different

kinds of subordinate clauses: one that stands for a grounded predication (subordinate to a factive matrix predicate) and one that stands for an ungrounded one (subordinate to a cognitive [non-factive] predicate). Separation is not easy on formal grounds, since the only conceiveble formal criterion would be *'occurrence in the environment of a cognitive predicate'*, which leads to circularity. This may explain why such structures have always posed a major problem for formal theories.

There is, however, evidence that the relationship between a grounded subordinate clause and its matrix clause is different from the relationship of an ungrounded clause to its grounding predication: 'irregular' syntactic behaviour. Admitting that symbolicity of a certain (we might venture to say: mechanical) kind, based on the symbolicity of finiteness (and of *that*), may be infringed in these structures, we can now set out to find a new kind of symbolicity: **lack of epistemic grounding in a subordinate clause is symbolized by the consistent 'exceptionality' of the syntactic behaviour of the structure that contains it.**

Syntactic behaviour of the ungrounded clause

The most important 'symptoms' of the 'exceptional' behaviour referred to above are listed below (based in part on Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970)). We also supply an analysis of how each may be connected with the ungrounded status of the subordinate predication.

1. **Only non-factive (and cognitive factive) predicates allow the Nominative with the Infinitive / Accusative with the Infinitive construction.**
2. **Only non-factive and cognitive factive predicates allow WH-movement from the subordinate clause.**
3. **Only non-factives and cognitive factives allow Negative Raising.**
4. **Only non-factives and cognitive factives allow topicalization of the object from the subordinate clause.**
5. **Non-factives (and cognitive factives) allow a time adverb from the subordinate clause to be placed at the beginning of the matrix clause or of the subordinate clause.**
6. **Non-factives do not allow all kinds of gerundial constructions and nominalizations in *-ness*.**
7. **Non-factives and factives allow different co-reference relationships in conditionals: anticipatory *it* can only stand for the contents of the *if*-clause if the main clause predicate is factive.**
8. **With non-factives extraposition is obligatory, with factives it is optional.**
9. **Question tags tend to leave cognitive predicates out of their scope when the subject is first person. This is not possible with non-cognitive main predicates.**

Properties 1 to 5 can be traced back to a common cause, which could be summarized in the form of the rule: **nothing can be moved out of a grounded structure**. The similarity of such a rule is obvious to the **Tensed-S Condition** of early GB (the abbreviation GB refers to the Theory of Government and Binding), later to be replaced by **Subjacency**, and, since an ungrounded nominal structure never appears on its own, it leaves unaffected its counterpart on the NP level: the **NP-constraint**. (It can even be argued that it establishes a unified treatment of these two constraints, one of the reasons why the two were replaced by the rule of Subjacency in later GB.) The difference is that in our rule **grounded status** is separated from **finiteness**. As a result of this seemingly minor modification, however, our rule will not need to have a systematic set of exceptions (hence, possibly, no transparent S-bar, to which we shall return later), since the structures out of which elements are moved are all ungrounded.

At the same time, it is obvious that such a rule is impossible to accommodate with GB, since it brings the autonomy of syntax into serious doubt: there is no formal marker of the ungrounded status except the irregular syntactic behaviour that we are trying to account for, and grounding, since it involves the elements **speaker/hearer** and **deixis**,

could by no means be included into the conception of the autonomous formal system that GB considers syntax to be.

The rules will not be fully predictable, either: e.g. *possible* does not permit the construction in 1. Since the rules of cognitive grammar find motivatedness more important than full predictability, this should not present a serious problem.

In summary, we can say that the operations described in 1 to 5 would be quite natural *within a clause* (i.e. in a simple sentence). Quite naturally, complex sentences that establish the grounding relationship will be rather like simple sentences, in which the same relationship needs to be established if the structure is to be used on its own.

6 is connected with the grounded status of nominalizations and some gerundial constructions. The gerunds involved are **factive nominalizations** (cf. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970)). Pelyvás (1994a) shows that such structures, despite Langacker's claim that they are ungrounded, are in fact grounded (if not in immediate reality, then in some other Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM). It would be inconsistent behaviour violating the **epistemic commitment of the speaker** to 'override' their grounding at once. All the speaker can do (and has to do if such is the case) is to indicate that grounding is valid in some other ICM rather than in immediate reality.

7 can be traced back to a similar problem. If we assume that the type of the *if*-clause determines the probability the speaker assigns to its truth (i.e. expresses its grounding) and that the truth of the main clause is examined only for the case when the *if*-clause is true, then, for a sentence like (8)

(8) It$_i$ would be possible if *you opened the window*$_i$

the interpretation would have to be: IF *you **open** the window* IS TRUE, THEN *you **open** the window* IS POSSIBLE.
This is clearly not consistent behaviour on the part of the speaker, and anybody uttering (8) would break the epistemic commitment.

8 can be seen as a parsing problem. In a grounding relationship it seems natural for the value of the grounding to appear first, although exceptions like *He is, perhaps, rather lazy* are not uncommon. This tendency may be connected with the fact that the default case (immediate reality) is zero-marked: consequently, any structure not marked initially but marked as different from the default case at a later point would have to undergo reinterpretation -- a procedure language users prefer to avoid.

9 is an example of how semantic considerations of 'objective' vs. 'subjective' construal can affect syntactic behaviour (and hence, arguably, syntactic structure). In sentences with cognitive main predicates that take object complements, second and third person subjects allow only an objective reading, and the tag question is concerned with 'the status with respect to grounding' of the main predicate, as in the usual case of non-cognitive predicates.

With first person subjects, although this option is still open, it is far less likely. The more likely option is that the tag question is concerned with the grounded status of the 'subordinate clause'. But this cannot be done by the usual method of repeating the grounding predication (which could normally be the modal), since in this case that would lead to the objective reading. As a result, the 'subordinate clause' is treated as if it were an independent clause.

There are several questions connected with the syntax of such complex sentences which will have to be left unanswered here. One of these is why the interrogative sentence is *'Do you think he likes ice-cream?'*, with a 'full' main clause rather than *'*Does he **you think** like ice-cream?'*, with the simple sentence structure, as in *'Does he perhaps like ice-cream?'*. An answer could perhaps be formulated along the following lines:

- the grounding predication *(you think)* is atypical, even in the system now established, since it has a second person subject (owing to its interrogative nature).
- even with modals, the epistemic senses do not freely occur in interrogative sentences. (The *Do you think* construction is one way of avoiding them.)
- if it is true that modals have main verb origins but have now assumed what Quirk et al. (1972, 1973, 1985) call operator status, then we can expect that cognitive predicates might tend to follow this route. I can think of at least four reasons why this would be more difficult than it was in the case of modals:

1. cognitive predicates like *think* have a fully explicit (first person) subject (cf. Subjectification Type 1 and Type 2). Assuming full operator status would require the loss of this subject. But this would run counter to the tendency of increasing subjectivity (cf. Traugott 1989).
2. the complement of these predicates is finite.
3. *think* has important functions of expressing epistemic modality even when the subject is not first person: in *'He thinks/believes that the Earth is flat'* there is the hidden epistemic meaning that the speaker does not hold the subject's belief.
4. subjectification of this type is a relatively recent process. The time may not have been enough for any full-fledged system to develop.

In spite of this, it is possible to argue that such cognitive predicates **can** function, at least partially, as operators. Negative Raising could be a case in point. Perhaps even *Do you think* can be interpreted as functioning as an operator, with changes in its internal structure (which it still? has, in contrast to modals). In an interrogative sentence like *'When **do you think** he arrived?'* this is at least conceivable. We shall not pursue this line here, but it is certainly an interesting area for further study.

We can now summarize this section with the observation that the ungrounded status of clauses subordinate to cognitive predicates goes a long way towards explaining their syntactic behaviour. We can thus claim that a symbolic relationship has been established which, nevertheless, manifests itself in function rather than in form: sentences that look complex are in many respects reminiscent of simple sentences. This is not surprising if it is assumed that the 'complex' sentences establish the same relationship of epistemic grounding that is part of any simple sentence.

Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the difference between subordination under a cognitive predicate and a non-cognitive one. Figure 5 is a **grounding predication -- ungrounded clause** relationship. The result is a grounded predication. Figure 5 represents such sentences as *She may be beautiful* or *She is probably/perhaps beautiful.*

Figure 6 illustrates *It must be surprising that she is a criminal,* which is a combination of two units of Figure 5. The **conceptualizer** (and hence the **reference point**) is identical for the two substructures. The matrix clause consists of a grounding predication that places the target in **unknown reality,** and the target structure **T(m)** itself, i.e. the stative relationship *be surprising.* The schematic trajector of this stative relationship is elaborated by another **grounding predication + ungrounded clause** complex (which together constitute a grounded clause). In this subordinate complex the ungrounded clause **T(s)** is placed in immediate (known) reality and the grounding relationship does not have an overt linguistic form. It can, however, become explicit if **T(s)** is moved out of immediate reality, as in *'It must be surprising that she might be a criminal'*. There is nothing (except common sense) to prevent any combination of explicit grounding relationships in the two clauses, which we shall regard as solid evidence that each is fully independent.



Figure 5 Grounding predication (Subjectification Type 2)



Figure 6 Subordination of independent grounded predications

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Endre Abkarovits

The Use of Verbals after Finites in the Light of the Collins COBUILD Corpus

Introduction

In the past few years I have written several papers on the use of the *-ing* form after finite verbs. My research was mainly based on information offered by grammar books and other types of reference books. These books give varying lists of verbs which can be followed by the *-ing* form. It is not always easy for the teacher or learner of English to find out which of these verbs are the really important ones. Many of them can only be followed by the *-ing* form. After some of them there may be a choice between the *-ing* form and the infinitive. What the choice may depend on is usually not explained in a satisfactory way. There are books which make no comments at all, several books offer explanations that contradict those given by other authors. It is difficult for a non-native speaker of English (sometimes even for native speakers!) to decide who is right. It is even more difficult, or rather impossible, to quantify how much more frequently a certain form is used than the other if both forms are acceptable.

These are the reasons why I found it extremely important to explore this issue in a corpus which contains data that describe structures which are actually used by native speakers of English and which is big enough to draw safe conclusions. In 1994 I had an opportunity to spend a month at Birmingham University and to have access to the Collins COBUILD corpus, which contained 167 million pieces of data at that time. Most of the subcorpora represented written English; the total of data from spoken English was 8.5 million at that time. Although this seems to be disproportionately small, it is big enough to compare usage in spoken and written English.

The results of this research would be impossible to summarize in a paper of such limited extent. I am going to publish them in an international journal in the future. This time I would only like to point out some general lessons and then I wish to concentrate on a special group of verbs (those naming (dis)liking), which might be of general interest among my colleagues who teach English.

The overall experience of the computer assisted research of the corpus

The checking of the frequency of verbs that may be followed by the *-ing* form proved extremely useful. Most of the verbs turned out to be much rarer in spoken English than in written English. If you compare their occurence, you will find a lot of surprising things. One would not think that among 8.5 million pieces of spoken data there was only one example of the verb *prohibit.* If you examine the 'per million' occurence of words, several of them seem to be far less common than we would suppose (*permit:* 4.0, *postpone:* 3.0, *forbid:* 5.0, etc.). Would all teachers of English suppose that *involve* in the spoken language is far more common than *intend, suggest, continue,* and many others?

Not only the frequency of certain words is surprising; we have the same problem with grammatical constructions. Many grammar books suggest that the choice between 'I like him playing jazz.' and 'I like his playing jazz.' depends on the style of English that

is used: the possessive pronoun (noun in the genitive case) is more typical of the written language, while the accusative pronoun (the common case of the noun) is typical of the spoken language. We will see in this paper when I am checking the occurence of different forms in the case of verbs of (dis)liking that this is not really the case. Although the majority of the data in the corpus represent the written language, very few examples of the possessive/genitive were found. Similarly the proportion between the use of the *-ing* form and the infinitive may be contrary to our expectations.

To illustrate the above problems I have chosen a group of verbs expressing (dis)liking. Before going into details I wish to point out that the occurence of verbs of positive emotions (*love, like, enjoy*) was far more common than that of the verbs of negative emotions (*hate, dislike, loathe*) both in the whole corpus and in the spoken subcorpus. It will need further research to decide whether this is the result of some national characteristic of the English, i.e. that they are more likely to speak about positive feelings than about negative ones; or that they simply prefer using the negative forms of positive emotive verbs. (Perhaps in Hungarian we would come to a different conclusion!?)

Verbs of (dis)liking followed by non-finites

It is a common problem that grammar books give differing explanations as to what verbal form should follow these finite verbs. Some grammar books don't indicate any difference. Others say the infinitive refers to a particular occasion while the gerund expresses something more general or something based on personal experience, etc.. But examples often show that something indicating general liking is expressed with an infinitive (E.g. S. Pit Corder: 59)

On the other hand one cannot find any indication of the relative frequency of these words. The figures I found out with the help of COBUILD database seem to prove that the infinitive is far more common when the verbal immediately follows the finite.

prefer	prefers	preferred	+ -ing	324
prefer	prefers	preferred	+ TO (infinitive)	3660
love	loves	loved	+ -ing	1592
love	loves	loved	+ TO (infinitive)	2851
hate	hates	hated	+ -ing	570
hate	hates	hated	+ TO (infinitive)	871
like	likes	liked	+ -ing	11372*
like	likes	liked	+ TO (infinitive)	23547

(*many examples of the base turned out to be what is labelled as conjuction/preposition/adjective in the various grammar books.)

The difference is astonishing in some cases and this is what we usually cannot deduce from the rules of grammar books, namely that the infinitive after *prefer* is more than ten times more common than the gerund and this cannot be due to the general or particular character of the action. It is also clear that even in this construction the verb *hate,* which expresses a negative emotion, is far less common than the verbs of positive emotions. In the case of *enjoy* and *dislike* most grammar books agree that they can be followed only by the gerund. (Though the computer gave some examples of American English when *dislike* was followed by to - infinitive.)

When I took a closer look at the examples I found an interesting fact, which partly explains the high frequency of the infinitive forms. This is the high number of verbs in the conditional. And this seems to be in accordance with the rules of most grammar books (though there are exceptions like Alexander: p. 320), namely, that verbs of

(dis)liking in the conditional are followed by the infinitive form. When asking for the same number of examples with the infinitive, I found the following results.

	number of examples retrieved	number of examples in conditional
hate	72	21
like	72	44
love	72	34
prefer	72	16

It is striking for me to find how high percentage of the examples with these verbs is used in the conditional, especially in the case of *like* and *love*.

On retrieving the same number of examples where these verbs are followed by the *-ing* form, I could find only a few examples (4-5) of *prefer* in conditional. The four above verbs are mentioned in a list of Collins COBUILD English Grammar (pp. 187-188) described as verbs which can be followed either by the present participle or a to--infinitive without greatly altering the meaning. There is no further indication here either what the choice may depend on or which form is more frequently used. I am sure there will be more information on these issues in later editions of both their grammar book and the forthcoming second edition of the Collins COBUILD dictionary, which will be based on a database about ten times bigger than that of the first edition.

Another issue of interest, which I have been trying to explore for some time, is what form can express the logical subject of the *-ing* form in this construction. The choice is between the accusative and the possessive. Very little information is given on this topic in most reference books, which I tried to summarize in earlier papers.

It is not easy to find the right examples even with the help of the computer. You can ask for the pattern 'verb + one word in between + *-ing* form'. In this case pronouns are more likely to appear on the screen but it takes long to select the construction 'object + object complement' because the concordance lines don't give examples corresponding to syntactic functions. The computer doesn't even realize when the verb is the end of one sentence and the *-ing* form is the second word of a new sentence. In some cases either the noun has no two separate forms (eg. inanimate things) or the two forms of the pronoun coincide ('her'), so it is not clear whether the possessive or the accusative would be used after the given verb if both forms were available.

With one word between the finite and the *-ing* form

	total	coincid-ing form ('her')	accu-sative of the personal pronoun	possesive pronoun	noun in the common case	noun in the genitive case	no genitive available
hate	33	1	13	3	10	0	6
dislike	7	1	0	2	3	0	1
prefer	11	2	3	1	4	0	1
love	12	3	3	3	1	0	2
like	63	2	42	3	12	0	4

Conclusion:

It is clear from this table that, contrary to the above mentioned rule of grammar books, the choice is not a matter of style (spoken or written) as the majority of the corpus represents the written language. But in spite of this, with one word in between the finite and the *-ing* form, not a single example of the genitive of the noun was found. In the

case of the choice between the accusative case of the personal pronoun and the possessive pronoun the former ones outnumber the latter ones but these are also used.(Except *dislike,* which, like *enjoy* and some other verbs, is also described by several grammar books as always being followed by the genitive and not the accusative. Even here, however, the rule seems to hold only with pronouns, not nouns.) The absence of examples showing the genitive case of the noun does not necessarily mean that they are incorrect; they are simply not used and this is why COBUILD books emphasize all the time that their rules are based on *real* English, even if some authors have a differing opinion. [E.g. Alexander says, 'In everyday speech, the accusative is preferred to the possessive, though not all speakers approve of its use'. (Alexander: 316)]

It seems natural that Collins COBUILD English Grammar says that 'when the second verb is a participle, a possessive determiner is used sometimes in front of it, instead of a pronoun. This is rather formal' (pp. 189-190). The possibility of a noun in the genitive case is not indicated, which seems justified in the light of the above table, and the phenomenon is treated rather as an exception; there is no division of the verbs into ones followed by accusative/possessive + gerund and others followed by accusative + participle in their description.

To find out if longer noun phrases take the genitive or the accusative is even more complicated as you have to ask for 2-4 words between the finite and the *-ing* form. It takes even the computer very long to check the whole corpus, the result is only exceptionally V+O+OC construction (where O+OC=LS+LV) and most of the concordance lines have to be deleted. I have asked for 10 percent of the matching lines. Allowing a maximum of four words in between proved the limits of this kind of enquiry. This will need further research but the basic tendencies seem to be similar to the use of the pronouns though I have found examples that contradict the general rules. There were several examples of the accusative with *enjoy* and *dislike* and also a few examples of the genitive case of nouns after *love, like, hate, prefer.*

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Tibor Laczkó

In Defence of the Gerund

1 Introduction

1.1 General remarks

The traditional categorial distinction between **gerunds** and ***-ing* participles** is strongly rejected in Quirk et al. (1985), a rather influential descriptive grammar, and also in Pullum and Zwicky (1991), on the grounds of general theoretical considerations. The fact that these rejections come from clearly distinct types of linguistic investigation forces one to take them seriously and to examine the justifiability of their assumptions and argumentation carefully. In this paper I will argue that the traditional distinction can (or, rather, should) be kept in both descriptive grammars and the type of theories Pullum and Zwicky have outlined.

The paper is structured in the following way. Firstly, I will show the most important types of *-ing* forms and their classification in traditional grammars, Quirk et al. (1985), and Pullum and Zwicky (1991) in section 1.2. Secondly, I will summarize the argumentation in Quirk et al. (1985) in favour of collapsing the categories 'gerund' and 'participle' and argue against this view in section 2. Thirdly, I will offer an overview of the analysis proposed in Pullum and Zwicky (1991) and point out why I find it somewhat problematic as opposed to the traditional account in section 3. Finally, some concluding remarks will follow in section 4.

1.2 How many -ing forms?

The table below highlights the most important aspects of the classification of *-ing* forms in traditional grammars, in Quirk et al. (1985) and in Pullum and Zwicky (1991).[1]

Quirk et al. (1985) postulate a complex gradience from deverbal nouns via verbal nouns to participles, that is, a gradience from pure count nouns to pure participial forms. These authors argue that deverbal nouns and verbal nouns are distinct points of this gradience but we cannot draw an equally satisfactory line of demarcation between 'gerunds' and '(present) participles'.[2] However, it appears to be

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1. For expository purposes I use the relevant examples from Quirk et al. (1985) and the Quirkian terminology, where applicable, to refer to comparable categories in the three approaches.
2. Referring to examples like (3) and (4) in the table above, they write the following. "Traditionally this mixture of nominal and verbal characteristics in the *-ing* form has been given the name 'gerund', while the uses of *painting* in [7-14] *[5-8 in our table - Laczkó]* have been distinguished as those of the '(present) participle'" (1985:1291-1292). This description of the traditional approach to the types exemplified in (5) and (6) seems to be mistaken (at least with respect to a rather general tendency after Curme (1931)). For instance the results of Abney's (1987) survey of 'traditional' classifications of the dubious type also contradict the generalization in Quirk et al. (1985).

the case that most 'traditional (descriptive) grammars'[3] and also practical grammars[4] maintain the gerund vs. participle distinction; moreover, they even opt for the gerundive approach to the dubious types shown in (5) and (6).)

Traditional grammars	Quirk et al.	Pullum and Zwicky	Examples
deverbal nouns	deverbal nouns	deverbal nouns	*(1) Brown's paintings of his daughter are very expensive.*
verbal nouns	verbal nouns	*present participles*	*(2) Brown's deft painting of his daughter is fun to watch.*
GERUNDS	*-ing participles*	*present participles*	*(3) Brown's deftly painting his daughter is fun to watch.*
GERUNDS	*-ing participles*	*present participles*	*(4) I dislike Brown's painting his daughter.*
(HALF) GERUNDS	*-ing participles*	*present participles*	*(5) I dislike Brown painting his daughter.*
(HALF) GERUNDS	*-ing participles*	*present participles*	*(6) I watched Brown painting his daughter.*
present participles	*-ing participles*	*present participles*	*(7) Brown painting his daughter, I decided to go for a walk.*
present participles	*-ing participles*	*present participles*	*(8) Brown is painting his daughter.*

3. The following excerpt from Curme (1931) provides an excellent summary of both the problem and the solution offered by the majority of 'traditional' grammars: "... in clauses that are the object of a verb, the gerundial and the participial clause have been confounded. In 'I remember *his mother's saying it' saying* is a gerund, as we can see by its genitive subject. In 'I remember *his mother saying it' saying* was originally a present participle. *Mother* was the accusative object of the verb *remember* and at the same time the subject of the present participle *saying*. As the gerundial and the participial clause have been confounded, we now usually feel the form in *-ing* as a gerund whether its subject is a genitive or an accusative. However, where it has descriptive force, representing something as proceeding or as being repeated, we feel it as a present participle: 'I see *him* (not *his*) *coming* up the road.' 'We could see *him* (not *his*) *bowing* graciously to the people as he drove along.' The uniform use of the accuative here shows that the form in *-ing* is a present participle" (p. 490). Cf. also Jespersen (1940), Zandvoort (1957) and Scheurweghs (1959).

4. The three practical works most widely used in Hungary (Allen (1947), Thomson and Martinet (1960) and Swan (1980)) all make a sharp distinction between the two categories along the same lines as Curme (1931) (see above). It is noteworthy that Swan (1980), partially influenced by Quirk et al. (1985), abandons the term 'gerund' and uses the expression *-ing form*; however, he retains the term and category of *participles*, too. Thus, the categorial distinction is also consistently kept in Swan's grammar and there is only a terminological change in the description.

As the table shows, Zwicky and Pullum (1991) go even further than Quirk et al. (1985) and collapse three categories: 'verbal nouns', 'gerunds' and 'present participles'.

2. On the analysis in Quirk et al. (1985)

2.1 Infinitives and -ing forms

2.1.1 The Quirkian approach

The major argument in Quirk et al. (1985) for merging the categories of gerunds and present participles is that the category of infinitives is not multiplied in traditional descriptions despite the fact that infinitival constructions, too, can have at least two entirely different roles: they can function either nominally or adverbially. Consider their examples (1985:1292).[5]

(9)	*a. Painting a child is difficult.*	*[15]*
	b. Painting a child that morning, I quite forgot the time.	*[16]*
(10)	*a. To paint a child is difficult.*	*[17]*
	b. To paint a child, I bought a new canvas.	*[18]*

The *-ing* construction in (9a) is used nominally, it functions as the subject of the sentence and it is traditionally called a gerundive construction, whereas the *-ing* construction in (9b) is used adverbially and it is traditionally called a participial construction. Similarly, the infinitival construction in (10a) functions as the subject of the sentence, while in (10b) it functions as an adverbial clause; nevertheless, traditionally both constructions are invariably called infinitival.

2.1.2 A significant difference between infinitives and -ing forms

In my opinion this comparison between infinitives and *-ing* forms is not convincing because the parallel drawn by Quirk et al. (1985) is not complete. *Gerunds* and *present participles* can be argued to serve as heads of totally *different constituents*, the noun phrase and the sentence, respectively, while *infinitives* head the very *same constituent type*, the sentence.

The basic question to be addressed here is whether one intends to offer a unified analysis of the non-finite constructions exemplified in (9) and (10) and the corresponding non-finite constructions containing explicit 'subject' arguments. It appears that a natural answer to this question, irrespective of whether the principles to be observed are those of descriptive grammar or a particular theoretical framework, is in the affirmative. This view is not expressly stated but tacitly assumed in Quirk et al. (1985). The main reason why I think their argumentation is not plausible enough is that they only compare 'subjectless' *-ing* forms and infinitival constructions. I consider it to be a serious methodological mistake to argue that no meaningful categorial distinction can be made between gerundive and present participial constructions in general by just pointing out that their 'subjectless' subtypes happen to coincide formally. If we also consider the corresponding constructions with explicit 'subject' arguments the differences between *-ing* and infinitival constructions will be striking. Compare the following examples.

(11)	*a. John's painting a child is a delight to watch.*
	b. John painting a child that morning, I quite forgot the time.
(12)	*a. For John to paint a child is surprising.*
	b. I bought a new canvas (in order) for John to paint a child.

The most straightforward generalization we can make, both on the basis of the argumentation in traditional grammars (cf. footnote 3) and on the basis of tests

5. The numbers in square brackets are the numbers of the examples in Quirk et al. (1985).

relying on more theoretically oriented considerations,[6] is that the *-ing* form in (11a) belongs to a different category from the *-ing* form in (11b) because they head different types of constituents, while the non-finite form in both (12a) and (12b) belongs to the very same category because it heads the same type of constituent. Following traditional terminology, we can assume that the *-ing* form in (11a) is a gerund, and the constituent it ultimately heads is an NP, the *-ing* form in (11b) is a participle heading a non-finite S, while the non-finite form in both (12a) and (12b) heads an infintival S.

As is well-known, a typical gerundive construction is a mixture of verbal and nominal features. More precisely, it is analysed, both traditionally and in the generative paradigm, as an NP containing a VP constituent. An example of the traditional approach is given in footnote 3. There have also been a great number generative accounts proposed.[7] I find those solutions the most appealing which attribute it to the presence of this special *-ing* form that a VP can occur within an NP in a special head function. Consider, for instance, the following structure along the lines of Horn (1975) with an example.

(13) a. $[_{NP}$ ***NP*** $[_{N'}$ ***-ing*** $[_{VP}$ ***V NP]]]***
b. $[_{NP}$ ***Brown's*** $[_{N'}$ ***-ing*** $[_{VP}$ ***paint his daughter]]]***
c. *Brown's painting his daughter*

This structure correctly captures our intuitive generalization that *-ing*, as it were, nominalizes a whole VP.

On the other hand, when the *-ing* form is unequivocally used as a (present) participle, it is normally the head of either a finite or a non-finite verb phrase which, in turn, functions as the phrasal head of the sentence that contains it. In this case the suffix *-ing* does not function as a nominalizer, instead, it serves as the present participial ending. Consider the following (simplified) structure:

(14) a. $[_S$ ***NP*** $[_{VP}$ ***V NP]]***
b. $[_S$ ***Brown*** $[_{VP}$ ***painting his daughter]]***

As regards the treatment of the dubious types (cf. (5) and (6)), in addition to the Quirkian approach, there are two alternative solutions available, both of which have been applied by traditional grammars. On the one hand, we can keep the sharp gerund vs. participle distinction and relegate the 'intermediate' type to a different category, for instance, 'half-gerund'. On the other hand, we may attempt to classify different subtypes of the 'intermediate' type as either gerundive or participial.[8]

The distinction between gerunds and present participles (at least in the unequivocal cases) appears to be further supported by the following two facts which are related to a certain extent.

A) Originally, the gerund and the present participle had entirely different forms.[9] The former had a nominal function, while the latter had an adjectival function.[10]

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6. For a summary of these arguments, see Abney (1987).
7. For an excellent overview of both the nominal and the verbal features of gerundive constructions as well as various generative accounts, see Abney (1987).
8. Cf. the quotation from Curme (1931) in footnote 3.
9. Cf. Curme 1931: 483.
10. Obviously, the two forms' becoming identical greatly facilitated the gerund's acquisition of more and more verbal force. However, as should be straightforward from the discussion above, it can still be argued that the original categorial difference is discernible even today and it should be maintained despite the fact that, as a result of analogical developments, there are also some dubious cases on the boundary between the two

B) It is also significant that when the corresponding NPs and participial constructions can be used in Hungarian,[11] they corroborate the categorial distinction between English gerunds and present participles, and I suspect that this is the case in several other languages. Compare:

(15) *a. Reading the book takes four hours.*
b. A könyv elolvas-ás-a négy órá-t vesz igény-be.
the book.nom read-NOM-its four hour-acc takes demand-into

(16) *a. Reading the book, I quite forgot about my task.*
b. A könyv-et olvas-va, egészen megfeledkez-tem a feladat-om-ról.
the book-acc read-PART quite forget-Past1sg the task-my-about

It is one of the differences between English and Hungarian that in the latter the 'verbal noun' and the corresponding participle have entirely different forms; consequently, in this language the verbal noun has not acquired any verbal force.

Quirk et al. (1985) argue against the gerund vs. present participle distinction by pointing out that although infinitival constructions can also perform radically different functions, in all their functions they are traditionally referred to as infinitives. However, I think that this parallel is far from being a convincing argument for their case for the following three reasons.

A) Infinitival constructions, irrespective of the functions they are used in, are invariably the same. For instance, it is uncontroversially assumed that the same category and internal structure is to be ascribed to the sequence *(for John) to paint a child*, whether it has the subject function or an adverbial function in a sentence.

B) All infinitival constructions go back to the same origin, that is, never, in the history of English, has a categorial distinction existed between any two different types of infinitives.

C) English infinitival constructions do have their Hungarian infinitival counterparts in both uses. Compare:

(17) *a. To read the book is difficult.*
b. Nehéz elolvas-ni a könyv-et.
difficult read-INF the book-acc

(18) *a. I went home to read the book.*
b. Hazamen-tem elolvas-ni a könyv-et.
homego-Past1sg read-INF the book-acc

2.2 A comparison of English and Latin 'gerunds'

Quirk et al.'s (1985) other argument for avoiding the category 'gerund' is a terminological one. They point out that what is traditionally called the gerund in English can be used in both modal and nonmodal senses, and as such it corresponds to two distinct categories in Latin: the modal 'gerundive' and the non-modal 'gerund'.

My problem with this argument is twofold. Firstly, I am not convinced that applying the term to a partially different construction type in a different language is inappropriate or untenable from a general theoretical point of view. As regards the case at hand I would even claim that the use of the term 'gerund' is definitely desirable because it helps to relate similar constructions in two different languages.[12] Secondly, even if the argument in Quirk et al. (1985) is accepted, it is not an argument against recognizing a particular category (traditionally referred to as

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categories.

11. It has to be noted that in the majority of cases Hungarian uses finite subordinate clauses in place of NPs and participial constructions.

12. Note in this respect that the two terms applied to the two categories in Latin are derivationally related.

'gerund') but it is an argument against calling a particular category a particular name. All we have to do is to use a more neutral term.

3 On Pullum and Zwicky (1991)

The primary objective of Pullum and Zwicky (1991) is to reject the Chomskyan view according to which grammar consists of universal constraints and non-universal settings for certain parameters (cf. Chomsky (1989)). In this framework there are no parochial construction definitions, that is, syntactic rules in the traditional sense. However, filters applying across constructions are still postulated.

Pullum and Zwicky (1991) make diametrically different assumptions. Consider the following quotation from their paper:

> We take a grammar to be simply a set of construction-particular rules (partly universal and partly parochial in their formulations). We regard the notion of a construction as the crucial basis of syntax, and we think parochial transconstructional constraints probably do not exist at all. We develop this counterpoint to current trends by re-examining a classic transconstructional filter in English, Ross's "Doubl-*ing*" constraint, and showing, contrary to all previous accounts, that it is a condition on a single construction-defining rule (pp. 252-253).

3.1 The Doubl-ing constraint

Consider the following examples from Ross (1972:157):

(19) *a. It continued to rain.*
b. It continued raining.
c. It is continuing to rain.
*d. * It is continuing raining.*

Given that *continue* can take either *to* infinitival or *-ing* complements (cf. (19a) and (19b), respectively), there seems to be a special constraint on the occurrence of two adjacent *-ing* forms (cf. (19d)).

However, not all constructions containing adjacent *-ing* forms are ungrammatical. Consider:

(20) *You are risking losing your money.*
(21) *His expecting breathing deeply to benefit us is hopelessly naive.*

By pointing out that the relevant surface configuration may be the result of different derivational processes, Ross argues that a global and probably transderivational filter is needed if we want to avoid having to duplicate the condition.[13]

Emonds (1970) and Milsark (1972) contributed greatly to the improvement of the original formulation of the condition, and further refinements of the generalization were offered by Emonds (1973) and Pullum (1974) along the following lines.[14]

(22) *Filter out surface structures, from whatever source, in which an -ing-suffixed verb has an immediately following non-NP complement with an -ing-suffixed verb.*

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13. Ross's solution is as follows. "Apparently, what is necessary is to limit the doubl-ing constraint so that only superficially contiguous *verbs which were in immediately adjacent clauses in remote structure* will be subject to the constraint. In other words, the doubl-ing constraint is a global rule ... because it links remote and surface structure" (p. 173).
14. Cf. the discussion in Pullum and Zwicky (1991).

Pullum and Zwicky (1991) are primarily interested in the *from whatever source* part of this description. Their main claim is that there is only one type of *-ing* constructions; therefore, the *constraint* only applies to one construction type: it is *not transconstructional*.[15]

3.2 Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) analysis

In what follows I briefly summarize the main points in their argumentation and I offer some counterarguments.[16] First of all, consider the following quotation:

> Two syntactically (and semantically) distinct, but phonologically identical, forms of the traditionally recognized verb paradigm are implicated in Doubl-*ing* violations ... We will claim that the traditional morphological analysis is simply wrong to postulate homonymy between the Progressive and the Gerund in English verbal paradigms. There is only one form here; we will refer to it henceforth as the **Present Participle** (p. 255).

As the table in section 1.1 indicates, Pullum and Zwicky (1991) assume that three traditionally distinguished categories are, in fact, just one category. They claim that 'gerunds', 'present participles' and even 'verbal nouns' are different (functional) manifestations of one and the same category, which they call the present participle. I find their argumentation about *-ing* forms in English far from being unproblematic, especially in the case of 'verbal nouns'.

In the relevant subsections below I will argue that, at least for a considerable number of native speakers, 'verbal nouns' do exhibit phonological realization differences. Moreover, some independent general theoretical considerations very strongly force us to consider them to be nouns (cf. the traditional name: 'verbal noun') rather than present participles (that is, verbs, fundamentally). And if this can be proved to be the case then Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) original idea will lose its initial appeal.

3.2.1 Not multiplying categories: I.

It is a well-known fact that in Icelandic dative case-marked forms have several functions (subject, dative direct object, dative indirect object, dative prepositional object, etc.) but no distinct categories are introduced: it is assumed that the very same category is used in these different functions. Pullum and Zwicky (1991) argue that it is not appropriate to multiply category distinctions if there are no phonological realization differences and this principle should be applied in the analysis of *-ing* forms in English, too.

I do not think that the parallel Pullum and Zwicky (1991) draw between Icelandic dative NPs, on the one hand, and English 'gerundive' and 'participial' *-ing* forms, on the other, is complete and, therefore, convincing, either. It appears to me that it is the same, in essence, as the comparison made by Quirk et al. (1985) between infinitival and *-ing* constructions and it can be rejected along the same lines. Both dative NPs and infinitival constructions are constituents belonging to the same category in all their different functions, whereas gerundive and present participial *-ing* forms can be argued to head different constituents[17] (which in turn may have various functions, cf. the next subsection).

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15. According to them it is a further weakness of the definition in (22) that it makes reference to both the morphological composition of syntactic words (cf. *suffixed*) and the phonological makeup of morphemes in these words (cf. *-ing*), thereby violating the principles of Morphology-Free Syntax and Phonology-Free Syntax.
16. For ease of reference I keep the titles of the subsections in Pullum and Zwicky (1991).
17. For a detailed discussion, see section 2.1.2.

3.2.2 Not multiplying categories: II.

Consider the following quotation from Pullum and Zwicky (1991). "Many more than two category distinctions must be made. The logic that leads to distinguishing the Gerund from the Progressive in English morphology would lead to postulating not just two but as many as eight different V-ing verb forms in English with different syntactic distributions and semantics" (p. 256). They mention and exemplify Progressive, Gerund, Exclamatory, Postmodifier, Adverbial, Absolute, Premodifier and Action-nominal *-ing*, and point out that eight homophonous suffixes is too many to postulate.

Obviously no linguist would seriously suggest that eight different categories be distinguished. This would definitely be one of the two extreme views and it would be hardly supported by substantial evidence, and several generalizations would be missed. However, the other extreme, the postulation of only one *-ing* category might not prove to be the ideal solution, either. Perhaps it would help us to make one sweeping generalization for the formulation of the doubl-*ing* constraint; but at a very high cost: this merging of the three traditionally recognized categories would result in the danger of losing the possibility of making more fundamental generalizations and establishing more significant rules.

In particular, there are two main reasons why I think it to be a mistake to lump 'verbal nouns' ('action-nominals' in Pullum and Zwicky (1991)) together with all the other types of *-ing* forms and to say that it is also a verbal element, a present participle. First of all, its syntactic (distributional) features are unquestionably nominal. Secondly, it seems that the phonological argument in Pullum and Zwicky (1991) for merging all the relevant types of *-ing* forms is not particularly strong in the case of 'action-nominal' *-ing* (see section 3.2.3 for details).

I have already discussed several arguments for the traditional gerund vs. participle distinction (cf. sections 1.2, 2.1.2 and 2.2). I would like to claim that these two categories and the category of verbal nouns (action nominals) should be distinguished. I take progressive *-ing* to be the canonical function of the participle. Of the remaining five types mentioned by Pullum and Zwicky (1991) three can be rather uncontroversially taken to belong to the category of participles: postmodifier *-ing*, absolute *-ing* and premodifier *-ing*.[18] As regards adverbial *-ing* and exclamatory *-ing*, I am inclined to think that they are also special functions of the participle (rather than the gerund). But this issue, which is not directly relevant to the discussion in this paper, would require further investigation. What is of real importance for us here is that it appears to be the case that we must think in terms of the above three categories and need not necessarily think in terms of more than these three categories.

3.2.3 The unity of -ing: I.

By way of providing a phonological argument for their analysis, Pullum and Zwicky (1991) claim that all and only the verbal *-ing* forms are subject to the same alternation between a velar and an alveolar nasal shape of the ending (*-ing* vs. *-in'*). Compare:

(23) *a. singing outside the building*
b. singin' outside the building
*c. *singing outside the buildin'*
*d. *singin' outside the buildin'*

The reason why (23c) and (23d) are ungrammatical is that in these examples *building* is used as a noun,[19] a synonym for *house*, and not as a verbal *-ing* form.

Note that it is extremely important for Pullum and Zwicky (1991) that this

18. Although premodifying participles are also often regarded as adjectives.
19. Cf. deverbal nouns in the table in section 1.2.

phonological test should work in the case of all the eight functions of what they take to be the present participle because this should justify their assumption that there is only one category involved here.[20] However, the data I collected from my informants (American native speakers) appear to seriously call into question the validity of Pullum and Zwicky's generalization in the case of the 'action-nominal' function of their 'present participle'. Consider the following examples (with my informants' grammaticality judgements).

(24) a. *the enemy's destroying the city*
b. *the enemy's destroyin' the city*
c. *the enemy's destroying of the city*
d. **the enemy's destroyin' of the city*

(24d) indicates that in the variety of English my informants speak there actually *is* a phonological difference between the action-nominal *-ing* and the other 'verbal *-ing* forms'. Consequently, we are justified, even according to Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) principles, in making a categorial distinction in this case, which seems to be tenable and also desirable for independent reasons (cf. section 3.2.2).

Pullum and Zwicky (1991) might have overlooked this phonological fact about action-nominal *-ing* or they might have described a different dialect of the language in which their generalization holds. No matter which is the case, it can be stated with a considerable degree of certainty that there is no straightforward phonological evidence for eliminating the category 'verbal noun'[21] from the English language.

3.2.4 The unity of -ing: II.

Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) morphological argument, based on Kiparsky's (1974) observation, runs as follows.

> ... all and only the *-ing* forms in the paradigm participate in the compounding process that incorporates non-subject nouns into their verbs, as in *wine-making*, *spear-fishing*, and *bicycle-riding*. There are incorporations involving all eight types of *-ing* ... but no form other than the Present Participle is available (p. 257).

I would like to make two comments on Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) morphological argument.

Firstly, their generalization is not entirely correct and, therefore, it needs to be qualified. Apparently it holds for the incorporation of object nouns but it does not hold for the incorporation of instrumental nouns. Compare:

(25) a. **I haven't wine-made for ages.*
b. **I haven't letter-written for ages.*

(26) a. *I haven't spear-fished for ages.*
b. *I haven't fly-fished for ages.*

This fact by itself does not weaken Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) argument, which only has to be made more precise and it has to state that the generalization does not apply

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20. Cf.: "... category distinctions should not be multiplied in the absence of phonological realization differences" (Pullum and Zwicky 1991: 255).

21. Another traditional name is 'nominal gerund'.

to the incorporation of instrumental nouns.[22]

Secondly, in the discussion of the distinction between gerunds and participles in section 2.1.2 I drew a parallel between these English constructions and their closest Hungarian counterparts. I pointed out that these counterparts in Hungarian, at least indirectly, support the distinction in English. Now I would like to make a similar claim with respect to *-ing* compounding. If the categorial distinction between gerunds and participles proves to be tenable on the basis of independent evidence, then the corresponding Hungarian facts provide (at least indirect) motivation for maintaining this distinction in the case of compounding, too.

As we have already seen, the closest Hungarian counterparts of English gerunds are verbal nouns ending in *-ás* or *-és*. The closest Hungarian participial equivalents of present participles in English, participles terminating in *-ó* or *-ő*,[23] are rather restricted in their functions (e.g. they do not combine with auxiliaries, they cannot be used in absolutive constructions, etc.). The corresponding rules of compounding are, in part, also different in Hungarian inasmuch as fundamentally only object nouns can be incorporated. Despite all these dissimilarities, however, both categories in Hungarian participate in the same type of compounding, which is comparable to English *-ing* compounding. Consider:

(27) *a. Letter-writing is difficult.*
b. A levél-ír-ás nehéz.
the letter-write-NOM difficult
'Letter-writing is difficult.'

(28) *a. letter-writing boys*
b. levél-ír-ó fiú-k
letter-write-PART boy-pl
'letter-writing boys'

The important fact is that there is no verb like **levél-ír* 'letter-write' in Hungarian (just as there is no **letter-write* in English). Therefore, in the case of both (27) and (28) it is reasonable to postulate that first derivation takes place (nominalization: *írás*, and participle formation: *író*, respectively) and this is followed by compounding.

The moral of these Hungarian data is as follows. Provided that there is independent motivation for distinguishing two categories (gerunds and participles in our case) the fact that they can be involved in the same type of morphological process (compounding in our case) does not necessarily weaken the tenability of the categorial distinction.

3.2.5 Revision of the Doubl-ing Constraint

Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) make the following two basic assumptions for the reformulation of the constraint to be possible.[24]

The first assumption is that there is only one construction type involved in all the relevant cases: the present participial construction. So far, I have been discussing the arguments they offer in support of this view.

Their second assumption is that rules can refer to "direct object" and

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22. The use of some of these verbs has been completely sanctioned even by some dictionaries. Let us take two randomly chosen examples. ***A)*** Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987, F.C. Mish (ed.)) contains this entry: ***spearfish** vi (ca. 1949): to fish with a spear.* ***B)*** In A. S. Hornby's Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English (1974) we find the following: ***fly-fish** vi [VP2A] fish with artificial flies as bait.*

23. The choice between *-ás* and *-és*, on the one hand, and *-ó* and *-ő*, on the other, depends on the rules of vowel harmony.

24. For lack of space, the description of their approach is considerably simplifed.

"complement" relations. The following three tests can be applied to tell these functions apart. In English, direct objects can, whereas complements cannot, be passivized and *tough*-moved. Complements can, while direct objects cannot, be separated from their head verb by an intervening modifier.

The essence of their generalization is that a construction is ungrammatical if its head V and an immediately following head of a complement VP are both in Present Participle form.

I would like to make the following remarks on Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) analysis.

1. Their arguments for the merging of the categories gerund, action-nominal and present participle, do not appear to be unproblematic (see the discussion above). This especially holds for their considering action-nominals to be participles, too.

2. They claim that all the relevant constructions are present participial VPs. They do not even offer an outline of an analysis, along these lines, of either gerundive or action-nominal constructions with genitival 'subject' arguments. Therefore, all that can be said at this point is that this claim appears to be somewhat questionable in the case of gerunds and rather untenable in the case of action-nominals.

3. In their analysis, Pullum and Zwicky (1991) state their version of the Doubl*ing* Constraint over one construction type, if by this we mean the uniform category label of the constituents involved in these phenomena (*present participles*). However, they achieve this goal by also making reference to a grammatical function label: *complement*. This procedure raises the following two questions.

A) Why not associate the distinction between two function labels (*direct object* vs. *complement*) with the traditional distinction between two category labels (*gerund* vs. *participle*, respectively) when the parallels are rather straightforward and the traditional distinction appears to be independently motivated? If we correlate these function labels and category labels, we can state the generalization by mentioning two category labels (instead of invoking one category label and one function label). Consider:

(29) *In a non-finite construction headed by a gerund or a present participle the head cannot be immediately followed by a present participial argument.*[25]

I think (29) would serve as a satisfactory alternative statement of the constraint.[26] Obviously, this alternative is transconstructional in the sense that it refers to two construction types (gerunds and participles) but in exchange for this alleged shortcoming we can retain some generalizations about gerundive and participial constructions a great number of linguists have considered, and still consider, significant.

4 Conclusion

In this paper I have argued for the possibility (or, rather, the necessity) of maintaining the traditional categorial distinction between gerunds and present

25. Note that, in addition to the two pairs of the crucial labels, a third (functional) label is also mentioned in both Pullum and Zwicky's (1991) reformulation of the constraint and the alternative given in (29): the label *head*.

26. I find it extremely important that even Pullum and Zwicky themselves explicitly admit the possibility of correlating functions and categories. Consider: "We will assume here, uncontroversially, that rules can refer in some way to the relations "object" and "complement". It does not matter whether they do this à la relational grammar by direct reference to the grammatical relations Object-of and Complement-of, or via an NP versus non-NP categorial distinction à la Emonds (1970)" (p. 259). And it is a well-known fact that gerunds are traditionally regarded as NPs, while participles are considered non-NPs.

participles which is partially and indirectly supported by facts about the history of *-ing* forms in English[27] and corresponding Hungarian constructions.[28] I have shown that the arguments for merging these categories provided by Quirk et al. (1985) and by Pullum and Zwicky (1991) are not quite conclusive.

Pullum and Zwicky (1991) go even further and they suggest merging three categories: the present participle, the gerund and the action-nominal. I find that their idea of merging this latter category with the other two seriously undermines the justifiability of their fundamental claim to the effect that transconstructional constraints in syntax do not exist. Furthermore, it seems to me that even if they manage to solve this problem somehow (e.g. by finding conclusive evidence that action-nominals are not involved in doubl-*ing* violations),[29] their non-transconstructional generalization will inevitably lead to missing several other generalizations which are, perhaps, more basic.

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27. The history of the development of the gerund is basically the history of its gradually acquiring more and more verbal features. It is not at all inconceivable that in the course of the future development of this construction this process will be completed (the existence of some dubious cases between the gerundive and participial interpretations of certain *-ing* constructions clearly points in this direction) and the (verbal) gerund will disappear from the English language. However, at present it is still a discernible category to be distinguished from the present participle.

28. I would also like to point out that the distinction between gerunds and present participles is also extremely useful from the viewpoint of practical grammars for learners of English as a second language, especially when in the mother tongue of the learner the corresponding constructions are clearly distinct categorially.

29. This is a question I have not had the space to address in this paper.

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Péter Antonyi

Phrasal Verbs: Syntactic Properties and Learning Problems

1. Introduction to phrasal verbs

1.1 Significance

Phrasal verbs undoubtedly cause a great deal headache to students of English who wish to tackle them on nearly all levels. However, needless to say, no student of English can possibly afford to ignore phrasal verbs altogether. Not only would they certainly fail to comprehend even simple, everyday utterances by native speakers, but their performance would come across as awkward and unnatural, if they kept using mostly formal, latinate, one-word verbs in all contexts, regardless of pragmatic rules controlling the choice of words. No field of vocabulary tends to be used so frequently and, at the same time, so unreasonably neglected, disliked and avoided as phrasal verbs. Moreover, this tension is increased by the fact that the frequency of phrasal verbs in both speech and writing has triggered a flow of phrasal verbs into more formal (even official or legal) style, so it is no longer appropriate to label phrasal verbs as 'mostly colloquial' and merely 'informal'. This paper aims to discover the sorts of difficulties students of English may well undergo in tackling phrasal verbs and, by doing so, suggests possible remedies to lessen these difficulties and, hence, achieve a better understanding and more efficient learning process. The importance of phrasal verbs is highlighted by Mortimer:

> Phrasal verbs are used a great deal, especially in spoken English. So it is important for a student to recognise their meaning at least. If he wants to learn to speak English naturally and well, however, he must try to use these verbs himself — once he understands them properly. It is possible to use few of these verbs in one's speech; but then one is likely to sound rather formal, and possibly a bit pompous...[1]

As for morphological change, phrasal verbs create a great deal of new vocabulary that forms an essential part of current English. They may become nominalized by zero derivation (a *breakdown*, a *hold-up* etc.), others follow the pattern *particle+verb* as *upkeep*, *outlay* etc. Plenty of adverbials are likewise produced from phrasal verbs, usually assuming a hyphenated form (a *pick-up* lorry, a *knock-down* argument etc.).

1.2 Syntactic criteria

The traditional definition of phrasal verbs states that a simple phrasal verb comprises a verb and an adverbial particle. The idea that phrasal verbs really exist, in other words, that the verb and the particle constitute one unit can easily be proven by clefting, a test for general constituency:

General formula: It is _____(single constituent slot) that...

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1. Mortimer 1972, iv (intro.).

(1a) Drunks would *put off* the customers.
(1b) * It is *off* the customers that drunks would *put*.
(1c) It is the customers that drunks would *put off*.

The falsehood of (1b) shows that '*off* the customers' (=PP) is not a constituent of the VP '*put off* the customers'. However, (1c) supports the claim that 'the customers' is a constituent (NP) and thus it follows that *put off* is the other subconstituent of the above-mentioned VP since '*put*' and '*off*' cannot fall into different constituents, as they are adjacent and there is no constituent boundary between them.

As the example suggests, phrasal verbs are normally juxtaposed with prepositional verbs, which look very similar to them but, in fact, they have different underlying structure. The main difference is in the role of the particle; in the first case being an adverbial to the verb (phrasal verbs), whereas with prepositional verbs the particle functions as the head of the PP following the verb in the sentence.

(2) [IP [NP Drunks] [I' [I would] [VP [V *put off*] [NP the customers.]]]]
(3) [IP [NP Drunks] [I' [I would] [VP get [PP off the bus.]]]]

1.3 Further differences

There are a number of other criteria to distinguish between phrasal and prepositional verbs. Let us now contrast the following sentences with prepositional and phrasal verbs as in *A University Grammar of English*.[2]

Prepositional verb: *call on* (visit)

(4a) They called on the man.
(4b) They called on him.
(4c) * They called the man on.
(4d) * They called him on.
(4e) They called early on the man.

Phrasal verb: *call up* (phone)

(5a) They called up the man.
(5b) * They called up him.
(5c) They called the man up.
(5d) They called him up.
(5e) * They called early up the man.

The examples isolate some major differences. With the prepositional verb no movement of the preposition to the right of the object NP is allowed, whether it is a real NP or a personal pronoun. (4c, 4d) This obviously means that we are faced with a PP in which the head (preposition) must precede its complement (NP). Also, the adverbial ('early') can be placed between the verb ('call') and the preposition ('on') (4e). On the other hand, no adverbial can be put between the verb and the adverbial particle (5e), which seems to confirm the initial premise of considering them as a single verb. However, we can see that with the phrasal verb in the example, particle movement to right of the object NP is possible in both (5c) and (5d). Moreover, particle movement is compulsory in the case of pronouns used as the object NP (see (5b)).

As for prosodic features, stress patterns also play an important part in telling prepositional verbs from phrasal verbs. According to Mitchell (1958), '...the particle component of the phrasal verb can, and does bear a full stress, and when final and not

2. Quirk and Greenbaum 1973, 349.

in post-nominal position, is pronounced on a kinetic tone....'[3] On the other hand, '[i]t is true that the preposition, by and large, do not normally carry the accent,' Bolinger argues.[4] The following pair of sentences will show this contrast:

(6a) Jim is not the person I was looking at.
but
(6b) Kim is not the person I was *looking up*.

1.4 Particle movement

Before discussing the main issues linked with particle movement we must establish that a phrasal verb can either be *transitive* or *intransitive* (just like any other lexical verb) and obviously particle movement only applies to transitive combinations because otherwise there is no object for the particle to move around. We shall return to this issue later as one of the numerous learning problems.

However, particle movement rule seems to refute our supposition that a phrasal verb can be taken for a single unit. Now, let us observe the bracketed version of our initial example sentence with the particle moved.[5]

(2a) [$_{IP}$ [$_{NP}$ Drunks] [$_{I'}$ [$_{I}$ would] [$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ put] [$_{NP}$ the customers] [$_{PP}$ off.]]]]

On what grounds can we posit that 'off' is now a PP? The most decisive argument for this is that it can be modified by PP modifiers:

(2b) Drunks would put the customers right off.
but
(2c) * Drunks would put right off the customers.

Evidence can easily be given that it does function as a PP by completing (2a) so that 'off' becomes an actual head of a PP. This completion, however, is not always possible.

(2d) Drunks would put the customers right off their food.

As we have seen, particle movement seems to ruin the clear-cut definitions of phrasal and prepositional verbs since there is a shift from phrasal to 'prepositional' verbs as particle movement has been adapted. It is, therefore, plausible to propose this position of the particle (demonstrated as optional in (2a) and compulsory in (5d)) as clashing with the conventional approach and significant in that it eliminates the particle's 'mysterious' status and consequently weakens the theoretical distinction between phrasal and prepositional verbs. Apparently, in such a framework, the movement regarding the particle would be the inverse of what is traditionally called 'particle movement'. However, whether the particle moves or not, we know that we have the same sentence with the same phrasal/'prepositional' verb and, hence, with the same meaning. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the particle counting as a PP is a phrase that comprises a head but no complement (2a). It can take a modifier (2b) and it may take a complement (see completion in (2d)), but the main distinction between phrasal and prepositional verbs is still in effect because the adverbial particle can never take the object NP as its complement with which to form a PP, whether separated or not.

1.5 Looser definitions

Apart from students of English being confused by the rather complicated reasoning of an exact definition, then made somewhat uncertain by particle movement,

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3. In: Sroka 1972, 164-165.
4. Bolinger 1971, 14.
5. Radford 1989, 90-101.

there is a tendency for recent exercise and reference books on phrasal verbs to mingle prepositional and phrasal verbs, also including a number of prepositional verbs in their works. For instance, *Exercises on Phrasal Verbs* by Jennifer Seidl contains the following definition: 'In this book *phrasal verb* is a general term for all combinations of *verb+adverbial particle* and/or *preposition.*'

Another recent example may be *Test Your Phrasal Verbs* by Jake Allsop, which does not go so far as to give a definition at all, but in the very first exercise the sentence 'Where do you come from?' is given, which seems to contain a phrasal verb at first sight since there is nothing following the particle ('from'), so it does not look like a preposition. In fact, we are faced with a prepositional verb in which the complement (NP) in the PP is extracted by wh-movement. Sweet calls these forms 'detached prepositions' and his examples include 'he was thought of', 'who are you speaking of' etc.[6]

This is not to say that mixing these two types is wrong, rather it matches the experience of the average language learner who, being supposedly ignorant of the syntactic background, naturally presumes that these two categories are the same and is puzzled to find that one allows certain transformations the other prohibits and vice versa. The matter is made even more complicated by constructions having the pattern *verb + adverbial particle + preposition* called phrasal-prepositional verbs (e.g. *cut down on, get along with*). But this is just one of the various difficulties students face in learning phrasal verbs.

2. Learning problems with phrasal verbs

2.1 Large number of phrasal verbs

The most fundamental problem is that there are a large number of *verb + adverbial particle* combinations. (The second category being a closed class of morphemes contrary to verbs, which is obviously an open class of items.) The current teaching methods seem to imply that there is no system, so this vocabulary should be memorized piecemeal, which is inevitably intimidating. For most students the particle of a phrasal verb seems random (at least it is suggested to be so), giving way to a large-scale mixing up of phrasal verbs. In fact, there are theories that consider the particle as the more prominent part of a combination (as opposed to the 'main' verb) and they present phrasal verbs listed under one of the various 'meanings' of the particle concerned.[7] These 'meanings' can be isolated by generalisations based on the examination of most (all?) of the possible occurences of a given particle in phrasal verbs (taxonomy).[8]

2.2 Multiple meanings — degrees of idiomacy

Another important factor is that a great many phrasal verbs have several (seemingly unrelated) meanings in most cases including idiomatic ones. For example, on the one hand, *pack sth in* can function literally; 'She opened her suitcase and *packed* all the clothes *in*.' On the other hand, it has an idiomatic meaning ('abandon'): 'Sue decided to *pack* her job *in*.' These meanings must be remembered one by one since, naturally, they cannot possibly be arrived at by simply knowing the 'meanings' of the verb and the adverbial particle.

Nevertheless, idiomacy is gradable depending on the extent to which one might be successful in guessing the meaning. For instance, *put your hand up* is a non-idiomatic combination. A medium degree could be represented by the expression *turn off the light*, which gives us a chance to make an educated guess at its meaning, although it does not necessarily involve 'turning' of any kind. Thirdly, in the case of *put up with the neighbours* we virtually have nothing to hold on to, unless we have met this combination before and know what it means.

No doubt context can help a great deal to work out even highly idiomatic

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6. In: Sroka 1972, 21.
7. Side 1990, 149-150.
8. *Collins Cobuild* 1989, Particles Index, 448.

combinations but in the examples above the contextual scope was almost the same and, nonetheless, we could differentiate between various levels of idiomacy.

We can also make use of the test of insertion of an adverb between the verb and the particle ('expansion') to distinguish the idiomatic from the literal meaning of a certain combination. Namely, if the particle of the phrasal verb is quite literal (e.g. it denotes direction) it will allow expansion whereas in somewhat more idiomatic cases it will not. For instance, let us consider the following sentences with *drop out*:[9]

(7a) I watched the pebbles *drop* gradually *out*.
(7b) * You will see students *drop* gradually *out*.
(7c) You will see students (gradually) *drop out*(gradually).

According to Fraser (1976),[10] phrasal verbs fall into three basic semantic categories: literal (e.g. *go out, get up*), completive (e.g. *cut off, burn down*) and figurative (e.g. *let down, give in*). In the completive case, the particle describes the result of the action whereas figurative phrasal verbs correspond to what we have called idiomatic combinations. In this framework, completive phrasal verbs represent an intermediary category on the scale of idiomacy.

2.3 Transitive or intransitive?

It is also very important to ascertain whether a phrasal verb is *transitive* or *intransitive*. It might sometimes be misleading that the 'same' phrasal verb can be both, although this is the case with many lexical verbs as well. As in the example 'If George doesn't *turn up* within ten minutes I won't ever talk to him. ' *turn up* (make one's appearance) is intransitive whereas in 'Have you *turned* your sleeves *up*?' it is transitive.

2.4 Constraints on particle movement

We have already addressed the problem of particle movement, which is a rule generally applicable to transitive phrasal verbs. However, as we have seen, the particle may not precede personal pronouns, so particle movement is not optional but obligatory in that case.

'The original position (immediately after the verb) tends to be taken by the particle if the object is too long or the intention is that the object should receive end-focus.'[11] 'He *looked up* Jane, not Mary' would be a good example of the last condition being fulfilled.

2.5 Phrasal verbs with preferable separation

In addition, particle movement rule has its own exceptions, or more precisely, there are combinations which do not normally favour the particle to be placed immediately after the verb. One example could be '*think over* things', which is contrasted with '*think* things *over*', the latter being the more widely used version. Other examples of this kind of phrasal verbs include *get* sb *down*, *lead* sb *on*, *see* sb *off*, and so on.[12]

2.6 Pseudo-particle movement: idiomatic pairs

To make matters worse, (or I could say more fascinating) one subtype of the kind of phrasal verbs discussed under the previous point seems to have a corresponding 'deep structure', that is, a structure before particle movement, but these apparently relative structures turn out to be intransitive prepositional verbs syntactically completely unrelated to the kind of phrasal verbs mentioned above. This is best demonstrated by the fact that they mean completely different things. (Naturally, a separable phrasal verb must mean the same thing after having undergone particle movement.) The existence of such phrasal verbs also supports the claim (see 1.4) that the separated position of the particle should be deemed as the default (underlying or deep structure).

Nevertheless, there is nothing wrong in learning and presenting them together (as

9. After Bolinger 1971, 12.
10. In: Dagut and Laufer 1985, 74.
11. Quirk and Greenbaum 1973, 348.
12. Seidl 1990, 24.

in *Exercises on Phrasal Verbs* by Jennifer Seidl), in fact, it is a good idea to study them in pairs, since — despite the obvious structural differences — they are associated in our minds. Some examples from the book mentioned are as follows:[13]

Prepositional verbs	**Phrasal verbs**
see through sb (realize sb's deception)	*see sb through* (take care of sb)
pass on sth (not be able to answer)	*pass sth on* (tell or give sth to sb else)
get round sb (coax sb)	*get sb round* (summon sb to one's house)

2.7 Pragmatic problems

Also, different sort of problems concerning register/appropriacy start to emerge once a student has managed to acquire a combination: Can it be used freely replacing its so-called synonyms?

Naturally, pragmatic rules restrict the use of phrasal verbs and one must be aware that, for this reason, clear equivalents of phrasal verbs do not always exist. In Mortimer's words: '..."enter" for instance, is a rather more momentous verb than "come in", and is not always appropriate to the same occasions.'[14] Also, substituting *give out* for *distribute* in the sentence below, for instance, would result in a sentence of questionable appropriateness and would undoubtedly count as a register error.[15]

(8) The British Government recently distributed leaflets on AIDS to houses throughout the country.

Similarly, in a newspaper report, a VIP is unlikely to *turn up* ('arrive') at the airport when paying an official visit since it has the semantic component of contingency. To support this view further, in 'My radio *picks up* America.' *pick up* has connotations of difficulty quite undelivered by the 'equivalent' *receive*.[16]

2.8 Interference

2.8.1 L1 interference

2.8.1.1 General

Last but not least, L1 interference is a tremendous area affecting the use of phrasal verbs as well, among many other items. The selection of the verbs and the particles/prepositions accompanying them are widely controlled by transfer from one's native language, provided that the equivalent L1 structures are comparable to what is used in L2.

However, it must be noted that interference is often not merely structural but conceptual for the idea of *up* and *down*, *to* and *from* etc. are culturally variable.[17] This will hopefully dissuade us from being unsympathetic to students making certain mistakes, thinking that they regretfully lack common sense or the basic language faculty. So we must at least devote a quick run-through to Hungarian since — according to Dagut and Laufer:

13. Seidl 1990, 48-50.
14. Mortimer 1972, iv (intro.).
15. After Side 1990.
16. After Side 1990.
17. Side 1990.

> ...such avoidance can be properly understood only by an interlingual (i.e. contrastive) approach, and thus provides important, if indirect, corroboration of the dominant role of L1 in the L2 learning process.[18]

2.8.1.2 Hungarian

I shall provide a short overview of the situation in Hungarian as far as phrasal verbs are concerned. The main distinction between phrasal and prepositional verbs does not make sense because there is no prepositional construction in Hungarian (instead we either have suffixes or postpositive determiners).

In simple declarative sentences and yes/no questions phrasal verbs translate into prefixed verbs in Hungarian. These prefixes, however, can detach themselves from the main verb when combined with certain constructions (e.g. *will, must*). To illustrate what has been stated so far the following sentences are to be studied:

(8a) Péter elvitte a levelet./?
(8b) 'Péter away-took the letter./?'
(8c) Péter took away the letter. /Did Péter take away the letter?
(8d) Péter el fogja vinni a levelet.
(8e) 'Péter away will take the letter.'
(8f) Péter will take away the letter.

Moreover, in simple negative, imperative and interrogative (except yes/no questions) sentences the prefix will actually 'jump over' the verb and stand next to it as a distinct morphological unit, in other words, this is the case nearest to what happens in English. So we might expect Hungarians to perform best with these constructions in English but I have no evidence either for or against it since I have conducted no survey yet on this particular point. Here are some examples:

(8g) Péter nem vitte el a levelet.
(8h) 'Péter not took away the letter.'
(8i) Péter did not take away the letter.

(9a) Vidd el a levelet! / ??? Vidd a levelet el!
(9b, c) Take away the letter. /Take the letter away.

It is quite noteworthy that despite the fact that Hungarian is far from being a Germanic language, (it is not even an Indo-European language) its corresponding structure is more or less comparable to that of English phrasal verbs. Particle movement analogy , however, is rather weak since we end up having only marginally acceptable sentences if we try to apply it (see (9a)) and we would get a likewise questionable sentence from (8g).

2.8.2 L2 interference

Surprisingly enough, at a higher level of competence, interference can work the other way around, that is, L2 (target language) may affect one's performance in one's native language. For example, after having spent approximately five months in Britain, a friend of mine used the word by word Hungarian translation of the sentence 'I don't go out with English people so much.', which is unacceptable in Hungarian (*'Nem megyek ki az angolokkal túl gyakran.'). Also interesting is the fact that some proficient Hungarian speakers of English used 'drink up' in Hungarian in the imperative sentence 'Let's drink up and go' saying *'Igyuk fel (a maradékot) és menjünk!', which is incorrect in Hungarian. This may mostly take place if the L2 version is more direct or concise than the L1 equivalent.

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18. Dagut and Laufer 1985, 78.

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Ildikó Csépes

Discrete-point *vs.* Integrative Testing of Grammar: A Comparative and Correlational Analysis of Testing Grammatical Competence

Introduction

Grammar has always been regarded as an important area for testing learners' language proficiency. Methods of testing have, however, been rather limited. Discrete-point tests still seem to hold firm in testing practices, although various models of language proficiency have been proposed which advocate the measurement of the constituent parts of language proficiency communicatively. In response to this, integrative tests are often used as instruments for measuring knowledge of 'the rules in use' in a specific context of communication. However, because of the nature of language in use a number of issues have been raised by testers as to what language to sample for assessment and against what criteria performance in communicative language tests should be evaluated, in order to permit the general use of the results obtained. Based on the assumption that grammar is central to effective and efficient communication, there have been attempts to describe the nature of instruments for testing grammar communicatively, which, however, does not seem to be adequately specified yet (cf. Rea:1991).

In this paper, I will report on a study in which I compared and correlated 30 students' performances in three different tests, two discrete-point tests and one communicative writing task, in order to see how and why their performances differ when evaluating their grammatical competence. The third test will be examined to assess how far it could be used as a potential measure for testing grammatical competence communicatively. This, however, brings up the issue as to whether the criteria of communicative effectiveness involve the assessment of one's grammatical competence or not.

Rationale for the research design

There are three issues that motivated the research design of the present study:

1. How does performance based on three different tests (two discrete-point and one integrative test) differ if we intend to measure the same trait, that of grammatical competence in Bachman's definition of the term (1990)?
2. How does the actual 'use of rules', i.e. grammatical abilities and the range of grammatical features to convey specific meanings influence the criteria by which communicative effectiveness is assessed in a communicative writing task?
3. What scope does a communicative writing task provide for testing grammatical competence communicatively, i.e. assessing 'the rules in use'?

As a framework for this study, I will use Bachman's model of communicative language ability (1990) and analyse how grammatical competence can be measured by

three different test methods:

- through discrete-point, meaning independent decontextualised grammar items
- through discrete-point, meaning dependent and mostly contextualised items measuring use of English
- through an integrative language test, which is a communicative writing task.

According to Bachman's model of communicative language ability (1990) grammatical competence together with textual competence is an integral part of organisational competence, and it consists of a number of relatively independent competencies such as knowledge of vocabulary, morphology, syntax, and phonology/graphology. The reason why I limited my analysis to the investigation of how these competencies are demonstrated through performance on various test types is that these features of language use are present in all three tests and are, therefore, comparable.

I analysed the two discrete-point tests trying to establish a list of grammatical features being measured in each. Then I analysed the scripts, searching for occurrences of the grammatical features from the list as well as comparing test takers' performance on the specific features that occurred in the scripts.

Concerning the second issue, I specified a set of textual parameters that characterise the scripts, which I correlated with ratings of communicative effectiveness, judged by two native speakers. Based on the findings, I will discuss some of the aspects of the criteria for communicative effectiveness as required by the writing task from the point of view of the identified language features.

In order to give an answer to the third question, I examined the writing task in terms of Rea Dickins five criteria that she claims contribute to the communicative assessment of grammar (see in Appendix) and it was found to satisfy the specified features. Then I correlated the test takers' performance on the two discrete-point tests with the ratings of communicative effectiveness. By discussing the correlations I hope that conclusions can be drawn as to the scope for testing grammatical competence communicatively through task-based communicative test instruments.

Comparative and correlational analyses of the data

For the investigation of the research issues I used operational tests that were administered to CETT students in Debrecen in 1994. Concerning the first research question of how performance based on three different tests differs when one's grammatical competence is being assessed, I identified a list of language features measured in both the Discrete-point grammar (DPG) and Use of English (UE) tests. The Use of English test was part of the language proficiency exam in May 1994, whereas the DPG test was meant to be an end-of term achievement test and thus its content is somewhat limited: it reflects only those domains of descriptive grammar that were dealt with on the course itself.

By examining all the items in both the DPG and UE tests, I tried to define the testing focus in each. I drew up the GU List (Grammar & Use of English), which contains all the major grammatical features that are measured in both discrete-point tests. Having specified the grammatical features for the comparative analysis, I searched for occurrences of the GU List features in the scripts as well as compared the test takers' performance across all the tests on the specific grammatical items which could also be found in the compositions. The findings are summarised in Table 1 and 2.

Table 1 Summary of findings from the comparative analysis

Total number of grammatical features from GU List used in the scripts of Test 3	35
Total number of occurrences of grammatical features from GU List in the scripts of Test 3	182

Note : Total number of grammatical features in GU List = 125

Table 2 Occurrences and use of grammatical features of the GU List in all the three tests

USE OF GRAMMATICAL FEATURES	OCCURRENCES	%
1. correct use in GU and correct use in WT	118	64.83%
2. correct use in GU but incorrect use in WT	6	3.3%
3. incorrect use in GU but correct use in WT	57	31.32%
4. incorrect use in GU and incorrect use in WT	1	0.55%
	Total: 182	100%

Note: GU represents both the DPG and UE tests
WT refers to the writing test

From Table 1 we can conclude that slightly less than one third of all the GU List features occurs in the writing task (35 out of 125, i.e. 28%). This finding definitely seems to support the general assumption that discrete-point grammar tests are capable of measuring a wider range of 'knowledge of the rules' since with this test method a large sample of grammatical features can be measured in one test by using independent, single-sentence items with a different focus in each. Out of the total occurrences of the grammatical features in the List, more than half of them were used correctly (64.83%) across all the three tests. The number of incorrect occurrences of the GU List features in the scripts, irrespective of the fact whether they were correctly or incorrectly used in the two discrete-point tests, is very small (3.3% and 0.55% respectively). Thus it is possible to conclude that in demonstrating their performance of grammatical competence, the test takers seem to have resorted to an avoidance strategy: they were less likely to use such features of grammatical competence about which they were not sufficiently sure (cf. Bachman: 1990). It is equally plausible to assume, however, that it may have been the effect of the task demand itself, which led them to produce only such a small range of incorrectly used grammatical features from the GU List.

What seems to be very surprising in Table 2 is the very high number of occurrences of grammatical features which the students failed to get right in the DPG and UE tests but used correctly in a communicative context (31.32%). It is highly unlikely that without the 'knowledge of a rule' one could apply the given rule correctly 'in use'. The figure is much too high to be accounted for by chance alone. It is plausible to assume that the nature of the context and method of testing are the crucial factors in establishing the level of difficulty of discrete-point grammar items. However, the main issue seems to be which performance of the students should be regarded as a true and valid indication of their grasp of the item. When can we say that they master a specific language aspect? It is only when the context and test method used are closely examined in terms of estimated level of difficulty that we may be able to draw any conclusion. Following from that we might conclude that by manipulating the level of item difficulty in the discrete-point tests a 'greater mastery' of the given rule was tested than in the writing test.

In relation to the second research question, whether the criteria for communicative effectiveness in the communicative writing task is influenced by the demonstration of

one's grammatical abilities, a set of textual parameters were specified, which were then correlated with ratings of communicative effectiveness. I asked two native speakers to judge the 30 scripts in terms of communicative effectiveness. The two markers were only provided with a set of 'rough' guidelines using a five-point scale as the nature of the criteria was in fact to be investigated. In order to reduce the subjectivity in the scoring of the composition - the marking scheme was not fully specified - the scripts were marked independently and the ratings of each marker for each examinee were then totalled to give a composite score that reflects the combined judgements of the markers. The findings are summarised in Table 3.

Table 3 Correlations between Ratings of Communicative Effectiveness and Textual Parameters

TEXTUAL PARAMETERS		Correlation Coefficient
1 Text length	No. of words	-0.266
2 Readability	No. of words/sentences	-0.248
	No. of complex sentences/sentences	0.114
	No. of subordinating clauses/sentences	0.054
	No. of co-ordinating clauses/sentences	0.065
3 Lexical range	No of word types	-0.151
4 Lexical density	Token/ type ratio	0.133
5 Errors	No. of errors/words	0.441
	No. of incorrect lexical items	0.435
	No. of other errors (excluding lexical ones)	0.346
	No. of spelling mistakes	0.118

Note: p is significant at <0.05
only the highlighted coefficients reached the level of significance

It can be seen in Table 3 that only one set of parameters out of five shows an association between the ratings of communicative effectiveness and certain textual features, all of which are related to grammatical competence. Although the correlation coefficients are low, we may conclude that in judging the effectiveness of the letters the markers were, to some extent, influenced by the accuracy and appropriateness of the language used, with the exception of the spelling mistakes, which were, in fact, quite few (0.7 on average). The native speaker readers may have applied such assessment criteria as could be based on the intelligibility of the piece of communication.

As is indicated in Table 3, the nature of criteria used for assessing communicative effectiveness seems to include the other specified textual features of the scripts to a lesser degree. Thus it appears that neither the length of the scripts, their readability in terms of sentence complexity nor general lexical features like range or the number of repetitions influenced the judgements of the markers.

Concerning the range of language features that were measured in the DPG and UE tests, it can be noticed from Table 4 that there is a negative correlation between the grammatical items in the GU List and the ratings of communicative effectiveness of the scripts. This might mean that in order to achieve effective communication as judged by the two native speakers for this task, the smaller the range of grammatical features from the GU List, the more effective the given piece of writing. This indirectly implies that there were other grammatical features involved in making the written piece of communication more effective. This assumption seems to be supported by the significant but equally low negative correlation coefficient between the ratings and the number of

occurrences of the same GU List features mentioned above. According to this, it seems that the more often the candidates used certain GU List features, the lower the ratings of communicative effectiveness tended to be.

Table 4 Correlations between Ratings of Communicative Effectiveness and Number & Occurrence of GU List Grammar Features in Scripts

	Correlation coefficient
no. of GUList grammar features/script	-0.400
no. of occur. of GU List grammar features/script	-0.383

Note: p is significant at <0.05
the highlighted coefficient reached the level of significance

Although the GU List grammatical features that students used in their compositions have a negative correlation with the ratings of communicative effectiveness, the test takers' overall performance on the individual discrete-point tests seems to show a different correlational pattern with the same ratings. Table 5 displays the findings.

Table 5 Correlations between scores on the DPG and UE tests and ratings of communicative effectiveness

	Correlation coefficients
DPG test	0.661
UE test	0.256

Note: p is significant at <0.05
only the highlighted coefficient reached the level of significance

It is plausible to conclude that there is some evidence that markers were influenced by the appropriateness and accuracy of the language features used in the scripts. The correlation between the DPG test scores and the native speakers' ratings(0.661) seems to imply that, to some extent, there is a similarity between students' performances on specific discrete-points of grammatical competence measured by the DPG test and the markers' judgements in relation to students' performance on the task. This seems to suggest that their judgements may have been influenced by factors related to the assessment of students' grammatical competence demonstrated in the scripts, in which the features of grammatical competence may belong to a content domain similar to that of the DPG test. The UE test, on the other hand, appears to test different content domains of grammatical competence from the DPG test, the correlation between the two is non-significant (0.256).

Test takers' performance on different tests aiming to measure a similar aspect of communicative language proficiency may vary due to language variability and the influence of the test method (cf. Skehan 1987) and the varying contextual features of tasks (cf. Politt and Hutchinson 1987). How can we take into consideration all these issues when designing communicative tests of grammar? In addition to considering Rea Dickins fairly broad criteria for testing grammar communicatively (1991, see in Appendix), there seem to be two essential steps at the design stage that may facilitate a good testing instrument. It is important:

1/ through extensive piloting to determine the nature of the expected performance, which includes the language features that may influence the

difficulty of the task, by examining all the task- related factors like interlocutor, familiarity and complexity of the topic, purpose of communication, amount and mode of the elicited discourse, nature of mental operations, nature of instructions, physical setting, amount of time allotted for the task (cf. Tarone 1987).

2/ to design a range of test instruments to counterbalance the effect of variable performance, since several tasks will achieve better coverage of the trait being measured (cf. Skehan 1987)

Conclusion

In the present study, I have given a report on comparative and correlational analyses of three different tests in order to see how knowledge of certain grammatical features is demonstrated through the various testing instruments. Two out of the three tests were originally designed to measure grammatical competence through discrete-point items whereas the third integrative test was designed to measure students' writing skills. Based on Rea Dickins' five criteria of communicative tests of grammar, I investigated some aspects of the third test as a potential measure for testing grammatical competence communicatively. The grammatical features were specified on the basis of two discrete-point tests of grammatical competence, and only a small range of these features (35 out of 125) was found in the third test. This result seemed to show that this integrative test provided a smaller scope for testing students' performance on the specified range of grammatical features. The analysis of the quality of the students' performance also revealed that most of the grammatical features were correctly used (only 3.8% [7 out of 182] was incorrect). This fact may be accounted for by students' strategic competence (in Bachman's definition of the term), or may be due to the effect of the task demand.

The uneven distribution of the specified grammatical features across the scripts also seems to reinforce the assumption that research findings in language testing have brought to light recently. In addition to situational variability (cf. Skehan 1987), I have also pointed out contextual variability (cf. pp.8-9), both of which are closely related to issues of sampling and, as a consequence of the latter, the general application of the results. I suggested that in order to counterbalance the effects of variability in interlanguage and task demands in communicative tests of grammar it is important to sample performance through a number of tasks as well as to reliably establish the level of difficulty in each by examining all task-related factors.

In my analysis, I also examined the extent to which the demonstration of one's grammatical abilities and range of grammatical features to convey specific meanings may have influenced the criteria by which communicative effectiveness was assessed in the writing test. The rationale for this investigation was based on the assumption that communicative grammar is central for effective and efficient communication. Correlations between ratings of communicative effectiveness and students' performance on the specified set of grammatical features, which were assumed to be a representative sample of aspects of grammatical competence at advanced level, though not randomly chosen, showed varying degrees of association depending on the nature of the grammatical features measured in the discrete-point tests (DPG: $r=0.661$; UE: $r=0.256$ [non-significant]). On the other hand, I found little evidence that the markers' criteria could have been influenced by the accuracy and appropriateness of the language used. For this task, it seems that other language features, due to the task demand, were taken into consideration more seriously by the judges. Further research is needed to better clarify how grammatical competence is related to the criteria of communicative effectiveness. However, it may be the case that because of contextual variability the nature of this relationship will vary from task to task.

APPENDIX

Rea Dickins suggested the following five factors that make a grammar test communicative (1991:125):

1. the **contextualisation** of test items: a test should not comprise a number of decontextualised single sentences
2. the identification of a **communicative purpose** for the test activity
3. the identification of an **audience** to whom the communication is addressed
4. instructions to the test taker that focus on **meaning** rather than on form
5. the opportunity for the test taker to create his/her own message and to **produce** grammatical responses as appropriate to a given context

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Tibor Nagy:

'Hunglish' Suprasegmentals

The pronunciation of a language concerns two main areas; segmental and suprasegmental. To learners of English it is the segmental aspect that seems more difficult, and therefore more important, i.e. the articulation of sound segments; to native speakers of English, however, the suprasegmental aspect of pronunciation appears to be more significant from a communicative point of view. This kind of dichotomy can only be explained by a certain degree of lack of sensing the features and the importance of the latter on behalf of the learner. In other words, if the learner does not sense differences between two (or more) acoustic phenomena, he or she naturally assumes that there are no differences, or, what is more often the case, is not aware of the possibility of differences at all.

There is bound to be a certain degree of bias in the treatment of this topic since most of the phonetic investigation at Kossuth university is centered around the acoustic analysis of speech with a computerized speech lab. This machine (KAY CSL 4300) makes the revelation of features possible which, otherwise, remain hidden and unconscious both to learner and teacher.

Then, of course, we may rightly ask why it is necessary to detect features that seem to have no mental (and consequently practical) relevance, i.e. oral communication is not normally hindered by these phenomena.

The answer is theoretical on the one hand, and very practical on the other. It is quite possible that the difficulties non-native speakers have when trying to use English prosody are due to a lack of proper feedback as concerns their pronunciation. The typical "mistake" advanced students (and teachers) of English make is that they render less important words within the sentence prominent. This is an observation often made by native speakers of this language. We tend to use contracted forms and weak forms far less frequently in our speech than we should. The surprising thing is that oral instruction to students does not lead to a more English pronunciation, neither do aural feedback and continuous repetition. The other problem is that we do not normally sense and are not aware of the differences that there are when we listen to a native speaker and our own speech.

Traditionally, the teaching of pronunciation has relied on and will always rely on aural models, the 'listen and repeat' method. There is, however, an insurmountable obstacle as concerns this teaching method: our hearing apparatus may function quite satisfactorily from a communicative point of view and it is also capable of sensing artistic acoustic phenomena, but it was not created in such a way as to be able to detect all the linguistically relevant minute alterations in the acoustic continuum transmitting linguistic signals. In other words, there is a great deal of discrepancy between what actually reaches the ear and what we think we hear. This kind of difference between the acoustic signal and the mental image it creates cannot only be explained with the imperfection of the ear; it is more attributable to the way the brain processes the speech signal. In terms of speech-related acoustic phenomena, we tend to associate whatever we hear in any language with the 'landmarks' established by our mother tongue both mentally and articulatorily. This applies to segmentals and suprasegmentals as well.

A simple illustration can be given by asking a student to utter a continuous vowel-

like sound starting from /i/ and arriving at /a/. This is a task that requires the intermediate gradiance between the front vowel series /í, é, e, á/. Knowing the basic relationship between tongue position and formant structure, we would expect to get continuous slant lines on the spectrogram.

Interestingly, no Hungarian speaker has been able to perform this seemingly simple task successfully the first time. What appears on the screen is a picture of elongated Hungarian vowels with sudden changes to other Hungarian vowels. Most often, students grab the two extreme values with a very short transition phase in the middle. Even if the speaker is well instructed on how to pronounce this continuum, he is so bound by the Hungarian vowels that he cannot aim at intermediate acoustic effects. What is important here is the fact that the informant does not sense and cannot hear what he was actually saying. (See **Figures 1a and 1b**)

A very similar result is obtained with suprasegmentals. The results of the present investigation are based on case studies involving male and female native speakers of English and Hungarian students and teachers of English. The results are also consistent with the findings of other previous acoustic analyses. It must also be noted that the pronunciation of the Hungarian informants is better than average.

The problem of suprasegmentals to non-native speakers of English is the question of how to render certain elements of linguistic units prominent in the foreign language and in what ways.

The deviation from English models can be summarized in the following categories:

a) The speaker uses Hungarian patterns of stress as he is not aware that it is different from that of English. A typical example is the placing of primary accent on the first element of phrases like 'good work', 'nice chap', etc.
b) The speaker does not know which syllable(s) to render more prominent in the foreign language although he or she feels that the placement of stress is different from that of the mother tongue.
c) The speaker is familiar with English patterns, nevertheless he is unable to produce the desired acoustic quality. Such speakers usually confuse the application of the various means making linguistic elements prominent. (See **Figures 2a and 2b.**) The graph above shows a native speaker's pronunciation while the one below refers to a Hungarian speaker's utterance.)

In his description of English pronunciation, Roach (1991;86) gives a straightforward definition of the nature of prominence: "Prominence...is produced by four main factors:(i) loudness, (ii) length, (iii)pitch and (iv) quality. Generally these four factors work in combination, though syllables may sometimes be made prominent by means of only one or two of them."

It is actually the choice of and the ratio between these factors that causes most of the confusion to Hungarians. **Figure 2b** gives a typical picture of the way Hungarians tend to say phrases like 'good work'. Normally, the first element of such phrases receives secondary stress (Head) and the second element is rendered primary stress (Nucleus). (In these graphs, dots refer to pitch [fundamental frequency] and lines refer to intensity [loudness].) What is strikingly different is the flat contours of the Hungarian informant's utterance; where there should be pitch change is a flat, monotonous level tone. Listening to the recording, however, Hungarians do not notice how different it is from the English pattern.

Before we discuss the deviation from the patterns we should use when speaking English, let us study 'classic' examples of the way prominence is distributed over a sentence such as 'What's the time?' (**Figure 3a**), or 'Who's he?' (**Figure 3b**). In neutral Wh-questions, the question-word functions as the Head (the first stressed syllable), and the last stressed lexical word is the Nucleus. Although the Head may be more prominent in terms of intensity (loudness), the Nucleus is rendered more prominent owing to a considerable pitch-change.

One of the difficulties of giving a syllable 'the right sort of and the right amount of prominence' lies in the fact that spoken language is not a continuum of clear-cut models, but rather like a varying realization of several possibilities to highlight what is linguistically important.

There is a basic division between new and old information on the one hand, and there are certain ways of giving prominence acoustically on the other. The way we realize this phenomenon may be different from the way we identify it perceptually and mentally. The idea of Head and Nucleus seems a satisfying and workable notion, nevertheless its usefulness to learners has proved to be rather limited; it cannot guarantee a remarkable improvement in the application of suprasegmental features.

If we compare the surprising differences between the graphs in **Figures 4a** and **4b**, we will understand why Hungarians have difficulties with longer stretches of utterances. A seemingly simple word, 'Oh' said with a rise-fall was something the Hungarian informants were unable to produce. Instead of a rise-fall they used a fall-rise (!) even after several attempts. If the differentiation between these two very different tones requires practice and a conscious effort, how can we expect the learner to sort out the varying degrees of pitch (change) and intensity that culminate in a combined sensation of prominence?

The prospects appear to be rather frustrating; without a refined sensation of these features, advice as to how to modify pronunciation will only result in an unnatural, affected way of speaking in a number of cases.

Figure 5b shows a similarly unsuccessful attempt at imitating a rise-fall. The English pattern (**Figure 5a**) is so clear that we are tempted to believe anyone could say these two words in this fashion.

Longer sentences can reveal other deviations from the English model. 'Where did you put it' said with a rising tone and nuclear placement on the Wh-element when "asking someone to repeat" is a good example of how wrongly Hungarians apply the prominence of intensity. In the English speaker's pronunciation it is the Wh-word that is rendered most prominent (**Figure 6a**); the Hungarian speaker, however, in spite of a conscious effort, renders the less important words 'did' and 'you' the most prominent (**Figure 6b**, second and third peaks in the graph). It must be noted that this kind of pronunciation does not strike the ears of even advanced students of English as strange. In fact, owing to their knowledge, they mentally attribute non-existant prominence to the right syllables. Mistakes like that pass unnoticed in the majority of cases.

A similar kind of mistake is illustrated in **Figure 7b**. In the sentence 'Tell me the truth' it is again the less important words that happen to be most prominent. It seems very surprising first, but there may be a serious misconception working in the background. The mere fact that the speaker uses the weak forms of pronouns and articles makes him believe that he is using a lower degree of intensity. It is also possible that difficult sounds like the interdental fricatives require special attention from the speaker, which causes him to apply an unnecessarily great degree of prominence of intensity through the conscious articulatory effort he makes.

Figure 8a ('Pass me the salt') shows four greater peaks and divisions of the utterance, which is reflective of the rhythmic beat of spoken English. The distribution of intensity in the Hungarian informant's pronunciation is less even, and again the word 'me' is the most stressed element of the utterance.

After all these critical observations, it would be easy to draw some basic conclusions if these conclusions had not been arrived at and thoroughly treated in several text-books. Visual representation combined with aural feedback, however, can open up new areas in the teaching of pronunciation. The usefulness of pictures and graphs like these becomes undeniable when aural monitoring cannot yield satisfying results; the speaker becomes more aware of the way he modifies his articulation and applies prosodic features, and a stronger association between the acoustic effect and the means by which they are achieved will be acquired.



Figure 1a



Figure 1b



Figure 2a



Figure 2b



Figure 3a



Figure 3b



Figure 4a



Figure 4b



Figure 5a



Figure 5b



Figure 6a



Figure 6b



Figure 7a



Figure 7b



Figure 8a



Figure 8b

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Tibor Őrsi

Problems in Studying the Influence of Old French on Middle English

In the present study the term *Old French* is used in a wider than usual sense. It also covers the French language of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries which is normally referred to as *Middle French.*

The influence exerted by the Old French language on Middle English has been studied for a long time. Interest has focused particularly on vocabulary influence. Until recently, the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1888-1933) was used as the ultimate authority on any questions concerning English words. Since it gives the complete linguistic genealogy of each word, it contains a wealth of etymological information as well. Some important works, in which the influence of French on the vocabulary of English is thoroughly discussed on the basis of the OED are, to mention but a few, Jespersen's *Growth and Structure of the English Language*, Serjeantson's *A History of Foreign Words in English*, and Mersand's *Chaucer's Romance Vocabulary*. Besides these, any"standard" history of English contains spectacular word-lists with French loan-words grouped thematically.

Unfortunately, the supplements to the OED and the Second Edition only updated the later development of meanings and illustrated it by printed evidence. The etymologies were left practically untouched, in spite of the findings of scholarship that must have taken place since the OED was first published. The publication of the *Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* (ODEE 1966) and other etymological dictionaries has not changed the picture.

The *Middle English Dictionary* (in preparation since 1954 and soon to be completed at the University of Michigan) is a milestone in the history of Middle English studies. As the title suggests, this dictionary covers only the Middle English period. It yields a profusion of reliable information on Middle English lexis. When it comes to etymology, however, the information supplied becomes very scanty. Only the immediate source of the Middle English word is given, enclosed in brackets. The ancestor of the Middle English word is cited in the form that will enable the reader to pursue its remoter history in the standard dictionaries.

The Middle English Dictionary (MED) challanges many derivations thought to be generally accepted. The different attitude of the MED to words of French or Latin origin is obvious. The OED and the *Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* consider nouns like *figure, form, fortune, foundation,* and adjectives like *acceptable, annual, bestial, common, excellent, famous, fervent, general,* etc. to be words which have French forms as their immediate sources and the corresponding Latin forms as ultimate origins. However, according to the MED these words are all solely of Latin origin. Whenever the OED and the ODEE determine the etymology of a given word as of *French and Latin* or as of *French or Latin* origin, the MED inclines to say that the word is of Latin origin. In this way the number of *genuine* French borrowings is drastically reduced making all the previous statistical findings useless.

A recent study, Crystal's *The English Language* (1988:174) gives one of the many representative lists of French loan words in ME. Under the heading RELIGION, for example, the list includes the following words (in brackets I have added the immediate source as given by the MED): *baptism (OF&ML), cardinal (L&OF), communion (L&OF),*

confess (OF&ML), convent (OF&L), creator (L&OF), fine (=money, OF&L) heresy (OF&L), immortality (L&OF), miracle (OF&L). Under LAW, we find e.g. *accuse (OF&L), adultery (L&OF), convict (L), crime (OF&L), inquest (OF&ML).*

If we accept the derivations suggested by the MED, none of the above words should be included"in a list of French borrowings". Of the fifteen words above, three have OF&ML (=Mediaeval Latin) origin, six have OF&L, another five have L&OF origin and one word, the word *convict* has exclusively Latin origin.

The same observation can be made about language histories like Millward: *A Biography of the English language* (1989) or any other language history which offers a wordlist of French loans.

It appears that a certain number of these etymologies are impossible to solve. We might resort to employing the term"Romance" as already used by Mersand (1939) which could cover not only the words derived from languages that derived from Latin, but words of immediate Latin origin as well.

Summing up the problem of the etymology of words of possible French origin, we can say that if we accept the ultimate authority of the MED, the earlier studies based on the OED and the OED itself cannot be used as references. My personal opinion would be to trust the OED rather than the MED, but with the proviso that the OED is in many aspects out-of-date.

The MED gives a synchronic description of one particular period in the history of the English language. Probably due to this, the thorough treatment of etymology is outside its scope. The etymologies given are more like outlines which, however, tend to be biased in favour of Latin against French. On the other hand, I have been unable to find an etymological survey based on the already published volumes of the MED.

Most modern scholars tend to refuse vehemently any argument that might reveal Old French grammatical influence on Middle English. For example, A. C. Baugh in *A History of the English Language* (1974:200) states:

> It is a general observation that languages borrow words but do not borrow their grammar from other languages. The changes which affected the grammatical structure of English after the Norman Conquest were not the result of contact with the French language. Certain idioms and syntactical usages that appear in ME are directly the result of such contact. But the decay of inflections and the confusion of forms that constitute the really significant development in Middle English grammar are the result of the Norman Conquest only in so far as that event brought about conditions favourable to such changes. (...) Beyond this it is not to be considered a factor in them.

According to the *Cambridge History of the English Language* Vol. II. (1992:423),"French influence upon the grammar and phonology of English was of relatively little importance".

I examined some major problems where there was at least some agreement, however loose, to see what modern scholarship has to say on the extent of the French grammatical influence on Middle English.

1. One much-debated question is the influence of the French preposition *de* on the development of the ME genitival periphrasis. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1971:1976/66),"the great intrusion of Old French upon the domain of the genitive, which speedily extended to the supersession of the Old English genitive after adjectives, verbs, and even substantives, was mainly due to the influence of French *de*."

Mustanoja (1960:78) sums up the problem:"It is unnecessary to ascribe the rise of the new periphrastic genitive to foreign models. (...) In the course of the Middle English period, however, the use of the genitival of-periphrasis seems to be strengthened by the influence of French *de*."

2. The partitive genitive such as Chaucer's"... Of remedyes of love she knew per-chaunce." (Ch. CT A Prol. 475) seems to have originated in Old English."The possibility

is not excluded that French influence, as in many other instances, has promoted and modified the use of the English partitive construction" (Mustanoja 1960:80).

3. "It is not impossible that the **genitive of definition** is due to foreign influence" (Mustanoja 1960:81). A promoting factor may have been the corresponding French usage. To give you an example: OE had *Rome burh*. ME has *se burh of Lincolne*. In classical Latin there was *urbs Romæ*. In Mandeville's Travels, which is a travel book, and as such laden with geographical names, *of* serves to connect a geographical class-noun with a proper name almost exclusively: e.g.: the kyngdom of Hungarye (5/10), the lond of Pannonye (5/11). Only rarely do some of these class-nouns occur attributively without *of*.

4. "**THE WHICH.**" According to *The Cambridge History of the English Language* (1992:303), the development of *the* before *which* has often been ascribed to French influence. (...) Curme (1912) and Reuter (1937:146-88) have shown, however, that French *liquels* cannot have initiated the form (it can at most have supported its continuing use in later texts) because the earliest instances are found in the north, where French influence was slight, and because a certain number of syntactic peculiarities cannot be explained with reference to the French form."

Although it is very often used to translate OF *liquels, liquels* cannot have been the origin of *the which*. Mustanoja (1960:198) refers to Paschke (1934:217-20) and Reuter (1937:146-88) saying"although they believe that *the which* is native in origin, they do not exclude the possibility that the parallelism in use between *the which* and *liquels* strengthened the position of the English combination. In Mandeville's Travels the proportion of *which* to *the which* is 1:12. This is clearly superior to the 3:2 top proportion in prose works cited by Mustanoja (1960:199). On the other hand, a parallel examination of *liquels* in the French original of Mandeville's Travels and *the which* in the English translation of the Cotton Version shows only occasional agreement which also points to native origin in spite of the extensive use of *the which*.

5. The emergence and spread of the **periphrastic system of comparison** has again given birth to conflicting opinions. Some have ascribed it to French, others to Latin influence, still others to internal native development, thus denying any foreign influence. Mustanoja's assessment (1960:280) again abounds in understatements:"It is perhaps not altogether impossible that Latin influence has played a part in this process, particularly in the early stages. And considering that periphrastic comparison begins to gain ground in English at a time when French influence is particularly strong, it seems reasonable to assume that the influence of this language has considerably strengthened the position of *more* and *most* in the English system of comparison. Another point which seems to speak to foreign influence is that the periphrastic mode of comparison does not seem to be favoured by living popular speech."

6. The **postposition of adjectives** in Middle English is another feature worth examining. According to Strang (1970:199)"certain adjectives of a somewhat learned character, and recognizably of French origin, tend to keep both their French post-nominal position and their French number-contrast in concord with the head." Mustanoja (1960:277) has the same conclusion:"In works written under strong French influence adjectives borrowed from that language language (occasionally even native adjectives) may take *-s* in the plural. In the majority of these cases the adjective is used attributively and placed after the noun. The plurals of this type are, of course, direct imitations of French usage. The French type *places delitables* is common in scientific, ecclesiastic, and legal phrases." Some of these phrases have fossilized : attorney general, court martial, heir apparent, from time immemorial etc.

7. There are a great number of other cases showing examples of possible French influence, the study of which is outside the scope of the present paper.

Summarising the examples mentioned above concerning the extent of Old French influence on Middle English, we can conclude by saying that with the exception of the postposition of adjectives - where French influence is universally admitted - each of the grammatical features mentioned above turned out to be the continuation of an earlier native development. The spread of these may have been helped along by similar French constructions.

Another difficulty that arises is that the French and Latin constructions are sometimes very much alike, and it seems to be almost impossible to decide which of these two languages actually influenced the growth and spread of English.

As is apparent, Mustanoja is a leading authority on Middle English grammar. In his *A Middle English Syntax* he consistently uses the expression "works written under strong French influence". It should not be forgotten that an important part of the literary output in Middle English was the translation and imitation of French models. Although the overall impact of French grammar does not seem to be dramatic on the whole of Middle English grammar, in the case of individual writers it might have been of fairly great importance and the share they represent in Middle English literature cannot be simply ignored.

> From a grammatical point of view what one is accustomed to call *Middle English* is only a convenient entity. In point of fact, it is only towards the end of the fourteenth century that we see the language of London assume throughout the country the form of a common written and literary language. Previously only dialects existed, local speech-forms that changed from one town to the next. Each writer, each copyist employed spontaneously the speech of his own region.

This summary by Mossé (1952:2) could be complemented by a new proposition. It might be worth trying to examine Middle English not on the basis of its dialectal varieties this time but on the basis of its writers' attitude towards French. In this case we could say that the works of individual authors represent different attitudes towards French, some of these works being written—to use Mustanoja's expression—"under strong French influence".

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CODA

Rani Drew

The III-Act Hamlet — Feminist Reconstruction of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*

The III-Act Hamlet as a feminist version of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* was premiered in Budapest in May, 1992. In an environment where feminism until very recently had no place in the popular or academic belief-system, the production did not go unnoticed or without response. A Hungarian newspaper ran a piece with the title 'Feminista Hamlet?', questioning even a possible connection between the two words. Yet surprisingly, the response to the feminist text in the play was groundbreaking with comments such as,'you have put a new spirit into Shakespeare's 'ghost story' or 'a feminist perspective might at last crack the riddle of the Hamlet Question.' In staging a feminist *Hamlet* I attempted to do more than give Shakespeare's play a different directional stance. In this article I will trace the trajectory of the feminist theatre in relation to a reconstruction of *Hamlet*.

The III-Act Hamlet: Stylistic Parallels and Intervention

For my play I created two frameworks to surround Shakespeare's text: one, a frame of three Prologues that match each of the first three Acts of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, and an Epilogue that sums up the gist of Acts IV and V. This framework necessitated a complex technique of transition and link between the two texts, giving rise to forward and backward dramatic movements. The second framework encomposes both the texts, making a box within box structure. It begins and ends the play with an address by a 'female' stage manager, in keeping with the feminist mode of the play. The function of this frame is to locate the feminist production of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* in the history of the English theatre; and in a direct discourse draw the audience into the contemporary issues of gender relations.

TEXT AND STAGE: Empowerment of Ophelia

The empowerment of Ophelia became the raison d'etre for the writing and staging of *The III-Act Hamlet*. Ophelia, the feminist protagonist, emerges as the prohibition taboos are lifted from her mind, allowing her emotions to breathe freely. This fits well with her original character in Shakespeare's text as her second self in the feminist text is a more liberated form of the first. In the process of the transformation, her new character attains the Lacanian linguistic subjectivity without alienation from her former self. In Lacanian terms, Ophelia gains humanity, denied to her in real life. In the feminist text she is positioned as a speaker whose subjectivity, though not as endangered as Hamlet's since she is not a living being, moves freely between subject and object positions.

OPHELIA and HAMLET: parallels

In deconstructing the gendered identity of Hamlet, I reconstruct a feminist identity for Ophelia. In parallel with Hamlet, I endow Ophelia with those qualities which alone can give humanity to her outlawed self.

1) Subjectivity, Speech and Soliloquies: by becoming a subject, Ophelia attains

speech through which she questions and challenges the notions of love and loyalty, so much part of her dictated self in real life, and the very instruments of her oppression: The Prologues, despite their contingent elements, make her meditate, like Hamlet in long soliloquies, on the destabilized condition of the individual in a manipulative society. With the use of shifting nouns and pronouns, she distances herself from personal grief, and achieves a controlled emotional state. Neither revenge nor forgiveness govern her intelligence. Once she is empowered by these qualities, her other faculties bloom. She observes, she deliberates, she doubts, she historicises and in the end pronounces the patriarchal power as bogus with empty meanings.

2) Art and Creativity: by her perception of how the signs of gender alliance operate, Ophelia is able to reveal their emptiness, their bogus trait more clearly than Hamlet. Her use of the artistic form to enact the drama of social oppression is more creative than Hamlet's reliance on art as a mere trap for the adversary. The creativity of the two takes different forms: Hamlet's ends on a note of smug self-satisfaction, Ophelia's goes further into the very depths of how a self is split in its own humanity. Hamlet's 'Mousetrap' remains a clever espionage trick; Ophelia's dumb show mirrors the emotional trauma of a child socialised to identify with its gender group.

3) Consciousness of the Other: by attaining a perception of the male world as the Other, Ophelia comes into a growing consciousness of male-female relationship perverted by gender orientation of both sexes. She also comes to see the plight of the younger males who face the castration threat from the elderly. By distancing her relationship with Hamlet and making him as the Other, she attains an insight into 1) why Hamlet resisted reading the signs made by the patriarchy - the revenge command by the father, the love trap by Polonius and the surrogate protection of Claudius; 2) more importantly, how at the same time Hamlet shares many characteristics with Polonius; and 3) how by failing to see through the patriarchal signs, he tacitly accepts the gender alliance. Ophelia indicts Hamlet for the misreading of the signs - taking his father seriously about his mother - but defends him at the same time against the powers of a hegemonous patriarchy. With each prologue she progresses towards a more comprehensive vision of the social system which effects female oppression.

Performing the Textual Frameworks

THE STAGE MANAGER

The performance begins with the entry of the Stage Manager who informs the audience of the evening's stance on Shakespeare's Hamlet. In a parodying tone, she gives a short history of the types of *Hamlet* done before, but soon switches to a more serious note on the feminist mode of the evening:

> Tonight, the management
> Makes yet one more attempt at the riddle.
> We bring you a feminist Hamlet...
> Hamlet is ordered to
> Line up on the father's side. In fewer
> Acts, extended and enlarged by our own
> Text, we claim it was this imperative
> That made a tragedy of his life.

With these lines *The III-Act Hamlet* begins.

PROLOGUE I: Consciousness & Enlightenment

By starting the play with Ophelia's drowning sounds through a dark stage, the feminist text links up her rebirth with her death in the play (Shakespeare's Act IV). Distanced from her self in the third person singular and still smarting under the Christian condemnation of the mode of her death, she catalogues her oppressive condition in life at the hands of her father, brother and lover. Ophelia's empathy with Gertrude emerges

as she sees her no less a victim of taboos than herself:

> And the Queen, whose despair at my drowning
> Spoke more of the terror hanging over
> Her own womanly condition than
> Compassion for my unrequited heart.

At this moment the queen enters. This diachronic tension produces an intense visual effect as the two female characters span the stage, representing their deprivation and oppression in Shakespeare's text. Without effecting a female homogenized solidarity, they choreograph the different ways in which women are used as chattels in male rivalry. Lacan's phrases, 'woman as masquerade for the man' and 'the woman does not exist' underpin the visual of this choreography with Gertrude and Ophelia moving in unison as 'pawns on men's chequerboards' and 'trophies of male rivalry'. By association their movements bring to the audience's mind the constant shift of war centres in our own times.

Once her consciousness is at work, Ophelia sees the male hegemony divided into two groups: one, the elderly patriarchy represented by the ghost of Hamlet's father as the signifying male ancestry, by Claudius as the ruler and the surrogate father, and Polonius as the spying legislator; two, the younger generation as the signified represented by Hamlet, by Laertes, by Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and Young Fortinbras. The perspective on the generation gap leads Ophelia to speculate on the method by which gender alliances are achieved in the younger group by the elderly.

> Follow or have your
> Tender genitals sliced off....
> The figure of the father appears in full
> Armour. It's enough to convey the threat.
> .....
> Why and wherefore such bullying started?

The search for an answer develops the potential of Ophelia's creative powers. To illustrate the finding she produces a dumb show. Her consciousness of gender orientation points to three traumatic moments in a young child: 1) the disruption in the undivided happiness with the mother, 2) the threat from the father - a castration sign for the male child, and the beginning of prohibition sign for the female child and 3) their separation from each other and from the mother.

> Like you Hamlet, I too have
> Directed a dumb show to trace the guilt
> Of a different sort of crime.

Ophelia directs the show like Hamlet, using children as actors. She presents two oppositions: one, a dyad of mother-child nonlinguistic symbiotic relationship. As flute music plays, two young children run on stage and hug and kiss the mother. They communicate a sense of laughter, trust and physical comfort. Two, an interruption is caused by a loud, threatening sound of drum beat, and the father enters in modern day military uniform. Accompanied by a drummer and carrying a sword, he motions to the children to come to him. The children first hesitate, but the mother encourages them to obey the father. Amid the sound of drum beat they both walk over to him. He takes the boy's hand but asks the girl to return to the mother. The girl is puzzled but obeys him. As she turns back to go to the mother, the boy frees himself of the father's grip and runs to her. The drummer gives a louder beat, the father draws his sword, and swishing it noisily, threatens the boy. The boy is terror-stricken and his hand immediately goes to his genitals in an attempt to protect them against the advancing sword. He appeals to the mother. The mother shows helplessness and urges him to return to the father. As he

obeys her and turns to the father, the girl takes his hand in the desire to accompany him. The father takes a step forward, grabs hold of the son, and prohibiting the daughter to advance, motions her to return to the mother. To the accompaniment of the still beating drum, he turns on his heels, and takes with him the boy, who continues to look longingly back at the mother and the sister.

The mother consoles the sad daughter. Ophelia witnesses how little girls are coached into an acceptance of the taboos. It is in the moment of separation on a gender basis that Ophelia gains the consciousness of how so early in life prohibition and fear are put on the girl, and how the boy is led away to serve the patriarchy with promises of power and privileges. As the mother and the little girl move upstage, and stand there disconsolately, waiting for Hamlet to return, the three females of varying ages represent a complete state of oppression. They stand there in silence, waiting for Hamlet's return, but instead in a state of emergency Francisco marches past them, soon followed by Bernardo, soldiers and watchguards of a warring male world.

Lights fade and Act I of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* begins.

Thus the transition from Prologue I to Shakespeare's text is achieved by the above conflicting male-female representation on stage. The audience is invested with Ophelia's perspective on the events in Act I.

PROLOGUE II: From Male Revenge to Male Espionage

Ophelia tells how the elderly weave a web of intricate espionage against the young, whose desire to be free of paternal authority takes them into different directions. Looking back on her life she sees how Laertes' desire to escape his father's grip to fun-seeking Paris motivates Polonius to spy on him through a young servant (a short dumb show is enacted here with Polonius and Reynaldo appearing as backdrop to Ophelia's lines), and all in the name of fatherly love. Hamlet's engagement with philosophy and thought in Wittenberg makes him a dangerous suspect to the Danish court, with Claudius setting up a spy system on him manned by Hamlet's own fellow-scholars; and Fortinbras whose political involvement in Norway is *seen as* a threat to the general feudal structure is brought to heel by the two countries, though historically at war with each other, yet uniting against his revolutionary activities. But though Hamlet is the only one who manages to elude the long arm of patriarchy by an innate knowledge of their destructive powers, he gets sucked into their game by setting up a counter-system of espionage. He thinks he is winning but he loses in that he turns on those very people who the patriarchy is using to trap him. With this clear view of Hamlet's counter-espionage, Ophelia's begins her indictment of Hamlet. She finds him guilty of being willingly drawn into the male game despite a continuing belief in the bogus make-up of the ghost-father.

The first mistake Hamlet makes is to feign madness, a speech game with which he thinks he can elude the stalking elderly. But soon it develops into counter-espionage in which like them, he uses women and children as traps for the enemy. In this, unconsciously, Hamlet submits to gender alignment in that he gets the taste for male rivalry, and sacrifices his love for both Ophelia and Gertrude to win the game against them.

> Gone now is
> The vision of beauty and harmony.
> ....
> The mother is tarnished with the sin of
> Whoredom, the sweetheart the stuff of brothels
> Made.

Once entangled in the patriarchal revenge game, Hamlet gets sucked into the parallel espionage with his opponents -- Claudius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, but most with Polonius. He matches their hegemonous strategies with his lone ones --

inventing a state of mind for himself which apes madness. But if Polonius used the child-like Ophelia as a spy against him, Hamlet uses the child-actors against Claudius and the whole lot, including his father-ghost who he still suspects of being genuine. For the new man art, a system of words and aesthetics, becomes more reliable than men, old and new, aligned in gender structures. Ophelia with her retrospective knowledge of the spy games ends Prologue II with the lines:

> Mark, then, the players and the played,
> The powerful and the weak, the old and
> Young, and men against women and children--
> The stuff of games, war and art.

With the sound of Ophelia's verdict on Hamlet, the audience witnesses him in Shakespeare's Act II, setting up counter-espionage in every direction, and taking on the patriarchal colouring of cunning and craft.

PROLOGUE III: In the Dye of Patriarchy

Ophelia's knowledge of Hamlet's failure gets clearer as she speaks of his pursuit of the sign from his father's ghost. His obsession with finding the truth takes him deeper and deeper into the strongholds of patriarchy. But Ophelia allows Hamlet none of his tactics - madness or art as means of knowledge. She holds him guilty of exploiting the innocent and the unsuspecting through art as ruthlessly as Polonius does through love. She brings out parallels between Hamlet and Polonius, the many traits the two share, almost leaving us with a feeling that in time Hamlet will become like Polonius - rhetorical, pompous, long-winded, pretentious, and terribly blinkered. Like Polonius we see Hamlet destroy the love by which alone animal reality is humanised. Like Polonius we see him sexualise love, whether it is his love for Ophelia or Gertrude's love for Claudius. And in doing that he attempts to desexualise both women - sending Ophelia to the nunnery, and browbeating Gertrude into a life of widowhood.

In Prologue III, Ophelia distances herself from the man she loved. She sees him ruthlessly exploitative of the child actors he admired as artists, brutally oppressive to the woman he loved, and inhumanly bullying the mother he honoured. All this, Ophelia tells us, because he failed in the end to throw off the weight of all the father figures.

> You found your father
> His peace, reinstated him in the bedroom
> Of his reformed widow, relaxed in pajamas
> And nightcap. But his killer still remained
> At large. You failed to strike him dead, and
> Your father forgot to chide you for it.
> And so the revenge drama turned out to
> Be a reform act exercised on the weaker sex.

With this final verdict on Hamlet, Act III of Shakespeare's play cuts in.

EPILOGUE: From Verdict to Empathy

Through the dark, the sound of Ophelia's dirge at her father's death rises (Hamlet Act IV scene v), coming full circle to the beginning of Prologue I of the feminist framework. As lights come on, Ophelia walks onto the stage, picks up the dagger that killed Polonius, still fresh with the stains of his blood. In a dramatic action of freeing herself from familial obedience, Ophelia wipes the blood off the blade with her hand. Theatrically, this gesture of liberation juxtaposes with the very puzzling question of Ophelia's grief over her father's death in Shakespeare's play. After giving a short account of the deaths, exiles, funerals, killings and arriving armies in Acts IV and V, Ophelia eulogises Hamlet's attempt to defy the patriarchal father figures. By comparing him with Fortinbras' easy collapse at the hands of the elderly, she defends Hamlet in his tragic

failure to pioneer a new outlook on gender relationships.

THE OUTER FRAMEWORK - THE STAGE MANAGER

As the lights dim on Ophelia the stage manager enters and walks downstage in a direct movement towards the audience. Ophelia remains on stage, seated on the bench mid-stage right, she looks straight at the audience. The presence of the two women figures across time closes the gap between fiction and reality, past and present.

In a very formal tone on behalf of the whole company, the stage manager declares the performance over.

> We admit it
> Is daring to reduce the Bard's five-act
> Tragedy to three, but the reason should
> Be clear by now....
> The question we felt inclined to
> Explore - what was Hamlet's problem - turned
> Out to be related to our own lives.

As lights fade on the two women, *The III-Act Hamlet* puts Shakespeare's *Hamlet* at the very heart of our own times.

THE III-ACT HAMLET
by Rani Drew

PROLOGUE

Stage Manager:

Fifty times five thousand, perhaps, 'Hamlet',
Has been put on stage and proclaimed as
The tragedy - six deaths, to be precise
(not counting the two off stage) -
Of a son's obsession with his father's
Murder. But there is more to Hamlet
Than mere rage over a murderous crime.
This dithering Prince of Denmark has
Successfully confused the best scholars
Of each Age. Speculations have run wild;
Questions have remained unanswered. Hamlet
Was no Heironimo. Elizabethan savagery
Sat heavily on his enlightened mind. His
Promise to his father's ghost - you will
See presently how it's forced out of
Him - is given a long rope in the play
(five acts, at a count). In the scheme
Of familial revenge, what was it that
Failed to convince Hamlet? 'There's the puzzle',
As Hamlet would have said. Like the proverbial
Princes, many have courted theatrical deaths
To answer the same riddle. The range is wide.
Hamlet the moralist, Hamlet the puritan,
Hamlet the misogynist, Hamlet the existentialist,
And of course, the oedipal Hamlet though he
Escapes the original tragedy of Oedipus
Marrying his mother. Tonight, this management
Makes yet one more attempt at the riddle.
We bring you a feminist Hamlet. Don't get me
Wrong. There is no drama of sex change here.
The crisis of gender identity is the name of
The show this evening. Hamlet is ordered
To line up on the father's side. In fewer
Acts, extended and enlarged by our own
Text, we claim it was this imperative
That made a tragedy of his life. Lights down, please.

Lights go down. Flute music followed by Ophelia's song, which gradually fades away. Lights come up. Chorus enters. She is dressed as Ophelia as she had looked at the time of her death.

Chorus:
Ophelia, they named her, who barely managed
To claim a patch of ground inside the sacred
Precincts. Yet for the sin of self-slaughter
She is doomed to wander the earth and atone
The loss of her Christian will. The silence
Of after-death is peaceful, though. No songs

Of unrequited love tremble on her lips; or
Madness born of muted speech drive her to
An orgy of death. It was the deprivation
Of a protective father, and the absence
Of her betrothed to take custody of
Her orphaned self that threw her off
Balance. Like a blocked drain, long repression
Overspilled the bounds of modesty. Her coarse
Speech embarrassed the fineries of the Danish
Court. It had to come out somehow. Madness
Is the gateway to freedom. Hamlet knew that,
And she found it out, but a little too late
It was. I'm no vengeful spirit. Besides,
It's thrones and crowns that make revenge
Tragedies. Only ghosts of Kings, deposed
And murdered, haunt the sons to revolt and
Claim lost kingdoms. History is full of
Righteous Fortinbras. Beheaded queens and
Heir-princesses have failed to make heroes
Of their sons. Why have I, then, returned
This night like the ghost of the Danish King?
Who could I besiege to avenge my death? Who
Bears the guilt of my self-slaughter? At
Whom should I point my dead finger? The
Father, who would not let my passion
Alone? He spied o' it, regulated it
With caution, prohibition and control.

Pol. (Voice over) This is for all: 1.3.131
I would not, in plain terms, from this time forth
Have you so slander any moment leisure
As to give words or talk with the Lord Hamlet.
Look to't, I charge you. Come your ways. 135

And Laertes, brother and playmate,
Blindfolded and bound by courtly heritage,
Was put upon to strike fear in me. Caution
And prescripts like vultures sat pecking
At my desiring heart.

Laer.(voice over). Fear it, Ophelia, fear it, my dear 35
Sister, and keep you in the rear of your
Affection, out of the shot and danger of desire.
Be wary then; best safety lies in fear. 44

Such was the brotherly love that raised in
My mind visions of cold virtue,
Circumscribed and imprisoned, while
Himself remaining free and unblemished
By his own excesses. Yet, in poor
Laertes, my playmate, sorrow over my
Waterlogged body struck the human springs
So dry that no tears would flow. . .
And Hamlet - his neurosis o'er his mother's
Independence found me to hand - an easy
Reflection of female inconstancy.

Ham.(Voice over) Frailty thy name is woman!- I.II.146
Within a month 153
Ere yet the salt of most unrighteous tears
Had left the flushing in her galled eyes,
She married. O most wicked speed, to post
With such dexterity to incestuous sheets!

Misogyny, thy name is man.

Ham: (voice over) Get thee to a nunnery.
Why wouldst thou be a breeder of sinners? III.I.122
...Get thee to a nunnery. Go, farewell. 141
Or if thou wilt needs marry, marry a fool;
For wise men know well enough what monsters
You make of them. To a nunnery, go; and
Quickly too. Farewell.

Such violence did my lord strike at me.

And the Queen, whose despair at my drowning
Spoke more of the terror hanging over
Her own womanly condition than
Compassion for my unrequited heart.

The Queen enters.

Queen: There with fantastic garlands did she come IV.VII.170
Of Crowflowers, nettles, daisies, and long purples,
That liberal shepherds give a grosser name,
But our cold maids do dead men's fingers call them.
There on the pendent boughs her coronet weeds
Clambering to hang, an envious sliver broke,
When down her weedy trophies and herself
Fell in the weeping brook. Her clothes spread wide
And, mermaid-like, awhile they bore her up;
Which time she chaunted snatches of old tunes,
As one incapable of her own distress,
Or like a creature native and indued
Unto that element; but long it could not be
Till that her garments, heavy with their drink,
Pull'd the poor wretch from her melodious lay
To muddy death. Drown'd, drown'd. (remains on stage)

Chorus:
Drown,'d, drown'd. It's no worse than when
I lived. Perhaps even better. As women,
The Queen and I were truly superfluous to the
Imperial tragedy. Moved like pawns on men's
Chequerboards - stake as high as crowns
And thrones we were, for the throw of the dice,
Polonius's two to Hamlet's two.
Codes and signs of rival systems regulated
Political rebellions and filial submissions.
For smoother operation, the terror
Must be staged early. For young saplings,
A brute show of naked power spells out the

Message clear and loud. Follow or have your
Tender genitals sliced off. Like sharp-edged
Shining sabres of treasury-guarding
Sentries, threats are flashed at the rebels.
The figure of the father appears in full
Armour. It's enough to convey the threat.
Take your place beside me, be in control of
The gender power or choose to be
Less than a man. Later, no sword needs
To flash for the grown boy. Reluctance or
Doubt to fall in step with the legion is
Met with fear-striking choppers and
castrated manhood.
Why and wherefore such bullying started?

Within human life there exists a state
Of equality, a gender harmony. Hamlet,
In the distant past beyond memories,
You and I were taken prisoners, pulled
Apart and enclosed in separate
Dungeons. Later, when nature's rules
Brought our grown selves together, we
Hardly knew how firmly our worlds were
Differentiated, and set apart by
The orders of our fathers, forefathers
And a whole line of them before. It wasn't
Love that drew you to me in that first flush
Of desire. Love was lost to us a long
Time ago. So clever it's now where it
All began. Like you, Hamlet, I too have
Directed a dumb show to trace the guilt
Of a different sort of crime.

Flute music. Two children, a young boy and girl enter and run to the queen, clinging to her and kissing her. They mouth a song and rollick round her, who looks at them adoringly. Soft music is heard as they sit down as if amongst flowers, looking at each other. Suddenly, they are startled by thunderous music and the entry of the father in soldier's armour. He looks quite fierce and walks up to the mother and children, who are now huddled together in terror of his approaching figure. He takes hold of the boy, who clings to his mother's skirts, and orders him to come with him. When the boy refuses, he takes out his sword and flashes it at him. The boy covers his front in terror, shrieks and turns to the mother. The mother holds him tenderly but, looking into his eyes, implores him to follow the father. The girl takes his hand to go with him. But the father makes a prohibition sign at her. The girl looks to the mother, who also shakes her head at her. The girl and the boy are confused. The father comes closer with the sword glinting in his hand and towers over the boy threateningly. The boy appeals to the mother again, who looks helplessly at him. The boy acquiesces and lets go of the girl's hand. He follows the father, who is already leading him away, still swishing his sword noisily. Thunderous music continues as lights go down.

Chorus:
Oh, that first awakening to the mother' s love
Without swords and armour, without battles of
Victory and defeat. Poor Hamlet! He was
Given no choice. Nor was I. I was asked
To stay behind, he was ordered to follow. It

Was different, later. In the second awakening
Of the sexual desire, of sweet love for
Another, alien to childhood memories, the
Pain of earlier separation was forgotten.
Barely was there a recognition of ourselves
As beings once equal and free. Our love had
No freedom. It was the watch word of court
Intrigues and parental matchmaking by fathers,
Brothers and uncles. Why has Ophelia,
Like the ghost of the Danish King, returned to
Haunt the play tonight? Because Hamlet and
I share the same tragedy. I am no twin of
Hamlet. But far deeper are the ties
Of intelligence, of emotion, and of
The longing for an integrated wholeness.
If our desires were the same, so were our
Frustrations with the commanding social
Strictures. In the end, we both sought
Speech through madness, and peace through
Death. Once I saw the writing on the wall,
There was nothing to stop me from using
My human will. My gains and losses were
Nil. But Hamlet, poor Hamlet, he was sucked
Into the male game of victories ancl defeats.
He was bound by stricter laws, unbreakable
Chains of social contracts between fathers
And sons. He wasn't keeping his side of
The deal. On that stormy night when the King's
Ghost rose on the midnight horizon, fitted
In full armour, signalling, signalling
Something, but Hamlet wasn't picking up the message.

The mother and the girl are still waiting down stage for the boy to return. When Ophelia finishes and Francisco marches in, they leave. Act I scene i of *Hamlet* begins. Ophelia watches Francisco as he rushes past her, followed soon after by Bernardo. She leaves.

PROLOGUE II

CHORUS enters on lines: Hamlet. this do swear.
(Act I scene v. 179)
All freeze as they touch swords in the act of swearing.

Chorus:
Living or dead, fathers hold sons to
Filial vows sworn on swords like real
Men. In the dark of the night, a young
Mind is set afire with vengeance. (Rest
of scene v finishes. They leave.) A
Daring woman, a flaunting woman must be
Avenged. Traditions must be defended.
'Be kind to your mother, Hamlet,' is mere
Gloss on the vicious revenge invoked. The
Living alone can wage wars, the spirit knows.
Theft of women is not fair game among
Men. Troy was burnt to ashes by the Achaeans.

Helen, their queen defied a long tradition.
She left the mighty Menaleaus for Paris,
The prince of a pithy nation, Zeus's
Favoured city. Mere trophies of male
Warfare neither Helen nor Gertrude were
Fit enemies worth combating. For women,
Psychological terror is enough
To subjugate, to humiliate their defiant
Spirit. The ghost of the father descends
Into the son to bring back the sinning
Mother to the fold. Would Hamlet have
Done it without the after-life melodrama?
Would anything else had deployed him from
His philosophical pursuits to bring
Europe's Dark Ages to an end? He was
Not the only one though. Observe how
Youth is nipped in the bud by the
'wise reach' of the elderly.

Enter Polonius with Reynaldo downstage, instructing him. They leave.

Intrigues and conspiracies
Shadow the young like spies through the dark.
Every step towards freedom is mined with lies,
Slandlers, deceit and cunning. The court is
Full of the ailing and diseased, of jealous
Fathers and suspicious uncles, of spying
Statesmen and contriving Kings. The royal
Court requires tittering sycophants and
Solemn courtiers. But the young have bounded
Away. Some are in Paris, swaggering,
Sporting, and drunk on unvintaged
Freedom; others remain more abstracted
In Wittenberg with sombre matters of
The mind. The spy net is thrown far and
Wide to scoop up the escaping. Youth is
Set upon youth - a caution the powerful
Take against union. Peers, pals and lovers
Are coached and trained in the art of
Surveillance. Polonius, the master politician,
Trains Reynaldo, a young lad, in the art
Of espionage - false identity, forgeries
And fake fellowship. Claudius, a superior
Statesman, more dignified and much
Sophisticated but no less prying and
Contriving, calls upon Rosencrantz
And Guildenstern to be the court
Agents and track Hamlet's stalking
Madness. No less the young Fortinbras,
Whose out-of-court rebellion is soon
Brought to heel by an 'impotent and bedrid'
Uncle-king. Such is the power of the
Elderly. Enemies or friends, battles or
Alliances, the strategy of divide and
Rule remains invariable. On which side
Are you? What's your allegiance? Which

Gender? Mother or father? Love or war?
These are not choices but threats. The
Real message is 'submit to fathers'
Rulings, or be made less manly'. The blades
Of swords glint and flash making soft flesh
Tingle with fear. Such is the dread of the
Patriarchs, the Jepthahs, the master
Hunters, the ambitious rulers and
Even the poets.

Hunters require scapegoats, chess players
Pawns and poet-dramatists actors. In this game
Of competition and combat, women and children
Become the masquerade, the prize or shame
For winners or losers. Gertrude is the
Bone of contention between the rivalling
Brothers; Ophelia, the dumb scapegoat
Strung to the tree, served as food to flush
Out the hunted beast; and the child-actors
The stage weapons of seasoned rivals to
Scale theatrical heights in the illusory
World of art. Was Hamlet's compassion for the
Exploited child actors a memory of the times
When no hunters trod woods and forests? and
All was living and bounding? Gone now is
The vision of beauty and harmony.
Bloodthirsty hounds are set to hunt out the
Deep-burrowed secrets of the resisting,
Tearing them to shreds. Listen to
Hamlet's cry of kinship with the child
Actor, voice not yet cracked, imagination
So untouched that art comes to mirror life.
The dirge of the weeping Hecuba empowers
The young actor with a vision of love.
But Hamlet knows he's lost it. 'Who
Does me this, ha?' He asks in vain. Now
The mother is tarnished with the sin of
Whoredom, the sweetheart the stuff of brothels
Made. Is art less militant than war? It
Served the same purpose for Hamlet.
'The play's the thing', speech that breaks
The secret silence of guilty minds.

Mark, then, the players and the played,
The powerful and the weak, the old and
Young, and men against women and children
The stuff of games, wars and art.

Enter Polonius with Reynaldo. Act II scene i of *Hamlet* begins.

PROLOGUE III

Enter Ophelia as Hamlet is leaving (end of Act II scene ii)

Chorus:
The game of spying picks up speed. Hamlet's

Own counter-espionage is mild compared
With Polinius's human shields and Claudius's
Political conspiracy. A triangle of wits is
At work. For the renaissance man, art and
Not sword becomes the weapon - 'the play's
The thing'. It acts as it doubts. Doubt is
The first step to enlightenment. To know is
To doubt, doubt even the doubting mind. But
Such thinking spelled danger in feudal Denmark.
It needed a cover, a concealment,
A mediation - which Hamlet first found in
Feigned madness. But the King knew that
'Unwatched madness in great men' was a risk
Ill-afforded by politicians. Yet his own
Hard-driven espionage through Rosencrantz
And Guildenstern, gets undermined by
Polonius's medieval trust in cause
And effect motion. Did Polonius
Really believe in the power of love?
Or was it a belief in his own control?
He regulated the love between the
Young couple. Prohibitions and prescripts
Were tutors to Ophelia's desire for Hamlet.
She is told now to spurn his advances, now
To encourage his love tokens; now to
Be bold, now to be submissive. In the end,
Polonius announced that the fault lay in
His ill-timed strategy itself, which led to
Hamlet's madness. It was no honest
Admission from a statesman, a mere change
Of strategy. His faith in the sexual
Game was unshakable. So began another
Re-play of it, and I, the baby, was made
The prime spy. Like the child-actors
In theatre rivalries between poets and
'Common actors' I became the stage on
Which Hamlet and my father played out
Their stalking game. Two throws of Polonius
To two by Hamlet. Hamlet's cry against
The misuse of innocence went no further
Than reforming it to his own purposes
Of espionage. My father too coached me
In the art of speech. Hamlet's own scheme
More artistic and moral, was no less
Exploitative. But it was he who was the
Hunted animal, much starved and on the
Run, and I the bleating goat tied in the
Clearing to flush him out for the concealed
Hunters awaiting in the bush. Sacrificial
Beast that I was in the game of the male
Hunt, it was the only time I had insight
Into Hamlet's mind. He knew what was going
On, and it terrified him. He came to see
How Love itself was used as a device to
Trap the young. Male power, male corruption,
Male distortion he saw reflected in the

Prescribed life of women. 'Get thee to a
Nunnery', the five-times repeated cry was
Not so much misogyny as a warning to women
To escape the tyranny of men. Tyrannical
Men produce weak women, who find safety
In servitude. That's how he saw his mother
Debased by the power of men. He could see
Me going the same way. O Hamlet, why did
You lift the veil of love and see the crude
Reality? You denied me even the illusion
Of love. So be it. Something changed for
Both of us in that confrontation. All
Turned vulgar and cheap afterwards. I became
The object of sexualised violence, a mere
Masquerade for your excitable maleness. But
My failure at turning your mind inside out
Would not discourage Polonius from one
More attempt to cure your madness. He threw the
Dice again to your second throw, and claimed
Your madness was caused by a lack of
Emotional contact with your mother, a
Psychic separation from the source of
Life. Was he much wrong in that? Victimised
Find victims. You found yours in your
Mother. Watch Hamlet how he overpowers
Her, browbeats her, makes her repentent of
Her self-willed choice, attracts promises of
Sexless life, a dreary future. There was
One thing your enlightened mind failed to
Examine: what was a widow's social worth?
The ghost of your father remained over
You until you overcame your baffled mother
By your savage rage. You found your father
His peace, reinstated him in the bedroom
Of his reformed widow, relaxed in pajamas
And nightcap. But his killer still remained
At large. You failed to strike him dead, and
Your father forgot to chide you for it.
And so the revenge drama turned out to
Be a reform act exercised on the weaker sex.

Enter King, Queen and others. Act III scene i of *Hamlet* begins. Chorus joins the group as Ophelia.

EPILOGUE

Chorus:
The rest was not all silence. The unwitting
Murder of Polonius set Denmark
Ablaze with uncontrolled passions. There was
Ophelia's madness. Decked with flowers and
Songs, she lay down on the waters as if
On her bridal bed. Laertes, maddened by
The twin-loss, searched for the killer
And found himself leading a rising against
The King. Yet impassioned youth rarely

Fathoms the subterranean reach of statecraft.
Machiavellian Claudius knew how to make
Enemy fight enemy. But Hamlet was past
The revenge cause. He wasn't interested
In Claudius's power game. He arrived to
Make his peace with the king, and slip away to
Quieter speculations at Wittenburg. Not
Even the Queen, reformed and wilting,
Drew him out of his distanced self. There
Was a short moment when my dead body forced
A burst of lamentation from him. He knew
He had traded love for obedience. Claudius
Was mistaken. The crown was never the issue
With Hamlet. It would have sat too heavily
On his head. Cornered and unadvised, Claudius
Resorted to plotting duels. Sabres poisoned
And arsenic steeped in victory toasts
Completed the scene at the Danish Court.
Four died in the end, piled on one another
Like in a collective grave. Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern suffered the worst. Their
Execution abroad must have baffled them to
The end. It was all so senseless. But for
Fortinbras it had meaning. It was his
Acquiescence to the elderly that brought
Him full reward. For the obedience to
His ailing uncle, he gave up the cause
Of the agrarian revolt; for the obedience to
Claudius, he followed correct political
Procedures; for the obedience to the State
Of Norway, he waged Polack war over a
Sterile piece of land. He obeyed all the
Powerful figures, and inherited a dual
Kingdom, much expanded and enlarged. He
And Hamlet were different men. Fortinbras,
Whose fear of the flashing sword at his
Genitals made him follow the long line of
The threatening fathers; Hamlet, whose
Doubt of the multiple image told him
It was a bogus solidarity, an empty threat.
But he was alone in that. His failure lay
In that he died for it, not lived to fight it.

She remains on stage. Enter the Stage Manager:

The evening now comes to an end, and
The performance over. We give our thanks for
Your patronage, and trust you'll recommend
Our efforts to your friends. We admit it
Is daring to reduce the Bard's five-act
Tragedy to three, but the reason should
Be clear by now. We have been faithful
To the tragic mode, while avoiding
Jacobean melodrama. Our perspective
Is modern. The question we felt inclined to
Explore - what was Hamlet's problem? - turned

Out to be related to our own lives.
Marching armies, pirates at sea, pools of
Blood and piles of bodies, all fell outside
The framework of our theme. We hope the
Play has yielded some thoughts to you. Born
Of living material, art must make its way
Back to reality. In this we have been
Adamant. And now on behalf of the actors,
The writer and the theatre company, we
Wish you a thoughtful journey home.

Freeze, lights go down.

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